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Summary 
 
 
A Dilemma for Landscape Architecture: Suburbs and Utopias. 
 
 
For computer software programmer Ward Cunningham, inventor of the Wiki, problems 
are enlightening while difficulties are unhelpful distractions. A dangerous dilemma can 
arise from confusing this distinction. For Karl Mannheim, who distinguished a utopia 
from an ideology, Fredric Jameson who recognised that utopias allow for consideration 
of things otherwise inconceivable, and Thomas More who coined a term charged with 
the paradox of a good place that is no place, utopian endeavour constitutes work on 
exactly such useful problems. So does design. 
 
Suburbs, utopias and landscape architecture share histories of similar important and 
revealing problems. These evolving problems, however, now face a new dilemma. This 
is not another framing of difficulties marking a further evolution of the useful problems 
that have always existed, but the attempted abolition of problems altogether. This is 
being pursued in two ways: through a strictly focused enumeration of de-politicised 
practical difficulties urged by bi-partisan calls for climate change adaptation and global 
economic resilience, and by the uncritical positioning of change itself as logically 
inescapable, essentially apolitical, and therefore utterly unproblematic to begin with.  
 
Arguments regarding what might be necessary for an understanding of suburbs, 
utopias and landscape architecture today appear irrelevant. Just as these three 
problematic terms have been discarded in favour of fresh vocabularies, the problems 
they promise have been made redundant too. They have been transcended. Such 
transcendence leaves suburban dwellings, utopian dreams of dwelling and the 
landscape architectural design of places to dwell, bereft of possibility for either escape 
from or error in conception of correct construction of our futures. The aporia inherent to 
discussions of suburban development, utopian ambition and the design of nature, have 
become apodictic pronouncements on suburban sprawl, dystopia and sustainable 
design, or alternatively, complex apologia for having no position at all.  
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The four chapters of Part I introduce the major areas of research, their contemporary 
suburban context and an argument for understanding design as a utopian endeavour. 
They focus on the particular dilemma of current attitudes to suburbs, utopias and 
landscape architectural design presented by the many understandings which operate 
as controlling myths, resisted and exposed by those which are utopian subversions. It 
concludes noting the dangers of slippage from committed and exploratory utopian 
openness to either newly emphatic closure, or non-committal open-endedness. A 
variety of disciplinary and other literatures competing for a place of significance in 
understanding suburbs and design are examined in the chapters of Part II. Part III 
provides examples of these contests through an evaluation of recent work in two well-
known areas of suburban imaging and imagining: the visions of real estate 
advertisement and the frameworks of urban design legislation.  
 
The work concludes with an appeal to rediscover a utopian impulse, to uncover lost 
potentials and prior states of utopian optimism, not in order to find the right, lost way or 
to fix an agreed direction, but to enjoy and realise their multiplication. Faced with 
intractable problems, the imperative of design to make strange in order to discover new 
purpose is becoming design estranged from purposeful making. The encouragement of 
more proposals for projects, not the abolition of the necessity for them, is required to 
resist the ever-recuperating standardisation, normalisation, and trivialisation of 
happiness and the good life.  
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Introduction 
 
Something is missing.  
 
Bertholt Brecht1 
 
When I started to explore the historic utopias, I was seeking to discover what was missing, 
and to define what was still possible. 
  
Lewis Mumford2 
 
Substitute whatever you like here - projective 'complicity', digital triumphalism, neoliberal 
neotraditionalism, etc - in the end, these all amount to a kind of postmodern group therapy 
designed to soothe but not cure the incurable loss at the heart of the crisis of 
representation. 
 
Reinhold Martin3 
 
Histories of suburbia and the definitions and development of suburbs by architects, 
landscape architects, engineers, surveyors, planners and many others disclose a richly 
contested legacy. Histories of designed landscapes document the poetics and politics 
of diversely motivated waves of land development. The development of land—the 
construction of landscapes—has shaped the profession of landscape architecture as 
well as popular appreciation of environments. Landscapes are revealed as not just 
variably constituted, but continuously re-constituted, cultural, ecological and economic 
assets. A design is the literally constructed argument for a variation in value. 
Something is always missed and there have always been counter-arguments in pursuit 
of that loss. Now, however, faced with global environmental, economic and other 
crises, designers are urged to accept a united, if ill-defined, agreement on landscape 
value—increasingly expressed in terms of ecosystem services—ceding argument to 
others entrusted with its determination. The loss of argument itself—of the mandate of 
design to be ‘for’ something, to represent and present a point of view—cannot be cured 
by further propositions, as these comprise arguments that are already illegitimate. 
Neither can it be cured by an apparent resistance that claims to be inclusively ‘for’ 
everything, to be ‘for’ representation rather than the representation of something. 
Designers construct arguments not their outcomes. Constructions bereft of argument 
are bereft of design.   
 
                                                 
1 In Bloch, E. 1979, p.45. 
2 Mumford, L. 2003 [1922], p.2. 
3 Martin, R. 2006, p.18. 
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Human societies have always altered their immediate environments by sudden or 
sustained, subtly embedded or extravagantly extrovert projects. Nonetheless, a self-
conscious history of intentional environmental manipulation by designers is most 
commonly understood to have emerged in the eighteenth century with the English 
landscaped estate, concurrent with an Enlightenment reappraisal and appreciation of 
nature (Hunt 1976; 1994; Jellicoe & Jellicoe 1995; Newton 1971). Such landscape 
architecture continued to develop expertise and significance throughout its negotiation 
of the complex changes in land tenure and land management practices of the 
agricultural revolution and further displacements of the industrial revolution. It became 
a subject of prominent public debate with the rise of the industry town and the city slum 
and acquired professional distinction and stature with the emergence of an affluent 
middle class, planned peripheral suburbs and revitalised city centres. In the twenty-first 
century the historic relationship of designers to the creation of successive settlement 
patterns and land development continues to provide material for popular, polemical 
understandings of landscape design and value. On the one hand, design is regularly 
hailed as the key factor in building better cities, exemplified by great cities of the past 
(Krier 1998). On the other, in its guise as the outcome of ego-maniacal experiment, 
design is demonised as the cause of catastrophic urban failures, also demonstrated 
with reference to the collapse of past civilisations (Sandercock 1998). Such 
assessments of past efforts fundamentally form our conflicting appreciations of 
contemporary suburban landscapes and our inconsistent expectations for their future.  
 
With the twentieth-century rise of planned residential suburbs, land development has 
gradually established a narrower definition and a more specific agenda. Land 
development is now commonly understood to involve the provision of adequate and 
equitable social and service infrastructure for the owners and occupiers of private 
property. It simultaneously and democratically facilitates yet lawfully limits creative self-
expression for an institutionalised greater good, increasingly identified with a triple 
bottom line of measurable sustainability (DSE 2002). Landscape design too has 
increasingly emphasised its professional activity as that which most effectively supports 
such land development. In Australia this is evidenced by the recent promulgation and 
swift implementation of policy by the Australian Institute of Landscape Architects 
(AILA), including the release of a Landscape Charter in 2007, the launch of supporting 
Landscape Principles in 2009 and the integration of both into awards criteria and 
education accreditation requirements. Any design exploration, expression or admission 
of the vigorously contested interpretations of adequate and equitable land development 
is generally opaque where it exists at all. Similarly, the likelihood that AILA-awarded 
projects may be exemplary not because they meet certain criteria but because they 
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make particularly inspiring interpretations of criteria which are infinitely interpretable 
has not been considered. 
 
Beginning with propositions that adopted and adapted earlier utopian models of 
essentially religious and political literature, proposals for the design of ideal 
communities have embraced a wide variety of economic and environmental models.4 
These have ranged from self-sufficient garden cities and satellite New Towns, through 
exclusive, gated communities and dormitory worker enclaves, to networked urban 
villages and multiple-use zoned hubs, amongst many other forms and very many other 
names (GUST 2002, p.8; Hayden 2004). The idea and identification of the ‘suburb’ 
shares these various experiments. Diffused and concentrated, mixed and solitary, 
layered, staggered, shattered and sprawling patterns of land use program and 
landscape form have been tried. Yet while there is seeming consensus on a 
predominant model of the suburban landscape—reflecting a normalisation and 
naturalisation of the dream of home ownership made manifest with hard, honest 
work—there is enormous disagreement as to whether this democratic space of fairly 
distributed resources and opportunities actually exists, ever has or ever can (Cohen 
2003; George et al. 2004; Levine 2005; Negrin 1994). Emerging from a period of 
disengagement from the suburban realm, architecture and landscape architecture are 
theorising new and renewed roles for design, along with new and renewed ideas for 
constructed environments—landscapes—different to the urban, rural or wilderness 
places more familiar to their published practice. The simple question initially posed is: 
How do you design the suburbs? And the simple background query asks: How have 
the suburbs been designed? However, the more complex research question which 
emerges is: How can the shifting disciplinary model of landscape architecture better 
advocate design of the shifting suburbs and engage with the shifting forces that realise 
them?  
 
One approach may be to celebrate shiftiness. Zaha Hadid’s tricks (Bentley 1999, p.37), 
Stan Allen’s ‘stealth’ (1998) and Rem Koolhaus’s provocations (Koolhaas & Mau 1995), 
amongst others, provide examples of an astute and engaged, winning yet devious 
playfulness with the economics and politics of building. As innovators, the traditional 
predicament of designers is to overcome resistance to change. With change 
increasingly demanded by market forces, new technology, capricious clients, fickle 
                                                 
4 Robert Freestone has discussed early Australian efforts to structure settlement on a variety of imported 
and compromised utopian models. (See particularly: Freestone, R. 1989). Andrew Milner offers a more 
recent and even broader consideration of utopianism regarding Australia, including historic conceptions 
and projections – textual, cartographic and pictorial – of the continent as a utopian place of otherness to 
European culture (Milner, A. 2006). 
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popular opinion, an erratic climate and much else outside their control, designers are 
now urged to better engage with and understand changes forced upon them (AILA 
2010; Stickells 2005). However, beyond the responsibility to innovate and the necessity 
to manipulate—which in practice are indistinguishable—there is another, newer 
challenge. Along with finding ways to deal with shifts themselves, designers have 
traditionally resisted the conservatism of those who want to abolish troublesome 
shifting altogether with appeals to a core or fundamental reality or value to be 
rediscovered in foundation myths of obscure origin. They have also had to interrogate 
the motives of those who want to secure the latest particular view, value and form, 
claiming to have done so with elaborate evidence of irrefutable logic which reveals new 
‘facts’ of the ‘real’ situation. Finally, in addition, designers must now also resist those 
who do not want anything but shifting, embracing, however indecorously, the 
uncontrollable phenomena to which designers are required to reactively adapt in ways 
which endeavour and claim to be non-controlling themselves. It is this final approach to 
change as something uncontrollable and the idea of appropriate responses as 
somehow non-controlling, which constitutes a peculiar threat to design practice, and a 
particular threat to landscape architecture in its dealings with ‘nature’. How it is 
manifested in the design of suburbs is the interest of the following chapters.  
 
There are many and varied studies focused on the suburbs, on landscape architecture 
or urban design more generally, but little that connects their separate yet parallel shifts. 
The dubious circularity of claims to value and meaning (a good city/place is the result 
of good design and good design is evident in a good city/place) are tautological 
references, not proofs. This research aims to make explicit the responsible task of 
design, in particular landscape architecture in its dealings with ‘natural’ environments, 
to query all received knowledge directing its endeavours. In doing so it must also self-
consciously admit and examine the value-systems and truth-claims attending such 
inquiry.  
 
Examination is inescapably evaluation. So a final, further question emerges with these 
queries: to what purpose? To what end should landscape architecture better advocate 
design of the shifting suburbs and engage with the shifting forces that realise them? 
Clearly it is to improve them, to be encouraged by possibilities for improvement, yet 
remain self-conscious of the history of similar failed claims. It is to be utopian. Design is 
driven by an ever-shifting goal of the good. 
 
The Good, the Dilemma and why something is always missing  
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Yi-Fu Tuan (1986), amongst a body of work focused on landscape, has outlined four 
ways that the good life has been envisaged historically in the Western world that can 
be readily illustrated by visions of the suburbs. The first is ‘environmentalism’ which 
requires a special type of physical setting and relationship with nature, whether that is 
'natural' nature, the idealised nature of gardens or—a view dominant in the twentieth 
century—the artificial environments of architecture and engineering. The BBC back-to-
nature television series The Good Life was a suburban experiment in various aspects 
of this type. ‘Nature’ in a variety of guises, from traditionally cultivated productive and 
ornamental gardens in diverse styles, through preserved wilderness and restored 
ecosystems, to high-tech sustainable constructed ecological infrastructure (wetlands), 
provides archetypal as well as photogenic imagery for the promotion of suburban 
estates. 
 
The second way to envisage the good life is 'to focus on the activity rather than the 
physical environment' as the means to achieve deep satisfaction. It is what people do 
and what they contribute to their societies rather than what their environments are or 
look like that is valued. A work ethic pervades this good life. The suburbs, through their 
appeal to community and neighbourliness, have traditionally valued this path to the 
good life. It is a particular feature of New Urbanist developments, which, despite an 
avowed critique of ‘suburbia’ have largely been appreciated by consumers as a 
particular type of better designed and exclusive, if not gated, suburb where these lost 
community values have been reinstated and protected. Suburbs perhaps would not 
have existed without a work ethic which raised money for mortgages, committed 
homeowners to lawn-mowing, home improvement and a degree of busy self-
expression, and, finally, which generally promoted the detached home as the reward of 
battlers. 
 
The third way is 'through the lens of philosophy' which asks what is necessary for the 
growth and maintenance of happiness for the individual and confirms the relationship 
between a good life and a virtuous life. This way is not interested in activities or their 
physical settings. It is less concerned with identifying what is good than exploring what 
goodness is. The suburban home as castle and retreat offers this pursuit of the good 
life. Regardless of the tastes or class or connections of its owners, the suburban home 
is valued as the locale for private reflection and active self-improvement.  
 
The fourth way is that of ‘utopian thinkers’. 'Their point of departure is a strong 
discontent with society as it exists in their time … They do not neglect the physical 
environment [which] must be hygienic if not also beautiful, and … must encourage 
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human communication … [It is] not a natural Eden' (Tuan 1986, p.5). This last, less 
well-defined, path to the good life via the rejection of a present unsatisfactory condition 
and a groping toward an improved and newly imagined one, comes closest to 
explaining the restlessness of the suburban homeowner today in seeking upgrades to 
something ever bigger and better. But the musing of utopian thinkers exploring 
discontent is easily hijacked by the pronouncements of myth-makers exploiting it. The 
struggle captures that defining quality of suburban expansion which has made the 
suburbs ‘suburbia’, turning dissatisfaction into the horizontal flight of ‘sprawl’. The 
suburbs expand not just because of demographic pressure or increasing affluence per 
se, but because these new landscapes present themselves as highly desirable places 
to spend—or rather invest—good money in a good life. Each new housing estate 
endeavours to market a ‘new’ vision for a hygienic and beautiful environment populated 
by a friendly community where each home-seeker is importantly offered creative 
control over their own space, along with financial security and independence. 
  
There are many arguments made for the good life under each of these four categories 
and arguments for the good of suburbs have employed each of them too. Tuan goes 
on to note that a study of all these possibilities for appreciation of 'the good' could 
occupy a hardworking scholar for a lifetime and yet it would remain unclear to what 
purpose (1986, p.6). A similar question confronts those who have investigated and 
catalogued the history of suburbs and the organisation of cities, as it has those who 
have tabled taxonomies of utopias. Following an extensive summary of literature on the 
history of urban planning, Stephen Ward wonders about its future: ‘But if there can be 
no conscious grand narratives, what prevents the story being a mere accumulation of 
facts?’ (MacLeod & Ward 2002, p.3). In researching Melbourne’s suburbs historians 
Barbara and Graeme Davison ‘wonder whether there is anything left to do other than to 
read all the scholarly monographs and articles and distil them into vivid narrative prose’ 
(in Davison et al. 1995, p.18). They are referring to the work of ‘geographers, planners, 
sociologists, political scientists and economists’ and over a decade later suburban 
analyses remain dominated by the investigations and publications of these fields. 
Designers and design theorists have had relatively little to say in this popular arena 
about the physical form of the suburbs. Like Davison and Davison there may seem to 
be little to do except illustrate the text and data of others’ research with the plans and 
sketches of their professional training, in particular the attractively deployed vegetation 
of landscape architecture. However, just as the Davisons note that historians bring a 
particular view of others’ ‘facts’ to debates on suburban values and precedent, 
designers offer particular critical interpretations, and remind us that there are no merely 
accumulated facts, just as the eye is never innocent and space is never empty. More 
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than that, their built interpretations actually constitute the values and precedents that 
others will examine for ‘only design makes purpose manifest and open to debate’ (van 
Schaik 2000b, p.6). Examination of built form can lead to propositions for different 
form-making procedures, or models or templates for new form. More importantly, 
design relates these to questions of value and to the arguments of new propositions for 
the pursuit of the good life and happiness. 
 
A search for happiness is central to radical as well as conservative agendas. The 
Situationist Internationale noted that: ‘Of all the affairs we participate in, with or without 
interest, the groping search for a new way of life is the only thing that remains really 
exciting’ (Debord 1955). Landscapes are an inseparable part of this search. ‘The 
landscape retains its grip on us as a subject of consuming interest’ (Archer 2004, p.6). 
Michael Archer shows how the life lived in it is necessarily politicised: ‘The modality of 
our belonging to the land, whether that affiliation be time-honoured, God-given or the 
result of usurpation, colonisation or occupation, is, too, forever in play. A landscape is 
an image of power relations …’ (p.6). Claims to hold keys to the good life are 
fundamental to political contest. ‘In a socialist country, the general nature and specifics 
of the good life are at the core of an official doctrine that is relentlessly propagated 
through government channels. In a capitalist country, it is broadcast ceaselessly 
through all the powerful and cunning devices of the commercialised media.’ (Tuan 
1986, p.6)  
 
‘Utopia’ is a term which Jameson notes is:  
 
… a symbolic token over which essentially political struggles still help us differentiate 
left and right … a code word on the left for socialism or communism; while on the right it 
has become synonymous with ‘totalitarianism’ or, in effect, with Stalinism … a left 
critique of social-democratic reformism, within the system; and on the other hand a free-
market fundamentalism (Jameson 2004, p.35). 
 
‘Suburb’ is certainly employed as ‘a code word’ for conflicting political viewpoints. The 
left has seen it as both positive and negative, as has the right. For the left it means fair 
housing opportunities for all, but is also a term critical of rampant free-market 
consumerism and unsustainable physical and financial growth. For the right it is the 
material proof of the successes of capital investment, accumulation and growth, while 
also used as a slight upon lowest-common-denominator housing provision. Jameson 
goes on to ask why we cannot simply discuss political issues ‘directly and openly, 
without recourse to this, seemingly literary, third issue of utopia?’ (2004, p.35). The 
same has been suggested of the suburbs: ‘one argues about representation of the 
suburbs rather than the suburbs themselves’ (McCann 1998, p.vii). Why not discuss 
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separable aspects of landscape architectural design such as circulation, programmatic 
requirements, ecological enhancement, and so on? Why not discuss issues of density, 
service provision, infrastructure costs, local ecosystem damage and other specific 
difficulties without resorting to emotionally charged references to suburban sprawl? 
Jameson continues: ‘Indeed, one could turn the question around and say that we are 
perfectly free to discuss utopia as a historical and textual or generic issue, but not to 
complicate it with politics. (In any case, has the word not always been used by some of 
the most eminent political figures on all sides as an insulting slur on their enemies?)’ 
(2004, p.36). Certainly ‘suburban’ is etymologically derived and has been popularly 
used as a slur on those less than urban or civilised. Why too with the suburbs, can’t we 
discuss suburban culture and features without resorting to politics for an explanation?  
 
For James and Nancy Duncan, who gathered material from over ten years of study of a 
wealthy suburban estate in Westchester County, New York City, ‘[t]he logic of 
aesthetics parallels the logic of hegemony so that class inequalities are refigured and 
depoliticised as questions of landscape taste or environmental ethics’ (2004, p.31). 
They interpret gifts and covenants of land for nature preservation as prestigious 
investments in cultural capital ‘that resonate with spiritual and moral power’ while ‘the 
language of capitalism, [the] economic rationality of passing wealth from one 
generation to the next’ is attached to these gifts of land (2004, p.154). ‘Historic 
preservation tends to be based on an exclusivist aesthetic that no longer recognises 
itself as such.’ (2004, p.152) Reviewer Margot W. Garcia, a self-proclaimed deep 
ecologist, disagrees, finding ‘many observations and interpretations in this book difficult 
to accept’ (2005, p.106). For her ‘such environmentally sensitive and supportive 
projects’ are an ‘important and socially responsible act’ of support for healthier 
ecologies which benefits all (2005, p.107). 
 
Debates regarding what is ‘good’ seem easily distracted or substituted. Similarly, if we 
are missing a roof over our heads, we are told we need affordable housing not shelter, 
and if our environments are deficient in basic services for life, we are informed they 
lack liveability, not adequate infrastructure. Theodor Adorno observes: 
 
He who asks what is the goal of an emancipated society is given answers such as the 
fulfilment of human possibilities or the richness of life. Just as the inevitable question is 
illegitimate, so the repellent assurance of the answer is [as] inevitable [as it is 
ideologically dated] . . . There is tenderness only in the coarsest demand: that no-one 
shall go hungry any more. Every other seeks to apply to a condition that ought to be 
determined by human needs, a mode of human conduct adapted to production as an 
end in itself (2005, pp.155-6). 
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Foucault’s observation that ‘[t]he guarantee of freedom is freedom’ makes the same 
point (1984, p.372). The goal or guarantee of freedom is freedom just as the goal of an 
emancipated society is an emancipated society and that of a good life is a life that is 
good. But what does this mean for designers, whose task is surely more than the 
provision of shelter; whose task might more familiarly be described as contributing to 
that ‘fulfilment of human possibilities or the richness of life’ which Adorno condemns as 
‘repellent’? Is it a different species of question to ask: What is the goal of design? The 
answer is not—cannot be—freedom itself, let alone affordability or liveability or 
sustainability, but only the creative and experimental offering of conceptions of 
freedom, of newly engaging ideas of an emancipated society that hopes to engender 
freedom through form that endeavours to encourage and communicate—to embody—
those ideas. Adorno warns of a condition where issues of need are determined by, and 
insidiously become, moral imperatives of appropriate behaviour. When no-one should 
go without shelter or clean drinking water, the problem is not how to supply affordable 
housing or plumbing, but how to put a roof over everyone’s head and provide access to 
a reliable water supply. To demand affordability is to see the problem only within the 
terms and conditions which created it; that is, within the aims and ideology of consumer 
capitalism and, specifically, the real estate and mortgage markets which are, to judge 
by the causes of the global financial crisis, its primary arena of speculative operation. 
This is to be trapped within that particular ideology and, as Jameson argues it is the 
very function of utopianism to enable escape from that condition (2004, p.46). This is 
also the function of design. 
 
Those involved in the courageous, uncertain and ultimately doomed search for 
something missing—utopians—are not easy to distinguish from those involved in the 
confident indulgence of nostalgic life-world substitutions or the excitement of novel 
lifestyle alternatives. The only possible escape and sole effective response in the face 
of constant slippery recuperation of liberating ideas is utopianism; the production of 
new hopeful propositions destined in their turn to fail. That utopias cannot deliver—are 
impossible—does not negate their importance or usefulness, but rather constitutes it. 
‘Nothing remains interesting where anything may happen,’ declared H. G. Wells (1933, 
p.140). A century later Rem Koolhaas defined the value of impossibilities: 
 
Impossibilities: A creator is someone who creates his own impossibilities, and 
thereby creates possibilities. It's by banging your head against the wall that you 
find an answer. You have to work on the wall, because without a set of 
impossibilities, you won’t have the line of flight, the exit that is creation, the power 
of falsity that is truth. You have to be liquid or gaseous, precisely because normal 
perception and opinion are solid, geometric (1995, p.794). 
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The ‘line of flight’ is one of hope and ‘[h]ope is the opposite of security, of a naive 
optimism. Within it always lurks the category of danger’ (Anderson 2004, p.15). For 
Bloch, architecture call for wings (in Heynen 1999, p.125). Peter Corrigan closed his A. 
S. Hook Address referencing Emily Dickinson: ‘To conclude: architecture should 
enhance that sense of a defining difference. Which is central to what makes a culture 
rich and its citizens proud. Architecture is the thing with feathers’ (2003).  
 
Three themes 
This research investigates three related claims: that suburbs are a key environment of 
our times in terms of understanding human relationships with a non-human or natural 
world, that landscape architecture is the key discipline to approach and respond to an 
improved understanding of suburbs, and that utopianism is the key attitude for any 
useful design response.  The importance of suburbs, of landscape architecture and of 
utopianism to an understanding of contemporary culture and dominant world-views is 
not argued in order to settle slippery terminology once and for all, or to reveal the errors 
of particular definitions in order to propose correct ones, although considerable effort is 
made to expose inconsistencies and alternatives are offered. Neither was the intention 
of the work to explain things away by demonstrating the imprecision of terms, nor so 
generalise definitions so as to render them effectively meaningless or empty. Rather, 
the research examines terms in order to prompt closer and clearer examinations of 
things, in the process critiquing the interpretations and histories others have created or 
assumed for them.  
 
There are those that consider the suburbs to be simply the dormitory residential 
periphery of a city, located between urban and rural environments. Others 
acknowledge a range of types, densities, shapes, relationships to other residential and 
non-residential centres and rural land uses, political and administrative structures and 
economic bases, along with evolving and newly identified combinations of these. 
Similarly, the professional practice of landscape architecture might be simply conceived 
as a negotiation between wilderness and buildings, horticulture and architecture, 
exterior and interior environments, pursued in accordance with any one of a variety of 
ideas regarding what constitutes usefulness and delight. There is particular recent 
interest in positioning the profession at the variously articulated interfaces of ‘art’ and 
‘science’. However, like suburbs, landscape architecture also appears at present to be 
variously and sometimes contradictorily defined. It is considered to be a discipline of 
ecological stewardship, productive land management, sustainable land use, 
environmental art, or any combination of these. The present location of professional 
expertise is scattered across areas that have also developed their own disciplinary and 
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cross-disciplinary titles. Urban Design has even grown to have its own sub-expertises. 
Landscape Urbanism claims a new title for a synthesising field of apparently recent 
endeavour focused on urban environmental processes. New Urbanism claims invention 
of a particular approach to settlement design organised around a central, essential idea 
of close community. In combination, the varieties of professional activity rightly or 
wrongly claimed by landscape architects and poorly or exemplarily undertaken, and the 
variety of definition given to the term ‘suburb’, lend themselves to a condition of huge 
potential variety in approach to the analysis, proposal and realisation of suburban 
environments.  
 
Suburbs, utopias and landscape architecture share then similar important and 
revealing problems. A critique of these allows for the formulation of ideas, necessary 
for the formulation of projects. The goal, then, is the further, clearly articulated 
exploration and even elaboration of informative problems, rather than the overcoming 
of limited difficulties. The goal is the encouragement of more proposals for projects, not 
the abolition of the necessity for them. This approach is not interested in the success or 
failure of suburbs, of landscape architecture or of utopian propositions, but in 
understanding and directing the terms of success and failure in defence of the 
usefulness of critique itself, a critique which can only play itself out in the experiments 
of built form. Inasmuch as critique requires this physical expression, landscape 
architecture becomes an essential, critical practice. Inasmuch as it will fail to provide 
unambiguous, unalterable and ultimate answers to unfixable questions, the effort and 
work is utopian.  
 
For James Corner ‘the future of landscape as a culturally significant practice is 
dependent on the capacity of its inventors to image the world in new ways and [more 
significantly and particularly for a spatial design discipline than other arts or sciences] 
to body forth those images in richly phenomenal and efficacious terms’ (1999, p.167, 
my italics). That is, to commit to making in the world. The problem for landscape 
architecture is not how to retain the open-ended potential of landscapes, for this does 
not require any design, or indeed any type of considered intervention, while equally, 
intervention cannot guarantee the constraint of potential. Similarly, the potential for 
interpretation of images of landscapes is equally impossible to secure, liberate or limit. 
The vital work of landscape architecture is not just the representation of new worlds 
representing new ideas, but the striving to realise them. It is not representation that 
designers should be concerned to re-invent except inasmuch as it assists this. The 
danger of accepting representation as the work of designers, divorced from a desire for 
embodiment, is suggested by Michel Foucault: ‘It is the connection of desire to reality 
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(and not its retreat into forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force’ 
(1984, p.xv).  
 
Scope and method 
The core aims of the thesis are to promote landscape architecture as a design 
profession, to explain design as a critical practice (that is, one which must position and 
argue the value of its work), and finally to examine present constraints to the critical 
practice of landscape architecture (that is, the pursuit of argument and the questioning 
of implicit values). This is undertaken by examining the particularly active and fraught 
arena of suburban land development. It is in the suburbs that the constraints on design 
as a critical practice are most evident, and the suburbs of Melbourne, Australian 
provide both typical and specific examples of constraints in the form of developer 
advertising and planning policy, while evidencing a dearth of commentary from the 
profession in either practice or academia. Analyses of the images of advertising and 
the rhetoric of planning in the final two chapters are preceded by others examining 
histories and theories of landscape architecture as a critical practice, and suburbs as 
manifest criticisms of alternative settlement forms. The historic failures and 
misunderstandings of both suburbs and landscape architecture are explained with 
reference to utopianism. 
 
The central problem which has been grappled with in this work concerns the link 
between the value of critique and the value of form as the outcome of critique or critical 
practice, and the difference of these to form as proof of value or self-evidently valuable. 
Value lies in the persuasiveness—or (albeit limited, compromised and ultimately 
defeated) success—of argument for a particular form. The form itself has no intrinsic 
value. It is mute without interpretative argument. Very dangerous oppressions of free 
thought and action result from assumptions of intrinsic or absolute value for forms. 
Also, while form may be the outcome and demonstration of a specific argument, it is 
not argument itself. Forms and landscapes are material expressions of ideas. They are 
not themselves ideas, but ideas of or for something. Demonstrating the value of critique 
does not demonstrate the value of form which results from critical practice. Such elision 
is the slippage of utopian proposition. The value of utopian effort is not proven by the 
value of utopian projects (which prove in realisation to be dystopian).  
 
The thesis assertions are an argument for informed—and relentless—criticism as an 
essential characteristic of design practice. The assertion that design practice is critical 
practice is intended to influence practice to be critical as well as to make critique 
practical. This assertion will not generate critical form or make form critical (in the 
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sense of the pathetic fallacy) although it will make form important in the sense of being 
a manifestation of critical practice. The assertions cannot be built but they can 
influence the practice of building. In particular they are intended to alert practitioners to 
the error of considering built form to be intrinsically valuable by ‘virtue’ of, for example, 
claiming self-generation or naturalness or goodness. It is an error to consider form a 
demonstrable proof of anything. It can only ever be an argument. And the value of 
argument lies exactly in the inevitable failure to finalise and fix value.  
 
Questions asked of contemporary designers seem to require the assurance of good or 
correct outcomes. If design critique or critical design cannot ensure the production of 
such outcomes, what is the point of it? Similarly, if argument cannot build something 
unarguably good, what is the point of it? If people were not unhappy or oppressed or 
suffering or even killed because of claims of the unarguable goodness or correctness 
of materially manifested ideas, argument would not be needed at all. You cannot build 
‘correct’ or ‘good’ work, only an argument for it. The position of the thesis is that no 
position is correct or good in a way that can ‘go without saying’ as Roland Bathes puts 
it (1972, p.143). Simply, there is no unarguable good that can be manifested. But there 
are definitely arguments and counter-arguments to be made—and manifested—for 
what is good. 
 
While there is some tentative work examining the engagement of landscape architects 
in suburban (or urban) development, there is little published self-reflective critique by 
practitioners. Initial investigations of the thesis attempted to identify possible projects 
that addressed, or attempted to address, the failings of design practice to articulate 
obstacles and frustrations in this arena, anticipating that suggestions, guidelines or 
even a design project itself may result as a demonstration of ways to overcome present 
silence. In addition, critique of specific project work as case studies was begun with a 
similar expectation of identifying present constraints. However, in building a picture of 
the present situation through which it might first be understood why such design work is 
problematic and case studies positioned—that is, in building a picture of the state of 
landscape architecture as a design profession within the arena of suburb 
development—a considerable body of material was collected which identified its own 
problem and generated a thesis in itself. This work then does not involve the 
generation of alternative design propositions or the development of case studies of 
design projects, but rather seeks to identify the position in which designers find 
themselves in attempting to distinguish their essential work from that of either 
pragmatic and instrumentalist disciplines commonly understood as sciences, or 
ornamental and essentially ameliorative ones understood as art. 
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Critique is essential to the undertaking as well as understanding of critical work, but 
also inseparable from the perception as well as production of text and images used to 
communicate it. Yet the unquestioned—uncriticised—criteria against which any 
criticism presently happens in suburban land development is argued by the thesis to be 
set by developer advertisement and planning policy and to be unchallenged by the 
profession. Resulting work cannot then claim to be critical. And so-called critique of 
built work against these same unchallenged criteria cannot claim to be critical either. 
This is the condition under which both written criticism and critical work currently labour 
and which the thesis endeavours to expose. Critique of built work is not overlooked in 
the thesis but made mandatory as it is argued that the relationships between 
image/text and built work make a critical position even possible. 
 
In its first two parts the thesis elucidates a history for various misunderstandings of 
design purpose as critical practice by considering and categorising prevalent theories 
of prominent commentators. It then illustrates our current misunderstandings with 
reference to Melbourne suburbs in the last part. 
 
In its analysis of a wide array of theories and theorists over the first two parts, the 
thesis seeks to demonstrate why these should be questioned and rejected if found 
incorrect, unhelpful or hurtful in previously unidentified ways. In a sense the thesis does 
not have a secure position from which to argue against other positions. Rather it draws 
on the historic truth of failures of ‘positioning’ in design discourses, particularly with 
regard to built environments. The thesis demonstrates the internal (and relative) illogic 
of many specific positions, not in order to champion a particular new position but to 
draw attention to the necessity of such examinations inasmuch as articulated critical 
(self)examination is currently wanting, or incorrectly assumed. A ‘correct’ position is in 
fact thought to be impossible. If it is possible to articulate a position for the thesis it 
would be—as the use of utopianism illustrates—that any position will necessarily 
become redundant, will become a dystopia, will generate problems even as it solves 
others, and that it is the failure to acknowledge and examine this which robs design of 
its power and sophistication in making proposals for a better world that is also an 
imperfect world. 
 
In choosing to focus on analysis of published text and image in the final part, the 
importance of built design work was less overlooked than clearly foregrounded and 
necessarily anticipated, although analysis of it was beyond the scope of the thesis 
itself. That landscape architects are involved in the production of built suburban 
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environments is not questioned. Why there is so little critique, discussion, self-reflection 
or even acknowledgement of this by the profession is the subject of the thesis 
investigation as a first step toward better design engagement with such environments. 
In examining the images of developer advertising the thesis sought to show that every 
drawing or image done by a landscape architect is also an advertisement. Had built 
work been examined the same might have been said; that is, that all built work is an 
advertisement. What is meant by either is that both images (including professional 
drafting such as construction drawings) and their resulting built works are persuasive 
arguments for ideas about what a good place is. They are not revelations of a truth of 
what a good place is. Ideas are not true or false, only assertions regarding them. Also, 
contrary to what seems implied by those who do assert the importance of design in the 
built environment, material form is no more or less ‘true’ to an idea than is image or 
text. The relevance to the profession of landscape architecture of analysing real estate 
images or planning rhetoric may seem dubious compared with analysis of landscape 
architecture itself. The thesis argues that such images position and constrain designers 
in ways that constitute insidious ‘briefs’ for delivery of built work. The intention of the 
thesis is to persuade readers that the built work which representations supposedly 
represent cannot in fact be overlooked.  
 
Thesis structure  
Part I introduces the major areas of research, placing these in a contemporary 
suburban context which offers a renewed argument for understanding design as 
utopian endeavour. The opening chapter introduces an historic conflict of ambition 
between designers and their clients, identifying productive tensions as well as outlining 
widespread and continuing differences of opinion as to the value and aims of design. It 
argues that landscape architectural design is essentially different to engineering and 
planning. Chapter 2 identifies four categories of critique common to examination of 
suburbs and landscape architecture: a simple ‘Pro’ or ‘Con’ judgment, a dialogical 
‘Anti’, an open-ended ‘Non’ and a fourth less clearly articulated openness that is 
argued to be ‘Utopian’. Both Non and Utopian projects are frontier explorations but 
evidence significantly different attitudes. Non-frontier projects aim through open-
endedness to resist absolute or closed systems and the closed minds that accompany 
them, recovering a state of lost potential. Utopian-frontier projects are, in addition to 
this exposure of power-relations and recovery of potential, actively invested in 
exploiting it through new propositions. Rather than just re-cover a state of open-
mindedness through open-endedness, utopian-frontier projects are concerned with 
contestable openness. Unlike non-frontier projects, utopian-frontier projects appreciate 
that an interest can never actually be disinterested. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 investigate myth and utopia respectively, contrasting myth-making 
and mythologies with utopianism. In Chapter 3, Non projects are linked to myth as 
elaborated by Roland Barthes for whom myth is a communication which ‘has the task 
of giving an historical intention a natural justification’ (1972, p.142). Chapter 4 proposes 
that the very idea of landscape is utopian and outlines some taxonomies of utopias, 
reflecting on their connections to landscape and suburb typologies. It concludes Part I 
by identifying a danger in the slippage between myth and utopia, distinguishing the 
possible yet self-effacing open-endedness of mythic projects from the impossible yet 
self-affirming openness of utopian attitudes.  
 
Part II draws a picture of the variety of disciplinary and other literatures competing for a 
definitive place in contemporary understandings of suburbs and design. Chapter 5 
surveys some of the vast literature of potential relevance for suburban studies. It also 
reviews an extended recent literature of landscape architecture relevant to suburbs. 
Chapter 6 considers similar trends in the literatures of both suburbs and landscape 
architecture in redefining terms for effective criticism. The final chapter in this part then 
identifies four stages or categories in the critique of suburbs and design: Form, 
Content, Languages and Frontiers. These four categories are correlated with those 
identified in Chapter 2.  
 
Following the introductory positioning of the main areas of investigation in Part I, and 
identification of their disciplinary relationships in Part II, Part III examines the 
competitive work undertaken to secure the placement of particular visions. It begins 
with a discussion in Chapter 8 of the similar conditions, critiques and contests facing 
the three areas of study—suburbs, landscape architecture and utopianism—despite 
predominantly separate investigations to date. It then summarises key positions within 
each area, beginning with suburbs, progressing to landscape architecture and finishing 
with a more extended examination of utopias, drawing links between the history, theory 
and experiments of all three in creating particular visions of work in each area. The 
next two chapters—8 and 9—evaluate recent work in two well-known areas of 
suburban imaging and imagining: the frameworks of urban design legislation and the 
visions of real estate advertisement. Both of these typically pre-empt and influence the 
design and designers of Melbourne suburbs. The vision of developers and their 
representative bodies—the Urban Design Institute of Australia (UDIA), the Real Estate 
Institute of Victoria (REIV), and others—present a powerful appreciation of suburban 
value, one which is epitomised by the messages of residential land development 
advertisement. In constant competition and collusion with the objectives of the 
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marketplace is government. Arguably the most powerful controls on Melbourne’s 
suburban growth and form come from planning legislation, guided for specific areas by 
Urban Design Frameworks, Structure Plans and similar documents, and the overall 
aims of Melbourne 2030.  
 
The work concludes by reiterating an appeal to rediscover a utopian impulse, to 
uncover lost potentials and prior states of utopian optimism, not in order to find the 
right, lost way or to fix an agreed direction, but to enjoy and realise their multiplication. 
Faced with intractable problems, the imperative of design to make strange in order to 
discover new purpose is becoming design estranged from purposeful making. The 
encouragement of more proposals for projects, not the abolition of the necessity for 
them, is required to resist the ever-recuperating standardisation, normalisation, and 
trivialisation of happiness and the good life.  
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PART 1 
PLACING 
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This first part introduces a problem. The ways in which design practice and designed 
projects are appraised and valued evidence a slippage between understandings of 
good design as an accurate expression of socio-cultural values, as an accommodation 
of evolving open-endedness, and as a pursuit of utopian openness. This slippage is 
exemplified by varying appreciations of landscape architecture’s role in the suburbs. 
Chapter 1 views these broad understandings from two perspectives: that of clients and 
that of designers. Chapter 2 elaborates on the three understandings—correct design, 
accommodating design and utopian design—as expressed through four current 
categories of design criticism: Pro-Con and Anti which are variously concerned with 
correct design, Non which is concerned with accommodation, and Utopian. Myth and 
Utopia present two contrasting ideas of a future for design of suburbs examined in 
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The first—Myth—is argued to advocate 
disempowerment of design and reconstitution of landscape architecture as a discipline 
subservient to other discourses. The second—Utopia—represents the empowerment of 
design through critique of the terms for desirable living arrangements set by planning, 
engineering and sustainability discourses. The challenges of empowerment, the 
dangers of disempowerment and the slippages between them suggest arguments 
pursued in later chapters for placing design before other activities in the development 
of human settlements. 
 
 
 
 
22
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
A Background of Intentions: 
The Determined Designer and Designated Determinants 
 
If a job’s worth doing it’s worth doing badly 
 
 G.K. Chesterton5 
 
Don’t worry boys, we’ll get over this storm of approval 
 
Saul Alinsky6 
 
A chronological overview of the growth of western cities reveals a relationship between 
settlements or, more accurately, real estate booms and the emergence and adaptation 
of built environment disciplines to new economic, political and social circumstances. 
The stories of this relationship have been told from two, inter-related perspectives: that 
of determined designers working with form to envisage and embody new ideas that 
emerge from facts of changed political, technological and other conditions of a society, 
and that of others pre-determining design via the descriptive and prescriptive 
designation of outcomes believed to derive from predictive analysis of facts and then 
stipulated in briefs and guidelines of various sorts for designers to adapt and deliver on 
specific sites. The intention of designers is to imagine and deliver newly possible forms 
for better settlement or landscape occupation. That of heterogeneous and competing 
clients is typically to secure delivery of a particular vision they already have, while that 
of planning and government is to fix terms for delivery of a generic and predictable 
form. Where designers please their clients—authorities and the market—too easily and 
too well, they may be thought to disappointment their own mission.  
 
Architecture was unknown as a professional activity at the start of the Renaissance 
(Picon & Ponte 2003). Its emergence as a distinct and important activity responding to 
cultural change wrought by new reflections on our relationship with and understanding 
of the natural world has parallels with later conditions prompting both the emergence of 
town planning and, later still, landscape architecture in the twentieth century. Planning 
as a profession was the invention of the twentieth century born of the writings and 
speculative plans of social reformers dating back much further but encapsulated and 
                                                 
5 Quoted by Peter Corrigan in an unpublished lecture. From Chapter XIV Folly and Female Education in 
Chesterton, G. K. 2010 [1910], p.254. 
6 In Corrigan, P. 2003, p.41. 
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popularised in the work of Ebenezer Howard (1898). It was instituted in Australia on a 
state by state basis through the first two decades immediately following its 
establishment in England. The profession of landscape architecture was founded much 
later in Australia in 1966 in response again to a freshly articulated impulse with a 
similarly long lineage. The 1960s were an era of political activism and of growing 
awareness of and concern for a newly acknowledged planetary environment shared by 
all. The first landing on the moon and view of earth from space, the institution of Earth 
Day in 1969, the publication of Rachel Carson’s 1962 Silent Spring, Barbara Ward’s 
1966 Space Ship Earth, Paul R. Ehrlich’s 1970 The Population Bomb, Barbara Ward & 
Rene Dubos 1972 Only One Earth, and many similar texts and related events evidence 
the rise of environmentalism with which landscape architecture was closely associated, 
particularly through the work of Ian McHarg (1971; 1998). It was concurrent too with the 
spread of suburbs and the interest of another group of landscape architects including 
Dan Kiley, Garret Eckbo (2009), Thomas Church (1995) and others who considered 
suburbs and the suburban home as sites for both reinvention of personal relationships 
with the land and with nature, and reinvention of social relations. 
 
The modern history of landscape design is typically presented as emerging from 
Western, and predominantly English experiments. The practice of amateur English 
garden design from the end of the seventeenth century—exemplified by William 
Shenstone—was followed swiftly by emergence of the hired landscape gardener or 
designer in the eighteenth century—epitomised by Lancelot ‘Capability’ Brown—from 
hybrid training as a surveyor, draftsperson, sometimes architect and horticulturalist. 
This was followed by a gradual reduction in estate size and the rise of a wealthy urban 
middle class in the nineteenth century, moving to ‘villas’ on the outskirts of cities (Simo 
1989). Ideas for the private gardens of these families, and the landscaped 
infrastructure of their public realms, were disseminated by designers via popular 
publications, such as those of John Claudius Loudon and his wife Jane, as well as 
through the example of built works. Spurred by the land booms of the later nineteenth 
century that brought even greater numbers to live on the outskirts of growing cities, and 
in Melbourne by the gold rush, an increased interest in city design and the provision of 
shared public open space for all, found expression in writing, lecturing, lobbying and 
the demonstrative linking of design endeavour to political endeavour (Olmsted 2010).  
 
While architects and town planners undertook physical design of the growing cities at 
the start of the twentieth century, by mid-century this was a distinct role. The term 
‘urban design’ emerged in the 1950s ‘replacing and superseding the more traditional, 
narrower and somewhat outmoded term 'civic design' (Carmona & Tiesdell 2007, p.7). 
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It recognised that ‘urban space, however is more than the city centre. It includes the 
suburbs where large numbers of the urban population live’ (2007, p.17). Interest in the 
architecture of whole landscapes associated with the public realm and provision of its 
infrastructures also required consideration of natural landscape systems. This focus 
and the rise of environmentalism consolidated landscape architecture as a profession 
undertaking the integrated physical design of land with consideration of geo- and 
biophysical as well as cultural systems. Part of its role in consideration of cultural 
contexts is the assessment and assignment of value (McHarg 2007; Thompson 2000).  
Post WWII and more recent histories have come to focus on ex-urban or essentially 
sub-urban land development and the role, or lack of a role, for professional design 
disciplines including landscape architecture (Boyd 1952, p.153; Deidrich 2006, pp.15-
16; Dunham-Jones 2005; George et al. 2004, p.4; Weller 2008). Here, the important 
involvement of design in questions of value has become an unwanted and unwonted 
interference, reduced to value-adding.  
 
Broadly speaking, the 1960s witnessed optimistic experiments with fundamental issues 
of integrating human settlement with natural systems at all scales including the 
suburban lot and residential subdivision. The 1970s saw a commercial consolidation 
and exploitation of these, the 1980s a compilation and review that strengthened urban 
design as an analytic planning tool, the 1990s undertook critical reassessments that led 
to the emergence of, for example, landscape urbanism and New Urbanism, while the 
new millennium ushered in new hope as well as a revisiting of past utopias as 
paradoxical lessons of such hope (Baudrillard 2006; Busbea 2007; Knabb 2007; Pinder 
2002; Scott 2007; van Schaik & Macel 2005). The long, historically articulated 
relationship of design and settlement agendas in the problematic production of 
particular landscapes has culminated in recent collections of past observations 
(Carmona & Tiesdell 2007; Gosling 2002; Larice & Macdonald 2006; Olmsted 2010; 
Stilgoe 2005; Swaffield 2002; Thompson 2008), ongoing ‘re-’ views (Corner 1999; 
Dunham-Jones & Williamson 2008; Shane 2005; Treib 2007; Wollscheid et al. 2002) 
and propositions for ‘new’ views (Baumeister 2007; Bull 2006; Holden 2003; Kruse & 
Sugrue 2006) of both the potential of the landscape and the potential of landscape 
architecture. However, to what ends and in pursuit of what values ‘potential’ is 
recognised has been a less clearly articulated or interrogated precondition for the many 
proposed changes. 
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The determined designer’s tools 
The determined designer pursues a vision which examines and challenges the 
prescription of form determined by planning or other supposedly pre-design 
investigations. Many designers and design theorists specifically argue that such 
analyses are in fact already ‘designed’ and should be acknowledged as the necessary 
work of designers (Glanville 1999; Kahn 1996). Such prescriptions, guidelines, 
frameworks or masterplans presuppose outcomes that it is the role of design to 
interrogate, revealing hidden or neglected alternatives. Significantly, utopian designers 
are frequently called ‘planners’ (Fishman 1982). More is meant by this tagging than the 
scale of their ambition or projects. At issue is the primacy of planning over design but 
also the nature and validity of a distinction between planning intention and design 
intention. Both aim at the delivery of better built environments, but while plans describe 
and prescribe how this is to be done—and ascribe too responsibilities for it—design 
must inscribe a specific response which becomes an inevitable interpretation and 
challenge to such description, prescription and ascription. Design proposition is the 
research which tests the sense and value of planning proposals. 
 
Projects begin with descriptive and initial interpretative phases of evaluation. More 
complex critiques follow that attempt a further explanation prompting investigations of 
potential for reworking initial assessments toward alternative possible evaluations. This 
level of work is predominantly the domain of planning-orientated disciplines or 
approaches, such as those of Ian McHarg and New Urbanism, where identification and 
codification of site specific ‘character’ and ‘qualities’ plays a determining role in how a 
design should or can be conceived in response to identified value. However, a design 
process begins prior to this with attempts to re-imagine the situation entirely. Rather 
than work with what is identified to be valuable, design is the work of finding and 
establishing an argument for some particular valuing. There is a danger too that such 
value-seeking processes can themselves become the thing valued, resulting in a failure 
to design at all.  
 
Before either the decision not to interfere for fear of securing an outcome that will fail, 
or the belief that correctly informed interference will secure a successful outcome, 
comes musing; mulling over alternatives, an imaginative play of possibilities. Musing is 
a state of positive, anticipatory uncertainty, related to other conditions of suspended 
judgement and iterative thinking such as wonder, amazement, contemplation of the 
unknown yet strangely familiar or uncanny, melancholy, even boredom. In architectural 
terms, such musing encompasses responses to terrains vague, ruins and the 
homeliness of the unhomely, all of which have been identified with the strangely 
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differentiated sameness and compact emptiness of suburbia. The following considers 
how such states provide useful ways of understanding design, especially in relation to 
its efforts to construct nature, and links them to utopianism as that effort which works 
precisely with such states to envisage future environments. The design of suburbs has 
become less able to take the time and risk of musing, yet this is what is suggested as 
now essential to finding new suburban forms are that instead being shaped by ever 
more rigidly prescribed and urgently implemented government policy and market 
strategy. 
 
Wonder and other useful states 
 
‘It is through wonder [thaumazein],’ says Aristotle, ‘that men now begin and originally 
began to philosophize’; and as Plato tells us, through the mouth of Socrates, ‘wonder is 
the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder.’ These sayings are well 
known, and they are also representative of an important thread that runs through much 
of the Western philosophical tradition, and yet, in contemporary philosophy at least, 
they are not much reflected upon (Malpas 2006, p.287). 
 
It is through ‘wonder’ that Leon van Schaik suggests that we begin to design (2000a, 
p.7). Daniel Dahlstrom of Boston University remarks:  
 
Differentiating wonder from puzzlement and curiosity, Malpas makes the case that 
wonder is not simply a psychological impetus but the first principle and measure of 
philosophy, its paradoxical origin and limit. While wonder may arise from the 
extraordinary, it is the extraordinariness of the ordinary (the opacity of ordinary 
transparency), Malpas submits, that instills wonder ‘at its most basic’ … disabling and 
disruptive … [wonder at] ‘the world in its specificity’. Wonder … rules out an exclusive 
pursuit of complete explanation but also a scepticism or relativism about our capacity to 
make things transparent (2006, unpaginated). 
 
Van Schaik too has an interest in Transfiguring the Ordinary (1995) as an aim of the 
practice of design, dedicated to transparency and specificity. In Interstitial Modernism 
he references Philip Fisher’s Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare 
Experiences (1998) to explain the significance of wonder for design. For Fisher, there 
is no 'experience of the ordinary' with which an 'experience' of the extraordinary or 
wonder is contrasted. Experience is extraordinary and ‘surprise, the eliciting of notice, 
becomes the very heart of what it means to “have an experience” at all... The ordinary 
is what is there when there are no experiences going on’ (Fisher 1989 p.20). In the 
same way it might be suggested that you cannot have ordinary design, just design; the 
extraordinary in contrast with ordinary non-design. In permitting the ordinary simply to 
'be' you also cannot claim it is designed or to be designing it. The archetypal 
ordinariness of late twentieth century suburbs is frequently challenged by those who 
find the extraordinary there and is continuously threatened by the many who go to seek 
and make something extraordinary. Design can and should assist them to ‘have an 
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experience’ but cannot do anything extraordinary while serving the marketplace’s 
‘experience economy’. Predictable pleasures are the utterly ordinary condition of real 
estate environments. 
 
Like Malpas, Fisher is interested in examining the origin of the saying 'philosophy 
begins in wonder' attributed to Socrates by Plato. He notes the two-fold use of the word 
‘wonder’ in English, as both questioning (I wonder if...) and surprise (what a wonder!) 
(1989 pp.8-9). It is between the two that design is actively engaged. Alone, the former 
can lead to perpetual deferment, while the later ends in self-congratulation. The 
balance is fine. In Metacity Datatown MVRDV argues that the frontier and edge 
conditions (suburbs) located and examined by their data-turned-diagrams prompt 
inventiveness, that will ‘trigger a series of extrapolations, scenarios, “what ifs”’ (1999, 
p.19). Rather than prompt questioning, however, their diagrams might instead trigger 
wonder’s other exclamatory surprise. The process is explained:  
 
How to study this Metacity? Initially, one can describe its vastness and explore its 
contents perhaps only by numbers or data... statistical techniques seem the only way to 
grasp its processes. By selecting or connecting data according to hypothetical 
prescriptions, a world of numbers turns into diagrams. These diagrams work as 
emblems for operations, agendas, tasks. A 'datatown' appears that resists the objective 
of style (1999, p.18). 
 
Is resisting style also resisting the outcome of form? How are diagrams spatialised? 
The datatown is described in terms of actions—‘operations, agendas, tasks’—but being 
on the move hardly ensures it escapes stylisation. Nike's tick and 'just do it' tagline 
might be thought of as exactly such a diagram emblematic of imperative action.7 
Perhaps ‘hypothetical prescriptions’ are hypotheses that prescribe how data is to 
become a diagram, but it is unclear how the hypothesis will then be tested; that is, to 
what end the process aims. ‘[S]electing or connecting data according to hypothetical 
prescriptions’ leads to ‘a town of data’ but not to an idea for a town conceived beyond 
this auto-generation (1999, p.19). If, as Malpas suggests, wonder ‘rules out an 
exclusive pursuit of complete explanation’ a datatown study of the Metacity process 
might help avoid pre-empted form, although suggesting instead that it may be self-
explanatory. But it must also overcome ‘a scepticism or relativism about our capacity to 
make things transparent’ and in this, as with other process-driven design approaches, it 
is unsuccessful. Wonder is not a static state of wonderment, albeit about an active 
process, but an active and creative state of wondering. It is the latter that gives design 
its subversive power. 
 
                                                 
7 See Borries, F. v. 2004, Who's Afraid of Niketown? Nike-Urbanism, Branding and the City of Tomorrow. 
for case studies of Nike’s urban marketing strategies in Berlin including appropriation of anti-capitalist 
‘happenings’ of the Situationists. 
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Peter Corrigan (1996 [1972]) makes the connection between the freedom of wonder 
and architecture’s liberating project. He makes an important distinction between the call 
for an apparently simple vernacular pragmatism, favorably embraced as a reaction to 
architectural elitism, and a more difficult offering which may be the quality of a true 
utopian avant-garde. In this, he warns against the mere reasonableness of argument. 
 
No one denies that change ought to be based on reasonable projections made from 
present-day technology, socio-economic facts and human psychological need, and that 
no real, socially relevant environmental change will occur without profound social and 
political change. But what is missing in all of these discussions is an elusive quality 
Louis Kahn refers to as 'Wonder'. In the present revolt against our institutions and ways 
there is no Wonder. Without Wonder the revolt looks only to equality (1996 [1972] p.37). 
 
Citing Walt Whitman, James Whistler, Louis Sullivan, Isadora Duncan, John Cage, 
Allen Ginsberg and Aretha Franklin, amongst others, Corrigan ascribes ‘a uniquely 
national quality of Rapture’ to the ‘creative imagination of the U.S.’ (p.37). However, he 
notes that while ‘All Power to the Imagination’ was painted in the 1960s in Paris, such 
slogans were not subsequently seen in uprisings in America. Neither were they in 
Australia. 
 
Fisher suggests that wonder is the experience of ‘making sense’ rather than ‘knowing’: 
‘We are engaged in an ongoing fragile project of “making sense”, and it is the nature of 
making sense rather than the nature of knowing that is my concern’ (1998, p.8). Here is 
design intent distinguished from that of planning, albeit a distinction of great fragility. 
But in the undertaking to problematise knowledge, to reject certainty, making sense 
must also be distinguished from making nonsense. ‘Socrates insisted that to know what 
it is that we do not know is the humbling first step of true knowledge. We need to add 
that the impossibility of knowing any such thing is one of the things that strikes us when 
we look closely at the reasoning and science of the past’ (Fisher 1998, p.9). Anthony 
Vidler’s examination of the uncanny led him to a similar observation: ’Many avant-
garde movements from dada to situationism were founded on this type of ironic 
awareness, the irritation of critical self-consciousness against the primordial Socratic 
“certainty in doubt”’ (1992, p.192). Eighteenth-century Picturesque debates concerned 
a state or training in reflective self-awareness, in the reciprocal influence of exterior 
stimuli and an observer’s intellectual and emotional responses. Similarly between the 
defaults of Wonder (your grasp of something) and Surprise (something’s grasp of you) 
is a realm of engaged musing, of mulling things over and considering ideas that 
suspend both our declarative intelligence and our unreasoned emotional reactions.  
 
‘Musing’ may be the term for a particularly Australian formulation of wonder. Australian 
landscape design, like Australian painting and poetry, has an eighteenth century 
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English heritage. As the title The Pursuit of Wonder: How Australia's Landscape was 
Explored, Nature Discovered and Tourism Unleashed suggests, it is tied to colonial 
exploration and settlement, but linked too to old-world Enlightenment as well as 
economic development (Horne 2005). The findings of eighteenth-century aesthetics 
culminated in a recognition of the problem of determining whether accurate perception 
lies in the truth of what is observed or the truthfulness of the observer (Hunt 1976, 
p.242). The experiments of those poet-landscape designers have been frequently re-
problematised by colonial and post-colonial poetry and painting, but rarely again by 
landscape design. The works of landscape architect Martha Schwartz are exceptions, 
as is the landscape art of Michael Heizer, Robert Smithson, James Turrell, Mary Miss 
and others.  
 
Harry Heseltine in the introduction to the Penguin Book of Australian Verse makes the 
same observation regarding the concerns of early Australian poets:  
 
The conventional way of judging our nineteenth century poets—treating them as 
cameras pointed at the landscape—clearly has its uses. Yet those uses are chiefly 
concerned with the outer trappings of poetry, its conjunction with socio-cultural 
desiderata. Investigations of Harpur and his successors in terms of their accurate 
reportage of antipodean phenomena will tell us very little about the inner continuity of 
Australian poetry, the workings of the imagination in this country, the way it has 
absorbed the physical environment rather than registered it (1976, p.30). 
 
He then quotes Harpur’s A midsummer noon in the Australian forest noting that it 
‘reveals its true inwardness only in its concluding lines [where] … the whole centre of 
the poem’s gravity is shifted away from the Nature which is observed to the 
consciousness which is doing the observing’ (1976, p.32). With this comment we are 
where the eighteenth century poets were in their examination of ‘nature’. What 
Hestletine says next concerns the identification of a uniquely Australian contemporary 
attitude.  
 
Again, while the processes of consciousness are among the universal and unavoidable 
concerns of all poetry; it is, I believe, the ‘musing’ quality of the Australian imagination 
which gives it its special flavour. In Australia, the reflexive fascination of the poet with 
his own perceiving powers less often reveals a stream of consciousness than 
something like a static, contemplative mode of knowing the world (1976, p.32). 
 
In the past, landscape design has been as important as poetry and painting as an 
expression of our cultural identity. Modern Architecture has continued to acknowledge, 
categorise and argue a range of national, regional and local efforts to distinguish ‘place’ 
in architectural production, and has named a host of ‘movements’ and ‘isms’ including 
nationalism, critical regionalism, a polyvocal postmodernism that is sometimes localism 
or vernacularism or lowbrowism. Landscape architecture has not had a similarly 
articulate discourse (Treib 1994). As a practice, it has not regained the position it held 
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in English eighteenth century imaginative life, even if ‘landscape’ itself is currently 
claiming a resurgent fascination internationally (Corner 2006).  
 
Charles Waldheim characterises the new discipline of landscape urbanism as the locus 
of a re-engagement of landscape design within debates that are cultural and political as 
well as aesthetic (Waldheim & Berger 2008). Waldheim cites Corner to explain why 
landscape architecture has become disengaged: ‘the narrow agenda of ecological 
advocacy that many landscape architects profess to is nothing more than a rear-guard 
defence of a supposedly autonomous ‘nature’ conceived to exist, a priori, outside of 
human agency or cultural construction’ (2008, p.38). If natural—or non-natural—
environments are not outside human control and construction, landscape architecture 
then needs to engage in the politicised questions of what constitutes them and how 
they should be constructed. But does landscape urbanism do this? Its practitioners 
rather seem to suppose their projects re-engage just by questioning the romanticised 
vision of an a priori nature responsible for ecological advocacy, but without themselves 
being engaged in debate about a new status quo that is an equally romanticised and 
naturalised idea of an a priori equality and legitimacy behind ideas of indeterminacy or 
a site’s self-determination. The moment that musing abandons itself to being either 
merely amusing or declaring a solution is found, useful problems become mere 
difficulties or no problem at all,. These are the moments when vital questions of value 
are de-problematised too. 
 
‘Melancholy’ is not simply a matter of being sad. The complex ambivalences of 
melancholy have been examined by Jacky Bowring in A Field Guide to Melancholy 
(2008). The malaise associated with suburban living, described by numerous writers of 
fiction as well as investigations of non-fiction, could find a champion in Bowring’s 
evocation of the richness and generative usefulness of particular types of engaged 
sadness. Yet even Bowring can slip. The useful musing of melancholy can become a 
type of marketable synthesising of happiness and sadness, or a type of paralysing 
inaction. In her review (2009) of the High Line project of James Corner, Field 
Operations and architects Diller Scofidio + Renfro, Bowring is critical of the designers’ 
erasure of the existing melancholic qualities of the site, but is ultimately unable to 
suggest how design might be engaged at all and maintain such qualities. She opens 
describing the allure of melancholy, which, amongst other places, can be ‘found in the 
marginal zones, the abandoned lands, the terrain vague’ (2009, p.128). ‘The High 
Line,’ she explains ‘was such a place. Overgrown, deserted and in a state of decay, it 
was the epitome of the aesthetic of melancholy ... a place outside time, like Andrei 
Tarkovsky's mysterious “Zone” in his film Stalker’ (p.128). Stalker linked Detroit to the 
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rise of Landscape Urbanism, inspiring a series of studies of its post-industrial cityscape 
(Shane 2004). Noting that melancholy ‘has often been conflated with mental illness,’ 
she asks whether the High Line's new incarnation isn’t ‘a kind of landscape Prozac, a 
means of suppressing sadness, alleviating gloom, and recasting the landscape in a 
euphoric glow’ (p.128). A more interesting inquiry might be begun by speculating on 
what happened to landscape urbanism's interest in those qualities of place—
indeterminacy, open-endedness and emergence—which one of its leading proponents 
(and a designer of the site) seems to have sacrificed whilst simultaneously claiming 
them as inspiration.  
 
Describing the makeover of the site, Bowring evocatively suggests that ‘[t]here is 
something cadaverous about this - like landscape taxidermy’ (p.127). In fact such 
zombie uncanniness—‘glassy eyes and groomed fur’—is arguably still closely related 
in sentiment to evocations of loss for a dead or ruined original. Instead, what Bowring 
sees is ‘as far from a ruin as one could imagine’ (p.127). The space is transformed 
from ‘a wild and unkempt plateau into a smart urban plaza ... bathed in the glow of 
conspicuous consumption’ (p.127). Bowring then asks a series of questions that 
critique the universal (market) value and general positivist attitude to improvement 
implicit in ‘development and change’ (p.127). She finds a touch-the-ground lightly 
answer which is, however, inadequate to conveying the complexity of issues which 
these and similar evocative environments pose. Indeed the outright recreation or 
mimicry of originally weird and wonderful places can arguably capture more of their 
uncanny qualities than timorous intervention. The profession does indeed have a 
‘predilection’ for doing something, as opposed to nothing, for in the case of the latter 
they are not needed at all. And this is the problem of landscape urbanism's claims to 
affirmation and revealing of already existing site potential. Bowring asks: ‘Why does the 
“discovery” of a site like the High Line inevitably mean the subsequent erasure of its 
unique qualities?’ (p.127). Because this has always happened; this is what discovery 
entails. The 'frontier' never stays where it was found and the remembrance and re-
creation of its qualities must happen in another medium than the original, which is 
already lost and cannot be regained. The attempt to maintain it merely replaces a 
euphoric glow of conspicuous consumption with a melancholic glow equally serving 
landscape consumption, perhaps less conspicuously than insidiously. Proust's 
rememberance of a lost past was evoked by a cake, relived and communicated by the 
written word. Dido's grief at losing Aeneas is known to us through Virgil’s text and has 
also been conveyed by the music of a final aria of an opera by Purcell, amongst many 
other arts and media. It is the virtuosity of art, not the virtue of originality which has 
power.  
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‘Can landscape architecture resuscitate the true meaning of melancholy...?’ asks 
Bowring (p.127). Can landscape architecture presume to know this 'truth'? And how 
would whatever landscape architecture create make claims to a truer truth than what, 
for example, the consumer marketplace would create? We are not dealing with the 
natural as true 'nature' but with 'nature' as we conceive and contrive it. Landscape 
architects are in the business of the artificial, which has at least as much, and ideally 
far more potential for directed—explicit and implicit—communicative power than what 
we chance upon in the unmediated natural world. In fact, inasmuch as melancholy 
might be argued to be an indulgence of the leisure class, true melancholy is exactly 
what conspicuous consumption offers us. You do not mourn the loss of something until 
it is irretrievable. The old High Line was melancholic because it spoke of the failure and 
loss of a transport system built for and representative of the lost might of a defunct 
industrial mode of production. Its new melancholic potential, like that conveyed by the 
Stepford Wives or Michael Grave's creepy Alessi kitchen figures (Naegele 2000), lies in 
reminding us of the loss of that loss.  
 
There is, Bowring began, 'an intense and paradoxical beauty to be found in places of 
melancholy' (2009, p.128). It is not the beauty which is paradoxical however, but the 
finding. The paradox does not lie in sad places providing pleasurable experiences, 
which is the essence of melancholia, not a contradiction. Rather, it lies in the fact that it 
is ‘found’, or, as Bowring puts it later significantly in quotation marks, ‘discovered’. 
Consumer capitalism discovered the opportunity to exploit the site (or discovered that it 
might be bought and valued within emerging models of production and consumption), 
rather than discovering the site itself, which was, of course, already known, but 
unvalued. This discovery of the opportunity for exploitation of its qualities subsequently 
destroyed those qualities which provided the opportunity in the first place, just as 
suburban housing is accused of destroying the site qualities that are used to sell 
residential estates in the first place (Weller 2008). We discover or find unexpected 
beauty, and in the experience of its chance finding in a lost place that we did not 
knowingly create and cannot control, we cannot then 'find' it again. It can only be found 
once. Subsequent discovery and the experience of such wonder require the 
repositioning of art or artifice. However secure our understanding of the experience of 
melancholy may be, the places where it might be found and the ways in which it might 
be generated are not so easily agreed upon or assured. A melancholic place cannot be 
designed with any more certainty than a happy one. The production of healthy happy 
places for healthy happy people is a familiar mantra and promise of suburban real 
estate. A design can achieve certain effects that are generally understood yet cannot 
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be guaranteed to produce certain affects. There is, to put it more accurately, an intense 
beauty to be paradoxically found in places of loss. 
 
Conclusion 
The productive pleasure of musing can slip to the secure self-satisfaction of certainty or 
the self-indulgent abandonment of any decision-making at all. On the one hand it falls 
to Socratic doubt that shows the ground upon which to build secure and correct 
knowledge (the ‘rigor’ of planning). On the other it slips to nothing is but thinking makes 
it so (and so there is no need to design, just reflect). Bernard Tschumi has suggested 
where architecture should situate itself:  
 
The architecture of pleasure lies where concept and experience of space abruptly 
coincide, where architectural fragments collide and merge in delight, where the culture 
of architecture is endlessly deconstructed and rules are transgressed. No metaphorical 
paradise here, but discomfort and the unbalancing of expectations … The architecture 
of pleasure depends on a particular feat, which is to keep architecture obsessed with 
itself in such an ambiguous fashion that it never surrenders to good conscience or 
parody, to debility or delirious neurosis (1977, p.268). 
 
Design’s pleasure is not to be found in conscientious and near-delirious thoroughness 
or in debilitating ‘anything-goes’. It must maintain a state of tension. For Tschumi 
architecture ‘is not a dream (a stage where society’s or the individual’s unconscious 
desires can be fulfilled) … It cannot satisfy your wildest fantasies; but it may exceed the 
limits set by them’ (1977, p.268). To imagine beyond the limitation of what is known is 
the aim of utopian speculation. It is also the present goal of fraught efforts to find new 
conceptions of ‘suburbs’ which we are unable to abandon and yet cannot, with good 
conscience, let alone resource and land scarcity, continue to build as presently 
conceived. 
 
Efforts to re-imagine suburbs and realise their lost promises are, like any utopian effort, 
efforts to realise the impossible. Nonetheless, they are necessary to goad creativity 
and to clarify the motives and goals that have driven suburban development so far. 
Jameson outlines a condition under which ‘political [or design] institutions seem both 
unchangeable and infinitely modifiable’ and yet also ‘this reality [or relevance] paralysis 
might, in fact, be the precondition of the new, purely intellectual and constructivist 
freedom’ (2004, p.44). However, he then goes on to describe the failure of the 
opportunities presented by this potential freedom under the pressure of its own 
urgency: 
 
[A]s one approaches periods of genuine pre-revolutionary ferment, when the system 
really seems in the process of losing its legitimacy, when the ruling elite is palpably 
uncertain of itself and full of divisions and self-doubts, when popular demands grow 
louder and more confident, then what also happens is that those grievances and 
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demands grow more precise in their insistence and urgency … But at such a moment 
the utopian imagination no longer has free play: political thinking and intelligence are 
trained on very sharply focused issues … the wide-ranging drifts and digressions of 
political speculation give way to practical programmes (even if the latter are hopelessly 
unrealisable and ‘utopian’ in the other, dismissive sense) (Jameson 2004, p.44). 
 
It is easy to substitute ‘design’ and ‘landscape architecture’ for ‘politics’ and the 
‘political’ institutions discussed above. It is also true that the times of social ferment 
Jameson describes are also ones of architectural and design ferment that have 
historically led to changes in disciplinary roles for architects, planners, urban and other 
designers. Utopian propositions at the end of the nineteenth century led to both literary 
and built projects. The 1960s were another such time of popular social, political and 
aesthetic rebellion, and we may be entering another now. Certainly this is what 
Jameson is suggesting we consider. In this respect the promise of post WWII 
speculative landscape architectural engagement with emerging environmental 
concerns and issues of appropriate ecological context has, with the ever-increasing 
popular and scientific focus on them, become specifically incorporated in a new 
orthodoxy of technical and practical programs justified under requirements for 
sustainable design and development. Such requirements are enshrined, for example, 
in the AILA Landscape Charter and the Landscape Principles.  
 
The re-enforcement of landscape architecture’s relevance at this time is positioned as 
that of leadership in creative adaptive change where design is a combination of ‘art and 
science.’ And yet such a role for ‘design’ is arguably inimical to that which innovation 
actually requires; that is, not a synthesis of other professional knowledges, but a radical 
challenge to them. Determined designers no longer have free play. Their utopian 
longing, their musing, the pursuit of wonder and delight and the exercise of trained 
imaginative speculation must now deal with sharply focused issues and designated 
practical programmes, even though these are unlikely to address the problems. 
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Chapter 2 
Four Current Categories: Pro-Con, Anti, Non, Utopian 
 
The important problems of suburbs, landscape architecture and utopianism are not 
those of issues arising from what we agree to be suburbs, landscape architecture and 
utopianism. Rather they are problems arising from the ways in which importance has 
been and is again being ascribed to them as tokens for particular world-views and 
carriers of particular meanings for certain groups. In recent reflective examinations, 
similar discourses of value and relevance are becoming more apparent across these 
subject areas. These historically recognisable discourses—generally discussed as 
positions, views or attitudes—can be seen to broadly adopt three trajectories, along 
with a less clearly articulate fourth. The first is a simple good-bad, ‘pro-con’ position 
which is predominantly descriptive, assuming uncomplicated interpretation of observed 
conditions. The second is a more complex dialectical, contrarian Anti position. It 
examines assumptions behind the received data and values from which the Pro-Con 
positions are constructed, applying and even developing new techniques and 
technologies in the reassessment of both descriptions and interpretations. It arrives at 
new explanations and is hopeful of better solutions based on improved information and 
the rediscovery of overlooked opportunities. Alternatively such projection can also lead 
to a third position of uncommitted open-endedness, a ‘non’ position that perpetually 
defers judgement in an environment that is seen to only hold value or relevance 
provisionally or where value is inherent to a context which expertise cannot possibly 
control and therefore judgement can not be trusted to examine or organise. A fourth 
position, equally aware of the risks of errors in judgment, nonetheless works toward 
specific propositions. 
 
Attempts to define good suburbs and landscape architecture can be seen to fit these 
varieties of approach: the Pro-Con is one that attempts to develop a secure, ’workable’ 
definition of absolute criteria, Anti is one that accepts approximate and provisional 
criteria as a starting point while pursuing more accuracy, and Non accepts no definition 
as definitive. The last approach is utopian. To explain these positions with more 
specific reference to landscape architecture, the first is one where simple design along 
with a simple understanding of what landscape architecture does, proposes to address 
an evident problem, (pre)determined by a client and their brief for a particular project. A 
‘good’ design outcome is then simply one which solves the identified problem while a 
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‘bad’ one does not. This approach is the basis of Pro-Con critique of the value of both 
design process and designed product.  
 
For many designers the simplicity of this attitude is merely simplistic and a limited 
difficulty has been mistaken for a problem which lies deeper. A second more complex 
design approach, Anti either Pro or Con judgment, then attempts to find and address 
the cause or real problem, as well as consider the more evident symptom with which a 
client has most likely initially approached the designer. The designer proceeds through 
a range of explorations and framings of the problem that suggests re-workings of the 
brief. If ‘simple’ practise alone cannot find scope for such extended work on causes, or 
clients fund such re-working of briefs, it is anticipated that academia, government and 
other funded research areas are or will be active in providing new models, tools and 
technologies for different and more thoroughly considered framings.8 With such 
consideration and having acknowledged and researched a particular site’s history and 
learnt its lessons, the designer can propose a new solution appropriate for its present 
time and context or claim to extrapolate a solution for future anticipated problems.  
 
For some designers, any re-framing still requires a frame so that the solution is also still 
constrained by the closed, exclusive or ‘appropriate’ terms of reference that the 
designer sets or resets for the client. These still arguably limit the work to getting rid of 
difficulties rather than solving problems. The third ‘non’ approach to design evaluation 
operates at this further level of examination, finally avoiding even posing solutions to 
what it finds are uncontrollable causes in infinite possible contexts. Here the designer’s 
position is one in favour of the open-ended proliferation of potentialities, becomings 
and future possibilities that dissolve the problem in history itself, arguably along with 
any obligation for responsible action or blame for outcomes.  
 
So the first position is a straightforward polemical good or bad one, the second is an 
elaboration of various possible fruitful negotiations and the third is an expression of the 
impossibility of any directed resolution if nonetheless hopeful of active engagement in 
an infinite, ongoing process with no defined purpose. However, the persistent framing 
of problems as well as the continuing hopeful expectation and exploration of solutions, 
suggests that while we can find these three positions useful to argue project proposals, 
we still find them wanting. We still require, still expect, still desire, but have not yet 
                                                 
8 Some research into suburbs has been funded by mortgage brokers and the real estate industry. In the 
United States the Fannie Mae Foundation published Robert Lang, among others, in favor of suburbs as 
spaces of active and diverse democratic practices. In February 2007 that Foundation, ‘one of the biggest 
donors to local charities’ shut down amidst criticism that ‘the company was using tax-exempt contributions 
to advance corporate interests’ (Hilzenrath, D. S. & Joyce, A. 2007, unpaginated). 
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reached any clearly satisfactory alternative. A further, fourth position is hinted at. 
Rejecting simple good or bad as well as complex possible or impossible framings, 
there is another approach. The evidence for such a fourth position requires further 
interrogation. It is the possibilities offered by this fourth position that the thesis is 
concerned to make apparent as there is within it an acknowledgement and 
encouragement of engaged action and therefore design. It is proposed that the fourth 
position is in fact already that from which suburbs, landscape architecture and utopias 
derive value, but value which is appropriated by the other more easily, familiarly and 
fashionably articulated positions. This last position does not mistake the solving or 
dissolving of problems—which is empowering even as it leads forward to other 
problems—for the overcoming of difficulties which does not lead anywhere except to 
confirm what was already anticipated. 
 
Pro-Con 
David Lowenthal notes that ‘[c]ities are famously seen through the opposing lenses of 
redemption and corruption’ (2001). He goes on to describe the same response to 
suburbs. ‘For’ and ‘against’ histories of the suburbs are evident from early uses of the 
term. Pro-sprawl, pro-suburban commentary notes all the reasons why suburbs have 
succeeded in spreading as evidence of their success. Commentary against sprawl 
unfavourably assesses the violence of the succession (the destruction of prior 
environmental, social and other orders of life) as axiomatic evidence of the failure of 
suburbs. In the first instance, the means not merely justifies but presupposes the end. 
In the latter the perpetual and brutal means of creative destruction is the sorry end. If 
pro-sprawl presents a latter-day manifest destiny for post-colonial occupation, to be 
against it is mere godless gainsaying. But if pro-sprawl is a failure to respect the land 
and traditional bonds of natural and social relationships with landscape, to be against it 
is to show responsible stewardship and god-fearing restraint. 
 
The arguments for and against suburban settlement forms are regularly recited. 
Richard Weller has offered a recent recounting, devoting a summary paragraph to the 
respective pros and cons of Australian suburbs (2008). The same commentator may 
hold or develop both views. Frederick Law Olmsted said of suburbs in the 1860s that 
they represented ‘the most attractive, the most refined, and the most soundly 
wholesome forms of domestic life, and the best application of the arts of civilisation to 
which mankind has yet attained’ (in Fishman 1989, p.17). Yet he noted a decade later 
that suburbs ‘which a few years ago were distinguished for their rural beauty and 
refined society, have thus, through the gradual development of various uncongenial 
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elements, entirely lost their former character’ (in Fogelson 2005, p.28). Lewis Mumford 
declared: 
 
In the mass movement into suburban areas a new kind of community was produced, 
which caricatured both the historic city and the archetypal suburban refuge: a multitude 
of uniform, unidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform distances, on uniform 
roads, in a treeless communal waste, inhabited by people of the same class, the same 
income, the same age group, witnessing the same television performances, eating the 
same tasteless prefabricated foods, from the same freezers, conforming in every 
outward and inward respect to a common mould, manufactured in the central 
metropolis. Thus the ultimate effect of the suburban escape in our time is, ironically, a 
low-grade uniform environment from which escape is impossible (1961, p.553). 
 
An equivalent complaint updates and adds to Mumford’s observation on conformity, 
although it is less a question of ‘outward’ or even ‘inward’ commonalities than a 
conformity evident in the consistency of goals underlying complex manipulative 
deceptions of variety serving global capitalism. 
 
Industrial agriculture has established ecologically moribund, machine-dominated 
monocultures around the globe. Yet we consume the resultant agricultural produce as a 
stupendous array and a dazzling celebration of traditional world cuisines and their 
uncountably many hybrids … the households of a single latemodern suburban street 
are far more likely to share the presence of microwaves, for warming our cuisine of the 
moment, than they are to share lifestyle preferences. While neighbors appear to 
disagree on fundamental moral and spiritual matters, this disagreement generally 
doesn't penetrate their cooperation in the proliferation of credit cards, reticulated 
sewerage, and transgenic vaccinations (Davison 2001, p.142). 
 
However Mumford could also say:  
 
Taking the suburb at its best, it provided a parklike setting for the family dwelling-house; 
and for all the domestic activities associated with it. In the kitchen, the garden, the 
workshop, activities that had once been the necessities of country life could now be 
carried on as a relief from the grim, monotonous, imprisoned collective routine of the 
city … Thus, in its earliest form, the suburb acknowledged the varieties of human 
temperament and aspiration, the need for change, contrast, and adventure, and above 
all, for an environment visibly responsive to one's personal efforts, as even the smallest 
flower garden is responsive (1961, p.560-561). 
 
In his most famous work Design with Nature, Ian McHarg recognises two types of 
suburb (1971). He distinguishes the legacy of the pre-war 'humane suburb' (p.74) from 
the 'ticky-tacky' post WWII suburban houses (p.24) of 'inchoate suburbanisation' (p.79) 
which make up the outer 'sad' (p.20) suburbs of 'unrealisable dream', the 'faceless 
suburb, no-place, somewhere USA’ (p.80). In those ‘older areas you will find humane, 
generous suburbs where spacious men [sic] built their concern into houses and spaces 
so that dignity and peace, safety and quiet live there’ (p.23). What McHarg does not 
acknowledge is the wealth that enabled the creation of earlier generous suburbs, and 
that life there was limited to the rich. It is not surprising that an aspiration for something 
similar for the masses, or even a middle class, could and would not lead to the same 
outcome in quality of materials or design. And yet it is not simply a failure of design to 
 
 
39
be good enough but a failure to employ good design in the first place inasmuch as it 
both makes the process of development more expensive and is usually not required in 
order to make the same profit. The peace and dignity of ‘spacious men’ is funded by 
the sale of ‘ticky-tacky’ environments to those who have no choice. What all these 
observations, and many others, reveal—even if, like McHarg, they do not recognise it—
is the connection of suburban development to the growth of consumer capitalism and 
the circulation of global capital without which alternative scenarios of building and 
dwelling increasingly appeared impossible to develop. 
 
The Initial observations of post WWII suburban expansion, resulting almost exclusively 
in condemnation, were succeeded by a period of defiant praise. The earlier partook of 
nostalgia for the suburbs of pre-sprawl landscapes, the latter, nostalgia for early forms 
of suburban sprawl. Nostalgia-driven Pro and Con phases continue, contract and 
overlap as suburban housing continues to change.9 These have been followed more 
recently by scepticism of both extremes and an even greater curiosity and wonder at 
the phenomenon of suburbia and the specific phenomena of various suburbs. As 
Graham Davison explained in the introduction to essays from two conferences in the 
early nineties as part of Monash University’s investigation into suburbia: ‘In urging an 
open-minded historical reappraisal of the postwar city, however, we do not wish to see 
the sneering contempt of an earlier generation of intellectuals replaced by the 
babyboomers' uncritical nostalgia for the days of the FJ Holden, the Sunbeam 
Mixmaster and the Hills Hoist’ (Davison et al. 1995, p.7). Yet it is still not clear what has 
replaced either and whatever has may already be in need of replacement itself. 
 
Con 
 
Though the rise of the suburb brought about significant changes in both the social 
contents and the spatial order of the city, most of the interpreters of the city, until but 
yesterday, have curiously passed it by; and even the few writers who have touched 
upon the planning of the suburb, notably Professor Christopher Tunnard, have treated it 
as a relatively recent phenomenon (Mumford 1961, p.549). 
 
There have always been ‘suburbs’, at least as long as there have been cities, notes 
Mumford, as has Ted Bruegmann much more recently (2005). Inasmuch as ‘[c]ities 
have always expanded horizontally unless curbed by walls, natural barriers, or the 
inability to communicate over distance’ (Beinart 2004) there was perhaps little 
comment necessary on the advantages of such inevitable expansion, especially when 
there was plenty of space to expand into and little of value there which those with any 
significant power or influence might object to losing.  
                                                 
9 Echoing J. B. Jackson’s Westward-Moving House, George Seddon has outlined the shrinking of ‘The 
Australian Backyard’ (Seddon, G. 1997 [1994]) as has Tony Hall (Hall, T. 2007) 
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The first writings on suburbs then emerge as criticism in reaction to the observed 
negative effects of suburban growth and the term itself—utilising ‘sub-‘ (below) rather 
than ‘ex-‘ (out-of) or extra (beyond)—is negatively constructed. It has been recognised 
that suburbia ‘has been a neuralgic point in debates about Australian culture and 
Australian identity since the end of the nineteenth century’ (McCann 1998, p.vii). Louis 
Esson’s 1911 diatribe against the ‘vaunted purity of the suburban home’ (in McCann 
1998, p.vii) captured what is still a pervasive anxiety about suburban life. The suburban 
home, wrote Esson, ‘stifles the devil-may-care spirit, the Dionysian, the creative spirit. It 
denounces Art, enthusiasm, heroic virtue. The Muses are immolated on the altar of 
respectability’ (in McCann 1998, p.vii). In America, the seminal texts of Robert Fishman 
and Kenneth Jackson in the 1980s, reviewing the earlier critical texts of such observers 
as Lewis Mumford, Jane Jacobs and William Whyte, echoed by Robin Boyd and others 
in Australia, have predominantly condemned the suburbs.  
 
From the 1960s, with the use of the term in Gods Own Junkyard: The Planned 
Deterioration of America's Landscape suburbs have become synonymous with ‘sprawl’ 
(Blakely 2003). The voluminous anti-sprawl position was consolidated by journalist 
Howard Kunstler in a genre-defining anti-suburban, anti-car assault which praises more 
contact with undeveloped ‘nature’ as the principal cure to suburban ills (1993) even as 
contact with domesticated nature in the suburbs was still accepted as a cure for urban 
ones. The most sustained, vigorous and widely disseminated sprawl attack has 
arguably been delivered in America by New Urbanism and related movements such as 
Smart Growth which have spread across the Atlantic (Calthorpe 1997; Calthorpe & 
Fulton 2001; Duany 1998; Dunham-Jones & Williamson 2008; Farr 2007; Katz 1993). 
‘Oldfangled new towns: a brilliant husband-and wife team lead a growing movement to 
replace charmless suburban sprawl with civilized, familiar places that people love’ 
(Andersen 1991) is a title typical of popular journalism in praise of New Urbanist efforts. 
The same attitude and arguments can be found in regular denunciations of suburban 
sprawl such as ‘The end of the great Australian dream can't come soon enough’ by 
Elizabeth Farrelly. Farrelly has compiled her anti-sprawl observations into a book: 
Blubberland: The Dangers of Happiness (2007). The predominant understanding of 
suburbs, their problems and solutions, as cited in the press, are that suburbs and their 
sprawl are wasteful and bad while planning can solve them through new strategies that 
compel more efficient and limited use of land concentrating on social and 
environmental benefits, supported by government and the employment of improved 
technologies for data capture and analysis as well as project delivery (Adler 1995). 
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Two sorts of Pro 
At the turn of the millennium another shift toward more positive views of the suburbs by 
cultural 'elites' of academia and the urban media was recorded by Nick Gillespie. He 
quotes several sources including the New York Times Magazine which ran a special 
edition ‘that actually had some good things to say about the suburbs’. 
 
One story even went so far as to praise Levittown, Long Island, that reportedly 
irradiated Ground Zero of the post-war suburban explosion: ‘Held up as an example of 
conformity and monotony, Levittown's 17,000 identical capes have mutated into an 
exuberant architectural Babel: the sparrows on a wire have each grown their own 
distinctive plumage’ (2000, p.4).  
 
This positive shift is based on claims of diversity and maturity. ‘The suburbs today are 
really cities in horizontal form’ (James Hughes in Gillespie 2000, p.4) replete with their 
variety of services and an array of housing style choices. In one respect this is similar 
to Mumford’s and McHarg’s praise for older suburbs and condemnation of the new, 
albeit their new suburbs are now the old and their old even older. The succession can 
be partly explained by the physical changes as well as memories and nostalgia that 
mature landscapes accrue. But ongoing, contracting and overlapping phases of praise 
and condemnation can also be considered part of competing and manipulated visions 
of what suburbs are, what they have been and what they could be. These visions 
emerge from three sources: radical utopian individualism, a conservative community 
and government, and a speculating market which utilises both. Pro-suburb views can 
be of two types: those that project utopian alterity and those that exploit or detourn the 
potential for difference as something not only normal and achievable but purchasable. 
The distinction is often a slippery one, with governments historically playing to each, 
variously curbing and encouraging optimistic innovation and cautious consolidation, 
although, regardless, now almost universally serving a ubiquitous if not always 
benevolent market economy. 
 
Defenders and advocates of the suburbs take several positions and these are not 
consistent in either the vision of current suburban life that they wish to defend, or in 
proposals for the future of suburbs. There are key distinctions between ‘suburbs’ and 
‘sprawl’ for example, where some commentators support and others condemn sprawl 
as a key characteristic of suburbs. The rarer pro-sprawl position is posited by Alan 
Berger in Drosscape. ‘[P]eople concerned with landscape, environment and 
sustainability issues almost never consider sprawl a positive opportunity, even though it 
is largely dominated by landscape development’ (2006, p.21). Another distinction is 
made between suburbs supported as a healthy democratic and necessarily capitalist 
space of free-market investment and return requiring the increased encouragement of 
freer government policy, and the view that suburbs provide an affordable range of 
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communal and family benefits where the mounting privatisation of public space and 
services along with rising house prices unfortunately distort the suburban ideal, 
requiring firmer legislative intervention. The politics of both left and right make use of 
the spatial potential of suburbia to realise political potential. 
 
In Australia, the initial post-war pro-suburban counter-attack to the generation of 
Mumford and McHarg was made in the 1970s by Hugh Stretton. While titled for cities 
his Ideas for Australian Cities is more properly and specifically about Australian 
suburbs as the best expression of and opportunity for a good life:  
 
So - to sum up - you don't have to be a mindless conformist to choose suburban life. 
Most of the best poets and painters and inventors and protestors choose it too. It 
reconciles access to work and city with private, adaptable, self-expressive living space 
at home...These are the gains our transport costs buy for us (1975, p.21). 
 
For Stretton a pro-suburb view is a political, specifically socialist one. ‘What follows 
is...a political tract, not a planning manual’ (1975, p.4). In France in the late 1960s, a 
group of avant-garde architects, artists, writers, theorists, and critics calling themselves 
‘spatial urbanists’ envisioned a series of urban utopias; phantom cities of a possible 
future (Busbea 2007). The group ‘Utopie’ founded by Henri Lefebvre in 1966 included 
writers, artists, sociologists, architects and landscape architect Isabelle Auricoste. The 
writings of Jean Baudrillard in its eponymous journal have been recently collected 
(2006). Like Stretton, although the projects and language are focused on the ‘city’ of 
Paris, the issues addressed were those most affecting and evident in the suburbs such 
as their unprecedented expansion, their poor-quality architecture, the increasing use of 
cars, population growth and inadequate provision of infrastructure including open 
space.  
 
Such issues were and continue to be examined as essentially political ones. Witold 
Rybczynski’s review of Ted Bruegmann’s Sprawl: A Compact History makes the 
suburbs’ connections with free market economics explicit: ‘Sprawl is and always has 
been inherent to urbanisation. It is driven less by the regulations of legislators, the 
actions of developers, and the theories of city planners, than by the decisions of 
millions of individuals - Adam Smith's “invisible hand”’ (2005). ‘Democracy—consumer 
preference writ large—unfailingly reflects the popular will’ (Kiefer 2004) and reveals 
itself enthusiastically in suburbs. Globalisation, argued as the spread of such 
democracy, itself defined as freely circulating capital, is presented as an actor-less, 
apolitical force of great potential, and ,at any rate, is an irresistible and unyielding 
power and fact of life (Castells 1996). However, its ‘potential’ works as well for 
repression as liberation of different people and their goals and it therefore cannot exist 
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as an apolitical or undirected force of nature. Global networks and economies are 
programmed and reprogrammed, designed and redesigned in series of struggles. Even 
in its newer forms of dissemination via digital communications, the dynamism of global 
networks—of whatever sort and however personally or corporately exercised, however 
inclusive of social, economic, architectural or any other arenas of ideas and 
information—is not freely evolving and opportunities are not freely circulating (Castells 
2009). Despite, or rather because of, seeming de-politicisation, the very idea of 
freedom and potential offered by such networks and the apparently unconstrained 
emergence of positive potentials generated by them, must be viewed and critiqued as a 
political and very deliberately motivated project. For David Harvey such projects are 
controlled by ‘capitalist class interests operating through the agency of the US foreign, 
military, and commercial policy’ (1997, p.69). 
 
Harvey’s Spaces of Hope (2000) relates political struggle specifically to the production 
of physical space and posits utopian thought and proposition as the key to resistance 
of otherwise irresistible global forces. The findings of his Baltimore case study might 
apply to parallel land development in Melbourne: a docklands/harbor redevelopment, a 
succession of major project investments required to fund their successive borrowing, 
public-private partnerships for specific sites and the formation of quasi-government 
bodies to oversee zones of rebuilding (Dockland Authority) and genres of building 
(VicUrban’s residential housing estates), gentrification of inner ring suburbs, de-
industrialisation and intensive development of post-industrial sites, privatisation of city 
services and infrastructure, subsidised suburban growth, an so on. Even as Harvey 
names and illustrates fallen utopias—the dystopias of suburban ‘bourgeois utopia’, 
downtown ‘developers’ utopia’, gentrifying ‘yuppie utopia’, city spectacular ‘event 
utopia’ and projected ‘videotopia’ and gated ‘privatopia’—in the end he still reserves for 
the term utopia a transformative power of imagination essential to overcoming 
arguments that there is no alternative, even as alternatives fall prey to their dystopian 
realities.  
 
Architecture, planning and landscape architecture, explicitly immersed in spatial 
production, cannot avoid acting with—or against—such interests, consciously or not. 
This is clearly evident in the objects of architecture. But the integrated programmatic, 
ecological and other systems of landscape architecture and of land development, 
which are not simply inseparable but, in practice, logically synonymous, are even more 
complicit with political agendas. In particular they are most readily implicated with neo-
liberalism and located, above all other landscapes, in the suburban one (Gleeson 
2006). As early as the 1960s, even the Australian Labor Party (ALP) had developed a 
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theory of reform coherent with evoking a ‘way of life’ and an ‘image of Australia as an 
undifferentiated suburbia, composed of individual households standing free of class 
relations’ (Rowse 1992).  
 
[The ALP] represented not the aspirations of a working class constituted by its 
subordinate place in production, but the needs of disadvantaged householders, 
concentrated in regions... After all, a class-oriented conception of the ALP constituency 
was inadmissible to these ideals precisely because the whole program was to be 
financed by the continued, privately-directed expropriation of working-class labour – the 
fundamental source of all the inequalities being dealt with … Hancock said with a 
playful mixture of banality and insight: 'There are no classes in Australia except in the 
economic sense'. He was viewing Australian society through the wrong end of the 
Marxist telescope. His use of the word 'except' trivialises the very processes which 
constitute ours as a class society...those who use 'suburbia' as a defining image of 
Australian society lend their support to this obscuring emphasis (pp.247-250). 
 
In War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life Wendell 
Cox (2006) argues primarily that suburban growth should be encouraged as there are 
unaddressed inequities in restraining it. He revisits evidence of earlier pro-suburban 
texts including Suburban Legends (DiLorenzo 2000a), a republication of The Myth of 
Suburban Sprawl (DiLorenzo 2000b). Thomas DiLorenzo argues that the adverse 
effects of suburban sprawl have been greatly exaggerated and suggests that planning, 
rather than being a positive force for control of problems, is largely responsible for 
generating them and for emerging systemic failures of suburban infrastructures. In an 
uncompromising pro-development, free-market appeal, he addresses and dismisses 
the major claims made by anti-sprawl advocates, including dwindling productive 
farmland, inefficiency of road transport, water and infrastructure supply crises, 
efficiency and equity of central regulatory planning and so on.  
 
To millions of Americans a house in the suburbs, with a nice yard, a garden, and a little 
open space is the American dream. But to environmentalists and planners it is a sheer 
nightmare. The invectives used by environmentalists and urban planners to describe 
suburbia reveal a visceral hatred of it … Many of the problems the critics of suburbia 
are concerned with have been either greatly exaggerated or simply fabricated. 
Moreover, their proposed 'solutions' to these problems—centralized governmental 
planning of where we live and work and how we commute (ie regulatory sprawl)—is 
bound to be economically inefficient, harmful to growth, and inherently inequitable … 
The major claims made by smart-growth advocates do not hold up to scrutiny (2000b). 
 
Peter Corrigan famously has a favourable view of Australian suburbs: ‘I’ve always been 
an unabashed fan of the suburbs. I’ve admired the wonderful sense of survival of 
suburban Australia, quite in spite of the tiresome harassment from architectural 
aesthetics. I see them as a source of fabulous energy’ (in Clark 2000). His positive 
view of the suburbs is not, however, unqualified or apolitical approval but consists of a 
vision of their potential, a utopian pursuit of architecture’s potential to help realise 
human potential. His view of suburbs is not simply Pro, and his suspicion of claims to 
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the effortlessly reasoned and reasonable working out of problems betrays neither his 
utopianism nor his appeals to intellectual endeavour and political debate.  
 
In a similar sense, some see the potential of suburbs as valuable and diverse 
ecological habitat. For Aiden Davison there are signs ‘that sub/urban nature is 
beginning to be thought as something other than an oxymoron’ (2005). He notes that 
biologist Tim Low ‘has found a receptive audience for claims that sub/urban 
environments are more ecologically resilient and adaptive than generally 
acknowledged’. Human as well as non-human nature has also been argued as 
unexpectedly diverse: 
 
Suburban or marginal regions across the globe reflect the latest evolving trends in 
contemporary culture. Beneath a veil of stereotyped uniformity lurk insomniacs and 
amnesiacs, plagued by fear or driven to invention. Poetry and violence, romance and 
pornography, and organic gardens and toxic waste are all nestled into the naturalistic 
settings of the suburbs … When I recently visited the omnipresent suburb I was struck 
by how far off the mark my picture of the place really was... We think we know what 
happens in the suburbs, but we are missing many sides to the story (Lang et al. 1997, 
pp.6-7). 
 
In a tribute to Peter Corrigan on the occasion of his receiving the (then) RAIA Gold 
Medal for architecture in 2003, Conrad Hamann positioned his work against Australia’s 
‘suburbhaters’ and the general disdain of professional architects.  
 
Then there were the suburbs. Seized on early as an exciting Australian substitute for 
dark satanic mills and tubercular demoralisation, they have been credited with every 
1850-1970 vice imaginable, from infantilism to repetition to conservatism to being seen 
as the realms of a lower order. Hugh Stretton and Hal Porter showed the absurdities of 
this loading, but for many in architecture the Australian suburb still remains an 
amorphous enemy … suburbhating, while claiming high moral ground, turned 
Modernism’s former engagement with more radical political activism into a crusade for 
taste, certifiable maturity and lifestyle (2003). 
 
Corrigan is not pro-suburb as much as he is against suburbhaters. His hope is utopian. 
Designers are rarely Pro-Con. They do not declare themselves for or against the 
suburbs, accepting or rejecting arguments presented to them, as much as seek to 
understand them in order to make—or rather design and build—their own arguments. 
Their work requires analyses of Pro-Con positions in order to develop new 
propositions. Such analyses are, in the first limited instance, Anti. They attempt to 
resolve or anticipate the resolution of polemic, opposing views. They employ or invent 
new techniques, terms and tactics for overcoming conflict. In these efforts they are also 
essentially conservative in their acceptance of the terms within which the suburban 
situation is recognised, its conflicts described and its problems intended to be 
overcome.  
 
Anti 
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Along with continuing familiar arguments which regard suburbs as phenomena of 
essentially known fundamental qualities—albeit of unprecedented amendment and 
growth—there are pleas for more carefully researched and complex appraisals of their 
history. Such appeals and their research now constitute a major part of literature on the 
suburbs. As this attitude suggests an optimistic and empowering approach to re-
assessment of problems, the Anti stance can be seen to generally favour a positive 
possible future for suburbs. This view has been most notably led by Ted Bruegmann 
(2005). He is a leading voice of the American ‘contrarians’, a group who argue that 
sprawl is not a newly threatening phenomenon and who remind critics that the suburbs 
have always been appealing. In identifying suburbs as the logical, common and 
demonstrable outgrowth of improved economies throughout history, Bruegmann 
denounces the argument that suburban sprawl is a new noxious threat resulting from 
unprecedented conditions and presenting unique challenges. The conditions he 
identifies that give rise to suburban expansion are not exceptional to the consumer 
confidence of our own age, but have been identified as typical to periods of growth in 
diverse cultures. A year later William Bogart’s Don't Call It Sprawl: Metropolitan 
Structure in the 21st Century put ‘the current policy debate over urban sprawl … into a 
broader analytical and historical context’ (2006, unpaginated) and similarly to 
Bruegmann suggested that ‘the debate about sprawl has been driven by a fundamental 
lack of understanding of the structure, functioning, and evolution of modern 
metropolitan areas’ (unpaginated). 
 
The Anti approach to the suburbs rejects simple Pro-Con arguments. Anti admits 
greater complexity. It is interested in specificity, authenticity, diversity, fitness, health 
and safety. It discusses the regional scale as a solution to the failures of focus on both 
too-small, unintegrated local problem-solving, and on the too-large generalisations of 
state, national and federal perspectives. It is also an advocate of the human scale 
against the impersonal inhuman scale of modernist planning and architecture. Anti is 
the preferred response of governments as well as planning, engineering, social and 
other sciences. Anti literature pursues rational, pragmatic, ‘real world’ solutions, 
utilising advanced technologies and techniques with ever-greater precision and 
capacity. Employing the promises that these make, an Anti attitude is also the preferred 
stance of real estate and the market, which can construct and embellish their own best-
practice and best-value promises around those of authoritative research. In this way 
Anti is also a compromising, have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too, best of all worlds attitude. 
Anti is not for or against the suburbs; it proposes to deliver better, newer, more 
efficient, balanced and—finally—correct suburbs. But Anti is also full of myths. It 
appeals to an unexplained because self-evident greater good or truth that all its 
 
 
47
interests serve. Merely to invoke its key terms—specificity, authenticity, diversity, 
fitness, health and safety—is to evidence desirable outcomes. Anti then is utopia failed, 
risk abandoned. Anti is the calculated and carefully planned recuperation of radical 
detournment.  
 
Anti is concerned with consensus and reasoned compromise. Government agents, the 
market and those who work for them are interested in reaching acceptable agreements 
for moving toward an agreed greater good. AILA, typically for institutions, is 
conservative. With large grants from the Federal Government, it has directed the 
profession’s concerns over the last few years to align with those of government policy 
and the advice of government agencies such as the CSIRO. Although the role of State 
Government Architect is managed differently in those states which have the office, part 
of their general brief is to act as advisors and mediators between government, industry 
and the public, resolving, advocating, educating and helping reach decisions regarding 
major projects and policy concerning the built environment (London 2009). For John 
Denton, appointed Victoria’s first State Government Architect in December 2005, this 
included ‘giving comfort’ and assurance to government and investors that designers 
are not being profligate, bureaucracies are not being wastefully obstructionist and 
developers are not being greedy. ‘His experience with high quality design can provide 
credibility and confidence in managing the bureaucracy’s traditionally risk-averse 
approach’ (UDF 2006).  
 
New South Wales’ Chris Johnson declares that ‘people out in the houses in the 
suburbs of our capital cities are looking for something they can believe in - something 
that is more than developer’s profit and more than Nimby parochialism’ (UDF 2006). To 
say that ‘Government Architects across Australia can act as very useful go-betweens, 
between the profession and the political world, in ways that move our industry into new 
areas’ is to place architecture firmly within an industry in ways that potentially estrange 
it from a more influential role it might have in moving society itself into new areas not 
constrained by industrial economies. Asked what ‘good design’ is Denton’s successor 
Geoffrey London ‘relates it to qualities of life such as amenity, pleasure safety, and 
economics – with faith in the idea and experience that good design is also good 
economics’ (UDF 2008, unpaginated). Nonetheless Professor Philip Goad of 
Melbourne University, the then immediate past president of the Australian Institute of 
Architects, was reported as believing that ‘the main challenge will be to ensure that 
design is actually the guiding principle rather than economic rationalism’ (in Dowling 
2008, unpaginated). Not dissimilarly, Professor Richard Blythe of RMIT warned that 
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‘state architects are important to ensure controversial projects are not stymied by 
media populism’ (in Dowling 2008, unpaginated).  
 
Ever popular with the media, New Urbanism, along with Smart Growth and similar 
strategic planning associations and lobby groups, identify themselves as movements 
against the suburbs. More specifically they are against ‘sprawl’ as a particularly poor 
manifestation of the suburban settlement type. However their own propositions might 
be considered another form of suburb or revived form of older suburb (Meredith 2003). 
So their propositions and attitude are more correctly Anti, neither for nor against 
suburbs, but an enhanced or compromised modification of their supposedly better 
qualities. Peter Calthorpe advised:  
 
It is time to redefine the American Dream. We must make it more accessible to our 
diverse population: singles, the working poor, the elderly, and the pressed middle-class 
families who can no longer afford the ‘Ozzie and Harriet’ version of the good life. 
Certain traditional values—diversity, community, frugality, and the human scale—should 
be the foundation of a new direction for both the American dream and the American 
Metropolis. These values are not a retreat to nostalgia or imitation, but a recognition 
that certain qualities of culture and community are timeless. And that these timeless 
imperatives must be married to the modern condition in new ways (1997, p.16). 
 
To know how to make the American Dream ‘more’ than whatever it is, one needs to 
know what it is. The Dream is self-confessedly not real to begin with. That it will be 
‘redefined’ via certain ‘traditional values’ which are ‘timeless’ does not make it more 
real, as these criteria too are both contested and deeply compromised by conflicting 
claims to authentic meaning and specific instance. For Calthorpe the ‘alternative to 
sprawl is simple and timely’ (1997, p.4). It is basically ‘a modern version of a traditional 
town’ which is effectively a denser suburb ‘with minimal environmental impacts; less 
land consumed, less traffic generated, less pollution produced’ (1997, p.17).  
 
Planning regulation and legislation is Anti, its power sustained by detailed research and 
studies that ‘prove’ both the need for and fairness of controls. New technology is 
marshalled to assist more accurate assessment—of material, psychological, economic, 
visual and other characteristics of a given site and situation—and to organise more 
persuasive and responsive corrections to identified errors. John Hasse’s ‘Geospatial 
Approach to Measuring New Development Tracts for Characteristics of Sprawl’ (2004) 
is typical of research which supports this. It comes from a tradition of social engineering 
exemplified by the detailed work of Alice Coleman on London’s public housing which 
led to the publication of Utopia on Trial (1985), a formative text of the type of research 
informing planning legislation. Following on from the findings of Oscar Newman’s 
Defensible Space (1972) which postulated that poor architectural design can 
encourage criminal activity, Professor Coleman of King's College in London headed a 
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research group called the Land Use Research Unit. Formed in 1979, it sought links 
between public housing design and crime as well as general social ‘malaise’. The 
objective was to determine if the spatial scale and configuration of modern, high-rise 
housing design was a significant contributing factor to social malaise in addition to 
straightforward criminal acts.  
 
For Tim Benton, Coleman’s work is an attack on utopianism at the same time as it is an 
attack on socialism. It is Anti in its use of statistical proof and its neoliberalism; in not 
being against denser living or apartments per se, but against social housing:  
 
In general, [Coleman’s work] confirms many tenets of modern folklore. The research is 
flawed in several respects and motivated by a passionate commitment to Thatcherite 
values of individuality, family, and self-interest as the only guardians of stability … The 
lesson of Thatcherite and Reaganite policies, well learned by their successors, is that 
there are more votes in reducing taxes and creating misery for a minority of uninfluential 
people than in bearing the ever increasing costs of raising standards of service, 
comfort, and hygiene for all … the vestigial idealism of the bourgeois architect and 
planner retreats behind the defensible space of the individual family unit (1999, 
unpaginated). 
 
Similarly designers retreat behind the entrance features of masterplanned ‘community’ 
housing estates. Such studies as Coleman’s led to the creation of Design Guides and 
associated codes and standards. The same form of studies and their comprehensive 
statistics ‘prove’ why (traditional) suburban sprawl is bad and suburbs dysfunctional. 
The relationships between the cause and organisational, even behavioural, effects of 
long travel distances and isolating detached housing on occupants may be 
supportable, but the assumption of affects (the misery, desperation and loneliness that 
explain ‘bad’ behaviours) is far less easily demonstrated. Even as there has been 
greater acknowledgment and accommodation of socio-political and cultural difference, 
there has been a tightening of the ways in which ‘facts’ and evidence must invariably 
be recognised and registered.10 
 
Sustainability is a mainstream Anti endeavour and an explicit aim of planning. It is no 
longer a radical concept, but appears as a widely adopted term, principally because it 
is ‘extraordinarily elastic’ (Davison 2008a, p.191). It has proven malleable to almost any 
agenda, and although much has been written on the ‘complexity and multiplicity of [an] 
                                                 
10 The rise of ‘evidence based policy’ has been examined in Michael, K. & Michael, M. G. (eds) 2008, 
Australia and the New Technologies: Evidence Based Policy in Public Administration (Workshop on the 
Social Implications of National Security, 2008). ‘Evidence-based policy (EBP) is an approach to decision-
making in government which stipulates that policy-setting should be based on objective evidence’ (p.11). 
However ‘EBP does not escape the age-old problem of what actually constitutes evidence. Is evidence 
fact, and can we really determine who is correct? Is evidence truth? What does it mean to have “enough” 
proof?’ (p.14). 
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essentially contested concept’ there is no inquiry regarding the need for it that is not 
dismissed as climate change scepticism or similar. Sustainability has been employed 
by (if it wasn’t a construction of) a dominant Western consumer capitalist paradigm 
formulated to promote new products and patterns of ‘smarter’, ‘greener’ consumption to 
feed continued economic expansion.  
 
Lewis Mumford’s City in History concludes, immediately following a chapter on 
suburbia, with a discussion of the ‘Myth of the Metropolis’. The myth resides in the 
supposed disinterestedness and democracy of civic power, a myth fostered to support 
the banking system through increased access to mortgages and following on from the 
associated myth of freely chosen demand for such houses (1961, pp.661-3). ‘Release 
and enslavement, freedom and compulsion, have been present from the beginning in 
urban culture. Out of this inner tension some of the expressions of urban life have 
come forth’ (1961, p.636). In doing away with this tension through the thorough, non-
dissenting adoption of the Myth, we do not ensure release and freedom, but submit to 
dependence and compulsion. 
 
In the 1960s the Internationale Situationniste undertook sustained critique of planning 
logic:  
 
An expert has argued on the basis of precise experiments that the programs proposed 
by the planners can sometimes create feelings of discontent and revolt, which could 
have been partly avoided if we had a more profound knowledge of real behaviour, and 
above all of the motivations for this behaviour (Vaneigem 1961, unpaginated). 
 
The same argument is offered that if only landscape architecture had better knowledge 
of 'real' nature it could design better and more sustainable environments. 
 
Planning is the big word, the biggest of the lot, some say. The specialists talk of 
economic planning, and planned urbanism, then they give a knowing wink, and, 
providing the performance is well rendered, all the world applauds. The high point of the 
spectacle is the planning of happiness … Roadways, lawns, natural flowers and artificial 
forests lubricate the gears of subjection, render it lovable … it is a matter of scenically 
organizing the spectacle around everyday life, to let each person live within the bounds 
which correspond to the role capitalist society imposes on him ... Urbanism is the art of 
reassuring, which it knows how to practise in its purest form: the ultimate courtesy of a 
power on the point of assuming total control of our minds (Vaneigem 1961, 
unpaginated). 
 
The same critique is offered by Guy Debord:  
 
The Situationists have always said that ‘unitary urbanism is not a doctrine of urbanism 
but a critique of urbanism’ … Until it merges with a general revolutionary praxis, 
urbanism is necessarily the first enemy of all possibilities for human life in our time … 
‘improvement’ or ‘progress’ will always be designed to lubricate the system and perfect 
the conditioning that we must overturn, in urbanism and everywhere else … 
‘Experimental Utopia: For a New Urbanism,’ already contains the whole ambiguity. For 
the method of experimental utopia, if it is truly to correspond to its project, must 
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obviously embrace the whole, and carrying it out would lead not to a ‘new urbanism’ but 
to a new way of life, a new revolutionary praxis … Sociological surveys … present 
options only between the dismal variations of what already exists … Nothing exists but 
a collection of techniques for integrating people (techniques that effectively resolve 
conflicts while creating others, at present less known but more serious). These 
techniques are wielded innocently by imbeciles or deliberately by the police. And all the 
discourses on urbanism are lies, just as obviously as the space organized by urbanism 
is the very space of the social lie and of fortified exploitation. Those who discourse on 
the powers of urbanism seek to make people forget that all they are doing is the 
urbanism of power (1961). 
 
Such critique is lost on Pro and Con arguments regarding the suburbs and even on 
more complex work that goes beyond offering summaries of the major points or 
elaborations of previously predicted scenarios of suburban growth or decay. 
Overwhelmed by the tremendous complexity of human settlements, now of 
unprecedented size and diversity and requiring the urgent gathering and analysis of 
new and more data to drive decision-making, debate regarding the objective of 
decisions has been largely forgotten. Meanwhile many environments have moved 
beyond known conditions of urban or suburban forms altogether, beyond the 
effectiveness of traditional or institutionalised conventions of design constraint or 
encouragement, and seemingly even beyond the usefulness of the accumulated 
knowledge of the history of architecture and design. What is being grappled with is not 
just what can replace present design methodologies or practices, techniques or 
technologies, but what might enable design to reposition and reinforce its relevance. 
The answer may not lie with new tools for a known problem but with a reformulation of 
the problem itself. 
 
The emphasis of literature, as of professional bodies such as the AILA, is on the former 
Anti search for new and adaptive skills and tools rather than a revolutionary rethinking. 
The question of relevance is then countered with a demonstrable professional 
adaptability and a substantial, seemingly overwhelming body of evidence. Yet this may 
miss the point: 
 
Futurological extrapolations of existing societal developments will doubtless continue, 
even though they are costly exercises that depend upon an adequate supply of graph 
paper; but in the end their mechanical anticipations of the next stage are not likely to 
destroy the utopian propensity, which makes a mockery of planners...To cultivate wisely 
the ancient art of wishing as an antidote to the present saturation with the 
pseudoscience of prediction and the busyness of the masters of applied utopistics may 
be a paramount moral need of the age. But this is more a utopian wish than a great 
expectation (Manuel & Manuel 1979, p.814). 
 
Without links to disciplinary histories as well as the ongoing history of settlement 
problems, the newness of tools or approaches or data effectively creates new 
disciplines. To initiate instead explorations which emphasise the continuing relevance 
of landscape architecture as a design discipline, would firstly require an 
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acknowledgement of its histories. And what such a careful inquiry would find amongst 
the accumulated knowledge of architecture are its failures. Where Anti would seek 
correctives to these, a third approach actively celebrates them as useful lessons. Yet 
too indulgent a celebration can turn a useful lesson about a failing into a fetish for the 
condition of failure, a celebration of non-design that pre-empts ultimate failure and so 
offers ways to relax with, rather than resist, seemingly inevitable change. 
 
Non 
If there are many designers busy in the Anti camp, there are a growing number in the 
Non. Non is a reaction to the supposed failed rational logic of Anti and more generally 
of the projects of Modernism, understood as an historical condition whose time is past. 
Non is linked to increased interest in performance and process across many fields, 
particularly life sciences and computer programming, from ecology to autonomic 
computing, autopoesis, ontological design and other self-generating, interconnected 
and adaptive systems. Design too is interested in uncertainty, chaos, openness and 
open-endedness, expressing its investigations in the form of tracing and mapping of 
networks, flows and agencies, while developing strategies, frameworks and 
scaffoldings to reveal, understand or organise them. Just as Non experiments in 
landscape architecture have borrowed from the theory of other disciplines, they can be 
linked too to dangers already argued within other fields. The main criticism of a new 
interest in process is the unselfconscious assumption of neutrality and of an apolitical 
methodology.  
 
Within landscape architecture, reaction to the failed project of Modern architecture and 
design as well as the ineffectual whimsy of postmodern responses has been 
complicated by the discipline’s already deep, and arguably never broken engagement 
with natural and morphological processes, and by its relatively weak engagement with 
the political projects of Modernity as explored by architecture (Treib 1994). Yet its 
disciplinary relevance has been asserted more recently with the rise of Landscape 
Urbanism which reclaims the ‘agency of the landscape’ and the site itself to generate 
and guide new integrated outcomes preferable to those imposed by human agents. 
‘Landscape Urbanism is … so to speak, the reactive child of all the teachings of our 
rationalist, functionalist and positivist forefathers’ (Girot 2006, p.89). Charles Waldheim 
similarly declared that:  
 
The origins of landscape urbanism can be traced to postmodern critiques of modernist 
architecture and planning … [which] indicted modernism for its inability to produce a 
‘meaningful’ or ‘liveable’ public realm, for its failure to come to terms with the city as an 
historical construction of collective consciousness, and for its inability to communicate 
with multiple audiences (Waldheim & Berger 2008, p.38). 
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However, according to Waldheim, postmodern approaches also failed, retreating to 
nostalgic comforts and practicing ‘a kind of preemptive cultural regression’ unable to 
deal with the ‘indeterminacy and flux of the contemporary city’ that emergent works of 
landscape urbanism came to deal with (2008, p.38). Landscape urbanism claims to 
address a need to deal productively with complexity and uncertainty while avoiding the 
repressive determinism of positivist closed understandings imposed on rich and diverse 
possibilities for alternate understandings and ongoing growth.  
 
Architecture and planning in their connection to urban design, have pursued many 
investigations into indeterminacy as a way to work more appropriately, sensitively and 
effectively with apparent chaos, if not always with inner doubt (Kolarevic & Malkawi 
2005; Kronenburg 2007; Leatherbarrow 2008). These investigations explore both 
biophysical models (Mateo & Sauter 2007) based around work in ecology (Hagan 
2001; Hensel 2008), biology (Cruz & Pike 2008; Gans & Kuz 2003) and genetics for 
example, and digital or mathematical ones working with parametrics (Meredith 2003), 
algorithms and computer sciences (Jencks 1997; Kwinter & Davison 2008; Waters 
2003). 
 
Landscape architecture claims special knowledge and accumulated experience of 
types of performative organicism because of a disciplinary tradition dealing with 
landscape morphology and natural systems. Landscape urbanism reminds landscape 
architecture that ‘[a]lthough we visualise the landscape as a place, it is best understood 
as a process’ (Freestone & Murphy 1992, p.184). It notes how architecture, planning 
and other urban design disciplines are using landscape as a model to better 
understand the city and urban development (Corner 1999; Waldheim & Berger 2008). 
Yet it is not ‘landscape’ as a negotiated construction of nature-culture relations that 
they find useful to examine or are borrowing models from, but nature as examined 
afresh through models provided by computer, advanced mathematical, 
biotechnological, ecological and other sciences. Scientists have observed nature to 
develop models constructed by humans (IBM 2005), while designers use models 
constructed by human science to explain nature. ‘Nature’ is now thoroughly 
constructed and commodified (Mateo & Sauter 2007; McKibben 2006) not just as a 
term or concept but in the influence and control humans exercise over its actuality. 
Given such a relationship, more than usually acute contradictions arise in citing nature 
as a separate, ‘true’ and correct source for modelling human constructions, 
simultaneous with recognising that it is already constructed, and concurrent with 
claiming to be skilled constructors of it. How can designers claim the efficacy of 
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something beyond a limited human capacity to create or control it and yet also still 
claim to be useful themselves? How can an approach be formulated which does not 
limit the possibilities of a site and its infinite potentials and yet then be needed to 
intervene or alter it at all? David Shane suggests as much: ‘no central designer or 
masterplanner is necessary; design, as a biological process, takes place autonomously 
within a network of feedback loops connecting random genetic change to the 
performance of individuals in the field’ (2005, p.89). 
 
In 1997 Stan Allen outlined the significance of ‘fields’ for architecture: ‘The term “field 
conditions” is at once a reassertion of architecture's contextual assignment and at the 
same time a proposal to comply with such obligations’ (1998, p.24). Why is 'obligation' 
plural when the assignment is singular? Allen's opening statement would seem to call 
for the obligation of architecture to consider context. However, he supposes that there 
are further obligations arising from such consideration: to comply with such obligations 
as arise from consideration of context. Yet how can it be known what these further 
obligations are? In its obligation to consider context, architecture is obliged to consider 
the requirements of the client, the brief, the budget and other determined or 
determinable parameters. The obligation to consider context arises from the defined 
need to meet or question various project requirements in relation to the site. Context is 
considered in relation to an objective or objectives. This is the contextual assignment. 
Having considered the context in order to meet these objectives where do further ones 
come from? In what ways and to what purpose can architecture comply with or even 
know that there are obligations beyond what can be determined in considering context 
in relation to project objectives? To whom is architecture further obliged?  
 
The suggestion is the site itself. The claim is that architecture's obligations stem not 
from consideration of a context in order to deliver project needs, but from a reversed 
set of presumptive obligations to meet the site's needs in order to create a project. How 
the all-inclusive given, the reality of the site, is to be registered or understood without 
reductive constraint or oppressive transgression and yet produce something new, 
assumes that such needs can be known; that what is best for the site can be known. 
The field is assumed to be an inclusive collective of uncontested and legible, if 
complex, opinion and self-evident need. The totality of all possibilities is asked to 
somehow provide direction or measure for realisation of a particular one, and the 
outcome is able to avoid individual interpretation or interference. Like the literary, 
natural, pathetic and other fallacies, it is a conceit of the poet-artist-designer to say that 
their interpretation is the revelation of a truth rather than the argument for one. 
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Anita Berrizbeitia urges a move from discussion of flexibility to appreciation of ‘scales 
of undecidability’ (2001, p.124). She is careful to footnote her intention to distinguish 
her use of the phrase from that of Derrida's although she does not say what his use 
entails. She ‘simply mean[s] a landscape's capacity to engage multiple systems of 
significantion at different scales’ (2001, fn.13). As with much landscape urbanist writing 
the landscape is granted a sentient 'capacity to engage' that should be correctly 
attributed to those experiencing it. She explains in the text that she ‘means a 
landscape's capacity for precision of form notwithstanding flexibility of program - for the 
precisely open rather than vaguely loose’ (2001, p.125). If by 'landscape' she intends to 
indicate the physical reality of a particular piece of land, it is difficult to imagine how it 
can have anything but a precise form, however imprecisely described. A thing is 
exactly - precisely - what it is. A landscape's reality is not a capacity to be real, but is 
real. The flexibility is irrelevant to its physical actuality, although the forms it takes will 
enable greater or lesser diversity of possible program. The 'precision' of the form does 
not assist this although the precision of rendering the form accurately from a plan may. 
Being precise, if this does not mean being real, only makes sense in relation to 
something. If by 'landscape' she means a design for or representation of one yet to 
exist, the notion of and call for precision in relation to its realisation has merit. The 
desire for a proposition that is ‘precisely open rather than vaguely loose’ in its 
objectives, representation, description or even its material, programmatic or other 
specifications makes some sense, as the precision of relationship between the 
landscape design proposal and designed landscape outcome can be assessed. It 
remains nonsensical to speak of landscape form itself as precise or loose. Only the 
comparative clarity of its projection or communication can be so. 
 
Richard Weller has noted that ‘the implied mastery of modernist planning underpinned 
by belief in predictability and utopia is of course now replaced by its obverse, strategies 
of partial intervention in anticipation of unpredictability and dystopia’ (2006, p.84, fn.7). 
In his contribution to the Landscape Urbanism Reader Weller identifies contradictions 
and other problems with landscape urbanist theories and rhetoric, as have others. He 
has reiterated some of his concerns more recently, while attempting to apply landscape 
urbanism’s ‘loftier theoretical ambitions’ to the problems presented by the ‘banal’ 
environment of suburbia (2008, p.248). The attempt might have evolved as a utopian 
challenge to landscape urbanism’s Non frontier approach, but has instead become an 
Anti investigation of voluminously diagrammed and illustrated options of equally 
indeterminate merit (Weller 2009). The lead designer of the controversial National 
Museum of Australia's Garden of Australian Dreams, Weller is a landscape architect as 
well known for his strong opinions as for his radical practice. And yet with this research 
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he has formulated a curiously conservative and thoroughly reasonable approach with 
an almost apologetic outcome to what might have been a powerful subversion; an 
investigation in which he could have revelled most in exposing the many myths behind 
Australian suburban land development rather than just the many possible new forms 
that might continue them.  
 
The abstract and introduction for Weller’s earlier paper in Landscape Journal outline a 
number of research aims which are either contradicted or remain unaddressed, while 
its language presupposes attitudes which are central to the problems he later 
discusses—principally the profit-driven motives of land developers and the 
marketplace—but which are never openly challenged, even when they are briefly 
acknowledged (2008, p.261). Weller’s work does not enter into any discussion of 
values or of social justice as a measure of values in relation to the many scenarios 
generated. The work demonstrates the incremental compromise of an Anti approach 
which neither rejects suburbia, nor accepts its predominant forms, but seeks to 
‘improve’ on an unavoidable, beloved evil without expressly defining the terms of 
improvement. The sheer weight and diversity of visually rendered statistics in the book 
is characteristic of the numbing number-crunching of Anti enumerations of the 
difficulties of making better suburbs. He avoids interrogating the problem behind these 
difficulties or questioning what 'better' is. In his essay, Weller believes he has provided 
tools—specifically, an awareness of and skills to work at an ‘urban scale’, driven by the 
‘meta-narrative of ecology’ and grounded in ‘empirical data’—which help ‘position 
landscape architects to more forcefully negotiate the conditions of contemporary 
sprawl’ (2008, p.265). But he fails to suggest to what end or why any negotiation 
should ensue that is different to what already happens. The tools he provides can be, 
and have been used by developers to further the status quo of the economic and social 
conditions generating ‘sprawl’, even if they superficially alter formal outcomes. 
 
His abstract begins: ‘This two-part paper superimposes current landscape urbanist 
theory onto practical suburban master planning experience so as to help landscape 
architects play a more influential role in shaping contemporary patterns of suburban 
sprawl’ (2008, p.247).  In fact the superimposition does not work for a number of 
reasons which he outlines and so the intent of using landscape urbanism to shift the 
practice of landscape architecture ‘from one of relative superficiality to one of structural 
influence’ (2008, p.247) remains unachieved in the terms set out. ‘This project 
suggests that the status of the master plan in relation to landscape urbanism's 
emphasis on indeterminacy is a key issue’ (2008, p.247) but this issue remains 
unresolved and, by the end, is explicitly rejected: ‘it rejects landscape urbanism’s 
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penchant for indeterminacy’ (2008, p.264). Furthermore, the project’s ‘essential logic 
differs little from an established tradition of landscape architects bringing open space 
networks to the fore in suburban planning’ (2008, p.264) and he suggests it actually 
has more in common with New Urbanism than landscape urbanism.  
 
Tellingly, Weller hits upon the dystopian outcome of what might have been finally a 
utopian transformation of landscape urbanist Non design through application on a 
specific site: ‘in suburbia, to “irrigate territories with potential” as Koolhaas would have 
it, could mean simply connecting the internet and the sewerage and letting 
development loose’ or, more in the spirit of Koolhaas, letting those seeking a home 
loose to negotiate or build their own. This is exactly the point Weller might have been 
expected to have anticipated at the outset: that is, that the marketplace has such 
control of the conditions of development that the utopianism of Koolhaas’s suggestion 
could not happen without a radical re-alignment of the ways in which the land 
development industry operates. Anything less will either be a dystopian failure or only 
serve the existing system, despite all programmatic, material or other alterations or 
innovations. And this is what happened with Weller’s work. He says that ‘suburbia 
doesn’t have much potential’ (2008, p.267) in the sense that Koolhaas meant, which is 
to deny or render ridiculous the very ambition to find and realise the potentials of 
suburbia with which the project commenced. Weller has assisted the continuation of 
the industry’s hold on the production of suburban dwelling, when he might have 
weakened it. 
 
What is problematic with an Anti position, which can then lead to a reactionary Non 
position, is a particular idea of critique. With criticism reduced to what Roland Barthes 
identified as ‘this enumerative mania’ in search of verifiable truth (1972, p.81) requiring 
the Manuels’ ‘endless supply of graph paper’ (1997, p.814), it is not surprising to find a 
tendency to seek a meta-critical frame for queries that seem already excised from 
discussion by conservative values or conventions of practice. Such a frame is what 
Landscape Urbanism attempts to provide and prove. Speaking of a critic's piece in 
L'Express, Barthes in Neither-Nor Criticism writes: ‘Its idea was that criticism must be 
“neither a parlor game, nor a municipal service” - which means that it must be neither 
reactionary nor communist, neither gratuitous nor political’ (1972, p.81). In the same 
way landscape urbanism has claimed to be neither Modernist (politically reactionary 
and inclusive) nor postmodern (aesthetically gratuitous and inclusive). Barthes 
observes two aspects to this superior yet evasive attitude: 
 
I... find, in our Neither-Nor doctrine, two common expedients of bourgeois mythology. 
The first consists in a certain idea of freedom, conceived as 'the refusal of a priori 
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judgments'. ... the very absence of a system - especially when it becomes a profession 
of faith - stems from a very definite system... One can without fear defy anyone ever to 
practise an innocent criticism, free from any systematic determination... even in the 
simple word 'adventure', which is used with such alacrity by our Neither-Nor critics in 
order to moralise against those nasty systems which 'don't cause any surprise', what 
heredity, what fatality, what routine! Any kind of freedom always in the end re-integrates 
a known type of coherence, which is nothing but a given a priori... The second 
bourgeois symptom ... is the euphoric reference to the 'style' of the writer as to an 
eternal value... This does not mean, naturally, that Literature can exist without some 
formal artifice. But, with due respect to our neither-nor critics, who are invariably the 
adepts of a bipartite universe where they would represent divine transcendence, the 
opposite of good writing is not necessarily bad writing: today it is perhaps just writing 
(1972 p.82). 
 
The simple word ‘performance’ is similarly used by designers with alacrity, condemning 
nasty static projects. The opposite of unsustainable—or sustainable—design may not 
be sustainable—or unsustainable—design, but perhaps just design.  
 
It is relatively easy to see how Anti serves the status quo, but Non can too. While not 
often theorised as a design position regarding suburbs, a non-regulatory, non-
interventionist approach has long been evident as the default position of a volatile 
suburban marketplace of ‘free’ capital eagerly attempting to grow itself by grafting ever-
greater numbers of those ever-less able to afford their property investments. The true 
designers of our most recent suburban landscapes are financiers. It is not the strategic 
manoeuvres of urbanists but of banks and governments, maintaining speculative 
opportunities and investment performance, with utter indifference to the form of actual, 
physical deliverables. This is arguably similar to the maintenance of performatively 
determined options that some landscape architects and urban designers have offered 
as a general design strategy appropriate to a postmodern, polyvocal, antiauthoritarian 
and deregulated age.  
 
Like Anti, Non turns problems into difficulties, or mistakes one for the other, but rather 
than attempting to find solutions it dismisses them as mere difficulties, while the greater 
problem and interest is positioned elsewhere, essentially untouchable by Anti’s too-
grounded logic and only approachable indirectly and uncertainly, if not mysteriously, 
through acts of patient design affirmation. The condition has not gone unnoticed:  
 
We have moved from a conscious form-giving model of the city at the beginning of the 
twentieth century to a self-generated urbanity based essentially on quantitative 
programs and regulatory norms at the beginning of the twenty-first … We have entered 
a period of blind entropic projection, with its array of unforseen results. Some theorists 
have taken on this fatality as a doctrine. The laissez faire aesthetic of the 
contemporaneous city requires, according to them, no vision; it just happens and 
evolves in an ad hoc manner. The denigration of vision and its relegation to the domain 
of post facto appreciation confirms the half-blind aberration we work and live in. (Girot 
2006, pp.89-90) 
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As a contribution to The Landscape Urbanism Reader it is unclear if Girot is suggesting 
that landscape urbanism offers a way to avoid this or is complicit with it. What he calls 
for are new tools of representation, approaches that can grasp and communicate 
complexity, contradiction and change over time. Yet although this may be what 
landscape urbanism says it does or seeks to do, it is unclear that this has or can be 
achieved. More importantly it is unclear and unstated what is to be achieved by this. Its 
appeal lies in its reaction to the vacuum of faith left by the failure of other political and 
cultural movements of the last century.  
 
[W]hatever remained of the left [has been] split between ‘cautious reformism and post-
revolutionary despair'. We have, on the one side, the diversity of pragmatic-realist 
liberals in pursuit of 'a reasonable chance of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect,' 
talking about dialogue, communication, recognition of otherness and so on... and, on 
the other side, those who still cling to some notion of radical Change, but whose 
Messianism is caught up in the self-defeating vicious circle of self-postponing, of a 
permanent 'to come' which display a fundamental obscurity or paralysis – thought 
controlled by situations in which it is impossible to react (Deleuze), by demands that 
cannot be met (Levinas), needs that can never be reconciled (Lyotard), promises that 
can never be kept (Derrida). ‘Today, however, the end of this deadlock, is on the 
horizon – the end of the end of utopias.’ (Žiz ̌ek 2006, p.321 quoting Peter Hallward's 
unpublished The Politics of Prescription) 
 
Koolhaas hints at something similar in wondering what happened to urbanism: ‘We are 
simultaneously dogmatic and evasive. Our amalgamated wisdom can be easily 
caricatured: according to Derrida we cannot be Whole, according to Baudrillard we 
cannot be Real, according to Virilio we cannot be There’ (Koolhaas & Mau 1995, 
p.958). Zizek does not explain further what Hallward meant by ‘the end of the end of 
utopias’ as a response to operational paralysis, and Koolhaas is almost as enigmatic, 
but offers a different form of clue ‘What if we simply declare that there is no crisis...?’ 
(Koolhaas & Mau 1995, p.971). That is, like Hallward, declare the end of the end of 
utopias—as of suburbs—and so proclaim their new beginning? 
 
Utopian 
The utopian attitude is not one that can be easily sustained. Its positive interest in the 
suburbs, along with its experimental propositions, can easily slip to pro-suburban neo-
liberal conservatism. Utopianism’s implicit critique of dominant political ideologies 
becomes a promotional tool for exciting new reformist ones, if not just superficially 
repackaged versions. ‘Those who criticize and those who celebrate cities often find 
themselves similarly disjoined, incapable of discourse because they confront the utterly 
unlike’ (Lowenthal 2001). David Lowenthal suggests a provocative approach to working 
through this by ‘stressing vividly opposed perceptions of urban social pasts’ rather than 
manufacturing consensus. This sounds very like the critical practice of design 
concerned to reveal tensions and suspend them for examination and productive 
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development. Yet he goes on to stress merely the encouraged exhibition of multiple 
perceptions and appreciations, rather than any act of curation or commentary that will, 
more importantly, arise from mere display and come to constitute shared 
understandings. He suggests that people can ‘enlarge their sense of self and 
community through collaborative projections of memory in public spaces’ but not how 
such enlargement moves from a memorialising aggrandisement to thoughtful 
transformative growth. He adds:  
 
Such efforts may require an initial impulse from institutional agencies and will also 
benefit from being monitored by those skilled in translating memorial and historical 
urges into visual and tactile form. But unless they are rooted in popular inspiration, and 
continually refurbished by public creativity, these efforts will remain superficial, 
ephemeral, and alien veneers, rather than durable urban enrichments.  
 
Designers here are left to ‘translate’ popular perceptions, threatened that otherwise 
their creations will not endure. Yet endurance is not the principal aim of design and not 
the opposite of superficiality. 
 
In setting himself the task of examining utopian propositions in the early twentieth 
century, Robert Fishman (1982) uses the term ‘planners’ to position the breath of work 
and scale of projects of Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, 
although the last two were trained as and more usually referred to as architects. Their 
broad-scale propositions involved physical design and material detailing as well as 
diagrammatic masterplanning. The work of town planning early last century involved 
such design and was undertaken by those from diverse disciplinary backgrounds. What 
strategic and statutory planning came to involve by mid-century was the un-utopian 
work of logically and legally positioning and justifying particular propositions, while 
physical town planning and the imagining and design of built places became the 
province of landscape architects amongst other designers. Fishman explains that the 
earlier work was ‘planned’ with a ‘detachment’ that was ‘not necessarily escapism’ 
(1982, p.x).  
 
Planned with both urban reconstruction and social revolution in mind, the three ideal 
cities were certainly 'utopias,' but not in the pejorative sense of being vague, impossible 
dreams. Rather, they come under Karl Mannheim's classic definition of utopia as a 
coherent program for action arising out of thought that 'transcends the immediate 
situation,' a program whose realization would 'break the bonds' of the established 
society (1982, p.x). 
 
The focus of planning has altered such that ‘[t]o the professional planner today... [the 
schemes of Howard, Wright and Le Corbusier] appear almost indecently grandiose’ 
and ‘a dangerous delusion’ (1982, p.xi) while they remain inspirations for design. More 
recently Robert Freestone has edited a collection of investigations into a range of 
‘paradigms’ in twentieth century urban design including 'quasi-utopias: perfect cities in 
 
 
61
an imperfect world’, empiricist and rationalist paradigms, the city beautiful paradigm, 
neighborhood paradigms, and others (2000). For Freestone these paradigms represent 
utopian positions. His early interest in the failed ‘model communities’ of last century 
(1989) has been expanded by further examination of the compromised and continuing 
Garden City and City Beautiful movements (2007), all of which find extensive 
experiments in suburban settings. 
 
The difference between the third Non position of open-endedness and the fourth of 
committed utopian openness is one of both critical and ethical self-consciousness and 
is the subject of detailed discussion in following chapters. It is possible to link the 
problems of landscape architecture, suburbs and utopia, or rather to see their problems 
as those which utopianism faces. Utopianism fights for something that cannot be won. 
It resists the arguments of adamant Pro-Con, reasoned Anti and self-deprecating Non. 
It resists those who suppress its propositions as fantasies of whim or force as equally 
as those who see and would support them as achievable goals. It resists those who 
see utopias as necessary projects of partial success, of reform rather than revolt, and 
also those who would see utopian thoughts as an abstract, speculative necessity yet 
are uncommitted to their implementation. What utopianism has always done, and which 
Thomas More intended as essential to the term he coined, is propose the impossible in 
full knowledge of failure, although not in anticipation of it. Discussions of suburbs are 
mainly Pro-Con and increasingly Anti. Those of the role and value of LA are 
predominantly Anti but with increasing elaboration of a Non bias. Utopias are 
characterised, discussed, accused and dismissed as all these, but their role and value 
actually lie in rejecting all for a fourth attitude. Utopianism is the fourth position.  
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Chapter 3 
Locating Myth 
 
Myth is depoliticized speech.  
 
Roland Barthes11 
 
[U]topia emerges at the moment of the suspension of the political.  
 
Fredric Jameson12 
 
For Roland Barthes and Fredric Jameson a similar excision of political consciousness 
and consequence is necessary for the creative construction of myth and utopia 
respectively. What distinguishes them—a distinction that will be elaborated in this 
chapter—is that where myth effaces the political, utopia only suspends it. Myth requires 
the abolition of doubt to confirm an unprovable story. Utopia requires the ironic 
knowledge of inevitable failure to be utopian. Myths look backward, framing the present 
as a condition which has gone astray from a past that can be recaptured and reformed. 
Utopias look forward, framing past histories in ways that require radical, revolutionary 
responses. Myths are. Utopias emerge. These differences in approach (revolutionary 
or reformist), orientation (forward or backward looking) and framing (suspension or 
erasure) are argued here to indicate a distinction between design and non-design.  
 
The following sets out to compare and contrast ‘utopia’ and ‘myth’ with reference to 
landscape production, and specifically ‘land development’ understood as the design of 
suburbs. Barthes Mythologies provides an understanding of myth and myth-making 
which will be explained and adopted here. Utopianism is understood here as proposed 
by Thomas More (2003), characterised by Karl Mannheim (1936) and Melvin Latsky 
(1976) and explored by Fredric Jameson (2005) amongst others. The distinction 
between myth and utopia will be used to better understand how recent and still 
emerging models for design practice and for suburban development might be 
considered utopian or mythic, where the former is a positive exercise in liberating, even 
if ultimately unachievable, possibilities for the future and the latter is a false 
naturalisation of particular possibilities, a controlled concealment of others in the 
service of a dominant ideology. It is certainly the case that many critics of utopias 
generally and certain utopian schemes in particular, view them in the way in which 
                                                 
11 Barthes, R. 1972 [1957] p.142 
12 Jameson, F. 2004, p.43 
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myths have just been described; that is, as tools for the imposition of totalising 
schemes and totalitarian ideologies. Amongst these critics of utopias are Tony Fry (Fry 
& Willis 2009), Elizabeth Grosz (2001) and James Corner (1999) whose own 
characterisations of new approaches reinvent what utopianism already encompassed. 
 
The distinction between a utopian view which explicitly posits reactionary, radical, 
critical and future-oriented action, and a mythical view which implicitly negates change 
through reference to a comforting, historically sanctioned, backward-looking 
confirmation and continuation of constructed pasts, may appear too subtle, 
unintentional, uncontrollable or even effectively non-existent in practice given the many 
views that come together to deliver a project, and the many positions which 
successively come to justify it. All projects look backward and forward to contextualise 
themselves, using explicit and implicit arguments of value. However, the fundamentally 
opposed attitudes described here—mythic and utopian—are not over-intellectualised 
abstractions. An awareness of both is essential to identification and appreciation of 
ever-new challenges to an idea of design activity which is independent of servitude to 
other predetermined ideas of landscape value and form. Awareness of utopian and 
mythical tendencies is necessary to overcome constraints on future forms of habitation, 
especially where these may be pre-emptively dismissed as forms of suburbanisation. 
The suburbs are so readily, almost ubiquitously understood in mythical terms, whether 
attractive or repulsive, that any proposal linked to them loses credibility and viability as 
an opportunity for ’difference’, even while the suburbs continue to provide the most 
potential for experiment because they continue to constitute the largest, fastest growing 
and most diverse scene of construction for most people in most countries. The Great 
Australian Dream has both mythic and utopian pasts and potential.  
 
Applied to the broader study of nature-culture relations, a typology of myth might 
helpfully demonstrate similar categories of approaches to the same ongoing, 
purposeful quest for freedom, happiness, truth and beauty as that which designers are 
obliged to pursue. Applied to questions of settlement patterns and the historic role of 
their designers, ideas about myth may help identify and organise their 
contemporaneous positions. Why and how are certain ideas of value inscribed in 
certain forms or assumed analogous to certain structures? In what ways have we and 
do we still mythologise the suburbs? What are the myths of suburbia and are they 
consistent and universal? How are utopias and myths different and how are these 
linked to landscape architectural and design histories? Finally, how can they be used to 
understand the future work of landscape architecture? 
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The following looks first at types of myth by relating them to types of design approach 
and design criticism with particular reference to landscape architecture and the 
suburbs. These can be seen to fundamentally reflect categories or theories of nature-
culture relations and the landscapes they produce. Four broad phases or groupings of 
myth are considered: mythopoeia is related to but distinguished from a mystic account 
of nature-culture relations, while mythological study is related to but distinct from 
myopic credulity. Following Barthes, consideration is then given to the idea that all 
types of myth, while they can be seen to evolve, mature and mutate, remain identifiable 
by certain characteristics, and that constant vigilance is required to make them 
apparent. For Barthes, myths of whatever type are in the service of ideologies that 
propose false or pseudo natures, although he concludes that an unmediated 
knowledge of ‘reality’ or the ‘truth’ is not possible either. In consideration of this implied 
necessity and usefulness of myth, an overview of ‘fallacies’ is then offered, particularly 
Ruskin’s pathetic fallacy in its relation to design through the lending of sentience to 
landscapes, landscape architecture, architecture and their various elements. A final 
consideration of ‘lying’ as similarly potentially useful concludes the chapter. 
 
Myths of nature and culture: mythopoeic, mystic, mythological and myopic 
relations. 
 
Myth may be defined as a story or a complex of story elements taken as expressing, 
and therefore as implicitly symbolizing, certain deep-lying aspects of human and 
transhuman existence (Wheelwright 1974, p.538). 
 
Philip Wheelwright (in Preminger, Waernke & Hardison 1974) identifies a narrative 
lineage for ‘myth’ and the critical discourses surrounding it. He begins with a definition 
which it then explains is careful to ‘avoid two contrary and one-sided views of the 
matter’ (1974, p.538).  One view gives no acknowledgement to the intervention or 
responsibility of the author-designer in the creation of the myth, while the other sees 
myth as entirely the construction of an author-designer and their subjective view rather 
than an external reality. 
 
The one … treats myth as primarily a kind of perspective … that all knowledge involves 
at the instant of its reception, a synthesizing activity of the mind … synonymous with the 
mythopoeic mode of consciousness; it is simply a basic way of envisaging experience 
and carries no necessary connotation of storytelling. At the opposite extreme stands the 
view that myth is merely storytelling … a tale that is not according to the facts (in 
Preminger, Waernke & Hardison 1974, p.538). 
 
The entry goes on to identify what might be thought of as a gradation of myth, implying 
too a progression from something understood in a state of direct personal revelation 
that is essentially storyless, through development of ways to solicit and share such 
truth collectively through various modes of storytelling, to myth as a system of universal 
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truth embodying an all-encompassing story or meta-narrative with a singular myopic 
viewpoint. At one end is primitive myth as mysticism, moving through philosophy 
tending to the formulation of explanatory and persuasive tools for order, arriving at the 
other end with the naturalised dogmas of political, religious and social guidance and 
control.  
 
Important, writers have believed ‘that primitive thought is essentially poetic, in that the 
endowment of primitive objects with life, will, and emotion is at once the natural 
tendency of primitive man and the most sublime task of poetry’ (Wheelwright in 
Preminger, Waernke & Hardison 1974, p.539). The same belief can be credited to 
some designers regarding the task of architectural as opposed to poetic construction. 
Christopher Alexander’s The Timeless Way of Building (1979) explores this idea. 
Following on from his 1977 Pattern Language, form is explicitly presented here as ‘a 
process through which the order of a building or a town grows out directly from the 
inner nature of the people, and the animals, and plants, and matter which are in it’ 
(1979, p.7). 
 
Mythopoeia designates ‘that early stage of culture when language is still largely 
ritualistic and prelogical in character’ (Wheelwright in Preminger, Waernke & Hardison 
1974, p.539). Beyond direct personal revelation comes the initial effort to communicate 
what is revealed. Yet tendencies to explain or share an understanding of the world via 
ritualised or repetitive appeals to emotional, a-logical beliefs are not limited to primitive 
cultures. Views of the suburbs and the languages used to characterise them are strewn 
with such attempts. The term ‘sprawl’ can be considered a token term, invented and 
invoked in ritualised ways to stand for a condition that is never wholly explained or 
explicable.  
 
Where a set of linguistic habits is such that virtually no distinction is made between the 
literal and the figurative there is likely to be just as little distinction between the 
descriptive and the fanciful. Such psychic and linguistic amalgams are one of the most 
important factors in the genesis and early growth of myth (1974, p.539).  
 
This is applicable to the growth of myths at any period where language struggles to 
identify and grasp new experience, as it does now in attempts to grasp rapidly 
changing landscapes of human settlement and dwelling. The linguistic habit of linking 
‘sprawl’ to suburbs illustrates precisely such a condition where distinction between 
literal and figurative, descriptive and fanciful, is unquestioned.  
 
Jameson opens his essay on the Politics of Utopia with much the same observation, 
one which can as easily substitute ‘suburbs’ for ‘utopia’: ‘Utopia would seem to offer the 
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spectacle of one of those rare phenomena whose concept is indistinguishable from its 
reality, whose ontology coincides with its representation’ (2004, p.35). However where 
myth allows this coincidence to persist unexamined as self-supporting circular 
argument for its own validity (the tautologous suburbia is sprawl and sprawl is 
suburbia), Jameson goes on to explain that utopian propositions prompt a critical 
evaluation of each. They require a working out of the conditions under which concept 
and reality came to be joined so that a separation, albeit impossible, might be imagined 
and a space made for conceiving other possible realities and relations. 
 
The broader reach of a primitive mythopoeic urging might be distinguished from the 
expressions of a primitive mysticism. While the former emerges from pre-lingual 
exploratory communication about experiences and appreciations of non-human nature, 
the latter claims to share an unmediated communication with it. The mystic myth is a 
familiar default of advertising presenting a desirable human relationship with nature 
antithetical to the human-dominated, artificial landscapes of a present situation. A 
dominant environment of ‘unhealthy’ and even ‘evil’ repressions of ‘natural’ instincts is 
contrasted with the possibility of one that typically recalls traditionally respected nature-
culture relations. The myth of a mystic relation with nature is one of freely gifted and 
openly received benefits such as that delighted in as the experience of unqualified and 
unlimited health and well-being. The mystic myth is always an implied if not explicit 
feature of suburb advertisement and a part of the historic appeal of suburbs contrasted 
with corrupt, polluted and overcrowded cities. The organisation of space as something 
that might be persuasively ‘read’ is a particularly skilled use of mystic appeals. The 
most manipulative arguments of pre-lingual mysticism construct emotional appeals of 
great sophistication. Kim Dovey begins Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form 
quoting Bourdieu: ‘The most successful ideological effects are those that have no 
words, and ask no more than complicitous silence’ (1999, p.1). 
 
Following mythopoeic expression and mystic appeal is the emergence of more 
sophisticated mythological explanation (Wheelwright in Preminger, Waernke & 
Hardison 1974, p.540). Mythological relations reflect myths of growing complexity 
‘when the primitive mythopoeic way of envisioning the world has been largely replaced 
by definite conceptions and a greater reliance upon reasoning, with the result that the 
older mythic stories have become material to be embellished, recontextualised, and 
often reinterpreted by the poet’s conscious art’ (1974, p.540). At its most conscious and 
furthest from intuitive and speculative impulses, design exercises a planning logic. 
Unself-conscious faith in this logic is mythological. 
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While the poet-designer’s art remains free to explore new contexts with new 
expressions, it can continue to make meaningful comment upon the changes and 
choices of the artist-designer’s society. But the further it is directed and constrained by 
that society and the forces within it to tell a particular story, the more myopic myth 
becomes. The more that mythological explanation comes to rely upon reasoning that 
requires ritualised, specialised and accredited training to find expression, the more it 
enters a phase of ‘rules’.  
 
[‘Rule’] may mean the exercise of sovereignty and direct authority or it may mean, again 
collectively ‘rules’ … ‘The Rule of Taste’ is intended to imply both a regime in which 
Taste is paramount and a canon, or a set of regulations by which fashions in taste are 
governed … what is peculiar to the period [eighteenth century] is an apparently general 
agreement upon what constituted Correct taste, and an attempt to substitute the 
certainty of the Correct for the more doubtful True or Good … The methods of defining 
[the Correct] are first the establishment of rules, then the establishment of rulers, and 
finally the establishment of a tradition of obedience to those rulers (Steegman 1986, 
pp.ix-x). 
 
If the doubtful True or Good are explained by mythopoeia, mysticism and the 
mythological, myopic myth explains the Correct. Myopic myths employ carefully 
detailed explanations and justifications such as the seemingly proven value of natural 
systems exemplified by planning and engineering logics in regard to sustainable 
landscapes. This final dogmatic or myopic nature-culture relation is a myth that brooks 
no interrogation of its imposing and imposed wisdom. This is not to say that facts of 
climate change are incorrect but that the storylines constructed to explain them and to 
advocate particular actions in response, are constructed from them in ways which 
discourage alternative reading or telling. In tracing the rise of planning in America as a 
rational approach to the problems of rapidly growing human settlements at the end of 
the nineteenth century, Christine Boyer identifies a realignment and reconstruction of 
two previously separate mythic storylines: 
 
Between the terms 'instinct', 'upliftance', 'harmony', and those of 'organic', 'unity', 
'expert', 'control', a radical realignment of discourse had occurred. In order to 
understand these two formulations, one stemming from the myth of a harmonious 
natural order enveloping humans and nature and the other thrusting forward into the 
rational organization and scientific development of cities, we have to analyze the nature 
of the space that divides the two dispositions. Held against the ideal standard of nature, 
the city's purpose, form and growth were impossible to describe rationally. But a 
rationally controlled city form progressing toward perfection could become the vehicle 
by which the nation would develop along the path of civilization (1983, pp.3-4). 
 
This describes a process of subsuming mythopoeic urges within a dominant 
mythological structure of myopic rationalism and Boyer describes this happening 
concurrently with the rise of suburbs as a place of ideal nature-culture relations: ‘It was 
only at this point—when they transcended this rural-urban opposition—that the 
development of a planning mentality becomes possible... it was the necessity for a 
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totally new orientation, a threshold beyond the natural and the ceremonial’ (p.8). 
However, the initial appeal and promises of planning as a myopic myth of beneficial 
control necessarily failed, according to Boyer, because of complicity with capitalist 
economics. Controlling myths are necessarily in the control of someone. 
 
Myth, ideology and utopia in suburban landscapes 
Paul Mattingly thought the suburbs worthy of investigation for two reasons: 
 
[F]irst the suburb represents the prevalent locus for American community life in the 
twentieth century, yet our basic knowledge of suburbia rests on a few exceptional 
versions of the genre and social mythology … Second, the general terms that social 
scientists, journalists and others have applied to suburbanization—homogeneous, 
affluent, middle-class, parochial—have become so abstract and ahistorical that they 
misrepresent that actual nature and experience of suburban culture (2001, p.2). 
 
Utopias are exercises in liberation from the merely probable, myths are 
misrepresentations of it. Myth is ‘sickening’ for Roland Barthes (1972, p.126, fn.7), an 
ideological tool for naturalising the cultural, a ‘typical act of imbricating a mythical 
message upon a seemingly innocent sign which, in Barthes's view, makes Bourgeios 
capitalist ideology particularly sinister’ (Csapo 2005, p.278). 
 
From the point of view of ethics, what is disturbing in myth [exercised too as landscape 
propositions] is precisely that its form is motivated. For if there is a 'health' of language 
[design proposition], it is the arbitrariness of the sign which is its grounding. What is 
sickening in myth is its resort to a false nature, its superabundance of significant forms, 
as in those objects which decorate their usefulness with a natural appearance. The will 
to weigh the signification with the full guarantee of nature causes a kind of nausea: 
myth is too rich, and what is in excess is precisely its motivation. This nausea is like the 
one I feel before the arts which refuse to choose between physis and anti-physis, using 
the first as an ideal and the second as an economy. Ethically there is a kind of 
baseness in hedging one's bets (Barthes 1972, p.126, fn.7). 
 
Karl Mannheim’s distinction between utopia and ideology treats ideologies as myths in 
Barthes’ sense: 
 
A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it 
occurs … Only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as 
utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or 
wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time.  In limiting the meaning of the term 
‘utopia’ to that type of orientation which transcends reality and which at the same time 
breaks the bonds of the existing order, a distinction is set up between the utopian and 
the ideological states of mind … representatives of a given order have not in all cases 
taken a hostile attitude towards orientations transcending the existing order. Rather they 
have always aimed to control those situationally transcendent ideas and interests which 
are not realizable within the bounds of the present order, and thereby to render them 
socially impotent, so that such ideas would be confined to a world beyond history and 
society, where they could not affect the status quo (1936, p.173). 
 
Oscar Wilde’s oft-quoted aphorism regarding the inclusion of utopia on any useful map 
of the world is usually abbreviated to two statements: ‘A map of the world that does not 
include Utopia is not worth even glancing at... Progress is the realisation of Utopias’ 
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(1891, pp.303-4).13 Matthew Beaumont (2004) evidences that in its shortened version, 
Wilde’s statement has been taken for ‘a bland bourgeois slogan for the progressive 
extension of the status quo’ of nineteenth century industrialism, and ‘simply a 
paraphrase of the triumphalist history of capitalism’ (p.14). Beaumont shows that in this 
essay, as with his other work employing irony and exaggeration, Wilde is deeply critical 
of philanthropy and reformists (particularly the Fabians), and all existing institutions that 
promise change through the perpetuation of systems which created the conditions for 
the very problems they attempt to ameliorate. ‘Wilde dreams instead of rendering the 
conditions in which charity is considered an adequate mode of social reformation 
entirely anachronistic’ (p.16). Wilde was blunt: ‘It is immoral to use private property in 
order to alleviate the horrible evils that result from the institution of private property’ 
(1891, p.293). Today, concerns to make housing ‘affordable’ represent just such 
reformist measures as Wilde criticised.  
 
The utopian effort to transcend such mythologising reformism is what Peter Corrigan 
recognises in the work of the Venturis amongst others. 
 
To architect planners, a real value of the Archi-gram Group and all similar 
propagandists lies, like any durable Fairytale, in the light they shed upon present-day 
assumptions and not in the quantitative 'success' or 'failure' of what their critics have 
dismissed as 'self-indulgent fantasies' (2003, p.38). 
 
Myth may seem very close to utopia here as a ‘fairytale’ but Corrigan goes on to 
identify a distinction. The former involves ‘an utter lack of awareness of any need to 
distil meaning from appearances’ while design as utopianism requires exactly this 
search for meaning as a ‘real need’ (p.39). 
 
Metaphor and archetype 
In later stages of mythological expression, a more advanced communication of 
symbols and metaphor become institutionalised. The role of symbols and metaphor in 
language links poetry and myth as it links designed form and myth. Connecting 
metaphor to symbols and archetypes more generally it is easy to link myth to 
architectural and particularly landscape architectural proposition. The planet as 
generative, life-giving body is still popularly appealed to as ‘Mother Earth’. Parks and 
gardens are the ‘lungs’ of the city and frequently the ‘heart’ of suburban estates and 
their projected communities. Olmsted’s Boston Fens park system was an ‘emerald 
necklace’ of nine parks around the neck of the city’s head, and many other projects use 
                                                 
13 The full text reads: ‘A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it 
leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks 
out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.’ 
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similar vegetal and waterway adornment and clothing metaphors for the geographic 
body parts of significant locations.  
 
A core symbol and metaphor of architectural languages is the archetype of the human 
body. Its translation into the classical vertical and horizontal of column and beam 
grounds its appeal in mythopoeic metaphor while advancing an explanatory mythology. 
The importance of ‘human scale’ is a myth of good design that has been challenged by 
Peter Eisenman. Reflecting on their collaboration for a 'garden' in the Parc de La 
Villette, Jacques Derrida notes that ‘the very axiom of architecture that Eisenman 
begins by overturning, is the measure of man’ (1997, p.337).  
 
[T]he 'metaphysics of scale' which Eisenman's 'scaling' attempts to destabilize is, first of 
all, a humanism or an anthropocentrism. It is a human, all too human, desire for 
'presence' and 'origin'. Even in its theological dimensions, this architecture of originary 
presence returns to man under the law of representation and aesthetics (p.337). 
 
While architects have questioned the usefulness and motives behind the use of 
anthropocentric archetypes, landscape architects, who would seem easily able to avoid 
them altogether given the wider, externalised realm of their operations, more often 
actively court the ‘human scale’ as not only a positive, but a central objective of 
landscape architectural intervention (Dee 2001). There are many examples on the 
AILA website of commentary which advocates and celebrates the human scale of 
exemplary work. ‘Project workshops and surveys … have shown that one of the key 
factors in community acceptance of increasing densities is the quality of design’ and 
this quality is identified through ‘key desirable themes,’ including ‘[t]hat the 
development should have a strong sense of place, human scale, with consideration of 
safety and comfort’ (Fuller 2008). The success of ‘one of Adelaide’s most popular 
outdoor cafes … lay in the human scale of the outdoor spaces’ (Richardson 2006). 
Fred Kent and Kathleen Madden ‘lecture widely on user-friendly design and planning in 
cities … It was their series of slides of people interacting with human-scale sculptures 
… which best illustrated the power of settings to encourage spontaneous cheerful 
behaviour in public spaces’ (Chenoweth 1992). Hassell Pty Ltd & BDP London’s 
Waterfront City plan was awarded a citation of excellence by AILA Victoria because it 
‘exhibited a responsiveness to both site and user amenity ... and to its Melbourne 
context and the focus on human scale, permeability and connectivity’ (AILA 2004). Yet 
while the comforts of such conventionally attributed meaning and value are easy to 
identify and interrogate, a rejection of presence altogether in favour of absence and 
imminence, presents a trickier mythic substitution of the responsibility to be meaningful. 
The myth of imminent ‘potential’ has been adapted to newly articulated myths of 
landscape beauty. The beautiful is once again meaningful, and both emerge from 
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inherent potential to be so, requiring only truthful representation by designers to make 
this apparent. 
 
Beauty and Myth 
Myths of beauty are of all types, from mystic recognition and praise for given or found 
rather than creatable phenomena, to myopic legislation of rules of taste for both the 
perception and creation of the beautiful. Robin Boyd’s complaint of suburban featurism 
was one of a misconceived idea of beauty.  
 
Why are the houses different? Partly because everyone likes to think that he or she has 
better taste than Mr or Mrs Smith next door. Partly because no-one wants to feel just 
one of the herd and many think that their house should express their individuality. But 
the visible changes also reflect different ideas about beauty. It is important to realise 
that nearly all houses are meant by their owners to look beautiful … Australian houses 
… might be more comfortable for living in, if they were designed to look - not more 
beautiful - but more inviting (1962, p.50). 
 
The same argument was made by Frederick Law Olmsted some hundred years earlier. 
 
‘Will it be beautiful?’ should be asked as to any proposition for improvement, but it is not 
by any means the first question to be asked … Time, effort, and money expended on 
embellishments, without painstaking thought as to their ultimate result, are apt to be 
worse than wasted; while wise forethought as to purposes and tendencies may so 
shape the simplest utilitarian necessities of a village as to give it the beauty of 
consistency, harmony and truth (in Carson 1905). 
 
In 1905 Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. wrote ‘Village Improvement’, quoting at length from 
a manuscript of his father’s written some twenty years earlier. In a damning critique of 
the ‘beautification’ of American villages through funded improvement schemes, 
Olmsted Sr. declared that:  
 
[T]he pursuit of beauty through decoration has set back any character they had, either 
as a local distinction, or as a class, which if found in Norway or Java would be have 
been known as the beauty of the American village. The beauty, on the other hand, that 
they have acquired is largely a common extrinsic beauty, which might as well have 
been produced anywhere else … on the outskirts of large commercial towns, and in 
European and Australian towns (in Carson 1905).  
 
This call to site specificity in design believes that ‘by far the highest and choicest 
beauty is that of inherent and comprehensive character and qualities, and whatever 
decoration hides this, or withholds attention from it, however beautiful in itself, is in 
effect a blemish.’ 
 
Similar ‘improvement’ can be found in Australian country towns and suburban shopping 
strips. Local progress associations have been assisted over decades by federal and 
state funding from Bicentennials, Olympics, Commonwealth and other international 
sporting events, Pride of Place schemes and gambling taxes. Typical works from this 
 
 
72
funding replace serviceable insitu concrete or asphalt pavements with decorative 
segmented pavers, install ‘themed’ seats, bins and ‘interpretative art’. Like Olmsted, it 
is possible to be ‘pleased’ and  
 
… praise the work of architects and gardeners, engineers and sanitary engineers, 
decorators and esthetes, [but] I do not think that the villages [or suburbs] which have 
gained most from them, or from the admirable labors of beauty-organizing women are 
likely to impress visitors … as pleasingly … as those of the general character and 
aspect I have endeavored to recall. [That is,] one consistent expression of character … 
particular to its location (in Carson 1905). 
 
Similarly distinguishing beauty from beautification, Robin Boyd also noted the 
damaging call to ‘improvement’ as primarily an economically driven endeavour.  
 
[T]he Australian's apparent distaste for trees stemmed not from his heart but from his 
head. It was based on consideration of the real-estate economic term 'improvements'. 
Having in mind always the asset which his home represented, the owner was keen to 
effect as many improvements as possible. Improvements of course had nothing to do 
with improving the appearance or comfort of the property. The term could best be 
defined as changes from nature, for better or worse. Every native tree chopped down 
made a simple but spectacular change from nature, and thus represented money in 
some hypothetical future bank. An English tree, on the other hand, was less natural and 
could almost be considered an improvement. A trimmed hedge or cypress cut into a 
kangaroo shape also qualified (1952, p.60). 
 
A recent essay by landscape architect Elizabeth Meyer represents a new perspective 
on the use of beauty, albeit one that seems in danger of repeating old ideological 
errors. In 2009 she delivered a public lecture and three further presentations in 
Melbourne discussing her recent article ‘Sustaining beauty. The performance of 
appearance. A manifesto in three parts’ (Meyer 2008). She outlines her aim: 
 
Here, I will make a claim for reinserting the aesthetic into discussions of sustainability. I 
will make a case for the appearance of the designed landscape as more than a visual, 
stylistic or ornamental issue, as more than a rear-garde [sic] interest in form. I will 
attempt to rescue the visual, by connecting it to the body and poly-sensual experience. I 
will try to explain how immersive, aesthetic experience can lead to recognition, 
empathy, love, respect and care for the environment (p.6). 
 
Meyer is concerned to make a claim for the value of aesthetics and the recognition of 
beauty as bodily and immersive experiences. Aesthetic knowledge and value 
embodied and thereby shared through form is certainly what landscape architecture 
aims for, but the visual does not just need rescuing by a connection to the body and 
poly-sensual experience, but by connection to the imagination and to intelligence. 
Aesthetics is not a particular beauty, but the study of sensible or sensory cognition. It 
considers that ‘feeling’ is a form of knowledge. The active consideration and 
examination of feelings—feeling itself—is a way to better understand both our own 
knowledge of the world and to speculate on how others know the world. However, what 
we do with this knowledge and in whose service we wield its power is another matter. 
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Meyer acknowledges that ‘[a]n aesthetic appreciation of the designed landscape 
emerged in the eighteenth century’ (p.8). John Dixon Hunt has summarised it as 
follows: 
 
What was basically at issue throughout the latter part of the [eighteenth] century was 
whether the aesthetic and emotional experience could be located in objects outside the 
mind (Price and Gilpin provide versions of that) or whether (Knight and Addison are the 
chief spokesmen here) it was not the property of the thing itself but a way of looking, a 
habit of the subjective mind (1976, p.242). 
 
These two positions—whether beauty is located in the object or with the perceiving 
subject—represent a typical bi-polar argument regarding the truthfulness of claims to 
understand and represent the ‘natural’ and the ‘beautiful’. This dichotomous position 
can easily be seen as similar to current theoretical argument regarding ‘form’ and 
‘process’ where landscape ‘processes’ are seen to be more truthful and valuable than 
landscape ‘forms’, even though it is not at all easy to see how they can be separated in 
reality or practice. While landscape architecture has recently pursued form-process 
distinctions as an important innovation dealing with contemporary concerns regarding 
rapid landscape change such as that experienced by suburban expansion, similar 
subject-object debates of the eighteenth century arrived at a realisation that only 
provisional and relative truths could be located. Some commentators further 
recognised that the language and arguments which did locate truth did so as a 
persuasive exercise of power. 
 
For example, Edmund Burke assumed a true nature exists, ‘in reality’. The only 
problem, for him—as for many landscape architects today—is how to show or reveal it. 
It is, Burke said, ‘a matter of no small difficulty to show in a clear light the genuine face 
of nature’ (1998, p.53). He believes that arguments about the Beautiful, Picturesque 
and Sublime have been simply about correct categorisation and terminology. He 
argues that, regardless of the terminology, there is a truth and a reality behind the 
words. He goes on: 
 
If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the Sublime be all found 
consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head of 
beauty; and if those which compose themselves under the class of the Beautiful have 
the same consistency with themselves and the same opposition to those which are 
classed under the denomination of Sublime, I am in little pain whether anybody chooses 
to follow the name I give them or not … The use I make of the words may be blamed, 
as too confined or too extended; my meaning cannot be well misunderstood (p.55). 
 
In fact his meanings can be easily misunderstood, especially failing shared cultural 
contexts. Richard Payne Knight’s concern in debating the matter was not about 
terminology for its own sake but because words stand for things that are themselves 
unquestioned (e.g. truth, genuine nature, authentic design, sustainability). The ‘reality’ 
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Burke assumes to identify is as problematic as his ‘nature’. The beauty that Meyer 
presents is similarly as problematically unproblematic as the ‘sustainability’ which she 
calls on beauty to support. It is also then as problematically unproblematic as her goal 
for the enhanced value and role of landscape architecture. 
 
In 1795, Knight published Landscape, A Didactic Poem written in response to Burke 
(1795). Amongst a range of criticisms, Knight is adamant that no automatic association 
or emblematic attribution be applied to the intellectual pleasures of aesthetic 
preference. The experience of particular forms of beauty is not automatically linked with 
and should not be used to persuade people to think a particular way. The connection 
Knight does make between aesthetic and political liberty is not to be confused with a 
connection between any particular aesthetic and some particular politics. It is a matter 
of freedom of thought and the openness of knowledge itself to new learning. 
Representation is representative of nothing more than the artist’s preferences and 
skills, and the ideas that they would persuade you of, not the real world. He offers a 
warning:  
 
All that I entreat is, that they [who would offer solutions based on spurious metaphor] 
will not at this time, when men’s minds are so full of plots and conspiracies, endeavour 
to find analogies between picturesque composition and political confusion; or suppose 
that the preservation of trees and terraces has any connection with the destruction of 
states and kingdoms (unpaginated).  
 
Phrased in consideration of more recent political events, desires for a sustainable 
landscape architecture, the motives of AILA climate change policy and AILA’s 
Landscape Principles, a similar warning might be made. Those confident in the 
discovery of design methods which achieve triple bottom line outcomes may find an 
attentive audience by appealing to concerns about terrorism and global warming, 
drawing parallels between indigenous plant use or Water Sensitive Urban Design and 
national pride and security.  The preservation of inefficient landscapes or the desire to 
leave—or even create—strange, dangerous or ambiguous landscapes unimproved by 
identified sustainable methods and technologies, should not be connected with desire 
for the destruction of western capitalist democracy or the planet, and offers no support 
for axes of evil. 
 
Introducing her various presentations in Melbourne, Meyer offered significant 
reflections: she had received the most responses to the Manifesto of any piece of 
writing she’s ever published, it was the fastest piece of writing she’s ever done, initially 
outlined in a few hours, and she had and continues to have great trouble sourcing 
images and examples for her categories. In the structure of her piece can be seen the 
development and expansion of a deceptively simple statement—beauty will help us 
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understand and fight for sustainability—which begins to unravel as she goes into 
greater detail and specificity, particularly in applying it to built work. The most important 
point of her manifesto is not a call to find or develop a new idea or definition of beauty 
appropriate to our time which will ‘perform’ in ways that help landscape architects to 
help us all achieve ‘sustainability’. The important, unintended message of her piece is 
not to have a discussion about what we find beautiful and how we can use it, but rather 
to continue discussions of how and why we see beauty and how and why we should try 
to share what we see. What is beautiful is not important—what we think and feel and 
are prepared to argue is beautiful is and this cannot be limited to serving a cause and 
should not be so co-opted.  
 
Meyer asks many questions herself throughout the piece. ‘What is the value of the 
visual and formal when human, regional and global health are at stake?’ (p.6). More 
correctly, what are the values. Questions of beauty are questions of plural values. 
Meyer assumes here that beauty is valuable and that therefore it is of value and of use, 
stripping beauty of its real value: the interrogation of values. A discussion of beauty 
requires discussion of quality, which means a discussion about how well and to what 
end beyond mere continued existence, the economy, society and the environment 
should or could be sustained. It is indeed important—vital—that landscape architecture 
reaffirm the importance of discussion and debate regarding beauty, because such 
debates are about values, about unearthing hidden values, sometimes just obscure 
because they are lazily accepted, sometimes because they have been manipulatively 
pre-determined; choices and decisions already made which are not open to discussion. 
Beauty is bent by Meyer to the dominant discourse of sustainability, sustainability is not 
enriched or questioned by discourses on beauty. She limits the profession, along with 
the power of beauty, to that which will serve purposes already determined. 
Sustainability is about physical and material problems of sufficiency. Meyer positions 
design as the motivator to engage us to recognise these, which are already assumed 
and defined by others, and find solutions which are also already assumed and defined 
by others. Is this really all design can or should do? 
 
‘Sustaining Beauty exploits the aesthetic experience of landscape as a tool in the 
sustainable design toolbox.’ In fact, Meyer’s tool is not even of much use beyond her 
rhetoric of use, because it cannot be guaranteed what effects the affects of beauty will 
have. The unproblematic becomes a problem as soon as it is applied to the real world 
of infinite difference, and the dissent that comes with it. More worryingly though, she 
would condemn designers to accept and apply her simple equation of beauty with 
sustainability, the former defined by the latter which is defined by others, rather than 
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liberate landscape architects to explore, enjoy and share the richness of all potential 
beauty and the power that it has to undermine any particular persuasive beauty, ever 
exposing and interrogating the value-systems behind it, while ever delighting in the 
creation of new forms. 
 
Meyer’s manifesto is so intent to persuade landscape architects to make use of the 
performing power of beauty that it sometimes seems a cunning demonstration of the 
very thing she means to draw our attention to repudiating; the dangers of all persuasive 
power. However, it is possibly rather a different audience than the one for which she 
was writing, that apprehends the dark warning in her wish for a new generation of 
accepting and complacent ‘environmentalist-citizens’ to replace the generation of 
differently complacent consuming ones that we already have. Beauty poses many 
useful problems rather than supplying an unproblematic solution. What Meyer’s 
manifesto outlines and examples with numerous projects is less evidence for 
sustaining beauty, the performance of appearance, than about beautifying 
sustainability, the appearance of performance.  
 
Already new suburbs, under the direction of new legislation, are incorporating best 
practice sustainable landscapes and these are as beautiful in appearance and 
performance—that is as fashionably embellished—as they previously were. The role 
that design might have—always has—is one that exercises independent interrogation 
of current conditions and criteria challenging inevitable and emerging inequities of 
present best practice through the uncompromising utopian proposals of something 
even better. 
 
Fallacies and lies 
At the outset of this chapter myth was positioned as storytelling that comprised neither 
wholly conscious nor wholly unconscious creation, and at any rate was argued not to 
be simply a deception, deliberate or not. Yet, in its extremes of mystic and myopic, 
whatever good intentions may lie behind their expression, myth becomes a deceptive 
story; in the former instance unconsciously and seemingly without authorial direction, in 
the latter, clearly authored and to deliberate purpose. The unravelling of uncertain 
intentionality is the subject of formulations of various fallacies and of lying too. John 
Ruskin’s ‘pathetic fallacy’ British philosopher G. E. Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’, 
Geoffrey Scott’s ‘Romantic’ or ‘literary fallacy’, and W. K. Winsatt and Monroe C. 
Beardsley’s ‘affective’ or ‘intentional fallacy’ might all be related to misguided objectives 
of the architecture of landscapes. These fallacies theorise the falsity of particular terms 
of and criteria for evaluation, whether of poetry, literature, architecture or, by extension, 
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any creative or created work. Yet they are also variously argued to offer insights that 
are otherwise incommunicable. 
 
The fallacy of affective criticism arises from a propensity to confuse a poem with its 
effects, raising concern with effects over regard for the effects’ source or means of 
creation. Yet some form of affective analysis is argued to be legitimate if not necessary 
to avoid the equal fallacy of judgement based on what the poem or object simply is, 
and that emotional effectiveness must be part of its value. Moore’s Principia Ethica 
(2004) intends to clear up moral confusion arising from the ‘naturalistic fallacies’ of 
Bentham, Spencer and others. Like other fallacy-formulation critiques, his is concerned 
to reveal the reductionism as much as the error in defining the good by ‘natural’ 
properties. Similarly Manfredo Tafuri asked:  
 
What does it mean … to liken the city to a natural object? … [T]he city is not interpreted 
as a structure that, with its mechanisms of accumulation, transforms the processes of 
land exploitation and agricultural and property revenues. As a phenomenon likened to a 
‘natural’ process, ahistorical because it is universal, the city is freed from any structural 
considerations whatsoever … this naturalisation fulfils its function by ensuring artistic 
activity an ideological role in the strict sense (2000, p.8). 
 
That is, ensuring that art support the new methods of production and exchange, and be 
recognised and rewarded too within the monetary value system of a capitalist 
economy. How much easier is it to then naturalise the value of landscape, particularly 
in the more nature-filled green of the suburbs? The mythology applies today with 
naturalism evoked as environmentalism, being supported by both artistic vision and 
scientific process—the two conjoined in ‘research’ and often indistinguishable—while 
the site of the ‘city’ now crucially includes the development of the suburbs as the locale 
of new machines and new mechanisms of economic accumulation.  
 
For Moore, the meaning of the term ‘good’ and the nature of the property goodness are 
irreducibly sui generis. Yet, although goodness itself may be sui generis, good 
architecture and design is not. It must be produced, debated and defended. A 
naturalistic fallacy applied to architecture which is necessarily not natural must serve to 
illuminate debate, not about ultimate or absolute good, but about what good is at any 
time with regard to the production of things which claim to serve it.  
 
John Ruskin is credited with coining the term ‘pathetic fallacy’ as a derogatory remark 
regarding those who sentimentally and erroneously credit nature or non-human things 
with human feelings and sentience. A closer examination of Ruskin reveals that rather 
than being simply derogatory the pathetic fallacy is a concept that encompasses for 
him what is both best and worst in poetry and art, and so might it also be so for 
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landscape design. On the one hand the pathetic fallacy results in mawkish sentiment 
and inaccurate perception, on the other, considered in relation to the interior state of 
the speaker, the pathetic (or emotional) fallacy tells a truth In the second volume of 
Modern Painters he exposes the dilemma at the heart of romantic theory when he 
states that, ‘though we cannot, while we feel deeply, reason shrewdly, yet I doubt if, 
except when we feel deeply, we can ever comprehend fully’ (1906, p.122).  
 
The pathetic fallacy is caused by ‘an excited state of feelings, making us, for a time, 
more or less irrational.’ Such irrationality can be both debilitating and liberating, but is 
always subversive. In his investigation of American suburbia, Peter Rowe advised that:  
 
Generally insisting so totally on empirical measurement and analysis limits the scope of 
problems that can be seriously entertained or, more important, speculated about. For 
instance, the symbolic realm of human experience is totally bypassed. The central issue 
is not whether planning models exhibit explanatory power or predictive accuracy. 
Rather it is that a limiting, dependent relationship can be struck between the possibility 
of forming social goals and the technical exigencies of following through on empirical 
model development (1986, p.233). 
 
The pathetic fallacy and lies can be useful aids to communication and the assigning of 
meaning to things otherwise incommunicable and meaningless. Inasmuch as form will 
invite interpretation, it cannot avoid telling a story and so communicative capacity is an 
unavoidable consideration for designers too. Myth has been argued here however to fix 
the story communicated and not allow re-telling. Whereas parables, fables and other 
tales encourage re-interpretative musing, myths hold a single storyline and a clear 
intent that brooks no dissent. Myths are the fundamentalist tools of vested interests. In 
the continuum of telling and retelling, ‘myth’ marks the low point of habitual 
understanding, unquestioned meaning and ossified emotional response, while utopias 
mark that of purposeful revolt, new meaning and invigorated emotional engagement, 
partaking of the better part of fallacies and lies.  
 
Conclusion 
Suburbs have multiple mythic and mythical appeals. Suburbs also exhibit multiple 
utopian efforts. The critique of myth offered by Barthes has been related to types of 
myth and the ways myths are used to explain and advance the production of 
landscapes, particularly suburban environments via politically and economically 
motivated deceptions. Mythopoeic influence in our consideration of the unknowable 
cannot be avoided and might be beneficially explored and usefully shared, as Ruskin’s 
acknowledgement of the usefulness of the pathetic fallacy allows and as certain lies 
subversively encourage. But advanced mythological reasoning, employing the 
attractions and borrowing the forms of mythopoeic expression, constantly recuperates 
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vital new subversions of what is known and valued. Neither, it seems, can be avoided 
or contained. ‘[T]here is no society without a social myth. In what measure can we 
choose or adopt, and impose, a myth fostering the society which we judge to be 
desirable?’ declared André Breton (1972, p.287-9). Wheelwright phrases this as a 
statement of the core problem of contemporary literature: 
 
The spiritual problems of the poet in contemporary society arise in part out of the lack of 
myths which can be felt warmly, envisaged in concrete and contemporary images, and 
shared with a wide body of responsive readers (1974, p.540). 
 
This is easily rephrased as a problem for designers: 
 
The aesthetic problems of the architect in contemporary society arise in part out of the 
lack of conceptions of beauty which can be felt warmly, envisaged in concrete and 
contemporary constructions, and shared with a wide body of responsive stakeholders. 
 
As Breton suggests, there is no society entirely without myth, and emergent gaps 
which poetry and design might struggle to fill or alternatively cede any responsibility for 
investigating, can be readily filled by others. Our present ideas of beauty are vigorously 
directed by markets and marketing, just as our ideas of right conduct in the world are 
strictly circumscribed by political policy and legal code. Design practice has variously 
and sometimes simultaneously or indistinguishably served and subverted such control. 
What Breton really asks is how this condition might be changed. How do we foster or 
enable a newly desirable social order? 
 
The subversion of dominant myths, such as sustainability, or the imposition or even 
suggestion of alternative ones is a difficult task. Inasmuch as it is both essential to 
undertake and unlikely to succeed it is a utopian endeavour. Considering ‘in what 
measure to … impose’ a new myth, the task hints also at the violence of dystopian 
failure. The following chapter examines the utopian impulse and the ways it has been 
manifested in different types of utopias. It unpacks the use and abuse of utopianism 
that has confused myth and utopia, concluding with recognition of danger in the 
slippage between utopian openness and mythic non-designing open-endedness. 
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Chapter 4 
Landing Utopia 
 
The methods for understanding, articulating and addressing the perceived 
opportunities and constraints offered by suburbs have been founded on the need to 
provide answers to agreed problems. These are now predominantly understood within 
the terms of ‘sustainability’ being forged by prolific and profitable research and an 
increasing canon of awarded projects. Sustainability is not simply a contested concept 
but one encompassing a wide range of variously compatible and contradictory visions 
of closed and open, finally perfect and adaptively evolving environments. These 
landscape visions—visions of settings for desirable human-nature relations—are 
meaningful in ways that can be considered broadly utopian or mythical. The difference 
between the urgings of utopianism’s impossible possibilities and the consolations of 
possible impossibilities that attend belief in myths are neither clear nor stable. 
 
Like the suburbs, utopias and utopian thinking suffered a period of general and 
architectural disinterest in the later twentieth century, having retreated into simple 
assumptions representing polarised views of their value to contemporary problems. 
Just as a body of new work on the suburbs is emerging, questioning the clichés of their 
Pro and Con conditions and sceptical of the proliferating studies of Anti scientism, 
utopias too have been the subject of fresh interest and examinations that identify and 
try to understand similarly extreme assessments of a nonetheless persistent notion 
(Coleman 2005; Jacoby 2007, Jameson 2005; Moylan & Baccolini 2007; Pinder 2002; 
Rothstein et al. 2003; Scott 2007; Trahair 1999; van Schaik & Macel 2005; Wegner 
1998). Utopian studies speak variously and sometimes interchangeably of utopia, anti-
utopia (Elliott 1970), atopia, embedded utopia (Grosz 2001) critical utopia, dystopia and 
critical dystopia (Moylan 2000) along with a variety of thematically or geographically 
situated topias such as technotopias, ecotopias, subtopias, and more.  
 
This chapter considers these typologies, especially as they relate to the articulation of 
space and the construction of place: their landscape setting. The very idea of 
‘landscape’ is a utopian one. The ambition to grasp and share any singular conception 
of such an infinitely layered, palimpsestuous thing is a hopeful projection. A landscape 
is a particular perception and preferential re-construction of specified land. Taxonomies 
of landscapes are similar to those of utopias, identifying a wide range of properties: 
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location, extent, influences, programmes and purpose, range of spatial features, 
specific elements, tools and techniques. Above all they are interested in classifications 
of nature-culture alliances. Utopias and landscapes embody philosophies of 
approaches to negotiating conditions for the coexistence of human and non-human life, 
even where non-human life or human nature is seemingly excised from a vision of 
human living. 
 
Closed utopias: good and bad  
The manner in which utopian attitudes to landscape construction have been identified 
and valued to date can be broadly identified as taking two forms; one in which 
utopianism is the positive expression of a will to strive for a better world, regardless of 
the failures of those utopias built as a result, and one which principally sees the 
disastrous dystopic results of a variously identified blind optimism, hubris or knowing 
exploitation. Both of these utopia-dystopias convey simple ideas of a closed system 
where an identified cause of evil has been permanently removed and the further 
interference of historical change remains unconsidered. The ‘good’ utopia espouses 
the usefulness of utopian ambition for an improved world free of a particular evil. The 
other, ‘bad’ utopia or dystopia warns of misguided faith in such vain hopes and, 
frequently by extension, in vanity itself. They reveal the unintended consequences of 
removal of the particular evil as the encouragement or installation of a new one. 
Suburbs as good utopian propositions have been presented as places where the evils 
of city decadence and rural decay, class distinction and other issues of equity and fair 
access to goods and services can be successfully overcome through planned provision 
of built and natural infrastructures. As dystopian places they gain instead a range of 
new evils including social and cultural isolation and fresh forms of inequity, prejudice 
and poverty.  
 
At an obvious level the good life offered by early ambitions for design of suburbs—
regardless of their political, economic, religious, stylistic or other flavour—and the ideal 
or diagrammatic versions of formal patterns proposed by their designers (architects or 
proto-landscape architectural planners) together represent the rise and fall of utopian 
ambitions doomed to dystopic failure. At this level, utopian suburbs, like the single-
mindedness of their designers, are cast as lessons not to be repeated and the 
adjective is clearly intended as pejorative. Nonetheless such exemplary and seemingly 
obvious lessons are not so easily learnt to judge by the frequency with which both 
suburbs and designers continue to be so labelled (Weller 2008). 
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Alternatively, utopianists are dismissed as essentially pessimists, or even sadists, who 
envisage only failure and pursue it, and where dystopia is the intended outcome 
(Wegner 1998). In the first case designers of utopias and those who buy into them are 
simply, albeit often catastrophically, misguided. The sprawling suburbs—which is to 
say, all suburbs—and their happily escapist, nostalgic neo-styled forms, are 
unsustainably consuming the resources of the planet such that they and the lifestyles 
they promote are largely seen as responsible for the environmental catastrophes 
awaiting us with the advance of global warming. In the latter case the utopians are 
dangerously charismatic, evil corruptors of common sense ‘good’ who take perverse 
pleasure in a nihilistic despair. The suburbs are in this case places of unique 
contemporary wickedness where wife-swapping, incest, indulgences and social 
dysfunctions of all sorts are celebrated as pleasures of a falsely free society, again 
busily and selfishly consuming scarce resources. In both cases the utopia-dystopia is 
an indulgent fantasy and the main objections to them become moral rather than ethical 
matters. ‘Good’ design is then not about broadening and extending choices in an 
infinitely varied possible landscape, but about directing and controlling them toward a 
correct choice which requires a particular landscape vision. This is precisely the role 
that planning legislation has, from local codes to overarching policy documents such as 
Melbourne 2030. 
 
Open utopias: reformist and radical 
Some more complex ideas of utopia than the simple good and bad closed utopia-
dystopia have been clarified within a burgeoning literature that re-examines failed 
propositions of the past in their own context and in acknowledgement of the effects of 
time and the ongoing operations of historical contexts. This results on the one hand in 
proposals to reform systems of identified errors. On the other, allowing for the benefits 
of hindsight and appreciating the unrealised possibilities of proposals that were not 
then knowingly impossible, examiners are encouraged to radical speculation beyond 
currently proven error and omission. This has two possible consequences. Firstly, such 
generous licence applied to present plans can freely advocate for their unknown 
potential on the basis that outcomes are not predictable, albeit such advocacy may be 
indiscriminately exercised by the same argument. Secondly, it encourages further new 
specific utopian proposals which can better utilise present knowledge while also 
pursuing and pushing the shifting boundaries of what is known. At this further level of 
analysis, the history of utopias, failed suburbs and failed design do not so much offer 
lessons in how to avoid failure in future, or advocate ignoring failure as an unknowable 
outcome, but reassert the necessity to take risks in order to know the limits of 
possibility. This means that the utopian attitude is not one which can possibly repeat 
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painful yet forgotten lessons, whether in ignorance or deliberately, but must be 
constantly inventing new ways to fail. Schemes which do not fail in new ways are not, 
by this definition, ‘utopian’ at all. Schemes which cannot be assessed to succeed or fail 
in any event, in light of an open advocacy of any eventuality, are equally non-utopian. 
 
There are, however, a variety of claims made along a sliding scale of invention and 
novelty that might appear in practice to make it difficult to know to what degree 
innovation qualifies as sufficiently new or different for utopian status. At a more modest 
and conservative end of the scale are reformist propositions, gradually increasing to 
more radical ones at the other. The continuing nuanced evolution of suburban forms of 
physical layouts, as well as governance structures, provide some evidence of what 
might be seen as a cautious level of experimental utopianism. Amongst such careful 
contrivances are the propositions of New Urbanism and Smart Growth. Although there 
may well be a return to considerations of earlier forms, these propositions might claim a 
utopian status in the light of their response to new contexts and new problems. 
However, for some critics, such reformist approaches do not qualify as utopian. Utopias 
are revolutionary and must offer a fundamental break from the past. ‘Utopianism 
generally is the imaginative projection, positive or negative, of a society that is 
substantially different from the one in which the author lives’ (Claeys & Sargent 1999, 
p.1). For the publication of forty-three exemplary works of European landscape 
architecture in 2006 organised and judged by the Landscape Architecture Europe 
Foundation, one of the jurors, Stig Andersson, explained the core criterion for the 
inclusion of a project: ‘if it has nothing to do with wanting to change the world, then it 
should not appear in this book’ (Diedrich & LAEF 2006, p.16).  
 
New Urbanism has been linked to utopias but only in derogatory or reformist senses.  
 
New Urbanism continues the paradoxical stance of previous modern movements, from 
the Garden City Movement to CIAM... by combining remedial intervention with a utopian 
agenda. In both cases urban and architectural form becomes the agent for social 
reform. Cognizant of the pattern of failure of previous purely architectural movements 
however, New Urbanists have encouraged the inclusion of a broad coalition of non-
architects... yet the sources of the modern cities’ problems for the New Urbanists are 
still, at the core, physical symptoms (Dutton 2001, p.15). 
 
And so no revolutionary program of social change is considered. As Freestone has 
suggested (1989; 2002), City Beautiful and Garden City movements were corruptions 
of the radical visions of Ebenezer Howard’s initial ideas (Howard 1898). New Urbanism 
then is only utopian in the mistaken derogatory sense. Along with largely failing to 
recreate the ‘authenticity’ of earlier models that they copy, their projects also exploit 
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nostalgia to deliberately avoid the work of creating new conceptions of desirable 
settlement types (Fishman 2005). 
 
More recent concepts propose a radical break with the past by advocating an ongoing 
reactive and flexible open-endedness, such as that explored through the speculative 
and competition projects of Landscape Urbanism. This apparent radicalism seeks to 
grasp and hold the positive promise of utopian thinking and avoid something of the 
ossification of new ideas into dogmatic ideals seen to characterise both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ utopias. It also hopes to avoid the consequences of actually failing, by casting the 
utopian project as an ongoing and indeed limitless endeavour of future possibility. 
However a ‘utopian’ project that flatly refuses its utopian destiny, despite radical 
credentials in regard to its attitude to an inadequate unreformable past, cannot be 
argued to actually engage with the problems that compel its necessity.  
 
Openness and open-endedness are features of many current design propositions 
critical of the way power has been exercised and power-relations hidden by closed or 
absolute systems. Before examining in more detail the distinction between open 
utopias and merely open-ended propositions, the following reviews the general 
taxonomic terrain of radical propositions typically labelled utopian.  
 
Three Utopian Themes 
Critique of ideal nature-culture relations, whether closed or open, is being undertaken 
within three broad and interconnecting thematic arenas: that of technological utopias, 
utopias of creative play and social engagement, and utopias of a life of optimised 
health and well-being. All three are regularly cited as arguments for the positive 
possibilities of suburban living. The first involves metaphors of the machine, the second 
employs an idea of theatre and play, while the third looks at models of life.  
 
Machine metaphors are not just about mechanisms but can also explore ideas of 
intelligently advanced, self-teaching and learning systems. This theme is primarily 
techno-centric, and features particularly in the closed utopia-dystopias of the final 
banishment of evil. Technotopias are characterised by the logics of ‘utopistics’ (Manuel 
& Manuel 1979, p.814). They are also readily linked to consumer capitalism: 
 
Capitalist societies are not wanting in horatory, bookish treatises that espouse ideal 
forms to be established within the existing scientific-technological framework, their 
obvious intent being the maximisation of capacities for the consumption of goods and 
services... The run-of-the-mill consumer utopias that peddle a professional optimism 
concentrate on mechanical inventions and have little or nothing to say about changed 
social institutions for mankind (p.806). 
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Technotopias, as projections of technological advancement and applied scientific 
instrumentalism, are principally the products of engineering. They approach the 
problems of human alliance or interference with ‘nature’ as difficulties of essentially 
technical concerns of appropriate production, distribution and consumption of goods, 
services and knowledge. Nature, including human nature, is appreciated 
mechanistically and instrumentally, all other possibilities or qualities circumvented or 
relegated to a passive or irrelevant background or ornament. The technotopian suburbs 
and their designers employ the techniques of water sensitive urban design (WSUD), 
including lot scale water tanks and estate scale wetland stormwater treatment, 
permeable paving, the use of solar panels at domestic and commercial or community 
levels, and application of various other schemes and systems to achieve improved 
energy-ratings and resource efficiency across all scales of the estate development. 
Such features are standard for advertisements of Melbourne suburban estates. 
Because of the faith in which scientific solutions to environmental problems are held—
and because of media concentration on ‘the environment’s’ problems—their inclusion 
may be emphasised through covenants or other legal assurances, regardless of 
whether this may seem to contradict the freedoms of the other arenas of utopian 
possibility, particularly the socialising communities’ playtopias. 
  
Playtopias employ metaphors of theatre, performance and scripting or programming of 
actions to enable, enhance, imitate or substitute an engaged social life with the 
satisfactions to be derived from the act of engagement itself. It is people-centred and 
socio-centric, the product of deliberate social planning, but also equally deliberate anti-
planning or illegal social experiments. Playtopias, like technotopias are closed utopias 
where social and other relations are carefully and ultimately engineered for the benefit 
of all. But they also feature in open utopias, related to theatres of the absurd that 
project an ongoing conversation and mediation of the play by the actors themselves. 
The performative nature of life, and social life in particular, lends itself to consideration 
of an open-endedness that accepts an ever-evolving contextualisation of action and 
interpretation. With reference to Karl Mannheim, the manipulation of contexts which is 
then possible evidences a socialisation of knowledge and even of experience and 
feeling. In addition, such manipulations which permit apparent freedom of immediate 
expression and social interaction might be considered, in Roland Barthes’ terms, a 
profoundly limiting naturalisation of culture.  
 
New Urbanist and other gated communities and enclaves are examples of planned 
social playtopias. While more a feature of American than of Australian residential 
growth areas, the concept of local controls defining communally acceptable size, style, 
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colour and other criteria of physical fabrics, and the behaviours and attitudes 
associated with them, is reflected in Melbourne in local council ‘character’ overlays. 
The Victorian Government’s Department of Planning and Community Development 
(DPCD) describes the importance of ‘neighbourhood character’:  
 
The residential development provisions in Victorian planning schemes and the Victorian 
Building Regulations are underpinned by key measures to ensure development 
respects neighbourhood character. Neighbourhood character is shaped by the 
combination of the public and private realms. Every property, public place or piece of 
infrastructure makes a contribution, whether great or small. It is the cumulative impact 
of all these contributions that establishes neighbourhood character (DPCD 2010a).  
 
In America there is a growing phenomenon of residential community associations. 
Similar bodies are encouraged in Australia by some developers as a marketable 
feature of their estates. Delfin Lend Lease establishes separate community groups for 
their estates and organises and funds their activities and newsletters. Delfin, like New 
Urbanist projects, has focused on ‘community’ as a primary aim of their residential 
estates and it is a key to their marketing as the following ‘testimonials’ to Delfin projects 
attest: 
 
‘Why is it different? I keep coming back to the word community.’  
‘It’s a great area for kids especially. They love it.’  
‘We love living here - wouldn’t live anywhere else. It’s a great community.’  
‘It's a safe place... the relaxed environment is wonderful for parents.’ ‘Everyone’s 
friendly, everyone talks to you. I get to know everyone’s names’ (Delfin 2004). 
(see also Plate 27) 
 
As well as being a selling point for the estates, such groups actively assist in 
maintenance and security (especially important and otherwise expensive for public 
areas that have not yet been handed to local councils) and can be used for market 
research: ‘Delfin holds regular focus group discussions with residents, purchasers and 
enquirers to help us gain an insight into changing perceptions, market needs and 
changing attitudes’ (Delfin 2004).   
 
In America such groups have become formalised in ways that have overlapped and 
appear to usurp local government responsibilities. William Fischel has reviewed these 
community associations and argued that they have not displaced the mandated 
regulatory responsibility of municipal government and neither should such private 
bodies displace elected governance. Harvard Law Professor Gerald Frug sees a role 
for residents to think of themselves as political and ethical actors (2001), rather than as 
mere consumers, although it is less clear how or if their actions can be clearly 
dissociated from economic motives. His argument is that although local government 
exists precisely to embody the public realm of discussion and difference it is 
increasingly unable to do so. This most basic form of American democracy is 
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constantly threatened not only by centralised bureaucracies imposing uniform rules (in 
Melbourne, State Government planning policies are administered, sometimes 
reluctantly and with various interpretations, by local governments), but also by the 
privatisation of local government law in subdivisions operating under development 
provisions different to established areas that serve to ‘wall off’ privileged suburbs from 
the rest of the region. Robert Fishman‘s critique of Frug is interested in connections 
between his legal theory and urban design (2001), linking both communitarian and 
postmodern theorists’ attacks on centred conceptions of the self. Frug only briefly 
discusses New Ubanism, but for Fishman: 
 
Frug’s ideas also have cautionary implications about the limits of design. A 
neighborhood or even a town filled with wonderfully designed public spaces will 
nevertheless be a betrayal of democracy, if it is governed by privatized conceptions of 
local law that promote exclusion. One might hope, however, that the converse might 
eventually prove to be true – that turning local governments into genuine public forums 
could help to reenergize urban design as the public sphere widens (2001). 
 
Suggesting that something can qualify the appreciation of a public space as 
‘wonderfully designed’, separate from the ways it has been conceived and constructed, 
already begs a critique of design as somehow merely formally appealing or functionally 
effective. This appeal and effectiveness must be, by association, already connected 
with appealing non-formal meanings. In his hope for a reenergized urban design, 
Fishman advocates utopianism, specifically the ‘realistic utopia’ of philosopher John 
Rawls, whose ‘political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are 
ordinarily thought of as the limits of practical political possibility’. For Fishman, the best 
urban design stretches the limits of the possible in pursuit of precisely that ‘community 
building’ that Frug is seeking. ‘For what is a regional plan, if not a “realistic utopia”?’ 
Rawl’s realistic utopia, like Grosz’s embodied utopia and Moylan’s critical one is either 
an oxymoron or a tautology depending from which side of the paradox the utopia is 
viewed.  
 
A utopia exceeds the limits of the possible, even if only in order to stretch them. New 
Urbanist and other realisable planned communities are reformist rather than radical. 
There are many settlement and life-style experiments with claims to utopian radicalism 
such as various counter-cultural environments including hippy communes and 
temporary festival congregations such as the annual Burning Man celebration held in 
the desert of Nevada. It attracts over 35,000 residents to its ‘city’, run as a gift 
economy. Sustained experiments in England in the first half of the twentieth century 
have been documented in Arcadia For All: The Legacy Of A Makeshift Landscape 
(Hardy & Ward 2004) recognising the ‘rural slums’ (pp.7, 30, 210, 228, etc) and 
seaside ‘eyesores’ (p.125) of self-built communities. Early phases of Australian post-
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war suburban settlement had similar cultures of self-, and familial or communal 
building, utilising informal, if not illegal networks to secure scarce materials for builders’ 
lots sold without sewerage, roads or drainage (Davison et al. 1995; Ferber et al. 1994; 
Garden 1992; Johnston 1964). The tradition of the beach house and bush getaway was 
even more a place of unplanned and unregulated building. Summer season suburbs of 
shacks accumulated on the backdunes of coastal towns or overflowed from camping 
grounds, becoming semi-permanent residences. 
 
Experimentation was not limited to vernacular community efforts. Non-Plan: Essays on 
Freedom, Participation and Change in Modern Architecture and Urbanism (Lang et al. 
1997) documents experimental and variously guided, professional and community 
design and building. In these residents, resident-designers and sometimes non-
resident architects participate in shaping their environments. Experiments were made 
with varieties of ‘cluster’ housing and irregular lot and/or building integration where 
landscape and communal outdoor and productive space was a key consideration.  
 
The last and probably most commonly if loosely employed theme of utopias utilises 
metaphors of, if not direct appeals to, ‘life’ borrowing from biology, ecology and ‘life 
sciences’. Utopias on this theme simultaneously draw on the awe accorded to nature, 
the respect granted environmentalism, and the intimidation levered by sustainability 
discourses. Bio-topias include metaphors of the architectural and social body as living 
organisms, referring to health, generative and procreative capacities, mortality and 
cyclically composted immortality. This thematic is primarily nature-centred and bio-
centric and is the central theme of open utopias. In references to the suburbs bio-
topian appeals encompass everything from the abstractions of economic ‘growth’ which 
investment in a suburban home is intended to capitalise on, to the absurdities of 
marketing blurbs.  
 
Summerhill is a place where life’s special memories are made; A place of joy, of 
laughter, of romance and of tears; a place to love and a place to cherish because 
Summerhill is not just a place to live but a place for life (Hume Leader 26 Jan. 2010, 
p.51). (Plate 8) 
 
There are many hybrids of techno-play-bio-topias. The examples of each type above 
incorporate aspects of the other types in explaining and delivering their landscape 
visions. Projects claiming sustainability implicitly link social (theatre/play), 
environmental (life) and economic (machine/system) utopias. The type of total 
landscape picture or gesamtwerk they offer is dystopian in a new way according to 
Lebbeus Woods: 
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[W]e are heading towards big central planning, big, distant global control of the 
environment... Maybe there are 'good reasons' for it. I am terrified by this prospect, 
because even though the reasons offered are humanistic and good, the reality is that 
politicians are not operating on that basis... What worries me is that... feelings for a kind 
of unity seem to comply with that control picture... something fairly totalitarian - not in 
the old style, but in the soft new slick style of packaging and marketing which is 
nonetheless tyrannical (in Aslet 1993, p.27). 
 
Slick new styles can be seen appropriating the ideas of many of the following utopian 
landscape taxa. 
 
Frameworks for Utopian Nature-Culture Alliances 
Having considered classifications of good and bad, closed and open utopias, and their 
three major themes, the following considers particular ways that utopian nature-culture 
alliances have been framed. In two essays published in 2005 and 2006 Lisa Garforth 
outlined frameworks for organising and understanding utopias. Focused on the 
depictions of future environments in science fiction, literature and film, these framings 
might serve equally well for organising current and future visions of actual 
environments proposed by a range of architects, planners and landscape architects, as 
well as the politicians, developers and others they work for. Garforth’s frameworks 
pertain specifically to constructed visions of cultural relationships with nature, 
understood as ‘landscapes’. These are clearly relevant to the theory and practice of 
landscape architecture as a discipline of construction, and particularly relevant to 
construction endeavours in the suburbs. The earlier work (2005), examines the ways 
that two novels in particular (Ursula le Guin’s Always Coming Home and Kim Stanley 
Robinson’s Pacific Edge) ‘negotiate and deconstruct three of the dominant tropes 
through which human social relationships with nature have been managed and 
imagined in modernity’ (pp.393-394). These are the apocalyptic, the progressive and 
the pastoral. All three can be found in narratives of the suburbs. 
 
A year later in Ideal Nature: Utopias of Landscape and Loss (2006) Garforth provided 
an overarching framework of the ways in which nature and utopia have historically 
expressed alliances in literary, artistic and architectural constructions of the good life. 
Incorporating aspects of her previous work, she characterises three broad types of 
visionary nature-culture alliances. The first, termed ‘ecotopia’ takes three forms, 
labelled ‘ecocentrism’, ‘sufficiency’ and ‘embeddedness’. The second is called 
‘landscape’ and the third ‘postnatural’. Within this tri-partite framework suburb 
examples can easily be found. In particular the third ‘postnatural’ looks at more recent 
conceptions of what a relationship might mean in a condition after ‘the end of nature’ 
(McKibben 2006). As earlier identified, the suburbs and new suburban conceptions 
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emerge with an end of the city, as new forms of practice are also emerging with the oft-
reported death of landscape architecture (Hohmann & Langhorst 2005). 
 
Ecotopia represents a ‘self-conscious, ecological utopianism’ borne of late twentieth-
century environmentalism. It encompasses ideas of dystopic catastrophe as a means 
to detail specific warnings about behaviours, as well as description of a resultant 
successful, redemptive, holistic new alliance. Ecotopia is typically explained as 
achievable via three approaches: ‘ecocentrism’ which (re)privileges nature over culture; 
‘sufficiency’ which advances an apparently self-explanatory pursuit of ‘enough’ rather 
than ‘more’; and ‘embeddedness’ which advocates a reintegration with nature resulting 
in a physical and spiritual empathy and equality. In all of these visions the separation of 
nature or a natural world and culture is assumed as the problem which is being 
overcome. It is not difficult to see how landscape architectural projects and propositions 
can be located in a tradition of these ecotopias. Typically they are mixed in various 
combinations with varying emphases. Deliberate suburban expansion was founded on 
a premise of closer integration of human culture and natural processes that offered a 
better life principally for people. Most suburban ecotopias are correspondingly about 
sufficiency or embeddedness, although it is also now suggested that carefully 
integrated suburbs may offer a better chance of survival for a broader range of non-
human species than typically thought (Low 2002). How natural and correspondingly 
valuable an ecosystem then is, is another issue grappled with by postnatural utopias 
where it is impossible for nature to escape deliberate or unintentional human 
interference.  
 
Ecocentrism, although a less common form of ecotopia, is the driving position behind 
most revegetation and restoration projects, many of which form part of outer-suburban 
residential developments, particularly along degraded and often ephemeral waterways. 
This is encouraged by Melbourne Water and new stormwater management policies 
that require treatment of all runoff onsite prior to discharge into natural waterways. 
Over the last decade this has led to a proliferation of wetlands and siltation ponds in 
new suburbs. It was further advanced in 2002 by the release of Victoria’s Native 
Vegetation Management – A Framework for Action which outlines a process of net gain 
of native vegetation throughout the state by required calculated replanting of prioritised 
areas or Ecological Vegetation Classes to offset the loss of other vegetation in 
development processes (DSE 2002). Such projects seek to return a site to a pre-
occupation condition of presumed ideal stability, if not perfection, although the precise 
time or historic period of this condition is rarely declared. The site is imagined as it 
might have existed before a history of human, or in the case of the Native Vegetation 
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Management Framework, colonial interference. While sometimes in other cases this is 
also specified as a pre-colonial settlement time, frequently ignoring or erroneously 
assuming a minimal impact on landscapes by indigenous peoples, it remains 
committed to an ideal of and preference for the ahistorical timelessness of a natural 
landscape. In effect the imagined natural landscape exists impossibly in a period 
before or beyond any history, while, paradoxically, human ingenuity and the latest 
science is employed both to support arguments for the existence of its past condition 
as well as its potential, and expansive, return.  
 
Something of the paradoxes of this unnatural naturalisation is explored by Andrew Biro: 
 
A common caricature of radical environmentalists suggests that they are in full revolt 
against modernity – against modern science and technology in particular. For example 
one of the slogans of the ecocentric group Earth First! Is ‘Back to the Pleistocene.’ Such 
a caricature is confounded, however, by the ways that deep ecologists so often marshal 
scientific evidence (often gathered through highly technologically advanced means) in 
support of their claims that we are indeed facing a profound ecological crisis … 
notwithstanding some radical environmentalists' efforts to thoroughly critique modernity 
and to celebrate primitivism, anti-anthropocentrism remains in some respects 
fundamentally in keeping with the trajectory of modern science (2005, pp.13-14). 
 
The design and construction of suburbs today deal predominantly in policy and 
planning with ideas of sufficiency, while marketing the more palatable virtues of 
embeddedness. Estate marketing abundantly references images of nature and outdoor 
activities, encouraging enjoyment and—especially through images of children’s 
engagement and fascination with trees, leaves and even sky—an educational and 
spiritual engagement with nature that embeds humans in natural environments. 
Embeddedness features too in projects that insert, protect, reconstruct or interpret 
human programmatic remnants—historic landscape features—into landscapes along 
with restored or preserved natural systems, superficially or carefully intended to 
comment on human histories of occupation and engagement with natural landscapes. 
This has the potential to result in richly layered readings of the ways in which past 
occupation has lived with and altered natural systems, although it is more frequently an 
exercise in colonial nostalgia.  
 
Sufficiency is advocated particularly by sustainable projects, by promising at the outset 
to provide everything one might possibly need. Sufficiency, as Garforth points out in 
her earlier work, is a counter-theme to a previously dominant utopian tradition of 
abundance. Environmental awareness has made such profligacy irresponsible, in 
marketing terms, if in no others. Yet sufficiency requires the establishment by someone 
of what is sufficient for whom, and this task, as with most important determinations, will 
be undertaken by the most powerful in a group, to their benefit. The ‘sufficiency’ 
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implicated in sustainability measures such as star ratings for appliances and a range of 
other systems being implemented world-wide, is generating a healthy consumer 
industry in green goods and services, which might be argued to squander the 
substantial embedded energy of existing ones. As Garforth notes, an inevitable 
reductive equivalency is required to arrive at determinations of sufficiency (2005, 
p.396). Reductive biases, not to mention even more biased corrections, are also at play 
in treating people, families, suburbs, cities and even nations as equivalent so that they 
can be comparatively measured. What is sufficient for a Melbourne family in a new 
residential estate is clearly a particular fiction about what is sufficient for human life, 
determined by forces that have little to do with quality of life at all, and appearing in 
practice to define and encourage a sufficient abundance necessary to drive (sufficient 
and sustainable) economic growth. 
 
Garforth’s second visionary nature-culture alliance category is ‘landscape’. She 
presents this as an explicitly political but also more insidiously ideological idea of 
occupation, anticipating at the outset its dystopian side. The power of landscape 
visions is promulgated by idealised literary and artistic representations of nature. 
‘Landscape’ alliance visions have been seen to offer ‘idealised representations of 
nature [in] debased utopias of mystification, refuge and compensation’ (p.13). 
Landscape utopias are escapist and essentially perfected visions of nature with which 
the powerful conceal and manipulate the subjugated. Citing texts familiar to landscape 
architects through the critiques of conventional landscape architecture practice offered 
by Corner (1999), Waldheim (2008) and others including Raymond Williams (1975), 
Denis Cosgrove (1984) and William Cronan (1996), Garforth situates landscape 
utopias as expressions of a nature that is ‘socially produced and culturally constructed’ 
where ‘dominant “ways of seeing” … legitimate property and power relations and 
disguise a real or authentic nature behind them’ (p.13). 
 
Nonetheless landscape visions are argued at least to recognise, albeit for the purposes 
of benevolent or malevolent exploitation, the essential constructedness of the natural. 
There is obviously a vast genre of such ‘landscape’ projects: consciously constructed 
artificial and recreated natures which serve a particular client brief and inevitable bias 
regardless of any intended inclusiveness or marketed naturalness. Such projects were 
typical of the grand landscape works of eighteenth-century private parks and 
nineteenth-century public infrastructures. Richard Weller suggests that aristocratic 
privilege still plays a large part in the desire for and appreciation and design of 
suburban estate landscapes (2008). Certainly appeals to exclusivity remain a feature of 
some marketing. Large parks, or more accurately large open-space systems 
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integrating many smaller linear and pocket parks, are still built. However, sensitive to 
popular repudiation of their perceived destructive monumentality and links to 
aristocratic or other class hegemonies, their designers and sponsors, including 
government, are now careful to position their artificiality and ambition within the terms 
of a carefully researched and scientifically supported idea of ‘constructed ecology’. 
Their designers also make sure that the aesthetic delights on offer to human occupants 
are appreciated as secondary, or rather complimentary, to a responsible stewardship 
that is more ‘ecotopian’ than selfishly ‘landscaped’.  
  
The third ‘postnatural’ vision looks at the complex and contested ways that nature is 
understood after the acknowledged end of a conceivable or even actual natural world 
separate from human understanding. There is a range of more speculative, largely 
unbuilt projects that investigate such a ‘postnatural’ utopian view seeking an 
understanding of what design can mean after the death not just of nature, but also the 
author-designer and now even the city as we have known it (Agrawal et al. 2007, p.91; 
Çinar & Bender 2007, p.xi; Habermas 1982, p.223; Ingersoll 2006, p.3; Lerup 1994, 
p.22; Rae 2003;). Garforth’s three forms of visionary nature-culture alliances, like the 
machine-theatre-life metaphors they utilise, are rarely wholly uncontaminated by each 
other. Like the trans-disciplinary design approach required now of any effective 
practice, projects argue multiple cases for the value of their design vision and there is a 
liberal use of mixed metaphors, cross-pilfering and hybrid marriages of terminology, 
theme and theory. This can result in works presented as engines of the theatre of life, 
the staged imitation of computed processes of growth, and composed varieties of 
environmental and sustainable natural and adaptive real and virtual structured 
landscapes.  
 
However it is metaphors of active, adaptive living and cycles of the perpetuity of life 
and the will to live which currently claim the attention of designers as the essence of an 
open-ended dialectical and ethical process appropriate for design. Projects are often 
theorised and justified, if at all and not necessarily for the client, within 
acknowledgement of an essentially postnatural contemporary condition.  
 
The ‘real’ nature that Marxist approaches invoke is not an essentialist or solely material 
category, but rather the nature that is brought into being through its dialectical 
relationship with the social, primarily through labour and dwelling (Garforth 2006, p.13). 
 
Garforth’s postnatural can be linked to the ‘next nature’ of Mieke Gerritzen and Koert 
van Mensvoort (2005), Damian White and Chris Wilbert’s ‘technonature’ (2009) to 
which Aiden Davison contributes a chapter ‘Living between nature and technology: The 
suburban constitution of environmentalism in Australia’, and Bruno Latour’s discussion 
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of the ‘bifurcation of nature’ (2005). Gerritzen and Mensvoort explain the present 
condition: 
 
The notions of nature and culture seem to be trading places … Nature, in the sense of 
trees, plants, animals, atoms and climate is getting increasingly controlled and 
governed by man [sic]. It has turned into a cultural category. At the same time, products 
of culture, which used to be in control of man, tend to outgrow us and become 
autonomous (2005 pp.5,7). 
 
Bill McKibbon also finds a recent irreversible change in ways that humans regard 
nature (2006). However, the unsettling idea that nature is a cultural construct is at least 
as old as eighteenth century theorists, and landscape architects have long been aware 
of it. Conversely, consideration of the ways in which culture is simultaneously 
naturalised is of more investigative interest and speaks to less acknowledged forms of 
the politicisation of such processes. Indeed to many it appears that naturalisation is a 
logically depoliticising process. While ‘process’ has received considerable recent 
attention by architecture and landscape architecture, linked to the idea of an open and 
ongoing dialectics of dwelling constituting the ‘real’, the conditions in which design 
takes place, literally, as process are less well articulated. The now unavoidably 
acculturated, de-natured site for design is still a landscape replete with prior values and 
designers are demonstrating increasingly subtle skills in finding this richness. However 
the terms within which they have to date recognised, recorded and shared these 
values, and the rights and responsibilities with which they presume to ascribe new 
values through inscription of a design, are very much unsettled. They are not even yet 
contested as much as seeking articulation. It might be argued that many projects avoid 
them altogether by ceding to autopoetic ‘natural process’ the otherwise unnatural task 
of a design process.  
 
Openness and the idea of landscape 
Various levels of openness have been identified above following on from the simple 
good and bad utopias of closed and static environments. There are many ever-
adjusting, newly nuanced reformist visions, radically open-ended ones and the radically 
open-minded. Arguments have been made for and against reformism in its various 
guises as essentially realist and non-utopian propositions. Radical openness takes 
different forms too, which await clearer distinction as well as sustained critique of their 
usefulness for organising the world, even though, or rather perhaps because, they 
appear to refrain from the authored production of built outcomes. A variety of problems 
have been identified with the idea of radical openness as exemplified in the writings of 
Landscape Urbanism, not least of which are those concerned to query a pre-emptive 
claim to the historic cachet of radical utopian strength, while avoiding the historic 
consequences of exercising authoritative decision-making and form-giving.  
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Garforth appears initially to champion ecotopian visions over landscape ones, vesting 
the former with ‘radical and emancipatory’ ambition while landscape visions are 
founded on deliberate and dystopian manipulations of nature from the start: ‘Ecotopia’s 
visions of social conditions explicitly politicise the natural and estrange and critique the 
social; landscape naturalises the social and mystifies nature’ (p.14). Yet the examples 
of suburban estate ecotopianism above reveal that its ambitions—however radical and 
emancipatory they are intended to be—are as manipulative as any landscape vision. 
The assumptions of radical ecological utopianism or ecocentrism partake of the same 
distinction between nature and culture that is claimed to be the problem, something 
which Garforth acknowledges: 
 
[E]cocentric thought depends upon assumptions about the taken-for-granted stability 
and materiality of nature as a discrete cultural category or physical object that have 
been thoroughly deconstructed ad declared untenable within recent social and cultural 
theory (p.12). 
 
In short, ecotopias are also constructed environments, that is, landscapes. All utopian 
projections are landscapes as they are all constructed environments, albeit immaterial 
constructs.  
 
Closed good and bad utopias are already failed propositions, historic curiosities 
proposed under the aegis of a political or religious radicalism that, even when 
obsessive in formal detail, do not attribute primary significance to form or its design. 
Because they are of the past, and failed, they no longer have a positive influence on 
the present. They are not now radical. They are not living utopias. At best they are ex-
Utopias. The reformist utopias do not offer that break with the present required to 
change the world, or they deliberately restrict their influence to enclaves divorced from 
it and not intended to consort with it, violating a requirement of utopian ambition. Finally 
the open-ended utopia will never actually fail because it never commits to a form that 
can. As such it remains, at best, a good idea rather than a utopian one. A true utopia 
contains a paradox: it is a good place that cannot be any place. Utopian design must 
hold the paradox in good faith, avoiding becoming either an oxymoron—as the very 
idea of sustainable or good suburbs has already become to many—or tautological—as 
the distilled work of landscape urbanism appears to be as when Simon Swaffield 
elaborates ‘landscape [particularly its processes] as a way of knowing the world’ (2005, 
p.3) while explaining that processes of observation of the world ‘provide a framework 
for different ways of knowing landscape’ (p.8). This leaves a barely identified open-
minded utopia as the only contender for true utopianism. 
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With the adoption of its Landscape Principles, the AILA and its members who are 
bound by them, place themselves firmly in the ecotopian camp. There is disdain of the 
old, failed and now utterly inappropriate and discredited ‘landscape’ camp, despite, as 
shown above, ecotopian design propositions sharing the same assumptions regarding 
both the separation of nature and culture and potentials for alliance. There is little 
production emerging from interest in a postnatural position, although widespread 
concerns to articulate work in experiments with process and time in the guise of climate 
change adaptability within the ecotopian genre seem imminent. Situating the profession 
within the easily reformist ecotopian genre severely limits both the type of work and the 
types of thinking that landscape architects are encouraged to draw upon and to 
undertake. It makes much of the past irrelevant and robs the future of ideas of any 
sophistication or danger, though there will be many of increasing complexity and 
difficulty. It does forge a ready body of experience and knowledge for continued service 
to a secure land development industry. 
 
The current status of landscape architecture is one which recognises a past that has 
been involved in both supporting and challenging suburban settlement patterns, has 
sought to resolve debates for and against the suburbs through development of 
propositions for new types of ‘suburb’, and has begun to explore the potentials of a new 
openness to design possibilities. It has also begun to posit and exploit such openness 
as an organised and even designable open-endedness. The slippage between myth 
and utopia is the same as that which might be made between other similar and 
generally poorly distinguished terms, such as that detailed by Karl Mannheim (1936) 
between ideology and utopia. It is also a distinction comparable to that between a 
moral and an ethical practice. It can further be considered as an emerging, discernable 
distinction between calls for a landscape architecture of anti-authoritarian open-
endedness and one of accountable openness. The latter terms of these pairs argue for 
a design attitude that requires a suspension rather than a denial of possibilities, 
positioning the role of design as one which promises to pursue rather than fulfil visions. 
This is not to say that promises are not made in good faith and with a commitment to 
their thoroughly researched and documented realisation, but only that designers are 
not designing if they are only constructing; that they cannot design if they are only 
envisaging what they already know has or can be built, or conceiving outcomes of 
which they are already certain.   
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PART II 
LITERATURES OF COMPETING PLACES (A TOPOGRAPHY) 
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Suburban studies, landscape architecture and utopianism are linked by the similarity of 
their current self-conscious re-examinations. The common symptoms of this include a 
simultaneous querying of and desire for defined disciplinary and subject boundaries, an 
interest in cross-disciplinary projects, a proliferation of new terminologies, the 
collection, reproduction and dissemination of key works, canons and other evidence of 
bodies of knowledge along with their typological organisation, new taxonomies and 
categories, and the emergence of sub-disciplines, splinter-disciplines and alternate 
disciplines. In this reviewing and shaping of their histories, they have each also 
rediscovered and justified an ambition to re-claim and re-enforce a lost superior 
significance for their area of study. In doing so, they reach for new framings that strive 
to elaborate and address overarching issues of universal human concern. Advocates of 
the suburbs, as of landscape architectural endeavour and utopian propositions, have 
each claimed that new study in their areas might open areas of much wider interest to 
urgent questions of the contemporary human condition. James Corner has declared 
that ‘the inventive traditions of landscape architecture actively renew the significance of 
those cultural and natural processes that undergird the richness of all life on earth’ 
(1999, p.13). In the same collection of essays, Christophe Girot begins his contribution 
by asking whether landscape architecture might become the one and only 
environmental panacea of the next century (p.59). The global dominance of suburban 
landscape forms is viewed as equally all-encompassing and culturally significant, while 
utopian studies are flourishing with new publications and revived research sectors. 
 
This second part has three chapters. The first, Chapter 5, looks at the considerable 
extent of literature of potential relevance for an understanding of suburbs, finding in this 
generative richness part of the reason for a paralysis of critical decision-making and 
design commitment. It briefly overviews general histories of suburban development, 
specific developers, the single suburb case study and its extrapolations for a wider 
picture of suburbia, moves to an overview of fictional suburban portraits and popular 
collections of these across various media, examines iconic elements and defining 
artefacts of the suburbs, and includes the dissemination of government funded 
research along with popular reactions to policy and legislation which emerge from it. 
The literature relevant to landscape architecture is similarly diverse. This is reviewed 
with a conclusion that considers the value of a combined focus on suburbs as 
contested spaces of design experiment. This provides a point of departure to consider 
in Chapter 6 how such prolific literature has prompted attempts to devise some 
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organising and explanatory structure. Typically this aims for re-configured ‘meta’ 
assessments of past conditions and a ‘meta’ structure for future scenarios. The 
literature on suburbs and landscape architecture suggests a four-part categorisation of 
common areas of analysis and critique examined next in Chapter 7, the final chapter of 
this part. This four-part categorisation—‘form’, ‘content’, ‘language’ and ‘frontiers’—can 
be related to the four positions or attitudes identified in Chapter 2 as Pro-Con, Anti, 
Non and Utopian. In particular, analyses at frontiers generate the slippery responses of 
Non and Utopian propositions which represent core competing values of a place for 
contemporary landscape architecture, a place distinct from the justifications of the 
marketplace as well as the empirically determined placements of planning and 
engineering.  
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Chapter 5 
The Potency and Impotence of Vast Potential 
 
There is a vast potential literature of relevance to queries regarding the efficacy of 
landscape architecture in the design of suburbs. It ranges across all literary genres with 
appeals to every social and disciplinary group. It includes scholarly and popular writing, 
empirical analyses and imaginative projections of specific locales and generic 
‘suburbia’, writing on specific aspects and defining artefacts of the suburbs and writing 
on the various disciplines engaged in the creation, management, development and 
even destruction of suburbs, suburban identities and suburban values. It incorporates 
writing on the design professions and the specific discipline of landscape architecture 
along with its changing relationship to the equally evolving and self-consciously 
splintering professional arenas of planning (town, statutory, strategic and urban) and 
engineering (civil, hydrological, environmental, ecological and even industrial). The 
extent of possible literature also results from long dispute, if not confusion, regarding 
what constitutes a ‘suburb’, what ‘design’ is, and what ‘landscape architecture’ properly 
involves as a distinct design profession. It is further expanded in response to the 
ongoing evolution of these three subject areas and their shifting, disputed definitions. 
Finally, it includes an increasing number of variously edited, themed and analysed 
collections of such observations, as well as a proliferation of journals and magazines 
devoted to ongoing suburban enlightenment and entertainment. Yet despite this wealth 
of diverse investigation, there is little which combines an investigation of all three 
contested understandings of 'suburbs', 'design' and 'landscape architecture'. That is, 
there is little written by or for practicing designers about the morphology of suburbs, 
particularly in Australia, and little which speculates on the potential for landscape 
architects to envisage and lead new forms of residential land development designed for 
new ideas about good living, or the suburban ‘good life’. 
 
Literatures of Suburbs 
Beyond capital cities and central urban areas, about which there is substantial written 
material, single suburb case studies and discrete local histories are legion. Volunteer 
and amateur historians utilise the invaluable resources of local and regional libraries, 
supported by local historical societies. Their publications are increasingly available and 
circulated. Hunter's Hill. Australia's Oldest Garden Suburb (Sherry & Baglin 1989) is a 
single suburb case study of suburban growth and amateur local history guide with a 
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preservationist agenda. Local histories and historians play important roles in supporting 
the modification or defeat of planning applications for new development intervention. In 
looking at a particular locale, such works sometimes aim to extrapolate a general 
historical trend or condition. Rumson: Shaping a Superlative Suburb was written by its 
local historian and professional author Randall Gabrielan (2003), comparing and 
favorably contrasting his home with clear reference to wider American suburb-shaping 
and a pro-suburb stance. City: Urbanism and Its End by Douglas Rae (2003), is both a 
richly textured portrait of New Haven, Connecticut, and the story of the rise and fall of 
American cities’ (Yale University Press 2010). Robert Freestone in his review of 
Constructing Suburbs: Competing Voices in a Debate Over Urban Growth (Forsyth 
1999), notes that it is a ‘definitive case study of contemporary Australian suburban 
development’ (2000, p.451). It focuses on the single area of Rouse Hill, a suburb of 
Sydney anticipated as part of a major growth corridor as far back as 1968, still being 
developed and still the subject of ongoing analysis. Via thorough investigation of a 
specific instance, Freestone understood this research as deliberately seeking to 
understand a wider ‘role and meaning of planning in times of change’ and to illustrate 
‘key features of the planning climate, such as the urban consolidation (compact city) 
debate, dynamics of population growth, urban development financing, and 
environmental sustainability’ (p.451). 
 
Films, poetry, novels, and other fictional accounts of suburban life play a different but 
no less important part in recording and characterising features of the suburbs. Of 
numerous Australian authors, George Johnston’s oft-cited, semi-autobiographical 
trilogy—My Brother Jack, Clean Straw for Nothing and Cartload of Clay—charts a 
developmental coming-of-age that is as much about the Australian suburb as it is about 
its central character David Meredith. In a famous passage of condemnation of 
Melbourne suburbs in the 1940s, Meredith climbs on to the roof of his new suburban 
home to fix the antenna of a time-payment radio and record-player unit. 
 
[My] elevation provided me with the first opportunity I had had to look out over all the 
Beverley Park Gardens Estate, and there was nothing all around me, as far as I could 
see, but a plain of dull red rooftops in their three forms of pitching and closer to hand 
the green squares and rectangles of lawns intersected by ribbons of asphalt and 
cement … There was not one tree on the whole estate. Yet there must have been trees 
once, I thought because when you closely examined the layout of the estate there were 
little folds to it and faint, graceful rises and declivities, not anywhere near definite 
enough to be thought of as hills or gullies, but the place was not really flat, that was the 
point … The place could have been really beautiful at one time in a tranquil sort of way, 
I thought – before Bernie Rothenstein came in with his bulldozers and graders and 
grubbed out all the trees and flattened everything out so that the subdivision pegs could 
be hammered in and his lorries could move about without hindrance – because there 
was a blur of higher ground much farther out, and beyond that the bluish bulk of the 
Dandenongs sat up there against a good bright sky in nice shapes and colours. And 
now there was nothing but a great red scab grown over the wounds the bulldozers had 
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made, and not a single tree remaining, because by no stretch of the imagination could 
anybody count the spindly little sticks which had been stuck in at regular intervals along 
the footpaths (Johnston 1964, p.288). 
 
This contemplation of suburban Sunday rituals and their setting, with something of a 
landscape architectural eye for the lie of the land and the significance of topography, is 
one that might equally be had now in new suburbs. This is despite greater attention 
and increased legislation to ensure the retention of mature and other significant 
vegetation, and despite efforts to establish more advanced specimen trees and a 
concern to offer greater variety of housing stock.  
 
The 2008 Miles Franklin Award winner was The Time We Have Taken by Steven 
Carroll (2007). The suburb of my own home, Glenroy, where Carroll also grew up, 
provides inspiration and setting for the novel. Interviewed by The Australian (Sorensen 
2008), Carroll said he hoped Miles Franklin, who set up the award to encourage 
excellence in writing about Australia by Australians, would approve of a novel set in the 
suburbs. ‘Lots of Australian fiction is set on the rural frontier, but it's also reasonable to 
suggest that the suburban frontier has been neglected.’ Linking ideas of utopian 
longing, failure and frontiers he noted that ‘[t]hese characters are all in a constant state 
of becoming, a yearning towards the perfect being.’ He is aware that this makes for a 
fraught environment, but, like architect Peter Corrigan, does not believe that challenges 
are incompatible with happiness or optimism, but rather help define what happiness 
might be. ‘People ask me about the sadness in the novels, and I think it's different from 
depressing. Sadness can be almost a positive emotion, cathartic, thrilling even.’ 
 
Such rich and evocative expressions of physical and metaphysical suburban qualities 
and the temperaments they foster have been collected and examined in a run of 
publications since 2000, particularly in America and Australia, exploiting an opportunity 
for centenarian, if not also millenarian, review. Suzanne Falkiner’s The Writer’s 
Landscape (1992) has extensive sections on the experience of Australia’s suburban 
landscapes. International examples include White Diaspora: The Suburb and the 
Twentieth-Century American Novel (Jurca 2001) and SuburbiaNation: Reading 
Suburban Landscape in Twentieth-Century American Fiction and Film (Beuka 2004). 
Further Australian investigations include Through Artists' Eyes: Australian Suburbs and 
Their Cities 1919-1945 (Slater 2004) and Artful Histories: Modern Australian 
Autobiography (McCooey 1996) which early noted ‘a general reassessment of the 
place of the suburbs in the Australian imagination’ (p145). Film as well as literature has 
been explored. Cinematic Urbanism: A History of the Modern from Reel to Real 
(AlSayyad 2006) includes extensive discussion of the representation of suburbs 
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especially as they contrast with the city, including Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times, 
Jacques Tati’s Playtime and Peter Weir’s The Truman Show. Welcome to the 
Dreamhouse: Popular Media and Postwar Suburbs (Console-ing Passions) (Spigel 
2001) compiles essays about suburban television. It features a cover image of 
spectacular modern architecture atop a cliff with panoramic views across a tropical isle-
dotted ocean and a relaxed couple watching a stage-centre television positioned 
beside an internal rock feature. It is reminiscent of Michael Leunig’s well-known cartoon 
of a father and child watching sunset on TV while the same sunset is seen beyond the 
window behind them; a popular critique of unhealthily mediated nature-culture relations 
that is echoed in critiques of suburban nature itself. Reinforcing the idea of such 
representational feedback loops, the introduction begins describing the television debut 
in 1949 of a popular radio program which consisted entirely of the two main characters 
sitting in their living room discussing the TV program they are watching.  
 
The literature of the suburbs also takes in writing on the recognisable physical aspects 
and artefacts of the suburbs, from the scale of subdivision layout with its archetypal 
worming lanes, battle-axe or blob court-head culs-de-sac and traffic calming devices, to 
the scale of the lot with its distinctively anti-urban setbacks and free-standing 
letterboxes, to consideration of the myriad separate elements of public and private 
place-making that comprise a suburban landscape. These include icons of the private 
realm such as Hills Hoists and Victa mowers, while in the public realm suburbanisation 
evidences itself in items as banal as the location, size and material of side entry pits in 
nature strips, bus stop furniture and street tree planting.14 The urbanisation of the 
suburbs can be seen in recent rethinking, upgrade and redesign of such elements. 
Suburban bus stops are being supplied with the same Adshell shelters and timetable 
pole attachments as those until recently to be found throughout the city prior to their 
upgrading to real-time digital displays and Superstops. This is at least partly explained 
by the standardisation of furniture elements over the last decade across the 
metropolitan transport system since its tendering to private enterprise, where once 
local bus companies operated separate routes.  
 
For similar reasons the upgrading of kerb and guttering and monogrammed side entry 
pit replacement in many suburbs can be seen to represent the privatisation of once 
public utility companies. The privatisation of services in the suburban public realm, 
leading to alterations and removal of various features once thought suburban have 
been seen as evidence of a challenge to the distinction of the suburbs from the urbs 
                                                 
14 Hills hoists and Victa mowers are Australian designed and manufactured proprietary products. The 
rotary clothes hoist is a backyard suburban icon. The mower was necessary to keep ubiquitous suburban 
lawns neatly trimmed. 
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and of corporate and urban interests over private, domestic ones (Gleeson 2006, p.84). 
In other ways the urbanising increase in density of suburbs, resulting in less open 
space and smaller nature strips and gardens, has lessened groundwater recharge and 
increased stormwater runoff. This has led to the application and retrofitting of new 
urban strategies for managing stormwater in suburban streets, changing characteristic, 
even iconic features of the suburbs, such as the concrete kerb and channel and side 
entry pits which are a feature of stormwater engineering developed as best practice at 
the time of Australia’s post war suburban expansion. The new management techniques 
focus on Water Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD) and its various elements such as 
swales, bioretention basins, sediments ponds and, for new subdivisions, constructed 
wetlands. These have been documented in Water Sensitive Urban Design Engineering 
Procedures: Stormwater (Melbourne Water 2005) and their implementation and retro-
fitting encouraged through numerous workshops, seminars and conferences. These 
influential elements and forms have largely not been developed by or in initial 
consultation with landscape architects. 
 
New organising principles and rationales for the gathering of people and sharing of 
resources are being urgently sought and also bitterly fought world-wide. The support of 
state and federal government has seen the creation of new university departments 
devoted to sustainability and globalisation while Australia Research Council grants fund 
ongoing and extensive study of their many interrelated issues, of which suburban 
studies form a significant part. Government-funded research and the policies and 
legislation which slowly emerge through review and consultation processes to 
implement them, continue to be contested. Melbourne 2030 released in 2002 continues 
to undergo regular refinement and revision under the influence of institutional and 
business lobby groups such as the PIA (Planning Institute of Australia), UDIA (Urban 
Development Institute of Australia), REIA (Real Estate Institute of Australia), as well as 
influential community groups such as SOS (Save Our Suburbs) which ‘lobbies 
government on issues such as residents' rights, Melbourne 2030 and reform of VCAT 
[Victorian Civil Administration Tribunal]’ (SOS 2010). The effectiveness of the group is 
recognised in Miles Lewis Suburban Backlash (1999). Again, there is little involvement 
or comment by landscape architects and designers in this highly contested arena. 
 
As an indication of widely supported interest of suburban studies in Australia, several 
universities have founded research programs investigating suburban phenomena. Led 
by Graeme Davison, Monash University began in the nineties to investigate suburban 
issues as part of a larger ARC-funded study of Melbourne since 1945. Kenneth 
Jackson, author of the seminal history of suburbs Crabgrass Frontier: The 
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Suburbanization of the United States (1985), was the keynote speaker at their first 
conference in 1992. Griffith University’s Urban Research Program established in 2003 
has published widely and a key researcher Brendan Gleeson published the award-
winning Australian Heartlands; Making Space for Hope in the Suburbs in 2006. Its 
‘provocative’ plea that ‘the suburbs be given their rightful place in Australia’s public 
consciousness’ (p.213) is not dissimilar to The New Suburban History’s ‘provocative’ 
introductory claim that ‘any effort to understand modern America must put suburbs at 
the center’ (Kruse & Sugrue 2006, p.2). Numerous conferences and public forums have 
been convened in the last few years in Melbourne alone by a variety of institutions, 
including public lecture series at BMW Edge and the Melbourne Museum drawing 
large, vocal crowds.  
 
For similar reasons as America, but compounded by a smaller population and perhaps 
also the later foundation of recognised professional bodies and formal education, 
Australian designers have had a limited involvement in published discussion of 
suburban issues. The architect Robin Boyd noted in the fifties:  
 
The influence on Australian home life of architects, as a profession, was not great. The 
few architects who were in politics at various times were not noted for radical proposals. 
The few who helped municipal officials to frame building regulations from time to time 
seldom anticipated or encouraged change (1952, p.153). 
 
Boyd articulated his unfavourable assessment of suburbs early in the 1950s and 60s 
during a period of unprecedented post-war growth in a series of lectures and 
publications, the most famous of which, The Australian Ugliness (1960), was 
unequivocal in its condemnation of suburban 'featurism'. More than a critique of 
Australian design culture, it set a standard for disparagement of all types of veneers, of 
the skin-deep superficiality of imported fashionable taste on the one hand, and the 
amateur aesthete’s misguided search for ultimate laws of beauty on the other that lead 
to beautification. He championed an inclusively courageous engagement with the 
reality of new materials and processes, situation and need. While not specifically 
saying that this engagement was unachievable within suburbia, he established a 
picture of suburbs defined by the very things he despised. In this way, with superficial 
featurism and beautification synonymous with suburbs, he effectively condemned the 
whole realm of their present and potential manifestation along with their defining 
characteristics. In declaring that ‘[t]he essence of Australian suburban life is unreality: 
frank and proud artificiality’ (1960, p.163). Boyd conflated the unavoidable artificiality of 
all construction, with a moral condemnation of escapism. Yet his drawings and clever 
cartoon illustrations themselves aestheticise the ugliness he condemns, celebrating 
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suburban unreality, however unintentionally, through the creative flair of his graphic 
critique. 
 
Meanwhile several architects, including Boyd, were proposing alternatives to 
predominant subdivision patterns along with dwellings suitable to these configurations. 
In Living and Partly Living, Ian McKay, Hugh Stretton and John Mant (1971), along with 
Robin Boyd outlined their opinions in essays and profiles of recent projects including 
cluster housing and high density developments. Architects were also involved in the 
development of improved project homes for building companies and emerging real 
estate development companies (London 2007). Existing site features were part of a 
considered architectural response to environmental context that included modernist 
contrasts of geometry and materials along with experiments in an organicist vernacular 
tradition. Professional landscape architectural involvement was focused almost 
exclusively on planting and an indigenous or ‘bush garden’ aesthetic.  
 
Despite these instances of involvement, writing of critical or even reflective comment 
on suburban morphology by practising designers themselves is limited, although there 
are regular exhortations in professional journals to engage more with both the politics 
and products of ever-evolving development. Lars Lerup has provided exploratory and 
provocative examination of urban fabrics in After the City (1994). Rem Koolhaas earlier 
wondered what has happened to such work in ‘Whatever Happened to Urbanism?’ 
(OMA et al. 1995). Likely responding to this gap, Peter Calthorpe, an architect, 
championed a particular assault on the problems of suburbs, founding the prolific 
Congress for the New Urbanism in 1993 with other architects including Andrés Duany 
and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, published a book of twenty-four urban plans 
demonstrating its features (Calthorpe 1997). Earlier, the architect Christopher 
Alexander (1977) similarly provided an exhaustive systematic categorisation of the 
‘patterns’ of good design so that communities themselves could plan and build their 
environments and Kevin Lynch (1984), building on earlier work (1960), suggested a 
Theory of Good City Form in his final book.  
 
The work of Alexander and Lynch retains a core place in the literature of professional 
training for planners, if less so for architects. More recently it is the contemporary work 
of avant-garde, alternative and utopian architectural practices of the 1960s and their 
critique of urban planning which have found a new audience in new design-focused 
publications. They include New Babylonians: Contemporary Visions of a Situationist 
City (Borden & McCreery 2001), The Activist Drawing: Retracing Situationist 
Architectures from Constant's New Babylon to Beyond (Zegher & Wigley 2001), 
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Archigram: Architecture without Architecture (Sadler 2005), and Superstudio: Life 
without Objects, (Lang 2003). These located a useful critique of the suburbs and 
suburban production in the 1960s writings and happenings of the Internationale 
Situationniste. Architectural interest was confirmed by publication shortly after of 
several texts: Exit Utopia: Architectural Provocations 1956-76 (van Schaik & Macel 
2005) Utopia Deferred: Writings from Utopie 1967–1978 (Baudrillard 2006), Visions of 
the City: Utopianism, Power and Politics in Twentieth Century Urbanism (Pinder 2002), 
Topologies: The Urban Utopia in France, 1960-1970 (Busbea 2007), Utopia Method 
Vision: The Use Value of Social Dreaming (Moylan & Baccolini 2007), Architecture or 
Techno-Utopia: Politics after Modernism (Scott 2007), and a Situationist International 
Anthology (Knabb 2007). In these writings, urbanism is an experiment in new forms. 
‘We are bored in the city’ (Knabb 2007, p.1), begins a Situationist anthology. The 
opening of Ivan Chtcheglov’s 1953 Formulary for a New Urbanism (in Knabb 2007), 
announces exercises for suburban possibilities. In their critique of the forms, content 
and boundaries of present human settlement practices and of the compliant cultures of 
architectural practice, we can find relevance for comparison today with suburbs as well 
as cities. 
 
Such publications are concurrent with an eagerness of design professions and design 
education to better appreciate the foundations of their missions. RMIT claims 
numerous publications documenting this effort and the Spatial Information Architecture 
Laboratories (SIAL) have contributed analysis and design studio research projects. 
Shane Murray’s 2003 to 2005 ARC-funded Ageing of Aquarius: Designing New 
Housing Solutions for Australian Babyboomers project (2007) looked at the changing 
needs and altered housing expectations of a diverse cohort of suburban babyboomers. 
Since 2005, Richard Weller (2008; 2009), one of very few landscape architects to 
undertake sustained examination of the form of suburbs, with others at the University of 
Western Australia, have been researching alternatives to orthodox suburban 
development as part of an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant. However, 
despite a turn to critique of dominant land development practices, conservatism 
prevailed. Weller’s research has been positioned in support of a reformed but 
essentially unbinding and readily compromised alternative approach to present 
subdivision practices.  
 
The Australian Institute of Landscape Architects invited Peter Timms, author of 
Australia's Quarter Acre: The Story of the Ordinary Suburban Garden (2007) and a 
staunch critic of the work of professional designers, to speak at their 2006 one-day 
seminar. Here his appeals to revalorisation of the backyard as rightful scene of 
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productive and messy, bottom-up and distinctly un-designerly engagement with the soil 
were warmly received, despite long-acknowledged popular trends away from this 
model of the suburban house and yard (Seddon 1997) and, more importantly, despite 
the failure to understand that, rather than being antithetical to design, such activities 
can and have previously been carefully considered by designers (Eckbo 2009).  
 
The sheer variety of the literature to date on all aspects of the suburbs is its strength 
and indicates collective acknowledgement of the complexity of interconnected issues at 
scales from the individual lot, or even apartment balcony, to the planet. The more 
recent direct and difficult involvement of untrained individuals and community groups in 
design debates as well as political agitation for a range of concessions at local 
government levels has promoted their wider dissemination. Media focus on global 
warming and the need to find corrective or sustainable forms of social, economic and 
cultural production have directed popular, professional and political attention at all 
levels of government to rethink the necessity and nature of suburban growth and forms. 
However the very wealth of continually accumulating material also both evidences and 
further encourages a paralysis of critical faculties as well as decision-making 
capacities. Criticism is viewed as scepticism and decisions involve less the exercise of 
choice that the undertaking of whatever is unquestionably determined to be the right 
thing.  
 
Literatures of Design 
The proliferation of collected writings on urban design since 2000 might be considered 
evidence for a desired reflection on a present body of knowledge toward informed 
construction of new propositions. Equally they may be evidence of the poverty of new 
thinking and ambition. Or they may reflect something of both. They include numerous 
‘Readers’ (Carmona & Tiesdell 2007; Freestone 2000; Gosling 2002; Susser 2001).The 
Routledge Urban Readers series has alone contributed some nine major publications: 
The City Cultures Reader (Borden et al. 2003), The Sustainable Urban Development 
Reader (Wheeler & Beatley 2004), The Urban Geography Reader (Fyfe & Kenny 
2005), The Urban Sociology Reader (Lin & Mele 2005), Encyclopedia of the City 
(Caves 2005), The Global Cities Reader (Brenner & Keil 2005), The Urban Design 
Reader (Larice & Macdonald 2006), The City Reader (LeGates & Stout 2007) and The 
Urban and Regional Planning Reader (Birch 2008). 
 
From urban and city texts quickly emerged an interest in suburbs. Difficulties of 
definition and a perhaps coy aversion to the tainted term ‘suburb’ in discussions of new 
human settlements, meant that many publications dealt with suburbs under other titles. 
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The Earthscan Reader in Rural-Urban Linkages (Tacoli 2006) largely avoids 
mentioning suburbs despite them being the logical zone in which rural and urban 
landscape might be expected to converge. The contents page mentions ‘suburban’ 
only once, although employing ‘peri-urban’, ‘intra-urban’, amongst other terms. The 
cover image shows a farmer against a backdrop of highrise buildings. The 
foreshortened interface is littered with weed and cars. With a focus on the problems 
faced by developing countries and low-income populations, the essays examine 
settlement options almost exclusively in terms of issues associated with high urban 
densities, including slums. Economic and other policy ‘linkages’ are examined, but not 
the physical linkage or mediating zone between the rural and urban which has 
previously been understood as suburban. Fieldwork (Diedrich & LAEF 2006) opens 
with the declaration: ‘The most urgent question today is certainly about the city’ (p.13). 
It then explains its title as specific to a European condition of city expansion which 
necessarily takes place over adjoining fields. This is not so different to the Australian 
context where cities also expand into agricultural land, albeit of increasingly marginal 
productivity given combined issues of soil degradation, drought and climate change 
projections. However, such an expansion is more readily and precisely positioned as a 
question of suburb rather than city expansion. Charles Waldheim’s The Landscape 
Urbanism Reader (2006) crosses disciplinary and geographical boundaries, collecting 
material that for some confounds and others expands both changing conceptions of the 
urban and suburban, as well as evolving ideas regarding the realm of landscape 
architectural and other design practice.  
 
Many other new and hybrid terms have been identified indicating both ambivalence and 
ambition in researching morphologies of human settlement. An interest in suburbs, by 
whatever name, can, like the interest in cities, be seen to have culminated in a range of 
related ‘readers’, including Becky Nicolaide and Andrew Wiese’s The Suburb Reader 
(2006), a collection of articles previously published as Sprawl and Suburbia: A Harvard 
Design Magazine Reader (Saunders 2002), and more popular texts such as The 
American Suburb: The Basics (Teaford 2007). A similar phase of consolidation, review 
and revision in the built environment professions had been initiated in the 1990s with 
the publication of anthologies of both theory and practice in the disciplinary areas of 
landscape architecture, architecture and planning. It included publication of collections 
of project material, case studies, dictionaries and encyclopaedias that formed the basis 
of history and theory courses in landscape architecture (Adams 1993; Fleming 1998; 
Mosser & Mann 1993; Plumptre 1993; Teyssot 1991; Vogelsong 1997;). 
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There was a continuation of such collections and commentary into the twenty-first 
century which included Simon Swaffield’s Theory in Landscape Architecture: A Reader 
(2002), Landscape Design: A Cultural and Architectural History (Rogers 2001) and 
Oxford University Press’ A Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture (Curl 
2007) first published in 1999 as a dictionary of only architecture. There were also 
efforts to bring project anthologies and research up to date with assurances of their 
‘newness’. Aside from numerous New Urbanist publications, there were: New 
Landscape Design (Holden 2003), New Landscape Architecture (Baumeister 2007) 
and The New Suburban History (Kruse & Sugrue 2006). 
 
Australian landscape architecture too has attempted to capture its recent history in 
New Conversations with an Old Landscape (Bull, 2002). Employing the well-worn trope 
of a ‘conversation’ with a place, or rather its spirit, this work struggles to represent a 
critical overview of Australian practice, practice which is itself a critical examination of 
particular historical conditions of occupation and an endeavour to find meaningful 
expression of a contemporary Australian character through designed landscape. It 
reviews achievements within the terms of an established notion of stewardship which 
sits comfortably within present doctrines of environmental sustainability. Bull offers a 
‘canon’ of Australian work, unaware that a canon is not just a collection of somehow 
exemplary projects, but a collection which establishes the terms of excellence, 
challenging future efforts to both confirm and refute them.  
 
Concurrent with ‘new’ titles, a more reflective overview and critical commentary also 
emerged with anthologies of landscape architectural writings, featuring ‘re-’. Beginning 
with Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Theory (Corner 
1999), followed by Re-envisioning Landscape Architecture (Wollscheid et al. 2002), 
these and other landscape architectural texts (Berger 2008; Dutton 2001; Kirkwood 
2001) specifically considered urban peripheries as the site of new considerations vital 
not only to the future of the profession, but to appreciating contemporary culture and 
society. A significant text in rethinking nature-culture relations—William Cronan’s 
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human place in Nature (1996)—emerged from an 
interdisciplinary seminar on ‘Reinventing Nature,’ held at the University of California, 
Irvine in 1994 as part of a conference series. Inspired by this and similar in scope is 
another influential book of conference proceedings: Reinventing Nature?: Responses 
to Postmodern Deconstructionism (Soule & Lease 1995). 
 
Undermining the strengths of better informed and more widely distributed debate, is an 
eagerness to find, and an expectation that there should and will be found, definitive 
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answers to more carefully articulated and more complexly conceived problems. There 
is a failure to appreciate that successive attempts to do exactly this have themselves 
historically failed. It would seem then that a study of failure might be profitable, not just 
of the failures of specific schemes but of the conditions that attend this tradition of 
failure. Even while appreciating the interconnectedness of problems associated with 
the suburban condition, solutions are frequently systematically reduced to those 
outcomes which result from one of two attitudes to an environmental condition 
conceived to be a known and finite state. One attitude sees design as the selfish, or at 
best Machiavellian, manipulation of situations to ensure the most advantageous 
compromises for one’s own position, argued, for example by neo-liberalism, to 
ultimately benefit all. The other advances a philanthropic vision of shared responsibility, 
equal reward and equal redistribution of wealth to weak as well as strong. It fights to 
instigate and ensure the survival of an ultimate, sustainable and finally secure form of 
settlement, in both physical environmental and abstract political, economic and other 
social terms. In their extremes these attitudes picture designers as either arrogant 
elitists or self-effacing servants and the suburbs as either unsustainable escapist 
indulgence or lowest-common-denominator, mass mediocrity. 
 
There are detailed histories of experiments to realise both these attitudes and the 
history of these efforts in ‘suburbs’ is inseparable from the history of their design and of 
the role of designers. In A New Design Philosophy; An Introduction to Defuturing, Tony 
Fry (1999) elaborates a ‘philosophy’ around the key concept of ‘defuturing’, one which 
he has revived more recently with stronger reference to sustainability (Fry & Willis 
2009). On the one hand defuturing is the malignant process of robbing the future, 
practised by designers because of their arrogant pursuit of perfection and their 
promotion of particular outcomes and forms at the expense of other possibilities. This 
design process is responsible for the disastrous destruction wrought on the planet by 
modernist, technology-driven ambition. On the other hand, defuturing is the positive 
process by which we can deconstructively rediscover potentialities hidden by ‘design’ 
and designers careless of their promises and the world views that their works and false 
logics create. This leads Fry to vehemently denounce ‘utopianism’ while simultaneously 
calling for formulation of a single, driving idea: his. Except that criticism of failed ideas 
employs the benefit of hindsight that his idea yet escapes, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ philosophies, if they are philosophies at all.  
 
Similarly cavalier with adjectives, The New Suburban History (Kruse & Sugrue 2006), 
even limiting itself to America, is not essentially new. It claims to be ‘provocative’, 
‘original’, ‘innovative’ and ‘cutting edge’. That it rejects the popular image of suburbs as 
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‘homogeneous, conformist and bourgeois’ (p.3) is no particular innovation. Neither is 
the concept of investigating issues identifiable nationally across suburban landscapes, 
questioning the presentation of case studies that have been chosen because, 
consciously or unconsciously, and almost by definition, they effectively support a 
predetermined view. Even the declared focus on political economy, the editors admit is 
‘by no means new’ (p.8). But if it is not essentially innovative in its approaches or 
findings—although there is much new supporting research and analysis—it does offer 
remarkably sober and well-evidenced comment in a field prone to hyperbole, pejorative 
slang and self-referential positivism, whether in the dress of neo-liberal economic 
rationalism or new urbanist reformism. The issues raised by contributors can find 
parallel, if not precedent, in Australia and would equip a developer, politician or planner 
with the gamut of argument and counterargument that still characterises the course of 
typical project debate through authority approvals processes. Appreciating the 
historical perspectives of ongoing problems is essential to empower designers and 
foreground design alternatives and experiments. That this alone fails to offer new 
directions would seem to be exactly because it fails to engage in speculative design 
investigation. It prioritises the manoeuvrings of abstract motives over the experiments 
of material incentives. 
 
What would be new is a discussion of the history of suburbs as a design endeavour. 
That is, a history which considers the primacy of built form as an expression of cultural 
values rather than a secondary reflection of them. Perhaps it is a prejudice of text-
based disciplines to explain ’fragmented, politically and economically competitive 
suburbs … [as] shaped through politics and the law’ (Kruse & Sugrue 2006, p.8). This 
emphasises imagination and desire for abstract goodness that then lead to pursuit of 
physical built goods. It discusses the spatialisation of politics. The disciplinary prejudice 
of designers speaks instead of the politicisation of space. It sees that politics and laws 
are reactively shaped by pre-emptive or uncontrolled physical building. It appreciates 
that the power of imagination and the manipulation of desire lies primarily in an ability 
to conceive of built outcomes rather than the secondary descriptions of satisfaction that 
flow from visions and examples of home-ownership. Echoing Jameson’s call for 
utopianism’s ‘visceral commitment’ (2004, p.53), this perspective advances the 
relevance and primacy of design professions to offer new suburban ideas and ideals. 
The struggles and slippages of these different perspectives and their conflicting 
conceptualisations of the problems of design and suburbs are the subject of the 
following chapter examining emerging frameworks for suburban and landscape 
architectural criticism. 
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Chapter 6 
Reconceptualising Conditions and Critiques: Meta-concepts  
 
The task of metacriticism is the critical examination of criticism: of its technical terms, its 
logical structure, its fundamental principles and premises  
 
 Max j Baym15 
 
[T]he absolute which was once a means of entering into communion with the divine, has 
now become an instrument used by those who profit from it, to distort, pervert, and 
conceal the meaning of the present.  
 
Karl Mannheim16 
 
We must think of Utopia in terms of a philosophy of philosophies. 
 
 Eugenio Battist17 
 
The first two quotations above offer two assessments of the framing of overarching 
concerns for assessing the frameworks of assessment of lesser concerns. In saying so 
the iteration of frames already hints at where we will end up, or rather where we will 
not; we will not eventually settle on any secure meta-frame. Terms for the value of 
landscape architecture and for specific landscape architectural designs will remain 
contested. Recent attempts to fix the terms of suburban critique within the metaframe 
of sustainability and to fix the terms of landscape architectural critique within related 
frames of either scientific pre-determinism or artistic non-determinism are shown in this 
chapter to be dangerous constraints to design endeavour. They also mistake the value 
of design, which is found in its embodiment.  
 
The first quotation proposes a higher order critique or upward transposition of the 
techniques of similar examinations of lower-order things and processes; the critical 
examination of criticism. The second warns that the framing of meta-concerns and its 
intended advantages (contemplating the absolute in order to enter into communion with 
the divine) have been and can be appropriated (for example, in guise of the ‘greater 
good’ or ‘the planet’) as ways to manipulate the frames or meanings of lesser, 
immediate concerns. This is a common technique for the exercise of power and a 
familiar criticism of the powerful. It was precisely the criticism articulated most 
frequently by the Internationale Situationniste in the 1960s and made often and 
                                                 
15 Baym, M. j. 1974, p. 951. 
16 Mannheim, K. 1936 [1929], p.78. 
17 Battisti, E. 1998, p.156. 
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specifically in regard to the design and construction of human settlement and dwelling: 
‘The sacred, by devaluing itself, becomes mystery: urbanism is the Great Architect's 
final fall from grace’ (Vaneigem 1961). Together the first two quotations describe both 
the advantages and dangers of utopian conceptions. Substituting ‘design’ for 
‘metacriticism’, ‘designs’ for ‘criticism’ and ‘design proposition’ for ‘the absolute’ they 
also describe critical design practice. Regardless of any particular advantages or 
disadvantages, they more importantly imply that an ever higher-order meta-meta-
conceptualising and framing follows, just as redesign does. 
 
What the last quotation suggests is that utopianism, first and foremost, provides for the 
fixing of a position that is necessary even to begin speculation. This position will, of 
course, not actually hold, as it is somewhere that cannot be anywhere. Yet even as it 
fails, even as it is agreed to be wrong or inadequate or evil, regardless of the failure of 
Utopia to provide a philosophy of philosophies, a meta-frame for truth or right or good, 
it does indeed suggest one. Like a design proposal, it has the courage to think so, 
should be granted the courtesy to be thought so, and be allowed to require that 
suspension of disbelief which makes both engagement and then criticism even 
possible. Without this, the only alternative response to the impossibility of constructing 
a secure frame or metaframe—a correct design—is uncritical acceptance of any frame 
or design, or, effectively, the abandonment of framing and designing altogether. 
 
Just as utopias cannot be any place, only ever realised as mere topos, meta-critique 
cannot get beyond a requirement to clarify its own terms of evaluation and so is merely 
criticism in practice. Masterplans become just a particular (and poorly particularised) 
plan in application. Utopias, meta-criticism and masterplans are ‘second order’ 
framings or understandings. Landscape is a second-order nature: ‘Nature can be 
experienced directly - lived in, walked through, exploited or enjoyed - but landscape is 
a kind of second-order nature, a refashioning of nature in our own image, and as such, 
is incontrovertible evidence of what and who we are’ (Archer 2004, p.8). Perhaps then 
the landscapes designed by landscape architects are not second-order nature as much 
as second-order landscapes—or third-order nature—reconstructions of land already 
fashioned into landscape. Leon van Schaik (2000a) heralded a second-order 
modernism in titling the introduction to collected works from the RMIT Research by 
Project program Interstitial Modernism – ‘second-order’ or meta-modernism at RMIT, 
‘because of a growing feeling that there is an underlying ethical argument being worked 
through in these investigations’ (p.7). Underlying or overarching, the groping for 
explanatory frameworks is ‘optimistic’ (p.8). Such optimism is utopian. 
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All overarching systems become in practice just a system, and as Roland Barthes 
(1972, p.82) points out, even ‘the very absence of a system - especially when it 
becomes a profession of faith - stems from a very definite system’. Utopias, in offering 
a final overview, a meta-solution, a philosophy of philosophies, know they stem from a 
very definite view, while the anti-utopian rejection of definitive viewpoints is a definite 
view with no such self-awareness. It is a myth. Barthes thought myth a metalanguage, 
‘because it is a second language, in which one speaks about the first’ (p.115). But it 
can be thought an infinite-order development, as is the practice of practice (van Schaik 
2003), the design of design (Glanville 1999) and the architecture of architecture.  
 
Let us never forget that there is an architecture of architecture. Down even to its archaic 
foundation, the most fundamental concept of architecture has been constructed. This 
naturalised architecture is bequeathed to us; we inhabit it, it inhabits us … it is not 
natural … It goes right through us to the point that we forget its very historicity: we take 
it for nature (Derrida 1997, p.326, author italics). 
 
Barthes has warnings for the mythologist as one who ‘constantly runs the risk of 
causing the reality which he purports to protect, to disappear … the mechanic, the 
engineer, even the user, “speak the object”; but the mythologist is condemned to 
metalanguage’ (p.158, author italics), just as the designer is condemned to meta-
representation. Landscape architecture never represents nature, let alone presents it. 
Yet a distinction may be drawn between the mythologist who does not see the warning 
and denies it (claiming through scientific analysis of or conversing with landscapes to 
know a truth), and the utopian who is fully aware of it and defies it (knowing that 
imperfect and provisional truth is all that can be claimed). Landscape, being a thing 
already en-cultured, already mythologised, is a sign that becomes a signifier for a 
further sign of the landscape architect’s ambition; their de-sign. All designers are 
necessarily mythologists in Barthes’ terms, dealing in objects that are not only already 
signs, but often also different and conflicting signs for different communities, partaking 
of overlapping myths at any one time. The utopian designer’s meta-representation, 
failing in the impossible task to fully encompass the pre-represented pre-existing 
landscape, is inevitably a mis-representation doomed to re-representation, but 
nonetheless actively engaged in ongoing contests of representational value. The 
mythologist designer, especially in the guise of non-designing revealer, claims 
representational opinion as meta-representational doxa when, according to Pierre 
Bourdieu (1984) doxa and opinion simply denote, respectively, a society's taken-for-
granted, unquestioned truths, and the sphere of that which may be openly contested 
and discussed. For Bourdieu, ‘the utopian paradox breaks the doxa’ (p.397).  
 
At the frontiers of knowledge meta-criticism can suggest two design approaches. With 
one the object of criticism (nature or landscape or landscape architecture) can be 
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confronted as an independent object, having objective reality and rights independent of 
subjective human evaluation, a life and value independent of human needs for or 
manipulation of it such that its own—natural—processes may be left to develop 
themselves from open-ended propositions. With the other approach, the object only 
has value via human evaluation expressed by and for humans as a clear measure and 
view of our values (the object shows the subject what they are and helps define them) 
and which, unlike an apparently objective and independently located value, makes us 
fully responsible for such evaluation and all actions arising from it. In this approach 
openness to reassessment of value is required while open-endedness is intolerable.  
 
Our present attempts to grasp the absolute or construct an explanatory meta-condition 
of life have been positioned as entering into an appreciation of the potentialities of 
infinite difference, change or ‘becoming’. But the pursuit of ‘potential‘ is a fetishistic 
reversal of the potential of pursuit. The slippery focus on the transcendent, prior to 
even establishing what is being transcended, eschewing ‘meaning’ in favour of ‘doing’, 
neglects the object and fails to provide an objective. It fails to ask what is being done 
and why to whom or what, or, conversely to what end or why might landscapes do 
something or anything anyway. The absolute is discredited and another meta-condition 
of perpetually imminent potential substituted. Where utopian absolutism existed relative 
to a diagnosed and criticised condition, ‘potential’ assumes a relation and a relevance 
that is uncritical, even unaware of the existing condition.  
 
Architectural criticism has recently developed a meta-critical tendency that resists 
criticism by eschewing it. While there have been perennial complaints of the divide 
between architectural theory and practice, criticism in architecture and design has been 
a subject of intense debate in the new millennium. Beginning in the US, several 
journals have produced special issues or devoted major sections to emerging factions 
of ‘post-critical’, ‘criticality’ and ‘projective’ architecture debates, including Perspecta, 
Architectural Record, Assemblage, A+U, Harvard Design Magazine, Log and AD. 
Significant texts appearing over several years in the Harvard Design Magazine have 
been collected in a series of books on interconnected themes (Saunders 2002). 
Architecture‘s ‘crit wars’, like the concurrent US-led ‘culture wars’ and Australia’s 
‘history wars’ regarding the portrayal and record of indigenous cultures, share similar 
right-wing, if multi-layered and variously nuanced reactions to perceived extremities of 
left-wing political correctness. The assertion of a ‘post-critical’ design agenda has been 
concurrent too with the rise of Landscape Urbanism which shares much of its rhetoric. 
In regard to the growth of cities and issues surrounding the expansion of human 
settlements its approach claims to be a corrective to landscape architectural errors of 
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both over-determination and under-engagement. It is opposed to utopianism on these 
grounds urging the abandonment of ambitions to grasp absolutes, while unaware that 
such denial is equally the product of absolutism. Beyond problematising representation 
and its traditions, design is ultimately challenged as a representational practice (the 
performative turn remains a representational one) to communicate or operate without it 
and retain the name and cause of architecture. 
 
The absolute as a utopian proposition, as an architectural ideal of spatial experience as 
much as a political ideology of action, did not just become problematic in the twentieth 
century, but should be seen to have always been a manipulative perversion of 
particular facts and views. Just as the attempt to commune with the divine may lead to 
submission to precepts and processes of a particular dogma (fastings and other 
prescribed abstentions), an equivalent contemporary attempt to appreciate the infinite 
complexities of life today can also lead to an unquestioning and obscuring adherence 
to fashionable theoretical or philosophical posturing and terminology. The search for 
the absolute or ideal—the commitment to a design idea—faces three objections: that 
all absolutism is bad, that whatever the goodness of intention, the outcome will be used 
as an instrument of perversion by others less well-intentioned, and finally, that the effort 
will succumb to supporting already existing perverse instruments simply in order to and 
as a result of becoming a reality within the system it is attempting to overthrow. Put 
another way, design innovation or design for change, becomes an instrument of the 
status quo, employed for profit, or, as the Situationiste Internationale described it, 
recuperated by market capitalism, materialism and instrumentalism (Knabb 2007). 
Given that it is impossible to escape one’s context or to avoid having a position, and 
given then that one’s work will inescapably reflect this too, the utopianism of a doomed 
attempt to be neutral, objective or inclusive is all that can be hoped for—and always 
was. That we may know better after the fact (although it has been a point made often in 
the past and is central to More’s Utopia) is just another of the myths of progress. 
Jameson explains:   
 
The utopian, to be sure, imagines his effort as one of rising above all immediate 
determinations in some all-embracing resolution of every imaginable evil and misery of 
our own fallen society and reality... [but] even the most capacious Absolute Spirit, 
remains an ideological one. No matter how comprehensive and trans-class or post-
ideological the inventory of reality’s flaws and defects, the imagined resolution 
necessarily remains wedded to this or that ideological perspective’ (2004, p.47). 
 
Nonetheless he goes on to advocate the necessity for utopian thought. The idea of 
utopia deserves attention according to Jameson because ‘that weakening of the sense 
of history and of the imagination of historical difference which characterises 
postmodernity is, paradoxically, intertwined with the loss of that place beyond all history 
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(or after its end) which we call utopia’ (p.36). Rhetoric of ‘loss’ in architectural theory is 
rife and in urban and suburban theory even more so (Berman 1988; Davis 1998; Ellin 
1997; Koolhaas & Mau 1995; Kunstler 1993; Mau 2004; Sorkin 1992;  Whyte 2002; 
Zukin 2009). It also permeates discussions of the suburbs as both a continuing 
opportunity for rediscovery of a lost good life and a lost opportunity overtaken by 
backward-looking nostalgia for a doubly lost past that never actually was. The difficulty 
our imaginations have to conceive new forms of settlement is not unlike the difficulty 
that Jameson sees in trying to imagine 
 
… any radical political program today without the conception of systemic otherness, of 
an alternate society, which only the idea of utopia seems to keep alive, however feebly. 
This clearly does not mean that, even if we succeed in reviving utopia itself, the outlines 
of a new and effective practical politics for the era of globalization will at once become 
visible; but only that we will never come to one without it (p.36). 
 
Utopianism is a manipulative perversion that knows it is, a plan for greater good that 
exposes existing, unacknowledged greater goods—or greater evils—that would 
otherwise remain unremarked. Without utopianism, the attention and energy for a 
revelation requiring meta-critical examination—that is, examination at the frontier of 
knowledge—is focused instead on merely critical categorising of what is already well 
known. Critique is then a means serving ends already deemed determined. While there 
is considerable debate surrounding the reasons for a designer choosing, for example, 
one type of suburban street layout over another (the grid perhaps over the wormy cul-
de-sac) or for a home-buyer preferring one housing estate or electrical appliance over 
another, there is not yet a clear critical examination of the parameters for forming such 
opinions. Rather than ask what makes one suburb better than another, we have 
neglected the requirement to first appreciate what makes one opinion about a better 
suburb, better than another. And while this appreciation will itself be opinionated, it at 
least involves a higher-order query that takes us closer toward the edges of what we 
can answer easily, remembering too that there is an immemorial race to control, 
establish or obscure this edge. There are few attempts to frame a meta-critical 
overview with which to examine and appreciate value-judgements of the criticisms of 
either suburbs or landscape architecture. For some commentators, such a framework 
is provided by the precepts and principles of ‘sustainability’, yet in practice this is a 
merely critical structure, providing check-list ratings schemes for building better 
suburbs against an assumed inarguable a priori aim of survival (Yu & Padua 2006). To 
ask about whose survival, on what terms, by what means and even why, begins a 
meta-critical enquiry of utopian ambition.  
 
Design is commonly thought a critical act, and architecture a critical practice. It has 
also been called problem-solving. But it must surely now be meta-critical too at a time 
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when the popularly acknowledged complexity of inseparable, inter-related problems 
suggests the necessity for a bigger picture. Indeed, considering the tumultuous times in 
which various key phases of significant landscape change have occurred (the 
landscape improvement of the eighteenth century agricultural revolution, the resource 
exploitation of the nineteenth century industrial revolution, and the land development of 
the twentieth) and given the enormity of impacts which such manipulation has had, a 
meta-critical attitude has always been essential to the approved manipulation of 
landscapes while being an equally necessary presumption for unapproved change. In 
this sense design is only problem-solving in that it critiques the terms of reference for 
identification of problems, seeking higher-order ones, which will in their turn be 
requestioned. The role that landscape architecture plays then in design for a better 
future must self-consciously explain what better is.  
 
There are many and sometimes contradictory criticisms of landscape architecture, 
suburbs and utopianism. There is no single paradigm of sustainable design and critique 
of sustainability is not offered exclusively by climate-change sceptics. Similarly there is 
no single model of the suburbs and critique of them is not limited to New Urbanist 
attacks on sprawl. Utopias too are for some too utopian (the inhumanity of being all too 
human) and for others not utopian (human, inhuman or superhuman) enough. 
Buckminster Fuller has said ‘We humans are manifestly here for problem solving and, if 
we are any good at problem-solving, we don’t come to utopia, we come to more difficult 
problems to solve’ (in Zung 2002, p.306). He is also famous for declaring ‘The World 
has become too dangerous for anything less than utopia.’ How can these statements 
be reconciled? Clues lie in the titles of his variously collected works. Utopia or Oblivion: 
The Prospects for Humanity (Fuller & Snyder 2008b) clearly endorses utopia, while 
And It Came to Pass – Not to Stay (Fuller & Snyder 2008a), self-evidently puns the 
nature of history and of inevitable change. Simply, the utopian aim, unachievable, 
nonetheless takes us further toward different, more difficult but also more important 
problems.  
 
Four critical positions, four stages of criticism and four types of critic 
There are three main critical positions adopted regarding the development of suburbs 
and the practice of landscape architecture, as there are three predominant ways in 
which utopias are understood. And then there is a fourth. The first constitutes a simple, 
received understanding where they are either good and helpful or bad and dangerous. 
Most comment is devoted to arguing this Pro or Con stance. Depending on whether the 
utopian designer is believed to be in charge or not, architects are then either divine or 
devilish geniuses, or humble or victimised servant messengers. A complication of these 
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extremes and appreciation of their historical and contextual complexities has resulted 
in two further positions or judgements. The second appreciation attempts a dialectic 
resolution or synthesis of these polarised for and against arguments, finding them 
artificially opposed. This is the designer as negotiator and value-adder, a specialist in 
creative conflict resolution adopting a positive position Anti either Pro or Con 
assessments. A third understanding argues that while neither extreme is valid, a 
synthetic resolution is also a falsely constructed position. In this understanding all 
solutions are the result of inescapable cultural conditioning and contexts that distort 
any attempt at objective and neutral judgement of their value. As no neutral position is 
actually possible from which to construct or judge them, there is no sure value in mythic 
or in utopian design propositions that can be usefully contemplated or employed and all 
the designer can then honestly do is enable, encourage and gently affirm already 
inherent, latent or emergent potential conditions in a non-authoritarian, non-interfering 
way. This third Non design position is challenged by a fourth: the utopian.  
 
Critical statements can be sorted into four categories—description, interpretation, 
explanation and evaluation—considered too as four stages in development of critical 
argument (Baym 1974). These can be seen to roughly parallel the four critical positions 
of Pro-Con, Anti, Non and utopia. The first category of criticism comprises descriptions 
which identify, locate and query the object of criticism typologically, for example 
whether a dwelling is a detached house or an apartment, whether open space is a 
sports ground, a playground or a botanical garden, or whether these are part of 
identifiable collections or arrangements of types. Secondly, there are interpretations 
which expose project intent through explication, elucidation, exegesis, or, more 
recently, through appreciation of the work as a performative act whose meaning is its 
unfolding. Thirdly, there are explanations which note the details or devices indicating a 
spatial or temporal location or context for the work, for example belonging to a 
regionally identifiable and historically recognisable cultural group. Finally, there are 
evaluations which offer an opinion relative to other works, the history of similar works or 
codified ideals of works, for example as judged against a disciplinary canon, rather 
than a personal view or feeling. Such evaluation establishes value beyond the status 
quo. 
 
The first three categories of descriptive Pro-Con, interpretative Anti and explanatory 
Non, might also be related to William Saunders’ three types of critic (2002). The first 
type of critic practices ‘subjectivism’ where the critic’s claim to especially sensitive 
emotional and intuitive responses dominates in hyperbolic description and vague 
analysis. The second type is concerned with ‘politics and morality’, focusing on built 
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works interpreted as embodied social ideologies and powers which the critic 
dogmatically exposes from their own defensible moral high-ground. The third, 
‘pluralism without relativism’, is romantic. ‘If sensitivity marks the first position, and 
sobriety the second, then romanticism, or “affirmation” marks the third: a belief in 
human possibility, an interest in everything’ (Benedikt 2007, p.xxvi). Saunders sees this 
as the most important goal of criticism, necessary to avoid the dangers and 
oppressions of ‘a universal sure thing’ (p.xxvi) toward which other criticism tends. Yet in 
his introduction Michael Benedikt believes that ‘there are dangers and temptations in 
the pluralist position too’.  
 
At the meta-level (i.e., at the level of criticism of critics), one must note that when 
broadmindedness is the virtue heralded, profligacy is the only rebuke that sticks, and 
the one who offers it is likely to be framed as a killjoy; while at the first level (i.e., that of 
the actual observations about buildings), the romantic view leads one powerfully to the 
‘pathetic fallacy’ (p.xvi). 
 
Avoiding the dangers of romanticism, so similar to the third trusting, affirming Non 
design category, may require a utopian constitution.  
 
Ignasi de Sola-Morales offers an explanation of the twentieth-century development of 
architectural criticism that shows an evolution from ‘critical’ criticism to meta-critical 
critique. In Differences: Topographies of Contemporary Architecture (2000) he begins 
with an overview of the relationship of twentieth-century architectural practice and 
architectural criticism. Initially the ‘modern movement opened with the architect and the 
critic in close alliance’ supporting a mutual aspiration to disseminate understanding and 
acceptance of a ‘new tradition’ appropriate to its time (p.13). They produced statements 
using the four categories of criticism to describe, interpret, explain and excite interest in 
the new architecture. He then proposes that following WWII the role and purpose of the 
architect and the critic divided, resulting in ‘an atmosphere of mutual ignorance and 
alienation’, with ‘a new conception of criticism as radical critique’ (p.13). Although he 
does not say so, architects clearly continued their own work as a critical and even 
radical practice, while their once-supportive critics now declaimed that  
 
… the words of architects are the products of a rhetoric of deception; they promise what 
they cannot deliver, proposing unattainable utopias and impossible models of living; 
architecture has become the lackey of the mythologising forces of society; capitalism 
has an intrinsic need to cover over reality with discourses full of tricks, deceptions and 
manipulations that conceal the truly perverse nature of the processes underlying the 
construction of spaces for public and private life (p.15).  
 
The tenor of such criticism is echoed today in familiar complaints, yet ones shared as 
much by divided professional bodies and practitioner groups as by their external critics. 
Using an analogy composed of landscape architectural elements, Sola-Morales then 
describes what could be taken as the condition of meta-critical critique:  
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The explication of architecture is not some arborescent endeavor, comparable to the 
branches of a tree growing out of a common trunk and nourished through its roots from 
a particular soil … Criticism is thus not the recognition or manifestation of branches, but 
is itself a construct, purposefully produced to cast light on that situation, as a means of 
drawing the topography of that point where a certain architecture has been produced 
(p.16). 
 
While Sola-Morales explains that architectural criticism is constructed, he is less 
revealing about how such construction might be undertaken. Is there an approach that 
can guide critical evaluation of ideas about and proposals for suburbs, landscape 
architecture and utopias? Speaking of a note he came across scribbled on a 1979 
catalogue, New York art critic Peter Schjeldahl speaks of how he is shamed recalling 
his failures to live up to the principles of his fifteen-years-younger self: 
 
What do I do as a critic in a gallery? I learn. I walk up to, around, touch if I dare, the 
objects, meanwhile asking questions in my mind and casting about for answers - all 
until mind and senses are in some rough agreement, or until fatigue sets in. I try not to 
think about what I will write, try to keep myself pried open. My nemesis is the veer into 
mere headiness, where ideas propagate fecklessly, and the sense are reduced to 
monosyllabic remarks now and then. I try to chasten my intellect with the effort of 
attention, which in intellectual terms is doubt - doubt being the certainty that you're 
always missing something. To stay as close as possible to confusion, anxiety, and 
despair and still be able to function is the best method I know (1994, p.12). 
 
This description of the ideal role and process of the critic might well be different to what 
is anticipated of the audience who has come to experience the work and different too to 
the process of conceiving and producing it. But if appreciation requires critical 
evaluation and design is a critical practice, there must be similarities. The process 
Schjeldahl describes touches on several themes explored in the assessment of design 
value. Trying not to think of what he will write, keeping himself ‘pried open’, hints at the 
open-mindedness required of design. Already too however, there is the warning of a 
fall into a situation where ‘ideas propagate fecklessly’, so similar to the condition of Non 
designing where site potentials are celebrated indiscriminately and for their own sake. 
There is doubt, though less a Socratic doubt that would start by acknowledging that 
nothing is known at all in order to know something definitely, than an ongoing attentive 
wonder. Mind and sense must be in ‘some rough agreement’ but certainly not united. 
Rather than the reward of satisfying exhaustion following the heroic work of reaching a 
conclusion or decision, it seems this roughness and perpetual casting about is itself to 
be sustained to the point of fatigue. All in all a place is hinted at that is suspended. It is 
a place ‘as close as possible to confusion, anxiety, and despair’ yet still able to 
function; a place where the critic learns, and where learning is a way of teaching. To 
put yourself in a place where ‘something’s missing’ and you are always missing 
something is the goad to utopian endeavour as it is to design.  
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In the end meta-criticism—as its utopianism hints at—provides less of a framework for 
secure future construction than a temporary vantage-point for a better view that 
requires continual re-positioning. The meta-narratives of utopian re-organisation of the 
world reveal their dystopian shortcomings in fresh utopian propositions. Similarly, 
landscape architecture, by whatever name, is developing new paradigms of practice 
which will invite, and have already invited, further critique responsive to their perceived 
and emerging failures. The meta-patterns of suburban development too, again by 
whatever name, invite revisions and re-visiting of both idealised and realised 
geometries. Utopianism as an attitude, landscape architecture as a practice, and 
suburbs as a product are all concerned to realise and share the experience of desirable 
places.   
 
Definition 
Four categories of similar motives and beliefs regarding the problems of definition, not 
dissimilar to the problems of ‘representation’ for design, can be detected in attempts to 
define or represent the suburbs, landscape architecture and utopias. A common, 
conservative approach is found in the urge to secure a ‘workable’ definition that can be 
used for consistent understanding of issues. Another approach views definition as the 
starting point for questions refining an understanding. Another accepts the validity of no 
definition and rejects even provisional classification. A fourth proposes new definitions. 
 
As well as variously critical and meta-critical questions there are further theoretical 
questions to be asked by critical designers as well as design critics, for example 
regarding what constitutes a suburb or how or even if we might any longer identify a 
global settlement type by common general properties. Debates about the suburbs and 
their design then have engaged in an unacknowledged tangle of criticism, meta-
criticism and theoretical enquiry which has further confused the aims and agendas of a 
wide group of varied stakeholders. Definition is already critical and evaluative. Debates 
about the usefulness or need for definition comprise those regarding criticism more 
generally. 
 
Definition is never the innocent first step in a process of empirical discovery that it is 
sometimes made to seem: it is rather always the final precipitate of an already elaborate 
theory. To begin with a definition is therefore in an important sense to begin at the end, 
and to urge acceptance of a position before presenting the arguments or the evidence 
(Csapo 2005, p.1). 
 
Understanding something like this, Geert Bekaert (2002) begins his introduction to 
After Sprawl recounting the beginnings of the project and the arguments between 
Belgian cultural philosopher Lieven de Cauter and himself along with the other 
architects of their firm Xaveer de Geyter. De Cauter had opened with a ‘seemingly self-
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evident’ declaration: ‘Of course, it is not unimportant that we try to understand what 
urbanity actually is before we endeavour to dig up a theory of the city’ (p.9). But this 
was exactly what the architects believed to be the problematic ‘crux of the issue!’: 
 
Must we start out from a definition or an idea in order to attempt to understand reality? 
Do we [not rather] need to take the 'words' for granted in order to perceive the 'things', 
as Michel Foucault wondered? Or do we somehow have access to the reality in some 
form or another which allows us to shape the so essential and inescapable concepts, to 
charge them with meaning and elaborate them into an always provisional theory - a 
theory of the after-sprawl, for instance, which takes both the city and the sprawl for what 
they are or were? (p.9). 
 
As Pierce Lewis noted: ‘Language is important. We cannot talk about phenomena 
unless we possess the vocabulary to describe them, and many observers still cannot 
agree on what to call this new amorphous form of urban geography’ (in Lang 2003, 
p.61). For Bekaert it is instead, quoting Stephan Hertman’s Antigone in Mind the Gap, 
important to ‘protect yourself from the language’ (p.10). Bekaert goes on to develop a 
thesis which pits language against experience, definition against understanding and 
words against tasks. And yet they both aim for a position of only provisional certainty 
and both sides are in search of ways to assess and communicate meaning and value. 
Bekaert refers to De Cauter’s characterisation of the urban as requiring ‘“a kind of 
indifference” that forms the cornerstone of this courteousness’ (p.10), accusing him of 
snobbery and insouciant disregard rather than critical distance. Yet this then seems 
little different from Bekaert’s own idea of urbanity a page later as that which ‘signifies 
estrangement in a positive sense, the blessing of anomie’ (p.11). While language can 
risk limiting or predisposing thought, is it possible to think or imagine without it? Is a 
language of text and words different—more or less ‘real’, more or less ‘utopian’—to a 
language of architectural forms?  
 
John Macarthur (1993) has discussed the dangers that attend the rejection of definition 
and the refutation of explanatory pragmatism regarding a discussion of form, recording 
the debate between Peter Eisenman and Jacques Derrida. Eisenman had said of 
Derrida and their collaboration on the competition for the gardens of Parc de la Villette:  
 
He wants architecture to stand still and be what he assumes it appropriately should be 
in order that philosophy can be free to move and speculate. In other words, that 
architecture is real, is grounded, is solid, doesn’t move around - is precisely what 
Jacques wants. And so when I made the first crack at a project we were doing together 
- which was a public garden in Paris - he said things to me that filled me with horror like, 
‘How can it be a garden without plants?’ or ‘Where are the trees?’ or ‘Where are the 
benches for people to sit on?’ This is what you philosophers want, you want to know 
where the benches are (p.99). 
 
As Macarthur records, Derrida responded in ‘A Letter to Peter Eisenman’ published in 
Assemblage in 1990 warning ‘that you believe in it, absence, too much’ (p.100). To 
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Macarthur Derrida ‘sets out to show Eisenman the sorts of problems he encounters by 
insisting on the erasure of these descriptions of things people might want, might do, of 
the places they might find themselves’ (p.100). Macarthur does not intend his own 
essay ‘as a critique of Eisenman’s buildings or writings, but rather attempts to produce 
from Derrida’s witty diatribe a working agenda for thinking about the experiences of 
architecture’ (p.100). He beings with an ‘attempt to map out what it might mean for 
Eisenman to “believe in absence too much”’, to believe it unnecessary to commit to or 
define things sufficiently to communicate or build them as specific possible outcomes, 
and ‘why it is in many ways convenient and prestigious, rather than eccentric and 
critical, to have difficulties with presence in architecture’ (p.100). For Macarthur:  
 
Eisenman is not concerned with what architecture might be if lent the tools of more 
sophisticated concepts of human subjectivity. Rather his architecture is a device to lend 
post-structuralist architectural theory, which is, or ought to be, provisional, critical and 
polysemic, an apodictic character (p.102). 
 
Assumption and meaning are frequently and unclearly opposed in discussions of 
definition. ‘Once we suspend the assumption that the city is a totality, which implies 
conceptual and definitional closure, then it becomes meaningful to enquire how cities 
are imagined in more open ways’ (Çinar & Bender 2007, p.xiii). Openness and freedom 
of thought is conflated here with that of things. It is imagination which is asked to be 
more open rather than the city, and yet it is quite possible to freely and openly imagine 
other totalities. ‘To locate, identify and understand such a city draws the scholar... 
toward the imagination and toward the making and remaking of public culture’ (p.xiii). 
Surely, to ‘locate, identify and understand’ is to define? Are not cities, assumptions, 
definitions, meanings, enquiries all part of imaginative, investigative exercises? What is 
imagination opposed or alternative to and are its images so different to the concepts to 
which it declares itself opposed? What is argued here is that closed minds equal closed 
cities, whereas an open, imaginative and creative mind equals open, creative cities. 
But might it also equal an imaginary city? To make meaningful enquiries it is necessary 
to suspend assumptions, and yet any enquiry, to avoid aimlessness as well as 
meaninglessness itself, needs an assumption to interrogate.  
 
The attitude of Bekaert, Eisenman, Çinar and others disdains efforts at definition 
because of the limitations it places on unfettered exploration, and this would seem to 
be supported by Csapo’s exposure of definition’s guilty intentionality and reductionism. 
However, on careful reading, his point is not that definition should be avoided because 
it is inevitably and deceptively controlling, but that definition is necessary to expose that 
control, to permit debate and to reopen and unpack conclusions already reached. 
Csapo’s message is not to not deal with definitions, but to be aware that definitions 
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need very much to be dealt with. Similarly for design, a project idea does not come 
unbidden from nowhere, but in opposition and reaction to other articulated ideas. At the 
very least, more sophisticated and subtle designs grow from advancing arguments and 
developing expressions of them in critical reaction to poorly defined briefs or the 
failings of other defined projects. You might choose not to define—but a definition will 
assert itself—and even the conviction not to define is decidedly definitive. 
 
Numerous recent texts from both America and Australia have explored the relationship 
between language and landscape, finding that each shapes and is shaped by the other 
in a reciprocal bond similar to that between culture and place or between designer and 
site common in discourse on built environments (Bonyhady 2001; Cranston & Zeller 
2007; Lopez & Gwartney 2006; Macarthur 2003; Slater 2004; Tredinnick 2003;). A 
major thematic interest in present writing about the environment, as about the 
identification of interlocutor accountability in nature-culture discourses, concerns the 
mutual influence of consumer and consumed, user and the used, to the extent that 
their mutually responsive and responsible relationship is the defining quality of both 
habitat and inhabitant. The significance of the following statement is acknowledged by 
its full page enlargement in the introduction to Sense of the City: ‘I experience myself in 
the city, and the city exists through my embodied experience. The city and my body 
supplement and define each other. I dwell in the city and the city dwells in me’ 
(Pallasmaa in Zardini 2005, p.14). It echoes Bloch: ‘Not only does the man make his 
world, but the world makes the man’ (1979, p.45). And David Harvey: 
 
As we collectively produce our cities, so we collectively produce ourselves. Projects 
concerning what we want our cities to be then are, therefore, projects concerning 
human possibilities, who we are, or, perhaps more pertinently, who we do not want to 
become. Every single one of us has something to think, say and do about that. How our 
individual and collective imagination works is, therefore, crucial to defining the labor of 
urbanization. Critical reflection of our imaginaries entails, however, both confronting the 
hidden utopianism and resurrecting it in order to act as conscious architects of our fates 
rather than as 'helpless puppets' of the institutional and imaginative worlds we inhabit. 
If, as Unger puts it, we accept that society is made and imagined, then we can also 
believe that it can be 'remade and reimagined' (1997, p.159). 
  
Reciprocity—and design—requires distance as well as association; the critical distance 
resulting from something made unfamiliar or strange and the sympathy and empathy 
that results from deep familiarity. The textual genre of utopian narratives claims a 
similar thoroughly inter-critical role:  
[N]arrative utopias not only contributed to the re-education of their audiences in the 
ways they imagined the places they inhabited, they helped their authors define, in a 
new and continuously evolving way, the vocation of the modern intellectual, a project 
also already begun with More's founding text’ (Wegner 1998, p.4). 
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Contested, shifting definitions of the suburbs, landscape architecture and utopia come 
from larger shifts in contests regarding the aims of settlement and human dwelling, the 
significance of design generally, and the value and meaning of projected and embodied 
notions of happiness, satisfaction and just goals. Utopias occupy the designer’s 
working space between absence and presence, utopianism is designed play between  
contingent possibilities and the impossible contingencies located within any definition, 
and utopians are designers; those who acknowledge the necessity for such a space 
and such an effort. The following chapter considers four levels of effort undertaken 
toward evaluation, from simple, seemingly self-evident assessments of form, through 
debated content and manipulative languages, to a frontier of knowledge where utopian 
effort faces acquiescent effortlessness. 
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Chapter 7 
From Form to Frontier via Content and Language:  
Four Ways to Talk About the Suburbs 
 
‘Ask the fact for the form,’ Emerson said, but the history of American poetry has tended 
to illustrate a rival quest, which is to beg the form for the fact … whether in tone, in 
cognitive aim, or in human stance, [every passage quoted here] shows the same 
anxiety: to ask the fact for the form, while being fearful that the fact no longer has a 
form. 
 
Harold Bloom and David Bromwich18 
 
The work of categorising and evaluating suburb design and development has adopted 
a variety of organisational methods. Often chronological, they are also based on four 
common issues: firstly, a concern to identify suburbs by their physical form (or 
formlessness); secondly, a desire to elucidate the content or elements that structure 
and compose characteristic form and that influence interpretation; thirdly, an interest in 
disciplinary and other languages of those who can exercise such influence, including 
landscape architects; and, finally, writing which speculates beyond the secure 
projection of these analyses of evident influences, to find new potential on insecure 
frontiers. These four approaches taken by writings on the suburbs are used to consider 
the literature in this section. 
 
Form, Content, Languages and Frontiers are not mutually exclusive although writing 
tends to proceed in this order; that is, texts begin with an expository definition drawn 
from examination of form, closely linked to an implied intent or guiding will constituting 
the meaningful content behind particular form. This is followed by a further analysis 
identifying particular group influences by their languages, whether these are secret 
vocabularies hiding vested interests such as those employed by specialists or, on the 
other hand, by locals employing a distinct vernacular or class dialect, or utterances 
obscuring both conscious and unconscious agendas such as the habitual speak of 
politicians or advertising or media, or even accidental expressions fomenting 
misunderstanding or prejudice. Finally, beyond this research into forms, meanings and 
languages, an inspirational alternative is sometimes offered, a rejection, violent or 
whimsical, of cumulative data or accepted convention in favour of a risk—a leap neither 
logical nor attractive—over a gap that others have either not noticed, chosen to ignore 
                                                 
18 In Preminger, A. Waernke, F. & Hardison, O. B. (eds) 1974, p.919 
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as irrelevant or fantastic, or, sensing its seductive power, attempted to cover over in 
embarrassment. These writings and propositions express frontier ideas of self-
conscious exploration, but they take two forms: a self-effacing non-involvement and a 
self-affirming utopianism.   
 
The material of anthologies in particular and how they are curated can be considered 
representative of the four broad categories suggested in Chapter 2: Pro-Con, Anti, Non 
and utopian. These will be related to the four categories just outlined: form, content, 
languages and frontiers. These linked quartets of approaches also represent a 
gradation of correspondence between form—which is the central concern and ultimate 
expression of architecture, as well as the stuff which everyday life negotiates—and 
fact, considered as the accumulated evidence of past form interpreted and used as 
demonstrative argument for future formation.  
 
Recent literature on suburban landscapes has rehearsed traditional and ongoing Pro 
and Con narratives. These attitudes are predominantly presented in relation to the form 
of suburbs. Landscape form (frequently confused with structure) and its content 
(confused with meaning) provide the basic material for Pro-Con positions. For example, 
patterns of winding or gridded or other-shaped formulations of repeatable lot modules, 
understood collectively as uncontrolled structural sprawl, inform an anti-suburban view 
of wasteful, selfish and ignorant unsustainability. Conversely, they epitomise a pro-
suburban view of democratically and equitably parcelled and distributed space. In Pro-
Con narratives the forms and facts of suburban stories have a simple and presumed 
inevitable correspondence. For example, to pro-suburbanists, low density evidences 
greater and equal access to open spaces and cleaner air, cheaper family home-
ownership, private garden cultivation and proximity to both natural and cultural 
expressions of seasonal cycles, and so on. Alternatively, the contrary opinion views the 
sprawling, low-density, formless form of suburbs as clear evidence of the many evils it 
engenders, including lack of a sense of community, expensive infrastructure, dispersed 
services, high resource and energy use, and creation of false natures and shallow 
cultures. 
 
Where Pro-Con attitudes can be related to writing of simple analyses of meaningful 
form, literature on the suburbs is also finding and articulating a more complex, Anti 
story of settlement beyond either Pro or Con attitudes. This writing pursues an 
investigation of variously privileged, specifically located and specialised influential 
languages seeking evidence for a critique uncovering concealed agendas and shifting, 
relative meanings. It incorporates examination of design and construction professionals 
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as well as developers, politicians, specific social classes and other groups, including 
most recently as part of the analysis of the global financial crisis and sub-prime 
mortgage dilemma, banks and financiers, all variously credited with responsibility for 
suburban forms. It examines a contingent and complex form-fact correspondence, 
focused on analyses of built environment disciplines and other interested groups, 
rather than on form itself as inherently, independently and singularly meaningful. It is 
rich with the data of specific, context-dependent relationships that represent a detailed 
examination of architectural, social, political, advertising and other relevant languages. 
For example, more nuanced histories of suburban development recognise that certain 
forms have worked well in certain landscapes under certain social and political 
conditions, but do not readily translate to other environments for other groups. 
 
The anxiety that Harold Bloom and David Bromwich identify in late twentieth century 
American poetry regarding the capacity of form to speak meaningfully of the world, is 
that shared by contemporary architecture and landscape architecture. The open-
endedness of a flexible Non approach identified in the first chapter, is increasingly 
apparent in theoretical writings as a response to this anxiety. It represents the first of 
two types of frontier literature. This first Non frontier approach to examination of the 
suburbs goes beyond analyses of both simple form-fact correspondence and more 
complex and contingent analyses of language as the determinant of form-fact 
correspondence, to emphasise and advocate instead an escape from any possible or 
necessary correspondence at all. The reactionary, open-ended Non approach attempts 
to escape the inevitable faults of any particular and reductive form-fact 
correspondence, maintaining an open-endedness that celebrates absence or at least 
emergence over what is normatively predicted to or has already emerged. Such writing 
argues that the suburbs have no meaning or can have any meaning. Rather than 
looking at the significance or aim of suburban form or the significance or aim of those 
involved in its conception and construction, Non frontier writing speculatively examines 
the suburbs’ multiple and contradictory processes, systems or forces, and their ever-
emergent, temporarily rendered expression. This literature can be identified with an 
interest in absence and increasing attempts to negate or neutralise the effects of 
controlling form or languages through an uncontrolled elaboration and dissolution of 
direct design authority. The Non approach recognises a perpetually expanding literal 
and metaphoric frontier of suburban knowledge, construction and definition, although in 
positioning itself negatively, it has typically failed to identify positive possible action. For 
example, the recent identification of the limitations and inherent biases of conventional 
techniques for landscape representation has only resulted in a call for more or different 
techniques but has not been able to suggest a bias-free one. 
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Finally, a second type of utopian frontier literature is evident in attempts to work beyond 
the simple or contingent explanations of form or language and toward something other 
than their outright negation. A utopian openness responds to the same limiting failures 
exposed through wider and more accurate data collection but probes beyond known 
languages and identified form-fact correspondences to suggest newly possible 
correspondences. Rather than a reactionary celebration of absence and open-
endedness, it calls for a responsive and responsible expression of openness and 
determined presence. Rather than escape from the unpredictable and perpetual 
shifting of suburb definition and landscape architectural purpose, it suggests a positive 
engagement with these shifts. Non frontier speculation is sceptical of where or if a 
place of unshifting security can be attained and avoids it as a desirable or possible 
design goal given the tragic histories of utopias that didn’t acknowledge they were 
utopian. Utopian frontier propositions are fully aware that their promises are impossible 
to deliver, but pursue them nonetheless as exactly the sort of exposure of frauds and 
provocation toward improvement that Non frontier visions promise in vain.  
 
In summary, the first three—Pro-Con form-content, Anti language and Non frontier—all 
place importance on form-fact correspondence, particularly Non’s attempted avoidance 
of it. The last utopian attitude essentially doubts correspondence and loses the 
expected, effective association between sign and signified, form and fact which limits 
free association and the subsequent focused musing on alternative possible 
associations. The following table assembles these relationships. 
 
Table 1. Correspondences:  Four approaches and four arenas 
 
Four 
approaches 
Four arenas Demonstrated/evidenced 
through: 
Characterised by: 
Pro-con Suburbs 
 
Form & Content as 
fixed, secure meaning  
Simple form-fact correspondence 
Anti LA / built environment 
disciplines and 
professions 
Languages representing 
shifting, relative meaning 
Contingent and complex form-fact 
correspondence 
Non  Design for marketing  
Reactionary design 
Frontier of one sort 
indicating any or no 
meaning (meaningless) 
Escape from any 
correspondence, open-
endedness (absence) 
Utopia  Responsive design Utopian Frontier  
 
Rigorously contingent openness 
(determined presence) 
 
 
Form and content 
The suburbs are recognised, examined, celebrated and condemned by their ‘shape’. 
This is variously documented, both in regard to representational technique 
(photograph, diagram, statistic) and criteria documented (land cover, land use and 
zoning, density, house size or style, governance type and extent, class and income 
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distribution, mortgage type, and so on). Issues surrounding the shape of land 
development, including relative and absolute size, scale, pattern and extent, are the 
professional concerns of designers as they examine issues of created form. For a 
designer, the problem of realising the ideal is not only of formulating an idea but also of 
giving an idea form. Architecture requires formal consciousness and intentional 
physical intervention, and is therefore responsible and influential.  
 
Examination of suburban form at a variety of scales, from individual lots and residences 
to whole estates and even metropolitan regions, appears awkwardly limited to either 
diagrammatic abstraction or elaborate pictorial illustration. Design contribution seems 
reduced to beautifying the empirically determined necessities of engineering and 
planning, producing diagrams and views of projected finished outcomes and supporting 
the promises of advertising with scenes of beautiful, buyable places. Suburbs exemplify 
the fundamental problems of form-giving. Sprawl is famously formless. Commentators 
deny it not only shapeliness but any shape, acknowledging only extension. Suburbs as 
sprawl become a process rather than definitive product. ‘Compared with the amount of 
literature on the social character and experience of suburbia, little has been written 
about its physical form’ (Harris & Larkham 1999, p.17). Hugh Stretton (1975) is an 
exception. He considers that there are ‘many ways of breaking up the regular march of 
sixty-foot frontages’ (p.22). He looks too at an even larger scale at collections of 
suburbs in the forms of ‘clusters’ organised in webs, radial or linear collections.  Yet 
while a form cannot necessarily mean a particular thing, it cannot mean anything at all 
or nothing, only itself. 
 
Discussions of form can be confused by what is meant by form. Patrick Troy, Professor 
Emeritus at the Australian National University and Adjunct Professor at the Urban 
Policy Program, Griffith University, distinguishes structure from form in a paper 
examining Australian cities and the ‘two fundamental forces that shape the way we live 
in them’: 
 
Structure is the spatial relationships between cities and their services and activities. 
That is, whether the activities are arranged in linear relationships and are highly 
centralised, or whether the city is structured as an interconnected set of nodes around 
which development is arranged. Form is the nature or density of development. All major 
cities in Australia are essentially low density, especially in their residential areas, 
although recently the city centers have been developed to high density (2004, p.1). 
 
Landscape architect Garret Eckbo means something else: 
 
A good theory of landscape design... must be a theory of form as well as of function... 
We cannot avoid the problem of producing form in the landscape … We must 
remember that most landscape problems are so plastic, so little under the control of 
functional requirements that any number of solutions is possible. For most, the final best 
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solution is probably as unreachable as the final best solution for a square of canvas on 
an easel, or a block of stone in the sculptor's yard. Design, like life, has no limits to its 
development … It has been said then, on what shall we base our forms? Where shall 
we find them? And the answer is, in the world which is around you in space and behind 
you in time (in Swaffield 2002, pp.10-11). 
 
The understanding and search for form of the planner and the designer are shown here 
to be different, if related. The emphasis of the designer is on form as a plastic, concrete 
expression, of the planner on abstract organisational principles. And yet Troy 
concludes his paper admitting that the abstractions of planning and policy proposals 
are misdirected and he appeals specifically instead to the need to give physical 
expression to our aspirations: 
 
There is one danger in all this on which I would offer one piece of advice: it is important 
to resist the visiting 'snake oil merchant' who claims to have the solution to the urban 
problems of Brisbane – or any other city for that matter. Whether they propose 
consolidation and the downsizing of dwellings, priority for public transport to the 
exclusion of private travel, the introduction of privatisation or the rigorous market pricing 
systems for urban services, they all claim to be able to solve the problem. In doing so 
they hope that citizens will forget that: there is always a simple solution to every 
complex problem … But it is always wrong! I suggest that we accept that our cities are 
complex highly adaptive systems and that we need to develop planning systems that 
are not physically deterministic but are built on the notion that in accommodating the 
basic forces operating in our society we must find appropriate ways of giving them 
acceptable physical expression (p.13, capitalisation removed). 
 
Such physical expression is hardly an uncomplicated or secure translation of forces 
and values and architects are well aware too, as utopians, that form remains part of the 
problematic of their expression rather than a final solution. Lars Lerup says of 
Manfredo Tafuri in Beyond Utopia that:   
 
[H]e saw the weakness of formfulness and silence as almost equally futile... [he] points 
out the futility of seeing form alone. Only in the mind of the architect does form stand 
alone; in life it is always motivated by use and thought. A willing interlocutor can rescue 
exasperated and silenced form. These touch on the subjects of the dwellers and their 
liberty (1994, p.24).  
 
Further: 
 
The role of the enlightened architect, outlined by Tafuri as 'the ideologist of the city' 
using 'form as the tool' to persuade the public that modernist planning can withstand the 
hit-or-miss market forces of modern urban organisation, has been radically 
reconstituted. This is very frustrating to modern reflective architects, who see 
themselves as unwilling instruments of capital without influence on urban organisation. 
Less reflective architects seem equally frustrated because they blame themselves for 
these same facts (p.23). 
 
This frustration and the hesitation that it occasions is perhaps nowhere more apparent 
than in the shaping of suburbs. But sprawl, declares Lerup, does have form. ‘It is 
asinine to suggest that the single-family house and its lot, agglomerated, have no 
consequence for urban form … These agglomerations or megaforms, are hard to 
visualize despite their molecular regimentation (house, lot and street) because their 
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horizons, their coherence as objects, are fuzzy and disjointed’ (p.25). The difficulty 
Lerup sees is that ’an urban configuration (say in all its market-driven formlessness) is 
acknowledged as basically democratic but somehow the form it takes is not right, even 
though the right form is not possible because too utopian’ (p.27). 
 
Despite Tafuri’s contention that both formfulness and silence—the silence of 
formlessness—are equally futile, informality and even formlessness itself have been 
embraced as desirable aims of design in reaction to the violence of imposed form taken 
as explanation for the failed project of Modern architecture. Slums are an ‘informal’ 
urbanism, ‘resisting representation’ (Fabricius 2008). Suburbs are similarly formless, 
resisting descriptive, confounding graphic, and challenging even statistical 
representation. It has been suggested too that suburbs are or will be the slums of the 
future (Leinberger 2008). In Resisting Representation: The Informal Geographies of 
Rio de Janiero (Fabricius 2008), Daniela Fabricius discusses ‘Urban Informality’ 
(AlSayyad 2004). This describes a shift in the twentieth century study of cities from the 
Chicago School where ‘the city is studied from what is essentially a Modernist 
perspective based on the model of a centralized nucleus with clear distinctions 
between centre and periphery’ to the Los Angeles Model ‘which can be characterized 
as postmodern, developed in the late 1970s emphasiz[ing] the decentralization of the 
city and the role of the global capitalist economy and advances in communications 
technology in determining urban form. The periphery of the city, in this case, controls 
the center’ (Fabricius 2008). More importantly for Fabricus is the lesson ‘that these two 
models, exported and applied to cities in the Third World, no longer apply (or perhaps 
never did) to most cities in the world, and that the very tools of analysis must be 
reconsidered.’ 
 
For Fabricus this realisation is a helpful one:  
 
As geographers, architects, or planners, accepting our inability to articulate urban 
boundaries is infinitely useful for describing the contemporary city. Accepting partial 
knowledge and relinquishing epistemic control is a step toward a geography of the 
informal (Fabricius 2008, unpaginated). 
 
While ‘infinitely useful’ for describing the present, questions remain regarding the steps 
that follow. Having relinquished control, then what do you do? Is a different form of 
control implied and if so, what? Form (as well as the representation of form), like 
definition discussed earlier, is both unavoidable and unavoidably representative of 
ideas albeit unintentionally. Form is not important because it means something but 
because it cannot mean nothing. For this reason forms—and formlessness—lead to 
utopian manifestations of ideas as ideals.  
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Discussion of form as something other than spatial is pervasive. Form is considered an 
abstraction of other forces upon materials, not the material which gives force to 
abstract ideas. In ‘Logistics Landscape’ landscape form is 'described' as the product of 
economic forces (Waldheim & Berger 2008). Three historical configurations are 
identified: ‘concentrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
decentralized in mid-twentieth century, and distributed at the end of the twentieth 
century’ and linked to shifts in capitalist ‘modes of production’ (p.219). The division 
echoes Foucault’s identification (1984) of a change from ‘localization’ or 
‘emplacement’, to ‘extension’, to networks of ‘arrangement’ or the ‘relations of 
proximity’ determining and constituting any ‘site’. It also recalls Cedric Price’s boiled, 
fried and scrambled egg analogy of city morphology (in Waldheim & Berger 2008, 
p.64). These instances and others note a present formal condition of chaotically 
dispersed and diverse elements. For Waldheim and Berger this creates 
 
… a new form of landscape, a landscape of logistics. This logistics landscape … is 
characterized by new Industrial forms based on global supply chains and vast territories 
given over to accommodating the shipment, staging, and delivery of goods. This paper 
offers a provisional theoretical framework and describes three emergent categories of 
logistics landscape: distribution and delivery, consumption and convenience, and 
accommodation and disposal … [It represents] an initial attempt to describe these 
spaces, to make them available for reading as landscape, and to begin the longer term 
project of their critical cultural appraisal (2008, p.219). 
 
Berger and Waldheim offer their research as the start of a ‘critical appraisal’ of a 
condition, but it is the condition of economic activity and logistical necessity which is 
critiqued, not form itself. Form is secondary. As designers the authors are curiously 
uncritical of the landscape itself or its capacity to be designed—that is shaped—to 
resist or represent anything other than the forces identified. It is unclear whether 
designers are to do more than work with or perhaps just understand the identified 
forces, rather than be a force themselves in articulating and shaping desirable future 
forms. 
 
Architect George L. Claflen Jr., considering conflict in architectural education, notes the 
‘surprising lack of literature in architecture on the actual making of form which creates 
the vacuum sometimes filled by the misapplied debris of other disciplines’ (Claflen 
undated, unpaginated). In relating the discourses of other disciplines to that of 
architecture, or rather to architecture as form, architects need to be alert to dangers of 
‘the frequent act of employing the properties of architecture to do nothing more than 
symbolize or aestheticise the processes of other disciplines whether science or 
poststructuralist philosophy’ (Claflen undated, unpaginated). Or economics or logistics. 
 
 
136
Much earlier, Russian architect Ivan Leonidov similarly argued for the importance of 
architectural form as determining, rather than predetermined: 
 
The ideas of OSA [Union of Contemporary Architects] are criticised not only by 
ASNOVA [Association of New Architects] but equally by other architectural groups for 
their denial of the influence of forms on the human being. But in fact it is only the OSA 
which is stepping over this artificial notion of the influence of external form, and is trying 
to genuinely design the architecural object in a way that takes account of the ideological 
dimension from the very beginning, in relation to the social function of the building, and 
right to the very end, down to the details, at the level of their standardisation, correct 
functioning and justification (in Kuzmin 1988, p.94). 
 
An appreciation of form is inseparable from appreciating its effects. An understanding 
of physical suburbs is inseparable from understanding them as part of active, altering 
sprawl. Time and space cannot usefully be examined separately. However there is an 
ongoing privileging of investigations into the former over the latter evident in continuing 
interest in what constructions or landscapes ‘do’ over what they ‘mean’ or ‘are’ (Corner 
1999; Hensel 2008; Kolarevic & Malkawi 2005), in processes over appearances, in 
their timeliness or dromology over their morphology (Virilio 1986), their infrastructure 
over their structure (Varnelis 2009), their extended networks over their immediate 
works (Castells 1996). Their performance (Davison 2005) and accidents (Virilio 1986) 
are in danger of being disembodied from the bodies that suffer them. The emphasis 
risks a separation of inseparable and mutually influential causes and effects.  
 
Content is inseparable from form. Even forms argued to arise spontaneously, 
organically or independent of human effort, are inevitably speculated to ‘mean’ 
something—denotatively and connotatively—when brought within human notice and 
cultural contexts. Literature of content asserts that suburbs are the physical expression 
of experiments, good or bad, conducted by controlling powers. It most often takes a 
positivist attitude, examining and stressing the logic of applied accumulated knowledge 
and the generally successful spread of improved living conditions as a result of this 
application. It presents a belief in the possibility of achieving a method and form 
ensuring good and right outcomes as the pursuit and objective application of research 
that has already determined what good is. Conversely, work not applying such 
methods and forms is bad. Sprawl is the effect of economic and other non-material 
causes. However this positivist rationalism has failed to resolve existing problems or 
prevent the continuing revelation of new ones, while the totalitarian powers needed to 
develop and instigate change arguably cause more oppressive environments than 
those they replace. The strictures of New Urbanism and the structures they give form 
to are examples of this simple pro-con, form-fact relationship. Much Urban Design, 
applying the work of Christian Norberg-Schulz (1968), Kevin Lynch (1984) and others 
is similarly concerned to establish and follow clear and logical guidelines for delivery of 
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appropriate form, understood as the outcome of applied common sense. This 
persuasive aim is most recently evident in the twelve key-word ‘Principles’ of the Urban 
Design Charter for Victoria which include structure, accessibility, legibility, fit and 
function, safety, inclusiveness and interaction (DPCD 2010b). 
 
In speaking of form as that which, on the one hand, is responsible for architectural 
violence and error, while on the other, is avoided by architects as their direct concern 
through a focus instead on processes of formation, we have already broached 
questions of content and meaning. As mentioned, a prevailing tendency is to explain 
form as the seemingly inevitable outcome of a range of forces which are the actual 
subject of examination and critique. Suburbs, as also outlined, are most frequently 
examined and understood as active sprawl, responsive to these forces. A typical 
example, produced by and for architects by ‘Architectural Design Magazine’, was an 
issue devoted to The Anglo-American Suburb, coinciding with the 'Suburbs' exhibition 
at the Cooper Hewitt Museum, New York (Stern & Massengale 1981). Prefaced by an 
explanatory essay, it provided plans, sketches, photographs and other graphics, 
profiling fifty American suburban developments, prefaced by four British prototypical 
suburbs. In an overlapping, roughly chronological sequence, they were organised into 
types based speculatively on rationales for their founding: railroad suburbs, streetcar 
and subway suburbs, industrial villages, resort suburbs, automobile suburbs and 
‘recent suburbs’. In contrast, architect Michael Sorkin (1996) privileges form as the 
influence and cause of other non-material effects. He interprets and utilises the 
planner's code as an instrument for creative development of urban form. ‘This code is 
written in the belief that meanings inhere in forms, and that the settings for social life 
can aid its fulfilment’ (p.11). The code is written to forefront form as the embodied 
evidence of abstract principles. Such discredited utopianism makes this a rare 
positioning. 
 
The literature of content seeks meaning and intent behind the creation of form. For 
suburbs it seeks to explain both form and the growth of that form. It represents the 
normative identification of problems and proposes either solutions or directions for 
further research that will reveal solutions. It does not consider that there is no certain, 
guaranteed, unmediated and meaningful intent that can be securely invested in any 
form. It believes that meaning can be found and understood, although it can and has 
been accidentally and wilfully misunderstood, leading to abuses of agreed canons of 
design taste and standards. The internal logic of the grid’s rational order became an 
externally imposed logic enabling its use as a tool for swift and disorderly subdivision of 
land. The particular curvature of William Hogarth’s ‘line of grace’ and Lancelot Brown’s 
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serpentine horizontal and vertical alignments of paths and waterbodies became the 
blob and wavy perimeter edging of Kwik Kerb suburban garden beds. The complex 
Picturesque investigations of irregularity and earlier theoretical interest in the 
asymmetry of non-western ‘Sharawadgi’ (Temple 2008) was echoed by twentieth 
century ‘townscaping’ (Cullen 1961; Wolfe 1949) and eventually became the real estate 
developers wormy cul-de-sac. No longer a response to topography, the artifice of 
winding lanes on flat ground is pretence to a topographic—as well as socially 
superior—sensibility. Some writing recognises or excuses such corrupted 
misunderstandings and trivialisation as the result of inappropriate education, lack of 
exposure to exemplars or insufficient immersion in the context of original 
developments. Such observers become less interested in expounding form-content 
relationship and focus instead on the languages which frame and claim them.  
 
Language and frontiers 
In order to unpack possible and shifting meanings one needs to analyse and 
deconstruct languages. Literature interested in languages offers critique of particular 
readings or perspectives of proposals for built form, seeking evidence for controlling 
groups and their ideologies. It analyses and examines the languages and grammars of 
various disciplines including different sciences, planning, design and other specialist 
disciplines, as well as that of advertising, journalism and academia. It looks too at 
dialects or fashionable accents within groups such as the many 'isms' associated with 
design movements. The dialects of popular culture and the ordinary person too are 
recognised in vernacularism and regionalism through to the coining of terms for 
localised critical practices such as Robin Boyd's featurism and lowbrowism. Such ‘isms’ 
become legitimised or normalised as ‘-ations’ (for example modernism becomes 
modernisation).  
 
The workings of languages become important to appreciate, not in order that correct 
translations might then be undertaken that simply demonstrate the correspondences of 
form and content already argued for, but because difference and differentiation involve 
questions of choice and value and therefore issues of power. Identifying the intended 
meaning behind forms and the manipulative interpretation of shape and statistics as 
significant and signifying content requires unpacking motives behind the inventiveness 
of the naming and claiming process itself. This process is one determined by 
languages. Literature that examines languages accepts that a shape may be a direct 
expression or manifestation of a designer’s idea which can be understood by various 
others who share his or her language, whether a narrow circle of fellow designers or a 
wider group.  
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The idea of a language of suburban design and development has been approached in 
various ways, from precise visual and physical systems of communication utilising 
elements of the built environment at different scales—analogous to the alphabets, 
words and grammars governing textual communication—to more abstract metaphors 
hinting at less precise landscape knowledge dissemination. Ledoux’s architecture 
parlante, (speaking architecture) is one that attempts to clearly symbolise its function 
and do away with human interpretative or manipulative intervention. Design guidelines 
can be seen to assume the same simple transliteration of text or diagram to form. 
Languages of landscape, the city or the suburbs have followed the various rhetorical 
and semiotic turns of architectural theory too.  
 
The language of design both reads and writes form. Built environments have ‘legibility’ 
(Lynch 1960). Aggregates of forms, like the sequencing of words, sentences and 
paragraphs, form meaningful patterns (Alexander 1977). Yet there is resistance to the 
ease with which communication is implied by linguistic analogies. 
 
OMA refuses the positive inquiry into semantics, the structural semiotics that have 
characterized so many attempts to develop 'true' languages in recent years. Nor does it 
intend to anthropologize its productions... the linguistic analogy, while affording valuable 
insights into the operation of signs... no longer holds an absolute interpretative value 
(Vidler 1992, p.196). 
 
Linguistic analogies, like other explanatory, representational and essentially 
interpretative tools, never did have absolute value or unambiguously communicated 
and finite meaning, despite appeals to universal values or fundamental principles for 
which they claim to stand. In her appeal to landscape architects to undertake new 
conversations with an old landscape Catherin Bull (2006) would disagree. She 
suggests that designers have simply forgotten to chat with them in order to learn what 
to do (pp.12, 16, 54). 
 
Failures and inadequacies of design are also explained as the limits and failures of 
present poor languages of representation rather than inevitable failures to realise the 
unrealisable. Anthony Vidler quotes Roland Barthes to preface a discussion of 
architectural representation: ‘“To change language,” that Mallarmean expression, is a 
concomitant of “to change the world,” that Marxian one’ (1992, p.190). Similarly ‘[t]he 
limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (Wittgenstein 2001, p.68). Design 
pursues and pushes those limitations beyond present frontiers, although the frontier—
the limit—will never be dispensed with. The expansion and alteration of 
representational languages expands and alters conceptions of and building for the 
world, even as such changes fall behind the frontier that has been expanded, ossifying 
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as new orthodoxies, being fixed as new limitations and abused as false liberations. Don 
Watson’s Death Sentences : How Cliches, Weasel Words and Management-Speak Are 
Strangling Public Language (2003) could be read as parallel critique of the abuse of 
design language and discourse by the clichés of planning and market imperatives to 
‘build better cities’. 
 
The present focus of interest in what form ‘does’ rather than what form ‘is’, appeals to 
natural common sense over formally acquired appreciation. It finds value in the 
demonstrative truth of meaningful function rather than the pretension to being 
meaningful. Yet what ‘doing’ demonstrates is still only meaningful within terms that 
have also been pre-determined. Dispensing with determination, in what we do or what 
we are, like attempting to escape all limitation, makes the meaningless falsely 
meaningful. In its production and reproduction of form, design activity appeals to and 
employs both learnt traditions of exclusive knowledge regarding the appreciation of 
form, as well as intuitive or natural reactions to environmental phenomena. It is only the 
closely examined ever-shifting relationship between both that generates defensible 
argument for any meaning. 
 
Frontier writing considers emerging and scattered speculations addressing the 
unpredictable and perpetual shifting of suburb definition and landscape architectural 
purpose. Designers work at frontiers but there are two types of approach to their 
challenges: one that acquiesces to unknowability (Non) and one which projects 
something desired to be known and made real (Utopian). The work and writings on 
frontiers explore the uses of irony and related notions of the uncanny, the fall, horror 
and disgust, open-endedness, chaos and indeterminacy. Frontiers are the edge 
between the known and unknown. Frontiers are for exploring. They command a 
particular view into the unknown and demand poetical as well as political apprehension 
and appropriation. The term is borrowed from Lerup’s Beyond the City: 
 
Still seeking, but now for a frontier where we can play out a distributed architecture and 
situate its architects. Searching the suburban metropolis for its frontier is confusing … 
The frontier is a heterogeneous subject, especially since it is increasingly mythical if not 
already fictional (1994, p.156). 
 
Suburbs are at frontiers, the edge, the hinterland of cities, the borderlands. Lewis 
Mumford explicitly connects the motivation to suburban settlement with America's 
frontier settlement: ‘What Francis Parkman had said of the westward march of the 
pioneer was equally true of the suburb: “The sons of civilization, drawn by the 
fascination of a fresher and bolder life, thronged to the western wilds in multitudes 
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which blighted the charm that had lured them”’ (1961, p.559). First and foremost of the 
charms destroyed was the sense of there even being a frontier.  
 
The literature of wastelands and deserts, of colonial occupation and expansion is a 
literature of expanding frontiers. Poetry, painting and other forms of expressive 
communication, are part of early experiments to understand the Australian landscape. 
In 1801 William Westall set sail as official artist on board Investigator with Matthew 
Flinder’s expedition to Australia in ‘hopes of finding an Arcadia, a rustic paradise of 
picturesque vistas' (Findlay 1998, p.xi). He was not simply disappointed but completely 
traumatised by his inability—the failure of his training in the conventions of European 
landscape painting—to find a way to grasp the difference of Australian landscape and 
light. 
 
In Seeking the Centre: The Australian Desert in Literature, Art and Film Roslyn Haynes 
(1999) examines the wide-ranging impact of the desert on Australian culture. In the 
opening chapter, ‘The Land is a Map’ (and thereby, incidentally, a human construction), 
she quotes the aboriginal poet Jack Davis: 
 
Some call it a desert / But it is full of life / pulsating life / if one knows where to find it / in 
the land I love (p.3). 
 
In a similar discovery of the variety and richness of American deserts—which we are 
reminded was a term applied to any form of unprofitable wasteland—David Miller 
speculates on swamps noting that ‘descriptions of landscape can be a revealing index 
of both the culture’s inner life and its professed worldview’ (2000, p.2). It was during the 
1850s that: 
 
… the swamp overcame, in the minds of many thoughtful Americans, its age-old stigma. 
Rather than evoking stock responses, it began to be confronted with fresh awareness … 
this scrutiny of the swamp, through exploration and advancing scientific knowledge, led to 
a number of unforseen implications. The image … illuminated emergent attitudes and 
half-repressed emotions and also gave shape to the moods and insights being 
engendered by a changing economic and social reality … Even more significantly … [it 
was] granted a new, more positive perspective (p.3). 
 
Less ambitious in geographical and disciplinary scope, Reading, Writing, Seeing 
Wetlands (Giblett & Webb 1996) presents evidence for the same influence and 
potential of the wetlands of Western Australia on the literary imagination. In these and 
similar publications examining the cultural impacts of particular ecologically delineated 
landscapes, there emerges the valuable discovery of a wealth of unexpected richness 
and rare life. Substituting ‘suburbs’ for deserts or other wastelands in such studies 
makes it easy to see how the suburbs too might become the sites of rich and rewarding 
closer observation.  
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Fluctuating Borders: Speculations about Memory and Emergence (Monacella & Ware 
2007) collects project work and essays on the theme of borders; a type of two-way 
frontier. If frontiers mark the edge of the unknown, borders delineate a complex mirror-
line of threatening strangeness, reflective and reflexive, where utopian and Non 
responses accumulate. Opening with the deceptive simplicity of an understatement, 
Monacella's concluding essay ‘On the Emergent Line: Complex Systems and Self-
Regulating Orders of the City’ urges consideration of a complexity that is already well 
exploited, a detournment that has been long recouperated: ‘The complexity of the 
urban periphery is difficult to capture through a singular line or figure on a map’ 
(Monacella 2007, p.108). Anuradha Mathur and Dilip Da Cuhna write eloquently of the 
fundamental lie of lines, particularly those employed in the demarcation of coastlines 
and the location of rivers (2001; 2009). They are alert not only to water’s three-
dimensionality (it overflows not flows) but to four-dimensional swell and shifting. The 
fair-weather maps of surveyors record a mythic fair-weather lie of the land, essential to 
claims of control if not to an actual ability to do so.  
 
Monacella discusses landscape form as a 'topological modulation' changing over time, 
which cannot be considered as an object 'detached' from its 'manifold' contexts (p.108). 
In such a condition the line of a border, drawn on a map, 'becomes less a decisive 
mark and more a suggestive mark' although no suggestions are made as to what it 
may offer (p.108). She suggests, following Corner, that the ‘landscape architect 
designs strategies that affirm the landscape's infinite change in time’ (p.110) although it 
is unclear why it is necessary to do this. She adds that it is to ‘facilitate the emergence 
of becomings and potentialities’ (p.111) while strictly avoiding the facilitation of any 
particular potential (p.117). Yet all potentials are already shown to be potentially 
something else; part of the manifold landscape continuum. Design here is a service to 
aid the proliferation of difference, the generation of alternatives, easily co-opted as the 
production of designer novelty. Broadly interpreting Paolo Virno, Monacella determines 
that the work of design, following on its duty to ‘work against convention’ is ‘to rework 
the old conventions of design in order to forge new design methodologies and 
processes’ although in order to further achieve what with these new conventions 
remains unclear beyond the self-effacing claim to ‘create the conditions whence 
potential for change can take place’ (p.114). 
 
Rather than being used to subvert the dominant hegemonies that establish lines and 
erect defensive borders, the flexibility and uncertainty of the line theorised here has 
already become something employed by controlling forces to deflect attention from 
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other offensive activities. The line, nominally securing the sovereignty of both sides, is 
already a convenient fiction rather than an inconvenient constraint to the powerful. It is 
happily conceded by those who can ignore it with legal impunity and technological 
superiority.19 Possibilities do indeed emerge and can be exploited more effectively by 
already dominant forces to maintain and extend power than by others to diffuse or 
dispel it. The celebration of and plea for recognition of mere possibilities does not 
suggest or champion any particular possibilities. Australia has a thickened border of 
literal fluidity: ‘the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South Pacific, 
would become a wall 14,000 miles thick’ (Robert Hughes in Davidson 2006, p.106). 
Full of possible occupations and hopeful crossings, it is better known as a place of 
desperation and death, that the dispossessed and lost known as asylum seekers and 
illegal immigrants, look to cross to find a new life. Yet despite - or because of - lines 
drawn in water demarcating responsibility, people drown and none are held 
responsible. ‘A landscape architect draws lines that will open up fields of emerging 
possibilities’ (Monacella 2007, p.121) although it is arguable that possibilities will 
emerge equally well without them. As the essay repeatedly points out, the richness and 
variety of all manner of natural and unnatural forces acting upon an already non-
delimited and essentially undefined landscape can hardly avoid it. Without the intention 
to open up particular possibilities, admitting that this closes off others, the intervention 
of landscape architects must be utterly irrelevant, rather than just risk being merely 
ineffectual or incorrect.  
 
Elaborating on Alex Wall's 'urban surface' as 'dynamic and responsive like a catalytic 
emulsion', Monacella declares that ‘The change that happens within a city [or any 
landscape?] is not telic; it does not necessarily need to move toward a utopian end 
forecast by jurisdictional and governmental authorities’ (p.117). This may be so, but 
should not design in fact attempt to do this: to move toward a forecast of an admittedly 
utopian—ultimately unachievable—end? Isn’t this what constitutes a design proposal? 
Otherwise what is the role of design? She continues: ‘The life of a city, the macro and 
micro events that are taking place within it are not mapped out. The affective change 
between events will unfold in time; in fact, one may consider that city's surface to really 
be this event of unfolding’ (p.117). This will happen irrespective of the presence of 
designers. The 'life' of the city is another instance of the pathetic fallacy, so easily 
abused as a token to substitute rather than prompt reconsideration and evaluation of 
the forces acting upon it, to conceal rather than expose the quality of that life.  
 
                                                 
19 For several essays on the theme of borders in different locations world-wide—considered not as 
protection from but as incitement to and enactment of a violence that occurs despite apparent de-limiting—
see: Davidson, C. (ed.) 2006 
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To this point, with the support of reference to Corner, Wall, Kwinter and others, 
Monacella has been concerned to indicate that a task of design is ‘working against 
conventions’ (p.114) even while demonstrating that this is called for within 
contemporary contexts of great flux which seem to beg the question of what remains 
conventional. The aim appears to be for the 'new' and for more and greater 'change', 
'transformation' and 'potential' (as well as 'potential for change' to add to the 
landscape's already ‘continual transformation'), but no mention is made of outcomes or 
to what end the intensification of existing profligate indeterminacy is to be pursued. 
There is, however, one key moment that supposes an end is required, and it comes 
with admission of the designer's political task. Quoting Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, this task is ‘not simply to resist these processes (taking place within old 
conventions) but to reorganise them and redirect them toward new ends’. Monacella 
has added the parenthesised elaboration and goes on to advise that ‘the process of 
radical design is not aimed at creating nothingness but aimed at a process of re-
ordering existing conditions so that new subjectivities and spaces may emerge’ (p.114). 
Yet how can an earlier declared constraint on producing an end that might be 'mapped 
out'—i.e. something—not engender the nothing-in-particular of 'shifting relations'? 
Specifically, the ‘city as a multitude holds the risk of it being collapsed into nothingness 
or the postmodern capitalist celebration of pastiche which may imply the reifications 
and exploitation of cultures, peoples and spaces’ (p.113). Hardt and Negri, 
unacknowledged by Monacella, go on to say that ‘the multitude will have to invent new 
democratic forms and a new constituent power’ (Hardt & Negri 2000, p.xv). In other 
words, the multitude will design whether or not designers do. 
 
In her outline of a design approach to the challenges of borders or frontiers, Monacella 
references Corner's 'eidetic image' (pp.110-111), invokes Deleuze and Felix Guattari's 
'intensive spatium' (p.111), Delanda's 'heterogeneous assemblages' (p.111), Hardt and 
Negri's 'networks of flows' (p.115), Wall's 'urban surface' (p.117), and Kwinter's 
'epigeneic landscape' (p.120), amongst others. Frontiers are where meaning is 
uncertain because what we think we know of the world and how we understand it is 
challenged by the utterly unfamiliar. To accept the unfamiliar as unknowable is one 
possible response; a Non frontier approach. The granting of agency to landscape, the 
appeal to the unknown to reveal itself through unfolding inherent processes, can divest 
the observer of responsibility to consider their own place within and influence upon 
such processes. Unlike appeals to genius loci—the assigning of sentience or exercises 
of similar pathetic fallacies adopted within traditional sanctifications of place as part of 
ritual approaches to the unknown—the granting of agency to a landscape is an 
unacknowledged fiction. Whereas earlier appeals were intended to be understood as 
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conventions aiding a groping toward understanding the ineffable, recent appeals to 
landscape agency are offered as ways to rediscover a truth that conventions have 
obscured and sullied. The dangers of this deception are great. Open-ended processes 
and undefined potential can be as easily appropriated and directed as more 
transparently constrictive processes and limited potential. 
 
Frontiers are certainly places where purpose fails, where one can become lost, 
succumbing to fear and despair or just indifference. Literature and work that ventures 
to or beyond frontiers of apparent relevance, identifiable application or acceptable 
disciplinary scope is argued here to hold the most value for future settlement design, as 
it has always done. Rather than be abandoned for their failure and dismissed for their 
ambition, investigatory utopian attempts need to be revisited and newly reconstituted.  
Utopia is a frontier project. The suburbs are a utopian frontier project. Parables are 
frontier tales, diagrams are frontier maps, climbing a frontier exploration, falling a 
frontier act, failing a frontier achievement (especially in Australian history) and irony a 
frontier past-time. Frontiers are where contests for uncertain rewards are fought.  
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PART III 
WORKS OF COMPETITIVE PLACEMENT (A TOPOLOGY) 
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This final part examines and examples ways that landscape architecture, suburbs and 
utopian propositions have positioned and argued their relevance in dealing with 
contemporary environmental, social, economic and other concerns. At present the 
terms of relevance have been dictated by various and conflicting concerns for 
environmental health and human survival collected under the unifying cause of 
sustainability as a central issue. Under such terms the historic obligations of design, 
suburban development and utopianism to pursue escape and otherness are not 
welcomed as liberating subversions or even argued as problematic but condemned as 
unacceptable. The place that these three held historically in generating alternative 
world-views and challenging truth-claims, along with exampling the built forms resulting 
from these efforts, has been occupied by calls for united approaches to environmental 
crises at the very time when alternatives are urgently required. Landscape architecture, 
suburbs and utopias are important because of, rather than despite, ultimate failures to 
sustain their visions and work, falling themselves to new orthodoxies that require new 
subversions, new competitions. Ignoring the successes of multiple successions, it is 
their failures to ultimately deliver on successive promises that have enabled a take-
over of their valued place in cultural discourses, halting further competitive complexity. 
 
Chapter 8 shows how landscape architecture, suburbs and utopias have struggled to 
position their relevance, revealing their place has failed to hold. Chapter 9 looks at how 
advertisement, and real estate advertising in particular, positions the relevance of the 
topic areas to solving present problems in both simple and sophisticated ways that strip 
design itself of that purpose. The good design of new suburbs is accepted as the self-
evident outcome of unambiguously advertised claims. Finally, chapter 10 argues that 
planning and urban design are similarly relieving designers of their obligations, suburbs 
of their greater potential and utopias of their liberating power. They favour securing 
correct outcomes through a range of non-competitive tools including charters, 
guidelines, frameworks and other legislated restrictions on non-conforming experiment 
and opinion. 
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Chapter 8 
Suburbs, Landscape Architecture and Utopias:  
Difficult Definition, Problematic Position 
 
The profession of landscape architecture appears to be finished. Its edges have been 
overtaken by architects and environmental artists. Ecology has been taken over by 
engineers and hasn't really affected design. At the same time, the profession hasn't 
found a core. The centre has not been defined and held. 
 
Diana Balmori20 
 
The center in fact has not held, and the boundaries of the city cannot be specified. 
There is not even an agreed-on name for the gargantuan urban agglomerations in 
which we live, no matter what continent we live on. 
 
Thomas Bender21 
 
Increasingly we ‘exist in a state of continuous construction and deconstruction; it is a 
world where anything goes that can be negotiated. Each reality of self gives way to 
reflexive questioning, irony, and ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality. The 
centre fails to hold. 
 
 Sherry Turkle22 
 
Suburbs have been argued by many not to exist at all, inasmuch as the morphologies 
of primarily residential and low-density landscapes which we believe are being referred 
to are actually so diverse that even density and residential occupancy are sometimes 
inapplicable primary criteria for identification. ‘Suburbia’ is a more accurate, because 
less precise, word to indicate a mythic landscape type inclusive of all suburbs, but it is 
not necessarily more helpful in characterising them in ways which assist in positioning 
a response to the concerns of specific existing or proposed suburbs. Landscape 
architecture, somewhat similarly, has undertaken such an expansion and diversity of 
theoretical and practical projects that its scope of works, seen by many as a crisis of 
identity, of relevance, of professionalism or some other characterising quality or 
mission, may enable any design, contextualised as all design is within an external 
world and ‘natural‘ systems, to be an architecture of landscapes. Again, while some 
landscape architectural practice may seek more accuracy in calling itself, for example, 
landscape urbanism, in order locate its geographical or other area of interest, this is not 
necessarily proving more helpful in either accurately characterising the traditional 
                                                 
20 In Beardsley, J. 2008, p.178 
21 Bender, T. 2007, unpaginated. 
22 In Nash, C. 2001, p.4 
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practice to which it is opposed or in enabling the formulation of specific project 
responses. Utopias are already, by deliberate definition, no-places that cannot actually 
exist. Yet unlike the problematic and re-problematised existence of the suburbs and of 
landscape architecture—both constantly threatened with extinction—the pre-confirmed 
impossibility of utopias has a well-argued, irresistible, if often misrepresented positive 
value. Understanding the arguments and value of utopian thought should clarify the 
potential value of problems encountered in thinking about suburbs and landscape 
architecture. 
 
The following examination of present understandings of suburbs, landscape 
architecture and utopianism outlines contested definitions for each, reinforcing similar 
difficulties and directions. For each term it investigates dominant and debated 
positions, and trends in new ones, also suggesting others that may be useful for 
present discussions, recalling past, overlooked or forgotten obligations.  
 
It’s all about the suburbs  
The many initiatives and investigations world-wide pursuing solutions to identified 
problems of human settlement are typified in discussions of the suburbs. The triple 
bottom line considerations of environmental, social and economic responsibility are 
more than contemporary obligations of the public face of business accounting or 
government accountability; they have become personal attitudes expressed and 
encouraged in the private realm. Important issues of environmental and ecological 
crises are currently largely understood as matters to be overcome by greater 
technical efficiency and supportive styling. Design addresses them respectively as 
difficulties of systems performance and selling, whether at the scale of the 
individual domestic consumer or of corporate or political collectives. 
 
The documented problems and promises of the suburbs have been seen to evidence, 
even exemplify, the identified failures and projected promises of our times. These 
problems are typically described in the hyperbolic terms of a culmination of Western 
cultural ambition, if not human destiny itself and they are pitched at two extremes. 
Suburbia is sin for some and reward for others, indulgence or sacrifice made manifest, 
the result of an exercise of rights and responsibilities either triumphant or tragic. 
Globalisation, global warming, and other varieties of apocalypse and transformation 
have been located and vividly illustrated in residential suburbs. From cartoons, TV 
soaps, films and games to government enquiry and legislation at all levels, from the 
invention of new terminologies that attempt to comprehend it, to new disciplines that 
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attempt to deal with it, suburban studies attract everyone. The suburbs are scenes of 
accommodation for a range of lifestyles from the contemplative private life, the active 
communal one, the family life, the consumer lifestyle, the self-sufficient life, the globally 
connected life, even the vita religiosa in one’s own defensible monastery-castle or in 
suburban enclaves or purpose-built gated communities of single faiths, classes or other 
orders. The suburbs have served, and increasingly supply the material, metaphor and 
meaning for an examination of the contemporary human condition. The suburbs are 
our definitive and defining space.  
 
While ‘the city’ continues to be a key term for self-conscious sites of cultural production, 
it is the suburbs which have arguably and increasingly given cities any reason for 
existence. More frequently, it is the suburbs and suburban conditions which are 
invoked and intended when the urban and cities are discussed. The much-publicised 
United Nations announcement (UN-Habitat 2007) that from 2007 more people would 
live in cities than the country for the first time in human history, distinguishes, as its 
other reports do (UN-Habitat 2008), between urban and rural, counting the suburban 
metropolis as part of the city. Hugh Stretton’s Ideas for Australian Cities (1975) is 
actually a discussion of suburbs, complete with case studies that analyse alternative 
gridded, linear and other arrangements for a speculatively mapped expansion of 
Canberra. Dejan Sudjik’s 200 Mile City (1993) is effectively a discussion of linear 
suburban spread, while his most recent work declares an Endless City (2008) where 
the urban is conflated with the suburban. MVRDV described the condition of a 
‘Metacity’: ‘More and more regions have become more or less continuous fields... Even 
the former anti-urban elements are colonized; they are now concentrated parts of the 
urban condition: nature has become crowded’ (MVRDV 1999, p.16) although the 
‘urban’ condition of crowded nature in continuous fields is more familiarly termed 
suburban. City or suburb growth, particularly in developing countries, is discussed as 
the expansion of slums. The ‘first global enumeration of slums at the country level’ 
undertaken by the United Nations (López 2003) and a follow-up report of the same 
year (UN-Habitat 2003) generated considerable interest in ‘informal’ settlement 
(Neuwirth 2006; Davis 2007) including suburbs. 
 
Slums are not confined to developing countries nor limited to the name-calling of 
clearly demarcated upper classes on lower. Poor initial design exacerbated by 
economic recession led Frederic Law Olmsted to note that many once attractive 
suburban lots near New York City in the 1870s had deteriorated and been turned into 
'boarding and tenement houses' (in Fogelson 2005, p.28). Over 130 years later the 
same ‘[s]trange days are upon the residents of many a suburban cul-de-sac. Once-tidy 
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yards have become overgrown, as the houses they front have gone vacant. Signs of 
physical and social disorder are spreading’ (Leinberger 2008). The subprime crisis is, 
he continues, ‘just the tip of the iceberg’ as ‘[f]undamental changes in American life 
may turn today’s McMansions into tomorrow’s tenements.’  
 
Olmsted’s generous and McHarg’s humane suburbs threaten to become urbs in other 
ways. Recently the redevelopment, retrofitting or retrofilling of suburbs intentionally and 
explicitly rethinks them as either self-sufficient towns ideally within preserved or 
reclaimed rural open-space, or as denser urban nodes. ‘Efforts to urbanize suburbia 
are becoming a major development genre’ (Dunham-Jones & Williamson 2008). In 
Melbourne, Delfin’s ‘warehouse concept’ was launched in July 2002 at the outer 
suburban housing estate of Caroline Springs (Delfin 2002), while most developers 
include higher-density zones incorporating terrace rows around town centres and 
community parks which provide compensatory open space for that taken from 
traditional suburban backyards. New Urbanism would like to urbanise the suburbs 
although it may be happening without their help (Hall 2007). For Robert Fishman 
(1989, p.xi) suburbia ‘has become what even the greatest advocates of suburban 
growth never desired - a new form of city’. They might equally be considered 
suburbanised in a new way; not new cities or towns as much as new forms of suburb, 
or new as-yet-unnamed settlement form altogether.  
 
As early as 1982, considering ‘disillusioned attempts’ to rehabilitate cities and build 
suburbs, Habermas wondered ‘whether the actual notion of the city has not itself been 
superseded’ (1982, p.223). Alev Cinar and Thomas Bender open their Urban 
Imaginaries: Locating the Modern City with reiteration of the difficulty of defining the 
'city', citing Robert Fishman and quoting architect Richard Ingersoll from a 1992 article: 
‘cities have become impossible to describe’ (2007, p.xi). By 2006 Ingersoll claims ‘the 
city has disappeared’ (2006, p.3) and Lars Lerup, as his book's title After the City 
suggests, agrees that ‘the metropolis has replaced the city’ (1994, p.22). Architectural 
Design devoted an issue to ‘emergent types of public space in low-density 
environments’ which questioned ‘the traditional boundaries between cities, suburbs, 
countryside and wilderness’ describing a ‘new form of urbanism: de-centralised, in a 
constant process of expansion and contraction, not homogenous or necessarily low-
rise, nor guided by one mode of development, typology or pattern’ (Segal & Verbakel 
2008). Sanford Kwinter announced that ‘The traditional notion of the city as an 
historical and institutional core surrounded by postwar suburbs and then open 
countryside has largely been replaced’ (in Agrawal et al. 2007, p.91) although it 
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remains unclear with what. The already indefinable suburbs are competing for a place 
against multiple emerging and yet-to-be-defined morphologies. 
 
There is an increasing interest and growing literature into the origins, forms, strengths 
and weaknesses, benefits and threats of suburbs. This includes a burgeoning 
publication of popular, professional and scholarly viewpoints, case studies and analysis 
in both theoretical and practical modes, scientific and poetic description and serious 
and satirical commentary. A common concern of all studies is to adequately define the 
area of study. Yet as Aiden Davison has recognised: ‘The study of suburban ideals and 
practices takes place amidst considerable semantic confusion’ (2005). This is a result 
of the increasing complexity of physical geographies of suburban form, as well as their 
‘diverse, historically layered and ambivalent cultural geographies.’ Chris Healy wrote 
almost a decade earlier that suburbia has functioned as an imagined space ‘on to 
which a vast array of fears, desires, insecurities, obsessions and yearning have been 
projected and displaced’ (in Ferber et al. 1994, p.xiii). Andrew McCann noted:  
 
Suburbia is both a tangible site, a distinct set of spatial relations, and a discursive 
fiction, a facet of various imaginary topographies in which it is stigmatised or 
mythologised according to certain ideological and aesthetic imperatives … the suburb 
and the connotations that surround it are...as much a function of particular discourse 
and narratives as they are palpable realities (1998, p.vii). 
 
Even more significantly he notes that ‘[i]f this undecidability, this confluence of the real 
and the imagined, might be seen as constitutive of the “problem” of suburbia, one of 
the challenges in writing about it may well be to avoid a position in which suburbia itself 
becomes one more vanishing referent which evades direct comment’ (p.vii). This is 
precisely Jameson’s observation regarding utopia: ‘Utopia would seem to offer the 
spectacle of one of those rare phenomena whose concept is indistinguishable from its 
reality, whose ontology coincides with its representation’ (2004, p.35), although for 
Jameson this seeming self-referential coincidence generates enlightening investigation 
rather than dispenses with the need for it. 
 
Despite or because of difficulties, all literature, to some degree, attempts to cover a 
statistically prescriptive or poetically descriptive background to position its field of 
investigation. For suburban studies, this attempt claims considerable energy and 
admits frequent failure.  
 
Politicians, environmentalists, geographers, farmers, designers and many other groups 
associated with land development struggle with generating a vocabulary to describe the 
causes and effects of rapid horizontal urbanisation... this vocabulary has, in many 
cases, further obfuscated and polarised the issue. Hundreds of acronyms and 
abbreviated names have emerged to describe the organizational structures, processes 
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and technical aspects of urbanization... A number of scholars insist the term suburbia 
inaccurately describes urbanisation outside cities (Berger 2006, p.19). 
 
There is customary confusion of suburb definition by even statistical evidence. This 
makes it possible to argue, but impossible to prove, the truth of claims to, for example, 
the first suburban development or the most suburbanised nation. Despite this, much 
work is devoted to collecting data, developing organisational methods and clarifying 
statistical terms of reference. The Planning Institute of Australia (Victorian Division) 
compiled an extensive response to the tabulated questions raised by a Victorian 
Parliamentary Committee into Outer Suburban/Interface Services and Development. It 
noted first the difficulty of definition of the areas of concern (i.e. of suburbs) and listed 
many international references struggling with this same constraint (Cousens 2003). In 
the same year the American Planning Association declared:  
 
We should be building a scholarship and a planning policy that is based firmly on 
suburban reality. First, though, we need a definition. The few thinkers who take the 
suburbs seriously are handicapped by the need to define the territory before every 
study. Economic development scholars like myself are limited by the lack of common 
economic geographical units to measure suburbs in this country and abroad (Blakely 
2003, p.50). 
 
Landscape Journal frequently publishes research into such concerns for accurate 
quantification, for example ‘A geospatial approach to measuring new development 
tracts for characteristics of sprawl’ (Hasse 2004). Ian McHarg (1971) provided an 
enduring model for systematically locating landscape architectural design intervention 
along with organising the planning and management of landscape uses. Much more 
recently the lure of statistical play and thrills of its bald revelations inspired graphic 
designers to cover The Endless City (Sudjic 2008) with some of the fascinating facts 
and figures which fill the interior.  
 
In one respect, particularly important to planning, the history, theory and future 
proposition of suburban forms remains constrained by difficulties of definition and much 
is being done to find consistent and more precise methods for gathering and assessing 
data (d_city 2008; Sustainability Victoria 2010). However these same difficulties 
expose more important problems in the form of assumptions regarding what data 
reveals of values and what direction it gives for action. This has been the basis of 
criticisms levelled at McHarg. McHarg’s unrelenting rhetoric of values and his methods 
for translating them into design projects are argued to be problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly he fails to recognise or allow them to be heterogeneous since he speaks of all 
humanity (actually, ‘man’) as a homogenous group with the same needs and desires. 
Secondly he fails to consider that even the seeming comprehensiveness of his analysis 
and mapping system may not capture all important information. Principally and crucially 
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it cannot map the values which are his main interest; it only maps objects and materials 
to which we ascribe value.  
 
There is much recent literature that investigates these issues, including the extensive 
literature of ecocritcism. In contrast to much of the prolific research and interest in 
biomimicry and the writings of Deep Ecology, Intelligent Design and other pseudo-
sciences which continue some of the errors of McHarg’s thinking—primarily that it is 
apolitical—‘[e]cocriticism is... an avowedly political mode of analysis’ (Garrard 2004, 
p.3). Garrard distinguishes between ‘problems in ecology’ (which call for scientific 
analysis) and ‘ecological problems’ (requiring social and cultural understanding), a 
formulation of John Passmore’s much earlier publication Man's Responsibility for 
Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (1974, p.43). The same very 
helpful distinction might be made between problems of suburbs which are instrumental 
and constitute the basis of extensive Anti investigation, and suburban problems which 
require understanding rather than solving. Utopias bind and problematise these very 
two forms of problem. 
  
Particularly since Andrew Ross exposed the ‘perversities of environmentalism’ (2004), 
others have investigated the nuanced and conflicted ways in which nature— and 
ecology as its study—have forged our attitudes and directed decisions regarding the 
design and development of land. Andrew Biro (2005) demonstrates that in its 
construction of nature and the human/non-human divide, ecology is not susceptible to 
the critique that it is just another construction, another ideological view, ‘and this 
becomes especially troublesome when this scientific view of nature is used to arrive at 
conclusions in the social realm’ (p.15), regardless of the ever-more careful, detailed 
and differentiated ecological intelligence being gathered by painstaking research. This 
is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than by McHarg’s 1963 paper Man and 
Environment, republished and delivered numerous times as a lecture throughout 
America and overseas as Is Man a Planetary Disease? (1998). George Seddon (1997) 
recounts its delivery and his deep concern regarding its enthusiastic reception at a 
lecture given in 1971 in Sydney at the invitation of the (then) Royal Australian Institute 
of Architects. For Seddon, McHarg is revealed as ‘the Billy Graham of the 
environmental scene’ (1997, p.191) and he relates with wit and precision the absurdity 
of McHarg’s anti-rationalism:  
 
‘Algae know about creativity but man does not.’ My own preference is for Mozart or 
Einstein, but perhaps I have not met the right algae … Finally we have to learn a 
prayer... ‘a plain prayer... addressed to the elements, hydrogen, helium and so on’... 
However desperate the environmental crisis, I will not say prayers to helium (1997, 
p.194). 
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In Large Parks (Lister 2007), the premise of better landscape architecture, following 
McHarg, is outlined in relation to better understanding of constructed ecologies and the 
greater size at which ecological sustainability and natural systems work independently 
of, by implication, unsustainable human assistance. 
 
In parks of smaller area in urbanizing landscapes, ecological structures and functions 
are often significantly altered... Such areas usually require intensive management to 
retain the ecology in place. Although ecological considerations do play into the design 
... in smaller parks, I suggest that this is 'designer ecology' - an ecology that is vital, 
indeed essential, for educational, aesthetic, spiritual and other reasons. Yet this is 
largely a symbolic gesture ... to recall or represent nature.... Designer ecology, while 
valid and desirable in urban contexts for many reasons, is not operational ecology; it 
does not program, facilitate or ultimately permit the emergence and evolution of self-
organizing, resilient ecological systems - a basic requirement for long-term sustainability 
(Lister 2007, pp.35-37). 
 
Large parks, by contrast, are capable of such self-organisation, which begs the 
question of whether they need to be designed at all. It is also unclear what it is that is 
being sustained long-term. How was it recognised, chosen and preferred? And, 
especially if it’s accepted that it will evolve anyway, why notice and value it above 
another thing or phase of things? Innocent of such queries Lister goes on to suggest 
that large parks ‘demand an approach I have generalized as “adaptive ecological 
design”... large parks must be designed for both ecological and programmatic 
complexity, for both biological and socio-cultural diversity, and, accordingly, for all 
facets of sustainability’ (p.36). She then suggests that ‘over the past two decades’ there 
has been a fundamental change in the way we understand ecosystems and that 
although there is an emerging discourse of adaptive management (and she lists other 
related terms used to describe this approach), ‘there are few tangible projects’ (p.36). 
She goes on to discuss Corner's Downsview Park as a ‘prototype of adaptive design’ 
(p.37). Her thesis and its relevance to suburb design are contained in the following 
challenge issued to landscape architects: ‘How might an adaptive, systems-based, 
ecological design approach be applied to urban and urbanizing ecosystems, or cultural-
natural landscapes that characterize this confluence?’ (p.37). The further question that 
might be asked is why design should pursue such an application at all, given that all 
landscapes already negotiate and reflect such confluence. The question is not how 
ecosystems do whatever they do and how might that be imitated, but why designers 
should try to do it too and to what end might they do anything different to what already 
happens, especially given that what already does demonstrably happen (and has been 
painstakingly studied) is seemingly what is aimed for. 
 
Just as telling as, and deliberately more provocative than these manipulations, is the 
growth of increasingly bizarre urban and suburban terminologies and monikers. This 
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includes a revived obsession for acronyms that would seek to allow for more precision, 
and also perhaps to assume the authority of officialdom, by conveniently abbreviating 
fuller description, although this offers well-exploited scope for satire as well. Such 
acronyms range from the reasonably straightforward, such as TOD (Transit Oriented 
Development/Design) to NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard), NIMFYE (Not In My Front Yard 
Either), BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere, Near Anyplace) and many 
similar.23 Part Three of Alan Berger’s Drosscape: Wasting Land in Urban America 
(Berger 2006) is a list of satirical acronyms. James Corner’s introduction to the 
Landscape Urbanism Reader (Waldheim & Berger 2008) also discusses the 
proliferation of acronyms relating to suburban forms. 
 
There are terms popularised by journalism that are deliberately emotive rather than 
informative. ‘Sprawl’, applied to the suburbs, is an early example. As Lieven De Broeck 
notes: 
 
With the publication of God’s Own Junkyard: The Planned Deterioration of America's 
Landscape by Peter Blake in 1964, ‘sprawl’ … became a topic in urban planning. Prior 
to this, sprawl was nothing more than a latent phenomenon that had remained locked in 
the subconscious of the discipline … The overwhelming ubiquity of the phenomenon 
itself, and not the pure interest in it, has ensured that sprawl has established a 
permanent place in urban planning and architectural thinking ever since (2002, p.21). 
 
With the ever-increasing interest of not only urban planning in this now international 
phenomenon, sprawl has become—if it wasn’t already—a value-laden, yet still ill-
defined term. In attempting a distinction between sprawl and New Urbanist 
development Jeremy Meredith tries, with difficulty, to define sprawl: 
 
The harms of urban sprawl are being articulated with increasing clarity, yet ‘sprawl’ 
evades a precise definition or a clear solution. Since some amount of growth on the 
outskirts of cities occurs almost inevitably as population expands, sprawl must be 
distinguished from the larger category of ‘suburban growth.’ Some scholars have 
likened sprawl to Justice Potter Stewart's description of pornography: ‘I know it when I 
see it.’ Other commentators have taken a more scientific approach … First, sprawl has 
a low relative density. Second, it consists of unlimited and noncontiguous or ‘leapfrog’ 
development … Third, under sprawled conditions, different types of land uses tend to 
be segregated … Fourth, sprawl consumes large quantities of exurban agricultural and 
other fragile lands. Fifth, in sprawled areas, people must rely on automobiles to access 
individual land uses (2003, p.448). 
 
Architect Aaron Betsky tells a tale:  
 
Some time ago I got into an argument in a conference with a woman who by my 
standards lived in sprawl. Yet she vehemently protested and said: 'I don't live in sprawl. 
I know exactly what exit-ramp I take and when I get to my community there's a 
Starbuck's here and a Blockbuster there. My neighborhood has all the other things that 
make it into a real community. I do not live in sprawl.' This, I suppose, might be the 
                                                 
23 Many websites offer to decipher these, including: http://planningwiki.cyburbia.org/Acroynms, 
http://www.planetizen.com/node/152   
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motto for all of us... I do not live in sprawl, sprawl is elsewhere, sprawl is everything 
beyond my immediate experience (in GUST 2002, p.89).  
 
If the suburbs are a confusing concept and moving target, now even ‘[s]prawl is no 
longer what it used to be’ according to Edward Soja (GUST 2002, p.76) and the other 
things it might be have generated other names. Dolores Hayden’s A Field Guide to 
Sprawl (2004) is a visual dictionary of descriptive and slang terms for ‘suburbs’ from 
‘alligator’ to ‘zoomburb’, although ultimately it is less about active sprawl or whole 
suburbs than limited and fixed instances of particular forms to be found within them. 
The book begins with a declaration: ‘Words such as city, suburb, and countryside no 
longer capture the reality of real estate development in the United States’ (p.7). The 
Ghent Urban Studies Team (GUST) introduces their Post, Ex, Sub, Dis via the 
neologisms that seek to describe the new urban/suburban forms of the contemporary 
cityscape: 
 
Terms such as posturban space, postsuburbia, exurbia and disturbia are part of a 
dizzying collection of labels that may be further supplemented by expressions like edge 
city, generic city, city a la carte, middle landscape, carpet metropolis, the burbs, slurb, 
technoburb, superburbia, nonplace urban field, technocity, polynucleated city, nebular 
city, galazy city, spread city, perimeter city, citta diffusa, citta autostradale, 
Nowheresville, autopia and so forth (2002, p.8). 
  
While most comment is focused on grasping the unprecedented growth of sprawling 
cities, Shrinking Cities (Beyer et al. 2006), the published atlas of a project and website 
of the same name, along with two books, seemingly documents the reverse. However 
in asking which urban areas people are leaving and why, Shrinking Cities reveals that 
people are moving from city centers to non-city suburbs. Shrinking cities are a product 
of the well-documented ‘donut effect’ and ‘white flight’ typical of America’s ‘rustbelt’ 
cities and most familiar to landscape architects through Stalking Detroit (Daskalakis et 
al. 2002). It is the premise of Robert A. Beauregard (2006), and noted also by 
Waldheim (1999, p.126) that suburbs became a significant form of settlement with 
white flight after WWII during the cold war as suburbs would be harder to hit with 
nuclear targets. For Beauregard suburban development was always spurred more by 
nightmares than dreams. That suburbs grow because of the pursuit of dreams is 
argued to be one of their founding myths. The growth of suburbs represents a shift 
from ‘distributive to parasitic urbanisation’ (2006, p.xi), the result of practical 
government policy and economic strategies rather than citizen choice (Levine 2005). 
 
Suburbs are global phenomena associated with the rise of global capitalism and a 
globalised market economy. However some have seen the quintessential suburban 
landscape as an Australian one. In 1952 Robin Boyd could say that ‘Australia is the 
small house’ (unpaginated). Fifty years later The Oxford Companion to Australian 
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Gardens claimed that ‘[b]y becoming suburbanites Australians fulfilled one of the great 
national goals - occupation of their own residence, on their own block of land and with 
their own garden’ (Aitken 2002). Most Australians live in suburbs and both critics and 
champions largely come from them. In Familiarity?: Re-examining Australian Suburbia 
(Negrin 1994), the catalogue essay for an exhibition of artists in Hobart, the connection 
between suburban landscape and national identity was explicit: ‘While the rise of 
suburbia was a feature of a number of modern cities in America, Britain and Australia, 
in Australia, it came to acquire connotations not present elsewhere ... it came to be 
regarded as integral to definitions of Australian national identity’ (p.24). Resisting 
planning policies that encourage densification and infill development of older suburbs, 
the Save Our Suburbs group declare that ‘the suburbs and environs of Melbourne … 
provide the city with some of the most desirable living conditions in the world and a 
lifestyle which is quintessentially Australian’ (SOS 2010).  
 
Australia’s quintessential suburbanisation may also be evidence of its attempted 
utopianisation. That is to say that the Australian urge to build a new life in a new land, 
evident in colonial histories of both free and convict settlement is part of the utopian 
endeavour to break with an existing system (Milner 2006). It is also evidence that 
urbanisation, moved to a realm of suburbanisation, has more in common with an 
architecture of landscape than with an architecture of buildings. This is partly a matter 
of scale. Suburbs are more extensive than their central cities, as landscape settings 
are more extensive than their buildings. It is also partly a matter of materials as 
suburbs claim more open space and ‘nature’ as part of their fabric than buildings 
generally can. But it is even more an issue of familiarity with inherent and irresolvable 
tensions in ideas about variously constructed natures and cultures. There is an 
inseparable tension too between the apprehension of a planetary landscape and its 
systems, and the recognition of many distinguishable, site specific landscapes. These 
tensions are mirrored in the critiques of a universally conceived suburbia, and the 
acknowledgement of specific local suburbs. Architecture too has grappled with the 
application of a style representative of universally applicable values (specifically the 
International Style of modern architecture) and the promotion of a critical regionalism of 
difference. 
 
The suburbs have emerging importance in their own right, identified, celebrated and 
condemned in familiarly accepted terms, but they are also the default or implied 
unnamed space of a growing non-urban and non-rural occupation that cannot be 
otherwise explained except as an unstable, in-between, edge or boundary condition. 
Suburbs are important then because they cannot be ultimately identified, enumerated 
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or addressed. In this they are closely linked to the history and development of 
landscape architecture, particularly as a sub-version of urbanism (Marot 2003) and to 
utopianism through a range of experimental subversions with both intended and 
unintended consequences. The bewildering speed and scale of suburban 
development, the disjunct establishment of dwelling on unfamiliar territory in familiar 
circumstances, and the uncanny experience of founding a home in wasteland and 
deserts, connects suburbs with a critical avant-garde and utopian tradition of making 
strange that will be argued to be that of landscape architecture too. 
 
LA is dead. Long live LA. 
 
Landscape architecture is the internationally recognised profession with the 
responsibility to shape and form future communities through the creative combination of 
art and science. The importance of landscape architecture as an agent for positive 
change has never been greater with the environmental and social challenges facing the 
planet, individual countries and local communities. Landscape architects through their 
professional activities enhance essential ecological processes and guide development 
in a sustainable manner to enhance the diversity of the natural and built environments 
and to enrich the human environment. 
AILA24 
 
We suspect that landscape architecture’s critical condition indicates that the profession 
is on its deathbed. But should we continue to administer care? Should we really desire 
to resuscitate the patient? Might landscape architecture not be a field whose time has 
come and has now passed? Are landscape architects thus like other defunct nineteenth 
century professionals such as farriers, wheelwrights, chimney sweeps, bloodletters? 
Has landscape architecture now become a practice of nostalgia? 
 
Heide Hohmann and Joern Langhorst25 
 
The dissolution of certainties in regard to what constitutes suburbs, or at least of how to 
approach and articulate their problems or organise the multivalent problematising of 
their critics, parallels uncertainty regarding the role and necessity of particular distinct 
design disciplines, including landscape architecture. Disciplinary literatures of 
architecture, landscape architecture and planning note shared concerns of a failing 
effectiveness in control, and even understanding, of suburban forms and growth. These 
concerns are often articulated as crises and they note similar professional neuroses 
and cures to recover effective respective roles in directing land development. There are 
also shared ethical concerns—to balance often contradictory goals of economic and 
ecological ‘sustainability’ against the realisation of social ‘dreams’ that reject 
limitation—as well as philosophical concerns to situate sustainability against the 
limitless background of history itself. 
                                                 
24 AILA 2009, unpaginated. 
25 Hohmann, H. & Langhorst, J. 2005, unpaginated. 
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Architecture suffers perennial complaints of irrelevance, in particular with regard to later 
twentieth-century suburbs. ‘While architecture and urban design are important in 
contributing to the character of the built environment, much of the decision-making 
about what kind of structure gets built when and where is in the hands ... of others, 
such as developers and politicians’ (George et al. 2004). This is a point made often 
(Boyd 1952; Corrigan 2003; Dunham-Jones 2005; Weller 2008). Landscape 
architecture has been similarly slighted, by popular complaint (Timms 2007), 
professional critique (Boyd 1952; Carson 1905; Treib 1994) and academic censure 
Lewis, M. 1999: Lewis, P. 1994) for its failure to be engaged, and even for results when 
it is. ‘[W]e cannot help getting the impression that landscape architects … have little 
influence on initiating major changes in spatial planning in cities, in the country or in 
suburbia’ (Deidrich 2006, p.15-16). 
 
While the legislated preparation of subdivision plans by qualified design professionals 
may appear to favour the influential involvement of landscape architects, such plans 
are approved by local government planners in accordance with the planning legislation 
which they administer on behalf of all levels of government as well as other public, 
semi-public and private authorities. The legislation of environmental quality in this 
situation has seen the introduction of ‘design guides’ and even ‘pattern books’ and 
considerable ongoing debate regarding the interpretative skills of administrators 
untrained in design wielding the traditional tools of designers. The efficacy of the 
introduction of design review panels and reintroduction of State Government Architects 
in providing corrective advice is currently being tested. But what is ‘correct’ remains a 
discussion limited by focus on sustainability criteria determined by ecosystem service 
measurements as prescribed by planning requirements. 
 
The challenges facing landscape architecture, often linked to those facing other design 
and built environment professions generally, have been articulated by many respected 
commentators and practitioners. Nonetheless, when a selection of these struggles and 
failures were gathered together in 2004 by Heide Hohmann and Joern Langhorst and 
distributed via email and the web, the reaction was swift and damning. Landscape 
Architecture: An Apocalyptic Manifesto (2005) is an overview of the state of Landscape 
Architecture as an effective profession compared to other disciplines, particularly 
planning. Beginning with the question ‘Is It Dead?’ it identifies six symptoms of the 
profession’s ‘chronic’ sickness, and then ‘dissects five of the most blatantly optimistic 
and most frequently presented cures’, anticipating and countering hope for the patient’s 
effective survival. Manifestoes tread a tricky literary path. This one generally failed as 
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an ironic attempt at mock despair, being taken at face value as an unwarranted attack 
on the sincere efforts of a profession struggling to reinvent itself in order to address 
contemporary problems. The negative dialectic that it attempted to engage in, 
identifying landscape architecture’s role via negation of all the roles it is currently and 
unsuccessfully claiming—for example environmental and hydrological engineering, 
landscape art, horticulture, conservation biology, urban design, philosophy, and 
others—and all the roles it has assimilated over time—architecture, painting, forestry, 
civic design and town planning among them—was dismissed as unhelpful pessimism 
and cynicism.  
 
And yet contestation is exactly what is necessary to a determination of meaning and 
value. Agitation declared that:  
 
… in the US there is currently an agitation shortage. There is not much work that incites 
discord with the prevalent views held by the profession … And there are few that feel 
agitated, or irritated, about this as the overall state of today’s situation. The scarcity of 
agitation is agitating … Constructive commentary and supportive engagement are 
replacing contention. Painstaking effort is made to arrive at complementary views rather 
than to spark conflict … overall one can sense the growing belief that insight is best 
gained through balanced discussion (Inaba 2007, p.2). 
 
Jeffrey Inaba’s introduction discusses the misunderstood agitator—as too the 
utopian—as a negative troublemaker; ‘someone who stirs things up to upset the status 
quo as an end in itself’ (p.2). The agitator is understood simplistically to be merely 
unruly. Inaba also suggests a more sinister motive for such dismissal: ‘Others abuse 
the term while at the same time renouncing it … there are leaders in power who 
actively combat agitation at home that then agitate foreign situations specifically by 
exercising disruptive force in the name of stability’ (p.2). The same might be said of 
critics of the suburbs as ‘sprawl’, who nonetheless embrace essentially suburban forms 
to advance their own version of residential and community design. There are those too 
who attack the opposition of some to predominant conditions, while advocating their 
own version of change, for example those who decry what they characterise as utopian 
ideas while repackaging them, for example, as ‘futuring’ (Fry & Willis 2009) or 
‘embodied utopias’ (Grosz 2001).  
 
An issue of the ASLA’s ‘Landscape Architecture’ journal devoted several pages to 
letters in response to the Manifesto. They included one from Elizabeth Meyer who also 
offered a more sustained criticism via the development of a short essay introducing a 
course exercise for her undergraduate history-theory class at University of Virginia. 
Meyer undertakes a critique entitled ‘Eyes that Can See and Hands that Can Make. A 
Response’ (2006) which reframes Le Corbusier’s ‘eyes that do not see’ (Corbusier 
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2008, p.145) With this positivist framing she risks a positivism which partly explains 
why she failed to consider that the manifesto attempted a critique that sought to make 
explicit what is implicit, assumed, repressed or contradictory in the claims and projects 
of the profession of landscape architecture. Meyer and the Manifesto authors are in 
agreement regarding what constitutes vital concerns of the profession. They disagree 
over whether the profession is fully aware and actively engaged in investigation of 
them. They also disagree about the value of different modes of altering, encouraging 
and provoking landscape architects to action and, finally, they may disagree about 
what the actual value of landscape architecture is.  
 
The Manifesto debates revealed a slipperiness regarding landscape architecture’s 
value as a profession certain of what it is doing compared with its even greater value 
as one uncertain, exploratory and liberated by shifting disciplinary definition. It seems 
that both the authors and critics of the Manifesto are trying to claim the latter: the 
Manifesto by showing how landscape architecture’s confident, familiar and essentially 
conservative responses to problems have failed: Meyer by pointing out that landscape 
architecture has and is undertaking far more diversely informed and experimental work 
than the manifesto acknowledges. The former sees the issue of professional relevance 
as one of claiming a new significance through contestation and agitation, the latter 
sees it as one of reinforcing the work that landscape architects are already united in 
pursuing. 
 
In addition to long-standing concerns regarding the particular usefulness, motives and 
value of design, as opposed to an apparently more simple, cost-effective, pragmatic, 
unbiased and demonstrably useful building or construction, landscape architecture 
must counter equally entrenched suspicions regarding the appropriateness and value 
of human intervention in supposedly natural and thereby automatically good ‘green’ 
environments. While a defence of architectural value in the construction of buildings 
and urban environments has been well-articulated, the arguments for landscape 
architectural value in construction of ‘natural’ environments have been made 
inconsistently and with much greater difficulty. The inescapable artificiality of designed 
and constructed landscapes struggles to be acceptable, while such art is a given, if not 
specifically celebrated, in other forms of architecture. This is particularly so at a time 
when threats to fragile existing biophysical and geophysical systems—or ecosystem 
services as they are increasingly known—appear to condemn all artifice as the 
intrusive destruction of a prior ‘natural’ condition requiring urgent restitution. That the 
suburbs have been argued as both more and less appreciative of nature than city or 
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countryside complicates further the ways in which landscape architecture is envisaged 
to best work there. 
 
In the face of this prevailing attitude and on top of the usual accusations levelled at 
design activity as elitist and exclusionary, and in any case expensive and unnecessary, 
professional landscape architectural design has generally failed to identify and expose 
erroneous assumptions. These include the uncompromised benefits of the natural 
conditions of existing landscape systems; the possibility of apolitical construction 
projects and their consequently passive acceptance; the untrammelled simplicity of a 
purely useful project or universally agreed criteria of usefulness; and universally 
appreciable criteria of beauty. These assumptions operate amongst other continuing, if 
paradoxical ones such as the continuous improvement of best practice by 
technologies, the ever-consistent greatness of art through successive movements, and 
the possibility of sustainable growth. Rather than undertake the difficult yet obvious 
critique of these assumptions toward the revelation of design as the very activity which 
takes responsibility for researching, revealing and delivering specific decisions on 
matters which cannot be assumed or avoided, the defence of landscape architecture 
has been made with claims of vital relevance in two other key areas. The first is in 
regard to sustainability, specifically professional experience and training in the practical 
choice of materials and application of processes for greater energy and resource 
efficiency. The second is a claim to knowledge and experience dealing with a newly 
emerging concern for programmatic flexibility to adapt to indefinite and changing 
project and site circumstances. Both of these are applicable at smaller scales, but are 
more significant at larger scales of site selection, design, construction and long-term 
maintenance. 
 
The first argument of sustainability relevance has been actively presented by 
professional bodies and is being embedded in their policy, statements and other 
documents and activities. AILA (like ASLA) has recently claimed a reinvigorated 
contemporary role for the profession in a series of documents that include a Landscape 
Charter and a Directions Paper (AILA 2009). With funding from the Australian Federal 
Government, AILA is also currently involved in the development of training 
programmes for members. Preliminary documents and a discussion paper for the 
Climate Change Adaptation Skills for Professionals Program, are focused wholly on 
environmental planning and remediation. While newly packaged and updated, such 
sustainability relevance builds on the traditional interest and skills of landscape 
designers to understand and manage environmental forces, larger landscape system 
contexts and ideas of ecological health and performance. It is an argument for the 
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practice of landscape architecture as an inherently useful, practical and even superior 
design discipline with historic experience dealing directly with issues of environmental, 
social and economic sustainability and with a body of adaptable knowledge ready to 
assist with our present pressing environmental crises. 
 
A second argument for landscape architectural relevance equally references a 
disciplinary history of dealings with the complexity and unpredictability of environmental 
forces and processes, but emphasises the flexibility and even the indefinability of its 
design approaches as its particular expertise and skill. This newly revived skill in 
adaptive or flexible design has been largely disseminated by academics and academic-
practitioners through publication and theorisation arising from studio and competition 
projects, few of which have been constructed. It is associated with the work of 
Landscape Urbanism and offered as part of a disciplinary reinvention, evident in the 
titles of key publications, for example, Re-envisioning Landscape Architecture 
(Wollscheid et al. 2002) and Recovering Landscape (Corner 1999). Landscape 
Urbanism positions itself as a type of interdisciplinary practice. Its rise is coincident with 
a general interest in interdisciplinarity, or as Jameson has observed:  
 
[S]uch heterogeneous disciplines as psychoanalysis and geography, history and 
business, economics and engineering, biography, ecology, feminism, area studies, 
ideological analysis, classical studies, legal decisions, crisis theory, et cetera [now work 
with and borrow from each other]. Perhaps this kind of immense disciplinary range is no 
longer quite so astonishing in a postmodern era, in which the law of being is de-
differentiation, and in which we are most interested in how things overlap and 
necessarily spill across the disciplinary boundaries. Or, if you prefer, in the postmodern 
the distinction between the old specialized disciplines is constitutively effaced and they 
now fold back on each other (2003, p.68). 
 
The first claim of relevance then is that landscape architecture is essentially 
sustainable design as advocated by a scientific and analytic approach to managing 
environmental problems by adapting our environments more efficiently to our needs, 
according to principles of sustainable growth. This is clearly pertinent to suburb design 
and also to the paradoxes of utopian construction. The second claim of relevance is 
through an artistic and expressive practice of handling environmental problems by 
exposing, celebrating and adapting human wants and needs to environmental 
conditions. Again this phenomenological focus is significant for suburbs as sites of 
personal expression and growth and for utopias as projections of wish-fulfilment. 
Although often presented as conflicting approaches, there are clearly overlapping ideas 
and projects that partake of both sets of arguments. The two fronts from which these 
arguments have been deployed are, on the one hand, that landscape architecture is 
newly aware and active in its important role as either sustainable design practice or 
flexible process, while, on the other, it has re-discovered these important roles which 
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had become obscured or otherwise lost, most commonly in misguided service to 
Enlightenment or Modernist agendas. 
 
The problems of the profession of landscape architecture and its disciplinary specificity 
have been variously conceived. James Corner identifies the three most common within 
the profession as indifference, political and aesthetic conservatism, and the 
mythologising of nature (1999, fn.28). These three are linked to the marginalisation of 
design as serious intellectual or aesthetic endeavour, its fetishism of fashionable 
landscape elements such as particular species, materials or features like rain gardens, 
and an emphasis on rationalism which is becoming more explicitly the success of 
economic rationalism linked to ecological performance. 
 
Architecture focuses its attention on buildings. Private residences as well as local 
community facilities help define the character of neighbourhoods. The architectural 
expression of this character is documented by such bodies as the National Trust 
through the recognition and protection of exemplar, not only of architectural excellence 
in general, but of local rarity or typicality. Such recognition now plays an important role 
in assessing the allowable intrusion or alteration of such identified areas of built fabric; 
a particularly contested role in the development of residential suburbs. It might be 
expected that landscape architecture should have an even more important role in such 
character documentation in the suburbs. The garden is central to definitions of 
suburban character, providing the essential setting for individual, detached dwellings, 
as well as the network of public realm parkland and open space, including necessary 
road reserve and other infrastructure corridors that make low density settlement 
possible. Jennifer Atkinson challenges ‘our customary associations of gardening as 
decidedly apolitical, escapist, or compensatory’ (2007, p.237). Similarly, the suburbs as 
garden-rich environments may not be a neutral ground of apathetic or apolitical 
domesticity. She examines the common depiction of gardens in scenes of both utopian 
dreaming and suburban comfort. Quoting Tom Moylan who seeks to rescue utopianism 
from such escapism, she examples his applause of literary texts that expose 
‘compromises and weaknesses found within utopian dreaming and actual opposition – 
refusing the temptation to move quickly to a restful refuge (in one's own garden, by the 
riverside trees, or in some solipsistic cul-de-sac) and to forget the need for collective 
action’ (p.238).  For Moylan, gardens and suburbs cannot be settings for political 
action, which may explain the absence of critical design. By contrast Atkinson 
evidences the many emerging ways that gardens and gardening pursue radical 
agendas, including guerrilla gardening movements, which suggest that garden design 
has an emerging political role there.   
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Something that should assist in disciplinary definition and clearer arguments of 
relevance is the identification of arenas of activity and the materials and processes 
employed there. When the subject of the discipline is confused or even substituted for 
its object and objective, this is not possible. If landscape, as already the particular 
product of unique combinations of natural and cultural forces acting upon land, is the 
thing worked with by landscape architects, landscape architecture is the outcome. But 
‘landscape’ seems often to be a term employed as shorthand for landscape 
architecture (Corner 1999, pp.1,4,5, etc; Stan Allen in Waldheim & Berger 2008, p.37; 
Waldheim & Berger 2008, p.39) and with this abbreviation, manages to escape the 
interrogation which we require to be made of architecture as the work of architects. 
‘Landscape’ substituted for ‘landscape architecture’ mistakes the outcome or process 
of the design of external or environmental space—however intuitive or minimal—for the 
pre-existing, living, changing and responsive material condition of the land itself. 
Landscape is already what the accidentally and deliberately manipulated space of land 
is. If such manipulation is considered already the outcome of works of design, a 
discipline of landscape architecture must struggle to distinguish its work from the 
accumulated and continuing actions already in operation, and ‘design’ loses any sense 
of the distinction of a process under particular disciplinary control or one requiring 
particular expertise. In one view all those who act upon land to consciously change it 
are then ‘designers’ (Lewis 1994), and of all changed environments, the Australian 
suburbs arguably best reflect the ease and extent to which anyone can ‘design’ their 
environment.  
 
From the beginning the ordinary Australian suburb was inclined to have more variety 
than anywhere else in the world. The houses may have been democratically equal in 
size and number of rooms, but every one was differently ornamented...Nowhere else in 
the world have ordinary people had so much control over the architecture of their own 
homes, and therefore of the appearance of the country as a whole (Boyd 1962, p.50). 
 
From another viewpoint, instead of everyone becoming designers more or less 
conscious of the effects of their actions, nobody is or can claim to be.  
 
In The Cultured Landscape, Simon Swaffield’s text (2005), exemplifies not just the 
difficulties of, but the perpetuation of confusion regarding what is meant by landscape 
in relation to design. It is introduced by the editor as leading the ‘first part of the book 
address[ing] cultural, philosophical and moral implications of landscape,’ (Harvey & 
Fieldhouse 2005, p.xv) already awkwardly inviting a noun, rather than a response to it 
or action arising from it, to actively imply something. Swaffield ‘discusses the 
complexity of landscape meanings and values’ (2005 p.xv) beginning with an evocative 
description of a New Zealand landscape. He notes that ‘[p]ersonal narrative is a 
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common opening device for landscape texts’ which we can understand to mean texts 
about landscape rather than texts which are landscape; that is, rather than landscapes 
which can themselves be ‘read’ for meaning. Yet what he goes on to say suggests that 
he does not make this distinction.  
 
While landscape provides ‘a framework for understanding’ the world (p.6), a page later 
it is the varieties of understanding which provide ‘a framework for different ways of 
knowing landscape’ (p.8). Landscape offers ‘a useful way, or ways, of knowing [and] a 
systematic basis for understanding’ (p.6) essentially itself. For Swaffield ‘landscape 
embodies knowledge’ (p.6). He suggests that our understanding of landscape/s takes 
two forms, one involving the reading of known and accepted values, the other 
questioning these values. ‘The striking feature of landscape as a way of knowing the 
world is that it fulfils both these conventional and radical roles’ (p.6) In other words, an 
examination of the landscape—the creation of a particular view or views of the world 
and our place in it—can lead us to confirm what we know if our own knowledge is 
sympathetic to the views that created it. But it may also lead us to question those views 
if we have different knowledge and experience. There is nothing striking about this. The 
landscape as embodiment of knowledge can excite argument in support or critique of 
that demonstrated knowledge. There are perhaps two assumptions here that cause 
Swaffield’s surprise. Firstly, ‘landscape’ is assumed to embody the lessons of an 
independent and sentient natural world trying to ‘teach’ us something. It is not a world 
constructed by humans with their own message. Secondly, it is assumed that 
knowledge comprises familiarity with a singular, monolithic, eternal and uncontested 
truth or wisdom—even if that truth is viewed in different ways from different 
perspectives—rather than comprising particular, contingent and essentially contested 
interpretations of what is viewed. 
 
Others have recognised that  
 
… [n]ature is always understood to represent the ideal state from which we have come, 
and with which, if we are to attain lasting happiness, we must again find an 
accommodation. A landscape then, is able to show us at one and the same time, both 
the tragedies and the irreconcilable conflicts of our present situation, and the place in 
which we might finally escape these pressing difficulties (Archer 2004, p.8). 
 
Swaffield claims that ‘[l]andscape is therefore a multivalent form of knowledge … It 
does not sit easily within any single discipline, nor does it offer only one perspective 
upon the world’ (p.7). What is ‘landscape’ here? Landscape architecture? The way in 
which the word ‘landscape’ is used throughout as a noun when it is actually adjectival, 
obscuring a variety of other implied but unidentified nouns, only perpetuates the 
difficulties the essay would hope to shed light on. While this perhaps preserves the 
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marvellous ambiguity and variety of understandings of what landscape is—let alone 
what it can then be argued to mean or do - it serves only to further mystify the 
necessity of doing anything at all. As the constructed world, the landscape is a record 
of many different knowledges, holding the traces of many different ideas about and 
ambitions for our relationship with the world or the unknown or non-human nature. 
Obviously then, it can, has and will be constructed by a variety of disciplinary and other 
group and individual perspectives. Landscape has neither a singularly apprehended 
form nor represents a single, if multivalent knowledge. ‘Landscape’, if it is not 
synonymous with the world or with nature, must be properly plural, just as the 
multivalence of knowledge is properly ‘knowledges’, while acknowledgment of 
collective knowledges might then claim to be wisdom.  
 
If landscape is as multivalent as the world itself, a mere synonym for it, how does it 
further knowledge? The value here of a utopian attitude, and the necessity of design to 
engage with utopian—that is, essentially impossible—proposition, lies in 
acknowledgement of the fundamental and unavoidable failure of any particular view to 
encompass the totality of the world’s potential. It allows us to escape the self-
referentiality of authoritative descriptions of the world, for an attitude encouraging 
further creative and interpretative options. Other, non-design disciplines such as 
planning and engineering have recently assumed something of the tasks of design by 
defining the designer as problem-solver, emphasising practical functionalism. The 
empirical terms of more recent ‘critical’ evaluation of such design work (for example 
assessment via energy rating tools) render it capable of quantifiable assessment and 
improvement which is reassuring and attractive to clients. That is, a devoted enterprise 
has emerged to analyse and ‘critique’ mapping and planning in terms that are already 
favourably predisposed to value them. Such critiques reveal a practical history of the 
mapping of maps and a pragmatic politics of the planning of plans via a process that is 
largely, however, itself uncritical of the terms of its own critique (Freestone 2000). 
Surveying, planning and engineering as makers of maps and plans might escape this 
further layer of self-reflection, but ‘design’ is always itself designed so that—for 
designers—the evidently constructed designing-of-design better avoids the dangers of 
empirical certainty. Ranulph Glanville (1999, p.90) affirms this, arguing that design as 
research circumvents the conventional positivist framing of rules as it must recognise 
‘the primacy and centrality of design, both as an object of study and means of carrying 
out a study’. 
 
The problems facing landscape architecture are not issues of professional recognition 
or the difficulties of either altering or retaining existing landscapes, but are the 
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problems of designing landscapes. These problems will probably require surmounting 
the site-specific difficulties of a careful, informed use of environmentally and 
economically efficient processes and materials, drawing on both traditional and new 
training and technologies. But designing landscape requires a self-conscious 
application of these toward a statement—an offering—of other value. The mere 
difficulties may be overcome, particularly with the guidance of legislative frameworks, 
streamlined industry compliance and market packaging. But the problems of 
communicating other value will be correspondingly exacerbated, especially in suburban 
landscapes where a dominant typological view condemns all suburbanism as 
extravagant yet cheap, and at any rate unsustainable and shallow, and where the 
profession is held in little or no regard except as stylists or stewards, and often then 
condemned as upstart fashion slaves or geriatric nostalgists. The problems of 
designing suburban landscapes can only be approached with utopian hope.  
 
From topos to utopias and back again 
 
Where history has taken, I feel, a profound and tragic turn is in the triple error: utopia 
conceived as a sterile, monolithic harmony; revolution as a dogmatic commitment to 
total change and violent reconstruction; principles of hope and belief transmogrified into 
an orthodoxy incompatible with heretical dissent or critical opposition. Where history 
provides consolation (and I, at least, feel so consoled) is in the triple hope: when 
utopian longing is a supple, changing ideal of diverse virtues and dreams; where 
revolution represents a reformer's open-eyed recourse to a difficult path of fundamental 
social reorganization, without conspiratorial self-delusion and bewitching metaphor; and 
where, whatever the devotion to principles of political action and ethical aspiration, there 
is present 'the heretic's true cause' – dissent, tolerance and a respect for human 
reason. 
 
Melvin Lasky26 
 
Melvin Lasky’s understanding of utopia might serve as a constant point of reference 
regarding the attitude of the thesis to design as a necessarily utopian endeavour. A 
landscape architectural approach to suburban land development should do this: 
conceive projects that seek and actively engage in attempts to realise ideal 
environments representing diverse virtues and dreams while encouraging negotiation 
and design development of supple changing expression; be aware of the difficulties of 
this open-minded endeavour as a radical challenge to professional practice; resist 
indulgence in representational distractions, disciplinary self-delusion or pre-determined 
formulas; resist too the influence of private enterprise, planning legislation and 
government policy at all levels where the conception and delivery of such projects is 
obstructed and would be prevented by them, and finally; be alert throughout the 
                                                 
26 Lasky, M. 1976, p.xii 
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commitment to this process of project delivery, to the greater ongoing commitment to 
simultaneously exercise and encourage dissenting views with tolerance and respect.  
 
More simply, a design process requires a simultaneous commitment to the realisation 
of an idea and openness to its modification or erasure. This tension or ambiguity 
cannot be resolved, synthesised or anticipated but it can be worked with. It can neither 
be turned into a method, as planning, engineering and even some educational and 
professional bodies advocate, nor left undetermined, as recent calls for open-ended or 
strategic design approaches encourage. It is essentially deconstructive and utopian. 
 
Utopias and utopianism, like landscape and the suburbs, having undergone a period of 
relative inattention, are now of interest to many disciplines, supported by new cross-
disciplinary journals such as Spaces of Utopia and Utopia and Utopianism. Monash 
University continues a series of ARC funded conferences, publication and research 
begun in 2004. The last five years has seen republication of Mumford’s The Story of 
Utopias and a new edition of More’s Utopia. Considering books alone there have been 
a range not only of anthologies (Baudrillard 2006; Noble 2009), but new approaches to 
the use and value of utopian thinking (Jacoby 2007; Moylan & Baccolini 2007; Roemer 
2003; Rothstein et al. 2003; Spencer 2006; Wegner 1998;). Architecture and design too 
have re-examined utopianism and utopian projects (Busbea 2007; Clear 2009; 
Coleman 2005; Pinder 2002; Sadler 2005; Scott 2007; van Schaik & Macel 2005). 
There are innumerable conferences, journal and other publications, many prefacing 
their comments with descriptions of the very explosion of interest to which they further 
contribute. Utopia Method Vision: The Use Value of Social Dreaming (Moylan & 
Baccolini 2007) begins with a list demonstrating how commercial enterprise has 
adopted 'utopia' for naming diverse products and services, from clothes to financial 
services, from fitness centres to toy worlds (Dinotopia, Barbie Fairytopia) and much 
else besides. While ‘we see this once-denigrated notion alive and well in the 
commercial imagination … the idea of a utopian alternative in this world is condemned 
as sinful hubris, useless speculation or dangerous intervention’ (p.13). Noting the many 
publications of David Harvey and Fredric Jameson the authors declare that the 
‘twinned revival and renunciation of Utopia’ (p.14), encompassing not only writing, but 
other creative media such as film, offers explorations of unprecedented profusion. 
 
These writings consider past framings of the value of utopian endeavour and failure, 
both popular condemnations as well as passionate support. Many find the inherent 
inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes to be not only interesting and useful, but 
germane to what utopianism is as Thomas More (2003) intended in coining the term. 
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Where newer writings about utopian propositions are generally supportive of their value 
and even view them as essential tools of civilisation and the ongoing operation and 
redefinition of civil conduct and values—as distinct from an established civilised society 
or Establishment—writings about architecture, by self-proclaimed conservatives as well 
as radicals, still often link utopias firmly with insupportable and irresponsible 
endeavour. Most recently Richard Weller (2008, p.264) declared of his own work 
investigating potential variations to the suburban development of Perth that it ‘is not 
utopian’.  
 
In particular the dangers of utopian propositions have been emphasised more recently 
in relation to environmental rather than social or political constructions.  
 
In many contemporary intellectual milieus the utopian enterprise tends to be viewed 
with sympathy and condescension, as the projection of the best qualities in human 
condition. The truth, however, is that the critique of the contemporary world engendered 
by the emergence of the environmental crisis has made us aware of the ‘human, all too 
human’ dimensions of utopian constructions, as well as of their close complicity with 
values that condition environmental deterioration, prolonging and intensifying it 
(Marques 2007, p.135). 
 
With this environmental emphasis, landscape architecture and the suburbs are 
assuming importance over architecture and cities in utopian conceptions. Architecture 
and cities have already excised nature while suburbs and landscape architecture are 
seen to incorporate and manipulate it. Because architecture and cities do not deal with 
a ‘natural’ environment, or at least an ecology that requires saving from human 
intervention, they are excused from more severe environmental criticism. City density is 
also argued to be more efficient and have less impact on natural ecosystems than low-
density suburbs, and buildings are considered necessities that cannot be sacrificed 
while gardens, especially private ones, can and should be. Suburbs bear the brunt of 
accusations of derogatory conceptions of utopianism. They are also linked to liberating 
schemes of positive utopian otherness. 
 
Many who carefully examine utopian propositions, their varied contexts, diverse 
responses and sundry defeats, are not only alert to project failures, but also to positive 
gains made in clearer positioning of problems. They are also inspired to speculation on 
models for newly useful failures. Meanwhile those who condemn utopian ambitions on 
the basis of their own authoritative positioning of problems appear guilty of the very 
same utopianism they denounce. Echoing the Bruntland Report’s famous dictum to 
pursue ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs,’ (1987), Australian Tony Fry’s ‘de-
futuring’ (1999), positively respun as ‘futuring’ (2009), makes familiar criticisms of 
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design presumptions and ‘preconceptions’. Fry focuses on how architectural 
utopianism has been criminally irresponsible in limiting future possibilities by making 
particular decisions now. He calls for ‘sustainment’ and ‘sustain-able’ practice rather 
than mere sustainability in developing a design practice that not only avoids limiting 
future possibilities but makes decisions that will generate more. That this was the failed 
intention of the design practice he criticises and remains a logical impossibility 
regarding his own good intention (to make any decision or choice limits future choice in 
some way) makes his own construction an unacknowledged utopia. Like Fry, Karl 
Popper’s anti-utopian arguments have been shown to undermine the alternative 
socialism he argues for. Michael Freeman (1975, p.26) observes Popper ‘committing a 
sin of which he vigorously accuses his opponents’. ‘Popper accuses the utopians of 
rejecting certain sociological hypotheses a priori. I accuse Popper of precisely this 
error.’ He concludes:  
 
A strong case can certainly be made against irrational utopianism and irrational 
violence. But conservative scientism may not be the best alternative. We should receive 
political orders from science in a highly critical spirit. The case for utopian experiment 
remains. The case for sociologically-informed experiment is strong. Sociology and 
utopia need not be enemies. Science itself (Popper rightly tells us) calls for imagination 
and creativity as well as realism and rigour. We can heed Max Weber's demand for 'the 
trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life' without forgetting that the same 
Weber wrote in the same essay: 'All historical experience confirms the truth that man 
would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the 
impossible' (Freeman 1975, p.33). 
 
A utopia is a place that can’t be fixed but ever promises to be. To be labelled utopian is 
to be dismissed, and architectural heroism has been marginalised, if not criminalised. 
Yet suburbs may be best understood through the lens of utopia. Issues of suburban 
definition, quality, form and purpose are not merely comparable to, but directly the 
evidence of, particular and prevalent misunderstandings of utopia, while these are in 
some important respects interchangeable with a misunderstanding of design. Both 
suburbs and design have a history of failure. Utopianism redeems doubt and failure as 
critically useful.  
 
Utopias are places that cannot exist. This is worth recalling as much discussion and 
censure of utopian thought and endeavour is devoted to projects which are merely 
ambitious, make claims for an exaggerated aspect of an existing situation or are 
improbable rather than impossible. But utopias are so radically different to the status 
quo that they depend on the rejection or suspension of what most people consider 
normal or achievable. It is the characteristic freedom of utopias that this suspension 
permits the entertainment of potential violence without evoking the least compassion. 
Their characteristic danger—their dystopian propensity—is that violence be enacted 
without restraint. Utopias simultaneously demand critical and creative thought or the 
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engagement of our imagination, and the disengagement of our easy emotions and 
ready sympathies. In this way utopian propositions attempt to show us an emotional 
reality beyond known experiences and expressions of feeling. The value of Utopias is 
not the projected value that would come with their realisation but the operational value 
of their otherness. Utopias are negative in their effects; doubly so, by exposing what is 
presently wrong and by hinting at what will be a failure in their own projected 
alternative. They show us both the shortcomings of existing places and systems 
(Jameson’s first of two types of utopia; those which excise of a ‘root-of-evil’) and 
compel the innovative exploration of new places and systems (his second ‘construction’ 
utopia type) (2004). The utopian suspension of disbelief is difficult to maintain. Even 
those who see its advantages can slip.  
 
Utopia has long been another name for the unreal and the impossible. We have set 
utopia over against the world. As a matter of fact, it is our utopias that make the world 
tolerable to us: the cities and mansions that people dream of are those in which they 
finally live (Mumford 2003, p.11). 
 
Yet Lewis Mumford could also say: ‘In fine, though this book takes seriously the 
literature of Utopias, it turns out in the end to be an anti-utopian tract, for in 
appreciating the positive contributions of utopian thought... [this book] was also one of 
the first to bring out... the essential weakness of this tradition’ (p.6). What he examples 
then is the ‘weakness’ of utopian thought to realise its ideas. This is not an essential 
weakness however but the essence of utopian thinking. The rejection of utopianism on 
the grounds of a weak tradition of building utopias is mistaken as utopias can't be built. 
Mumford's anti-utopian confession is mis-placed. He believes his work is anti-utopian 
because he believes that utopian thought and its communication in literature and plans 
begets dystopian construction. But this is precisely what defines utopias, something 
which he demonstrates elsewhere. Utopias cannot be placed in the world. That is their 
advantage and their point. 
 
Robert Fishman makes a similar slip. At the start of his Urban Utopias in the Twentieth 
Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier he determines that three 
objectives defined the type of utopia he was looking to research: ‘1) radically original 
urban design; 2) a revolutionary program for social change; and 3) a sustained 
personal committment by their creators to make the plan a reality’ (1982, p.xii). He then 
describes and lists several other types and examples of so-called utopias that did not fit 
these criteria and which he did not consider truly utopian, such as utopian romances 
that were vague and derivative including the Citta Nuova of Antonio Sant'Elia, the 
linear city of Arturo Soria y Mata, and early work of Buckminster Fuller (p.xii). There 
were also various types of urban ideologies which advanced the interests of groups 
 
 
174
already 'within the context of an established social order... to preserve and glorify an 
already powerful class’ (pp.xii-xiii). These are represented by the ideal city propositions 
of totalitarian regimes, whether left- or right-wing, from Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler to 
General Motor's Autopia at the Chicago World's Fair (p.xiii). Another form of 'urban 
ideology' is represented by the essentially reformist program of designers such as 
those of the Bauhaus, concerned to establish ‘the minimal standards of housing and 
urban life at a time when attaining even the minimum was an ambitious ideal’ (p.xiii). 
Many of these rejected utopias have equivalents today. The last idea can be 
considered the same as presently dominant methods for pursuit of sustainability where 
a variety of reforms attempt to meet minimum standards, nonetheless considered 
ambitious, with no concern to encourage social change or challenge existing power 
relations, ones that actually prevent their implementation. Despite having made so 
clear a case for the radicalism of utopias on his second page, on the second last 
Fishman says that planners ‘confront the question of values not as a search for some 
utopian harmony or in order to impose their self-image on others, but because planning 
can never be separated from consideration of the common good’ (p.276). Here utopia 
is used in the pejorative sense that Fishman rejected from the start.  
 
Similar to Fishman, Nathaniel Coleman (2005) champions utopian architectural 
proposition, defined as 'humane modernism' in reaction to Kenneth Frampton's 
'orthodox modern', illustrated through the work of three architects: Le Corbusier, Louis 
Kahn and Eldo van Eyck. He opens with a description of twentieth-century modern 
architecture characterised by the history of CIAM. Its utopian ambitions went wrong 
because of ‘a desire for order spurred on by supposed rationality taken to irrational 
extremes’ (Coleman 2005, p.2). Throughout his investigations Coleman plays 
awkwardly with a twofold radical and reformist idea of utopia, sometimes favouring one, 
then the other. Coleman wishes to ‘reform the concept of utopia’ (p.2) going on to 
describe a difference between 'pathological' (p.58) and 'constitutive' (p.60) utopias as 
that between, respectively, totalitarian or inflexibly absolute and partial schemes. The 
reformist attitude and acceptance of partial or approximate schemes seems at odds 
with the idea of utopianism elsewhere expressed. The distinction between pathological 
and constitutive utopias is expanded in chapter four, with reference to Ricoeur's 
recognition and use of these terms (p.63). It is also compared with Lewis Mumford's 
distinction between utopian propensities to fantasise 'utopias of escape' and to plan 
'utopias of reconstruction' (2003, p.15). These seem to be Jameson's utopias of ‘wish-
fulfillment’ and of ‘construction’ which, for him, are both valid types. For Mumford too 
are they linked via representation. They both exist initially 'on paper'. ‘It is absurd to 
dispose of utopia by saying that it exists only on paper. The answer to this is: precisely 
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the same thing may be said of the architect's plans for a house, and houses are no the 
worse for it.’ (2003, p.16). 
 
But if it is not always clear what forms of utopia are true utopias for Coleman, he does 
offer clarification on what should definitely not be considered utopian: 
 
In my effort to identify utopian potential, I will show how distinguishing the concept of 
utopia from science fiction, futurology and technical utopianism, with which it is often 
confused, is necessary for an understanding of architecture and utopia. Throughout, I 
will argue that architectural invention is akin to utopian projection and that utopia 
harbors the potential to rescue architecture from aimlessness, obsessive matter-of-
factness, or a non-critical embrace of global capitalism (p.6, my italics). 
 
A distinction is identified between the concept of utopia and particular forms and modes 
of speculative future possibility from which he hopes to 'rescue' architecture. These 
attitudes can be seen to relate to those already discussed: aimlessness is a form of 
Non design; obsessive matter-of-factness is Anti conflict or the de-problematised 
acceptance of statistical or schematic framing of difficulties and their apparently logical 
and practical handling; while a non-critical embrace of global capitalism partakes of 
both Non dismissal of critical analysis and Anti adoption of the logic of market forces.  
 
Utopias know their place: nowhere. Dystopias are the presumptuous upstarts; faith 
become dogma. The Internationale Situationniste picture the inherent radicalism of 
utopias, especially as applied to architecture and urbanism, and contrasted with 
projects of justifiable practical reform: 
 
Until it merges with a general revolutionary praxis, urbanism is necessarily the first 
enemy of all possibilities for human life in our time. By accepting this specialization of 
urbanism, one puts oneself at the service of the prevailing social and urbanist lie of the 
State, in order to carry out one of the many possible ‘practical’ urbanisms... 
Confrontation … is the sole criterion for a genuine liberation in the field of urban 
architecture … Otherwise, ‘improvement’ or ‘progress’ will always be designed to 
lubricate the system and perfect the conditioning that we must overturn, in urbanism 
and everywhere else … Medico-sociological banalities on the ‘pathology of housing 
projects,’ the emotional isolation of people who must live in them, or the development of 
certain extreme reactions of denial … [represent an approach that] is building the sites 
that accurately represent it, combining the conditions most suitable for its proper 
functioning, while at the same time translating into spatial terms, in the clear language 
of the organization of everyday life, its fundamental principle of alienation and constraint 
(Debord 1961, unpaginated). 
 
Descriptions of existing and proposed suburbs may be analysed as utopias are. As 
propositions they can hold the promise of radically changed ideas for a good life. This 
cannot be realised within the existing structure of suburban development but such 
proposition nonetheless pursue and expand our ideas of good and our capacity to 
imagine them outside that structure. Alternatively suburbs can be misunderstood, as 
utopias are, as already failed propositions under already known and accepted 
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circumstances, the product of irresponsible indulgences and greed. Landscape 
architects can work with the former radical rethinking of suburbs as part of a larger 
challenge. Or they can reject utopianism in favour of reformist support for incremental 
improvement of a structure that is thereby reinforced. In either case they cannot 
escape making choices and producing designs that have political consequences. Most 
commonly and perhaps most correctly, the suburbs may be described as the locale of 
The Great Australian Dream. But whether this is an unconstrained yearning for a good 
life set in the suburbs or the precisely costed desire to own a suburban house, 
becomes unclear. A dream or projected fantasy which bears no resemblance to 
possible reality yet draws continued strength from the power of its desirability is a 
potent tool that design forsakes at the risk of irrelevance. Utopias cannot exist and 
neither do dreams, yet ‘[u]topias are non-fictional even though they are also non-
existent’ (Jameson 2004, p.54). A design too is not a fantasy even if it remains unbuilt.  
 
It may well be that there are no longer suburbs of the sorts that have been identified to 
date. There may be no more landscape architecture as we have known it or even 
environments with qualities that we have hitherto valued. We may fear too that we have 
lost hope in imagining, let alone achieving a desirable future such as the exercise of 
utopian thoughts allowed us. But in all of these pictures of apparent loss and crisis can 
be seen the lineage of past crises positioned and overcome, or repositioned and 
circumvented, as present conditions will be. The importance of problems with regard to 
suburbs, landscape architecture and utopia is determined by how they are placed, by 
their identification with larger competing ideological attitudes and bodies of work, and 
the competitive values placed on those. The next two chapters review two such bodies 
of work with reference to design. The first considers how the production of real estate 
advertisement competes with the products of design. The second considers how 
planning also competes in a visionary placement that can also displace design.  
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Chapter 9 
Pretend and Real Estate Advertisement 
 
Landscape architecture has been concerned over the last decade to discuss and 
develop new representational techniques that better reflect changed conditions and 
new problems in the design of contemporary environments. In part, in the tradition of 
the avant-garde, this is an ambition to reinvent the language of the discipline in order to 
reinvent the ways in which the world can be imagined, seen and experienced, as well 
as designed. For some, a new representational language is an urgent requirement. A 
new way to show the truth of site conditions and contexts is not only imperative but 
now possible with new techniques—for example, Corner’s eidetic imaging (1999)—and 
new technologies, for example, video and other real-time and multimedia soft- and 
hard-ware as advocated by Christophe Girot (2006). These are argued to allow us to 
finally see and communicate complex environments clearly and comprehensively.  
 
In the quest for newly revealing or more appropriate forms of representation, a 
distinction is assumed between images created in good faith for the dissemination, 
edification and revelation of the freshly available truth of landscapes, and those 
composed to manipulate truth. Manipulations occur within contexts where distortions 
are understood as acceptable conventions, for example road maps that do not show 
houses or trees although we know they are there, or with efforts to deliberately 
deceive, such as the images of the real estate industry anticipating scenes which may 
never eventuate as pictured. What Malcolm Barnard (1995) has pointed out is that 
there is no difference between informative and persuasive visual representations. In 
‘Advertising: The Rhetorical Imperative’ he investigates the seeming contrast between 
images and advertising which are innocently and helpfully informative and those which 
are ‘more suspicious and potentially morally questionable’ in their reprehensible efforts 
to influence or persuade viewers (p.27). What he determines is that ‘the supposedly 
innocent sense has never existed and can never have existed apart from the sense of 
influencing’ (p.27). As Chris Jenks explains in prefacing the collection of essays to 
which Barnard contributes: 
 
What we see and the manner in which we come to see it, is not simply a part of natural 
ability. It is rather intimately linked with the ways our society has, over time, arranged its 
forms of knowledge, its strategies of power and its systems of desire … There is only a 
social not a formal relation between vision and truth (1995). 
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Similarly there is only a social not a formal relation between design and goodness. If 
the innocent eye is blind, anyone who can see, let alone anyone who creates and deals 
in images, is guilty of intent. All images—all representations—created by landscape 
architects are advertisements for something. 
 
Branding architecture and landscape 
There is an extensive recent literature of architecture’s contribution to the branding of 
space and place, from the design of iconographic single structures to whole urban 
regions (Borries 2004; Conley 2008; Donald et al. 2008; Dovey 1999; Florida 2002; 
Horne 2005; Klingmann 2007). Impulses to communicate through structure and 
decoration have always been part of architecture’s explorations of meaningfulness. A 
collection of Robert Venturi’s writings (1998) recognises the legacy of his work in 
recording and theorising the significance of vernacular and commercial architectures in 
their response to technological innovations in both representation and construction of 
buildings and also in their reaction to the International Style. But what does such 
architecture actually signify? The duck and decorated shed represented better 
experiments in form and function for the aims of American post-WWII consumer 
capitalism, and Venturi celebrated such experimentation as subversive of the 
predominant style of Modern corporate capitalism, itself originally conceived as a 
subversion of the ornate, cumulative style of Europe’s bourgeoisie.  
 
Lizabeth Cohen (2003) has examined the rise of American mass consumption  and the 
presumption of prosperity and equality that accompanied it. She finds that the 
egalitarianism it promised—for example by the spread of affordable suburban 
housing—was tempered by failures of policy to consider women, African-Americans 
and the poor, and by marketing which targeted beneficiaries along class, gender, age, 
race and ethnic lines, accentuating divisions and undermining commonalities. The 
cover of Venturi’s book pairs an interior detail of the iconographically-rich mosaic tiling 
in the fifth-century tomb of Galla Placidia in Ravenna, with an image of similarly 
coloured random computer-generated dots. The archaic and the up-to-the-minute, 
sacred and profane, can both be employed to serve the pursuit of saleable 
significance, regardless of the intended significance of the designer.27  
 
The desire for differentiation and for meaningfulness itself, rather than any particular 
meaning, operates in the same way that Pierre Bourdieu (1984) describes the desire to 
acquire a prestigious state of tastefulness rather than exercise taste. Such covetous 
                                                 
27 Compare Lears, J. 1995. He sees advertising as one of creative efforts to expand rather than fix the 
imaginative capacities of consumers.  
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desire drives the branded experience economy that launched the careers of 
starchitects, a term invented by journalists to simultaneously promote and lampoon. 
Starchitects are hired less for the buildings they will design than because their 
reputations assist in the development and approvals processes long before any design 
commences. Their clients are not paying for architecture, let alone a building, nor do 
they even buy the anticipated experience of the physical creation to come. They 
purchase, and sell on, the guarantee of a great building long before its formal 
conception is even toyed with. They invest in the sure-bet gamble of a future discovery 
of potential that architects will realise for the site. Indeed they have already realised it 
by being contracted. 
 
The discovery of potential—that is, the dual ability to frame a dream on the one hand 
and capitalise on selling it on the other—drove the discovery of land for colonial 
empires, as well as suburban subdivision, as it does the discovery of any new markets 
for capital. John Locke ‘the philosopher who probably had the greatest influence on the 
men who founded the American republic, added economic specificity to [the] utilitarian 
concept of space’ (Marx 1991, p.65). Leo Marx explains that Locke’s famous 
statement, ‘In the beginning, all the world was America,’ is typically quoted out of 
context, admitting he has done so himself. This has led to  
 
the misleading implication that Locke was calling attention to the general resemblance 
between the uncolonized state of North America and the prehistoric state of the world. 
Locke's actual point in the chapter 'Of Property' in his widely read Second Treatise on 
Civil Government (1690), however, is far more specific and revealing; namely, that 
incorporation into an economy, or commodity exchange, is a necessary precondition for 
imparting value to anything, including land … [H]e was able to contemplate the 
possibility, unimaginable in Europe, that fertile, habitable land could be so abundant as 
to lack value. The importance of this commodity-exchange facet of the American 
ideology of space cannot be exaggerated (p.65). 
 
Julia Horne (2005) focuses on the history of discovery of Australian nature 
predominantly through access to and advertisement of its mountains, caves and wet, 
ferny forests, rather than the desert and arid plains which cover a larger portion of the 
continent. More recently, even these latter places are made attractive icons of an 
Australian uniqueness of character, utilised in car, airline and other product 
advertisements as well as advertisements for themselves in their offer of a special 
experience of place. In this, they tap into the core lure of advertising; the offer of 
experience rather than the offerings of objects or services. Suburban real estate 
employs this same appeal.  
 
Catherin Bull (2002) has promoted the role of landscape architects in providing tourists 
with access to the experience of Australia’s landscapes. One of several motifs of her 
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theme of a conversation with landscape involves familiarity. The value of experience 
and desire for experiences are bound in contradictory ways with familiarity and novelty, 
knowledge and the unknown. Bull notes that the Australian bush and outback have 
been called ‘formless, colorless or monotonous, plain and unknowable’ (p.20). 
However ‘the use of such derogatory adjectives to describe the bush landscape … 
cannot merely be credited to those ignorant of such things’ (p.21), meaning, 
presumably, to those unfamiliar with experience of the bush or of its biological diversity 
and ecological value. This seems to contradict the assumption that familiarity will breed 
comfortable acceptance, even though shortly after we are told of pioneer landscape 
architects who ‘presented unusual indigenous plants in designed landscapes in ways 
that people could relate to and, through that relationship, become familiar with’ (p.21). 
Perhaps it is the unfamiliar, framed within the familiar, that is the point here, but if 
indeed the bush will never, in its natural or unmediated form, be acceptable to 
civilisation we can only conclude that any conversation we record is one of persuasion 
on the part of humans and submissive alteration and adaptation on the part of nature. 
Or in other words, as with earlier examples of conversations, it is an exchange of our 
own one-sided scripting, another example of the pathetic fallacy. 
 
Later this is made explicit: ‘The designed landscape is used as a means by which to 
achieve a greater acceptance of the qualities and value of the bush, through its artful 
interpretation … the familiarisation that follows is crucial to acceptance of the bush as a 
valid … part of Australia’s settled landscape’ (p.22). And again: ‘… appreciation could 
be encouraged through the day-to-day familiarity of those who lived there with the 
artfully presented nature of the place’ (pp.25-26). And yet again: ‘the design proposes 
that familiarisation encourages appreciation and acceptance of local nature’ except that 
this artful landscape is now surely not ‘the bush’ (31). This much is admitted a few 
pages on: ‘Although they appear more nature than artefact, these designed landscapes 
are artful in the extreme’ (p.36). Not only is the vaunted conversation with landscape 
shown to be a deceptive ventriloquism, it doesn’t even necessarily work. We learn that 
‘[d]espite the efforts made by planners and landscape architects … to make 
settlements that were responsive to the unique qualities of places’ they often failed 
(p.38). 
 
The most interesting observation, not pursued, is the suggestion that the Australian 
landscape may be essentially unknowable. Chapter three ‘Beyond the Black Stump’—
where dead men lie—begins with evocative descriptions of an alien and challenging 
landscape of ‘mythic and unknowable power’ (p.38). In a string of conflicting 
comments, she suggests that, despite being the subject of popular tales, stories and 
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paintings, harsh desert landscapes were not valued. Perhaps they were not valued as 
non-desert landscapes were. She further suggests that ‘these landscapes had to wait 
until the middle of the twentieth century’ to be represented in ‘compelling and 
interesting ways’, even though they had inspired considerable creative work and even 
though the emptiness recalls much earlier uncanny fascinations with similar spaces 
(p.38). Anthony Vidler (2000) relates a history of spatial anxieties and phobias from 
before the seventeenth century to the present day, developing a concept of ‘warped 
space’ that he links to recent architectural experiments in digitisation and virtual reality. 
He recalls Pascal’s ‘eternal silence of these infinite spaces,’ uncovering a phobia that 
cannot be explained by the accumulated myths of runaway carriages, but rather by the 
fact of his being a philosopher, ‘a scientific spirit who searches for the truth of 
phenomena with a sense of the powerlessness of science to discover the essential 
secret of the universe’ (p.22).  
 
Bull continues, with no acknowledgment of this history, suggesting that we now value 
such landscapes because they are recognised as metaphors for ‘the contemporary 
human condition … capturing and communicating the prevailing insecurities and 
unease of our time’ (2002, p.38). Tellingly ‘[t]hese qualities have attracted new users to 
the remote parts of Australia … tourists, who come in their masses to explore and 
experience the intractability of these environments’ (p.39). But they are not so 
intractable as to disallow exploration by the masses. As she notes ‘the previously 
unknown became known, even iconic’ (p.39). More correctly, such landscapes were 
well known as unknowable and were already icons of such a state. They became 
packagable. Clearly, the value of experience can be translated into a money amount, 
bound to a concept of usefulness for paying users. 
 
Lucas Conley (2008) considers branding an illness. He distinguishes branding from 
advertising, considering packaging, or rather re-packaging, as a substitute for new 
ideas or product innovation. There is an implication that advertising may be fair 
dissemination of information about new ideas and product something shown by 
Barnard to be impossible. Yet it is a distinction that President Obama made in a speech 
just prior to the launch of the book’s paperback edition.  
 
We’ve become accustomed to our economic dominance in the world, forgetting that it 
wasn’t reckless deals and get-rich-quick schemes that got us there; but hard work and 
smart ideas – quality products and wise investments (Obama 2009). 
 
In fact it was, strictly speaking, not the ideas themselves, but ownership of them—and 
the brand is the stamp of ownership—which brought America prosperity. Economic 
dominance is not directly correlated to the development of ideas, but to the control of 
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economies. ‘So we started taking shortcuts. We started living on credit, instead of 
building up savings’ (Obama 2009). Viewed another way, bourgeois America, like 
bourgeois Europe and other empires before it, ran out of territory and markets. ‘We 
saw businesses focus more on rebranding and repackaging than innovating and 
developing new ideas and products that improve our lives.’ What is unclear and always 
controlled by advertising are the terms of improvement for a better quality of life. For 
many the diversions and satisfactions of packaging are real enough. The effects of 
good branding are positive affects. In its own terms, branding does improve lives. Art 
for art's sake is no different to branding for branding's sake, architecture for 
architecture’s sake or nature for nature's sake. They all have value and truth within 
their own value-systems, conceived to be more valuable and truthful than other value-
systems or truth-claims. Neither branding nor advertising intend to advance a 
discussion of what a good or bad product or service is beyond their own terms. ‘Today, 
anything with a brand name is vulnerable and anything without one is an opportunity’ 
(Conley 2008, p.3). The proliferation of terms—for suburbs, for landscape architecture 
and for utopias—is an exploitation of opportunities to brand. 
 
For Bull the qualities of the landscape ‘attracted new users’ as opposed to new 
admirers (2002, p.39). The trivialising picturesqueness she condemns is 
indistinguishable from the picture-photograph-worthiness she appears to extol. Again, 
there is nothing here that would have surprised the eighteenth century landscape 
connoisseur for whom the frisson of the unexpected, carefully documented and even 
iconically revered was an anticipated delight of travel. It is not necessary or correct to 
credit ‘pioneering artistic explorations of the previous generations of abstract painters’ 
with making the awesome power of Australian landscapes popular, for the same 
market forces that made their strange and unfamiliar works attractive to art collectors, 
made strange, unfamiliar landscapes attractive too. One could as easily say tourism 
fed a hunger for representations of landscape features transforming them into iconic 
works of art as say painters made landscape features iconic works of nature.  
 
The distinction between good information and bad advertising, faithful representation 
and exploitative illustration, characterisation and caricature, treads a line claiming to 
separate essentialism from reductionism, and it is followed closely by moral claims 
distinguishing art from pornography. Martin Walch (2005) adopts the term ‘nature-porn’ 
to warn against exploitive representations of nature. ‘There are no moral or intellectual 
rights to protect the integrity of natural subjects being represented … There is presently 
no way of ensuring the subject will not be misrepresented, and the viewer lied to.’ Yet 
who determines what this integrity is and was there ever a secure claim to 
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representational truth? ‘The nature-pornographers have rapidly appropriated the 
stylistic conventions and compositional devices originally developed by artists in the 
fields of landscape painting and photography … without concern for the ethical stance 
of those that established the genre.’ The stance of landscape painters, photographers 
and architects was one which had readily served landed gentry and a continuing 
clientele of the wealthy and powerful. Walch contrasts money-making motives from 
awareness-raising ones via an appeal to inherent value linked to sustainability ‘of both 
the environment and humanity.’ Although independent of the viewer, nature’s inherent 
values require representations of ‘integrity’ as ‘primary forces’ to persuade us of their 
value. Human representations of nature secure a particular value in the service of a 
particular view. What is the nature we see ‘beyond the camouflaged Nature of nature-
porn’? Nature-porn ‘deliver[s] the natural world to the public as a commodity’ although it 
is not explained in what entirely non-commodifiable ways it might otherwise be 
(re)presented. That nature-porn is thought to substitute manipulative experience for 
accurate representation ‘is simply compounding the problem’. This cannot be the 
problem of understanding our unmediated experiences, as representations are not only 
an indispensable aid to making sense of them but also essential to communicating 
them. In contrast, for Walch it is essential to maintain a ‘critical awareness of nature-
porn as an active modifier of our relationship with the natural environment’. Given we 
already have a relationship, where or how can a primal or unmodified one be 
rediscovered and re-inscribed? Should we not critically examine all awareness and the 
assumptions built into all relationships? The line between true and false representation 
is not something that can be found but must be and is always made. 
 
Anna Klingmann’s Brandscapes: Architecture in the Experience Economy (2007) 
argues that branding can be employed by architects, not as a selling tool but as a 
strategic tool to effect economic and cultural transformations. However branding is 
already a strategic tool for selling and the selling point is economic and cultural 
transformation. Just as there is no difference between informative and persuasive 
images there is no difference between branding as a tool for selling or as a tool for 
transformations that both promote selling and result from it. Klingmann sees a danger 
in the focus on branding single buildings rather than wider urban contexts because 
single buildings have encouraged a ‘culture of the copy’ (p.3) while branding wider 
areas will promote critical examinations of cultural differentiation. It may be easier to 
copy a single building than a city but otherwise there is no constraint to critique just 
because design moves to another scale. Arguably many places now copy others 
wholesale. She further suggests that the practice of branding she advocates will avoid 
the commodification of experience resulting from a homogenisation of place. Branding 
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is differentiation and ‘it falls to architects to infuse an ever more aseptic landscape with 
authentic transformations’ that also, significantly, are for sale (p.322). As she has 
already explained, the object is not longer the commodity. In the Experience Economy, 
the experience is, and architects therefore aid rather than escape commodification in 
providing novel experiences of place. Klingmann offers no discussion of the aim or 
value of experiences. All experience is desirable if it is promoted as being distinct from 
experiences already available; that is, if it has novelty. Noting her ‘rigorously jaundiced 
eye’ Michael Sorkin seems to suggest that Klingmann is aware of the irony of her 
appeal to branding to provide the very thing that the object it promotes—the 
architecture—is to provide. Yet her target audience—architects—are unlikely to feel 
encouraged by this while their clients would probably prefer any ironic detachment be 
kept quite from their own customers. 
 
Time 
The packaging and presentation of constructed or natural landscape features for 
tourism or other consumption is a similar process to their promotion as desirable 
features of a potential place of residence. The immediately available stimulations of 
incorporated or near-by natural and pre-settlement attractions—often recreated or 
rejuvenated—are a constant feature of recent subdivision estate advertising. The most 
common and most important factor used in advertisements to promote the desirability 
of specific suburban estates after their landscape’s relationship with nature is their 
relationship with time. This is used to differentiate and universalise landscape values to 
exploit advantages of speed and proximity as well as the attractions of taking your time. 
Two half-page advertisements sharing a page of the real estate supplement for the 
Hume Leader (covering Melbourne’s north) evidence this. The upper page advertorial 
alerts readers to the ‘Push on Eynesbury development’ where the new director ‘wants 
to accelerate the delivery of the project’s town centre’ and is ‘looking at speeding up 
the rate’ at which it develops (Hume Leader Real Estate Supplement, 9 Feb. 2010, 
p.67). The lower page shows a gently dusk-lit field where a woman and boy are 
spreading a billowing tablecloth. It begins: ‘Where life and love can gently unfold … If 
you like things slow, the way Nature does, Providence could be just what you’re looking 
for. Here, Sunday lunch with friends and family can, quite unexpectedly, turn into 
sunset teas’ (Plate 1). Strange things happen to the time-space continuum in the 
suburbs. The development company Stockland regularly features different aspects of 
time in its advertisements. Its Highlands estate in Craigieburn is ‘Just moments from 
the rolling parklands of Norval Green … only 30 minutes from the Melbourne CBD’ 
(2005, Northern Property News, 15 Aug., p.15) while a little to the east at the 
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Hawkstowe estate ‘there are endless opportunities to relax, discover or simply enjoy 
time with family and friends’ (Plate 2). 
 
The city is fast, the country slow, but the in-between suburbs pulse with the benefits of 
both. The commonly referenced middle landscape of the aspiring middle class is 
shown as a realm between times, even beyond time. Emptying urban centres and 
swallowing rural farmland, fed by the contrasts of continually obliterated adjacency, 
suburbia is both the floating dreamscape and groundless nightmare of real estate 
promotion. Timely and timeless it offers a breathless proximity to surrounding 
landscapes ‘just moments’, or ‘only’ short trips from city and countryside. Yet within its 
airy realm there are ‘endless opportunities to relax’. The well-designed suburb is one 
where you ‘discover’, as well as ‘simply enjoy’, time. On the one hand, suburbia is 
condemned as the realisation of backwards visions of unsustainable, variously failed, 
stalled and stagnant pastoral utopias. On the one hand the relentless spread of 
suburban estates, uncontained by the planned efforts of urban growth boundaries, 
green wedges or rings, is a development phenomenon that has been accomplished 
with a swiftness unprecedented in the history of human settlement. Its developers offer 
it as the reinvented Eden of healthy living, where an ever-new, more accessible and 
equitable range of technological refinements for environmentally sensitive, indeed 
recuperated and enhanced landscape and lifestyle options is enacted.  
 
Both advertising and suburb design create their own times. The images and text of 
advertisements, as of material prepared by designers for client meetings and even 
planning approvals, employ common strategies and techniques to portray time. They 
attempt to particularise the advantages of each residential subdivision by 
characterising its special relationship to time through various manifestations of 
timeliness and timelessness of life on that estate. Advance advertising for estates, for 
which landscape architects supply draft design proposals if not the images themselves, 
pre-empts the actual work of designing the future physical fabric of suburbia. 
Expectations for delivery of both operational and visual aspects of estate landscapes 
are determined by their advertising. The design of time necessarily considers the 
possibilities and purposes of ordering space to figure time, employing invented 
explanatory and exploitive uses of time.  
 
Real estate advertisement generally portrays time in two ways: timely and timeless. 
Timely time is empirically measurable, translating the effort of tasks and actions—car 
travel, shopping, home loan repayment—into terms of the universal clock and calendar. 
It relates the space of the estate to the wider space and context of services and 
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facilities surrounding it. It includes all the persuasive facts of definite minutes, hours, 
days and years along with marvellous data of statistical agglomeration—numbers of 
events in given time spans across given areas—such as those that evidence the 
fastest-growing, selling or improving area. This is time as speed and sprawl, 
demonstrated with up-to-the-minute technologies and statistics. This measurable way 
of revealing time argues for timeliness and lends itself to predominantly textual 
expression. Occasionally, abstracted maps emphasise proximity and images support 
claims of adjacencies utilising views not actually available within the estate. Even 
though they have the weight of pseudo-scientific, impersonal conviction, and even 
excusing the emphasis of evident distortions, such measurements are, however, still 
only expectations rather than certainties. (Plate 3 offers a rare glimpse of the messy 
realities of landscape construction.) They are future probabilities of how fast things will 
sell, how quickly you can get somewhere or how large will be your investment return. 
They are not guarantees and most advertising carries disclaimers to this effect. 
 
The other way time is portrayed concerns space internal to the estate itself. It is 
experiential time, relative to unnamed, undescribed rival estates, comparable to a 
range of attractive historical precedents yet immeasurable in its essential quality: 
timelessness. If the first way presents savings of measurable, translatable time-as-
money, this way presents priceless time. This second type of time is what the sale of 
the suburbs really deals in. For all its time-saving and space-rich conveniences what 
the advertising of suburbs has always sold is a dream (Plates 4-7). The speed of 
development, urgency of involvement, pressure of limited offers and fast sales 
contrasts with a space where there is ample time to watch the grass and children 
grow. This is time in slow motion, hazy images and stretched sound (Plates 8, 9, 10). 
Ready relaxation and tranquillity are key qualities within the space of the estate. 
Relaxation is inescapable in the romantic half-light of dawn or dusk when streetlights 
and sky slowly trade intensity and colour. We half-remember, as kids, our dormitory 
suburbs coming alive in the early morning with the steamy light of frosted bathroom 
windows and at evening with the lace-curtain flickering of television screens. But a 
gorgeous sunset sky or its reflected glow in a glass of wine better suits saleable 
nostalgia for what we—or rather our parents—never actually experienced (Plates 10-
13). More accurately, these are pre-packaged future memories.  
 
A non-specific special place of calm is ‘waiting’, suspended in time for ‘you’, although 
as anyone who can afford it will do as well, you had better hurry (Plates 14 & 15). The 
special space of the estate is not just a place of sleepy time suspended in 
contemplative relaxation. It is even more popularly a place of critically suspended time, 
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a snapshot of heightened excitement on the cusp of release (Plates 16 & 17). There is 
something nearly erotic in the disorientating blur of context; a swollen, elevated 
suspension of disbelief as well as a frozen moment in time. Fathers mainly with 
daughters, poised just before flight, swinging loved-ones between security and 
disaster. Defying gravity is defying time, slowing or speeding the rotation of the earth 
(Plates 5, 18, 19). 
 
One way to ensure the wholesomeness of these happy families is to give them the 
innocence of youth. Almost exclusively the families depicted are of two young adults, a 
man and woman, and two young children, a girl and boy (Plates 8, 20, 21, 22, and 
even Plate 23). There are no teenagers (Owens 2002) and very few old or seemingly 
single people. The depicted activities are carefully available only to neatly balanced 
nuclear families of narrowly defined age. Another way to avoid improper over-
excitement is to depict reassuringly old-fashioned recreations, staying clear of 
troublesome, violent or antisocial teenage games involving new technologies and 
gadgets. The reality of troubles in new estates including graffiti and vandalism 
attributed to bored skating youth and their destructive addictions, is in another section 
of the newspaper. ‘Timeless’ forms of play abound in advertising including kite-flying, 
swings, fishing, picnicking. The accoutrements of these activities are reassuringly 
anachronistic if unlikely to be present: no developer for example, would provide a 
timber plank swing supported with knotted rope (Plate 24). 
 
Finally, security is afforded by the heritage aura of good old Times Past, regardless 
again of how much heritage remains intact once buyers have moved in (Plate 25). The 
frisson of the frozen moment in time captures both the desperation and boredom of 
delayed expectation. Delfin’s Caroline Springs ‘Catch-up’ campaign may be too clever, 
more confusing than ambiguous (Plate 26). The exclamatory ‘catch-up’ might mean 
either hurry up (verb) because you will be left behind, or it could mean relax and enjoy 
your ‘catch-up’ (noun) because you’re already here. It is both accusatory (you have not 
caught up if you don’t live at Caroline Springs) and congratulatory (it’s great to catch up 
with people here). Juxtaposed with an image of the city, it is unclear whether we are to 
catch up with Melbourne by coming to live on its well-connect fringe, or Melbourne is 
being exhorted to catch up with us already there. Like most advertising it is a display of 
ambiguous urgency, a blanket emotional appeal to implicit insecurities. Without 
debunking, exposing and fundamentally de-valuing the regimes of time-relationship 
established by advertisement, designers are subsequently to deliver specific proposals 
for built form. On one level, they face the same difficulties in construction of arguments 
to justify their uses of time. They can borrow from advertising’s timely and timeless 
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shopping lists of efficiency and beauty. On another, built reality has a habit of 
engendering its own problems, stubbornly ignoring the limited agendas set for it. 
 
The two portrayals of time outlined above—timely and timeless—do not just apply to 
time in estate advertising. The advertisement of time-saving efficiency with its 
measurable, concrete, particular value arguing the choice of one estate over another is 
closely supported by evocation of the timeless attraction of abstract, universal value-
adding experiences available to those living within the estate itself. Efficiency and 
attractiveness are also axioms of good design. The generation of design and 
development of criteria for its analysis and evaluation often consists in the variously 
contested weighting of the timely functionality of specific, concrete details on the one 
hand, against the timeless effect of universal, holistic significance on the other. Other 
criticism considers more closely the observable relationship between how things work 
and what they communicate in a limited context, and what they may mean or reveal 
within a history of aggregate contexts. The value of a specific space and time is 
ascertained through an apprehension of both.  
 
This is in one sense also the interplay of ‘form’ and ‘function’. For some critics, as for 
advertisers, a project may look good (have mature trees, garden beds, wide roads or 
parks) separately from working well (having good traffic circulation, efficient drainage, 
easy service access) so the matter of functional design is largely determined by 
engineers, the issues of aesthetic design pursued by architects, all overseen by the 
requirements dictated by statutory planners. For other critics and more rarely 
advertisers, the good look of the estate is inseparable from good function (broad tree-
lined streets supply a cool, quick driving experience) requiring a close working 
relationship between engineers and architects. The relationship of time to space in the 
suburbs is one of proximities and promises. The design of time then is about the 
engineering of efficient spatial arrangements—timeliness—on the one hand, and 
participation in the good life of good taste—timelessness—on the other (Calthorpe 
1997). For yet other critics the compromises of prioritising how combined elements 
function and appear will lead to more complex appreciations of value and other layers 
of interpretative interest (Bogart 2006; GUST 2002; Lerup 2000; Stretton 1975).  
 
Design endeavour is something other than the task of integrating timeliness and 
timelessness, engineering and art, efficiency and style, function and form.  Efficiency 
and attractiveness might be considered the overriding categories of Philip Johnson’s 
Seven Crutches of Architecture (1997). The crutches are seven excuses for form-
making that Johnson believes designers erroneously identify as their task and which 
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can be found in the arguments estate advertisement. The efficiency crutches include 
utility: an ‘old Harvard habit’ that proposes a building is good if it works properly; 
comfort: the delivery of good environmental control; cheapness or cost effectiveness: 
elimination of superfluousness; and serving the client. The attractiveness crutches are 
history: yesterday’s good past design is good today; and pretty drawings: substitution 
of built reality for representation. Finally and most dangerously because ‘awfully close 
to home’ is structure, partaking of both efficiency and attractiveness. ‘[C]lear structure 
clearly expressed’ pretends to be sufficient for the achievement of good design. 
Johnson does not say what design is, but suggests the outlines of its work by indicating 
what it is not. 
 
Both timely efficiency of particular function and timeless attractiveness of abstract form 
are constructed—that is manipulated and manipulative—concepts. Their use and 
abuse is as inescapable for designers as it is for advertising. As there is no innocent 
advertisement or disinterested dissemination of information, there is no innocent, 
disinterested, and thereby good design. For designers the questions of imitation or 
innovation are two sides of the same coin of an appreciation of precedent, and a 
prerequisite for assessment of design quality. This is meant not in the sense that a 
proposition be judged favourably if it simply have a precedent—for all proposals do in 
many and various respects—or that if it have particularly glorious precedents it will be 
necessarily glorious now, but rather that its past provides comparative clues to the 
probable reception of similar propositions in new contexts, which can only be judged by 
their own future performance. In a letter to The Harvard Architectural Review on the 
occasion of its call for submissions on ‘the use of precedent and the role of invention’, 
Colin Rowe comments: ‘I can’t really perceive how your topic … can very well lead to 
profitable dispute. I can never begin to understand how it is possible to attack or to 
question the use of precedent’ (1986, p.188). His suggestion for an alternative topic is 
‘How does the new invade the old and how does the old invade the new’ (p.189). This 
is a helpful reminder that the championship of absolute or relative models of time, as of 
good design, could easily presuppose no messy mixed alternatives. 
 
Timely and timeless appeals are similar to advertising’s newer appeal to usefulness 
and uselessness. In an essay in praise of ‘Useless Landscapes’ Chris Sawyer (2005) 
argues that these only ‘apparently useless’ landscapes are in fact extremely useful, 
providing ‘very basic functions’ (p.66). He characterises them as ‘ambiguous’ spaces of 
‘no clear rules’, ‘unregulated’, ‘loose’ and ‘wild’, being ‘about generalities rather than 
specifics’ which is a condition ‘intolerable to the market’ (p.66). In contrast ‘useful’ 
urban space is critiqued for its emphasis on qualities and elements designed to 
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maximise the generation of revenue, ‘absorbed into the economic function of the city, 
24/7’ (p.66) through the cramming of activities and events for consumption. Useless 
‘usefulness’ is essentially defined by its money-making capacity while useful 
‘uselessness’ plays no economic role.  
 
At first look, new suburban parks—the parks and open space of estate 
advertisement—seem to be exactly such praiseworthy useless landscapes, promising 
communal, ambiguous, undefined opportunity for unfettered appropriation, ‘to observe, 
to spectate, promenade and to wander’ (p.66). Where Sawyer criticises the modern 
urban park for having become just a backdrop to money-making events staged within 
it, it should be noted that the admirably useless suburban estate park is the backdrop 
for sales of houses around it. The coercive spending tactics of market-sanctioned 
activities within urban public space have their parallels in the mere existence of 
suburban parks whose main purpose for the developer is to coerce home-seekers to 
settle. However much provision of parkland may be legislated, the developer’s brief for 
suburban open space requires it to be designed and maintained at the outset to be 
effective for a limited time to generate one-off revenue from house sales. Once the 
developer leaves, it remains to be seen if such spaces can remain so attractive to 
cash-strapped Councils. Already there have been several responses to this dilemma 
including the agreed sharing of construction and maintenance cost with other 
authorities such as Melbourne Water, the formation of Friends groups and co-opting of 
sporting clubs who donate materials and voluntary labour, the complete redesign of 
parks, and even the removal of all maintenance-intensive or vandal-attracting features 
such as garden beds, irrigation, picnic facilities and playgrounds.  
 
Sawyer claims that ‘historically, public landscapes have been gloriously free of specific 
program’ (p.66). The history of public urban parks as well as other open spaces such 
as preserved wilderness or those grounds serving quite specific primary programs—
botanical collections, cemeteries, water catchment or drainage easements—was, from 
the start, one of contested rights of entry, hours and eligibility for access, strictly 
prescribed behaviour, carefully allocated expense, and variously organised sources of 
public and private funding, all requiring detailed design consideration. There are no 
useless landscapes—not because Sawyer is right or wrong about condemning 
remuneratively useful landscapes as ‘useless’—but more importantly because there 
are simply too many types of use. If landscape exists, it is, can and will be used. It is 
then impossible to design useful or useless landscapes. Unavoidably useful to 
someone, there are then no landscapes that can avoid inclusion in systems of 
economic value. It is the designer’s task to design, investigate and understand the 
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contingent realities of the site. They can resist some forces and privilege others but 
they ignore them at their peril. A non-defined need not be a non-designed space. 
Conversely defined spaces are not necessarily designed. The mere fact of usefulness 
or indeed uselessness is not a guarantee of goodness or good design. There are 
compelling reasons to resist ‘cramming our public spaces with more and more stuff’ but 
the alternative is not to design spaces that will be used ‘in ways and for reasons not 
necessarily considered by the designer’ and Sawyer’s own work contradicts this in 
continuing to demonstrate the difficult diversity of his complex investigations. 
 
More than the illogic of designing useless things, it should be recognised that 
uselessness itself is not necessarily, or even likely, to be subversive but has long been 
appropriated by advertising as a desirable and purchasable quality. Many people will 
pay a premium for the simple, basic and nominally free experiences Sawyer presents 
as somehow significantly distinct from those experiences offered by organised events. 
Indeed such ‘general’ experiences are more prone to the ‘glib, adjective-rich marketing 
campaigns’ (p.67) which he condemns than the succinct nouns and verbs of particular 
activities: drinking coffee, watching a show, riding skateboards and spending money. A 
praise of historic park forms of essentially elite culture is in more danger of supporting 
the hidden forces of exclusive, acquisitive capitalism than the obvious new forms of 
inclusive-by-definition mass-culture.  
 
More cunning than either overt or hidden payment for the experiences of the space 
itself, are campaigns that make money from the sale of products and services only 
associated with the space. Billboard advertisement and naming rights are not 
considered part of design consideration. Whether memorial reserves named after 
worthies or their battles are more reputable forms of association than corporate titles or 
product slogans, their purpose is the same: a conferral of meaning and value which 
usurps that of the experience of the designed space itself. All products have a value 
inclusive of inseparable direct experiences and indirect associations. These are socially 
determined and may not be reflected in either the initial cost-price, or the sale-price, but 
this value should not be confused with ‘good’, although that too is, yet independently, 
socially determined.  
 
Thorstein Veblen (2005) does not confuse, as readers of his often seem to, honour with 
good. A moral judgement of the excesses of the leisure classes is irrelevant to the 
social and economic power that society accords the ‘disserviceable anachronisms’ of 
their ‘noble’ and ‘higher’ pursuits and properties (p.96). Conspicuous consumption, like 
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conspicuous wealth, is demonstratively wasteful and, for good or ill, is vigorously 
pursued.  
 
However substantial may be the merits of the contention that the classic lore results in a 
more truly human culture and character, it does not concern the question in hand. The 
question in hand is as to how far these branches of learning and the point of view for 
which they stand in the educational system, help or hinder an efficient collective life in 
modern industrial circumstances – how far they further a more facile adaptation to the 
economic situation of to-day (p.96).  
 
That the classic design of parks or open space assists our character or humanity is 
similarly irrelevant to whether experiencing them helps or hinders citizens to adapt to 
economic as well as linked environmental priorities. Compare Graeme Davison: 
 
[S]uburbanites themselves display a disconcertingly high level of satisfaction with their 
way of life. In doing so they often register their desire for values and conveniences that 
may not rate highly in the intellectual’s scale of proper urban virtues, but which have 
more utility, even in an environment of recession, than its alternatives (1993, p.113).  
 
Yet Davison then describes a range of quite un-utilitarian features of the spreading 
suburbs such as increasing commuter distances and smaller allotments. More 
disconcerting than the suburbanite’s happy ignorance or rejection of ‘proper urban 
virtues’, is their uncanny ignorance of their real situation as Davison describes it. It 
seems it is not simply utility but something more compelling that must make the 
suburban home ‘something to which most young Australians continue to aspire. It is a 
dream which the future may deny them, but which they seem unlikely to renounce of 
their own free will’ (p.113). The suburbs may be stuck between the aspirations of lower 
classes for the conspicuous wealth of long-established, old-money material excess on 
the one hand, and the desire for efficient delivery of modern conveniences on the 
other. Or they may equally be offering what people want, regardless of what developer 
advertising, government planning or designers suggest they should want; an 
opportunity, despite all persuasions to the contrary, to pursue and craft their own 
dream. 
 
Yet even this opportunity is appropriated by others to sell back to those wanting to be 
told, and then persuaded, where and how they can best do this. In January 2009, 
Delfin ran a television commercial utilising their familiar testimonial approach (Plate 
27). The main interviewees were a young couple. The man declares: ‘Rather than buy 
someone else's dream, we have created our own.’ They stand before a project home 
within a materplanned estate. What can he possibly mean? In what sense can this be 
true? The intended implication is surely not that they avoided paying for their house 
and land or squatted and built it themselves. Perhaps it is that Delfin offers so much 
choice that the couple found or could customise—create—something different to the 
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stereotypes of suburban happiness represented by any other house. In one sentence 
Delfin confounds and reinvents what the dream is. There is another, more 
sophisticated and sinister possible message. The dream of this couple is shown to be 
exactly that: immaterial; all in their heads and their heads alone. Delfin no longer claims 
or feels it has a duty to provide dreams, or, rather, they have ceased to pretend to have 
any responsibility for the provision of happiness. By contrast The Pask Property 
Group’s Providence estate advertisement declares: ‘We don’t sell lots of land, we sell 
lots of dreams’ (Plate 7). Delfin just provides the house. The dream—the home—is up 
to you to make. By inference, compared to their courageous, destiny-fulfilling couple, 
you are uncreative and ungrateful not to grasp Delfin’s honest offer to assist you to do 
so. But of course the couple have not materially created any of their dream and they 
have or will pay for the material house they inhabit, even if their creative imaginations 
are responsible for rendering it, in their minds and daily habits, a home. The designer’s 
traditional role is to embody dreams, although it seems unnecessary to go to the 
trouble of providing embodiment at all—a well-designed product—when disembodied 
suggestion achieves the same effect. 
 
Both advertising and design of suburbs construct arguments of timely and timeless 
use, presenting the desirable experience of proposed products, services or space. 
Advertising exists to reap the financial rewards of such argument as promptly as 
possible, for itself and its clients. Design, in the service of the same clients, must 
address the same economic imperatives but also seeks differently timed, usually 
longer-term benefits for more stakeholders. It will probably make or support the same 
arguments—efficient use and environmental comfort, cost effectiveness, client 
responsiveness, historically sanctioned attractiveness and structural legibility—but is 
unnecessary to achieve only this. More importantly its arguments make the motives of 
arguments themselves transparent. That is its empowerment: not keys to a dream but 
open access to dreaming. Design—and Landscape Architecture in particular because it 
deals with natural environments comprising objects and processes which are easily 
hijacked by conceptions of incontestable higher purpose—becomes advertising when it 
fools itself that good comes from self-proclaimed usefulness or uselessness. This is 
merely another naturalised construction, not a self-evidently good one. The works of 
design challenge the ever-shifting terms of timely and timeless use, while continually 
fighting for the usefulness of doing so. The objectives of planning to establish and 
administer agreed terms are contrasted with this in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 10 
Design Guides and Pattern Books: Framing Work for the Suburbs 
 
If advertising represents one pole of influence in the construction of suburbs, planning 
represents another. They might be characterised as appealing to fantasy and carefully 
applied reason respectively, although this may equally be considered inversely: the 
overt if benevolent control of professional and political representatives is a fiction while 
representative fictional lifestyles are the reality of market control. This chapter looks at 
Melbourne planning policy and tools including Melbourne 2030, in particular the debate 
on the efficacy of urban design and Urban Design Frameworks (UDFs) in delivering 
‘places for people’ (Abbott 2006; DPCD 2009). It considers the gradual and ineffective 
privileging of planning over design and of planning department design guides over 
architectural canon and pattern books as a basis of UDF development.  
 
In the last decade Melbourne’s approach to resolution of suburban land resource and 
use problems has resulted in a range of changes to policy and legislative requirements  
for subdivision design. Released in 2002 by the Department of Sustainability and 
Environment for the Victorian Government, Melbourne 2030 provides the still-current, if 
much contested and frequently adjusted, framework for Melbourne’s land development. 
Other State Government Departments have roles in its interpretation along with local 
governments who largely implement State Government policy. The role of the Victorian 
Civil Administration Tribunal (VCAT) continues to provide a vibrant forum for debate on 
its application to specific conditions while industry bodies and diverse lobby groups 
continue to argue particular priorities. The difficulties experienced in policy application, 
perceived failures of specific legislation and the inadequacies of the planning process 
have been variously explained: a lack of detailed guidance and measurable targets, the 
necessary teething problems of new approaches, popular fear and misunderstanding of 
change, a lack of local government resources for proper implementation, and 
corruption and mismanagement of individual projects by responsible authorities and 
developers. However there seems to have been little mention that difficulties arise 
specifically and inevitably from the design process itself: the process that realises built 
form from articulated goals, however detailed, measurable or beneficial. The present 
lack of an effective design role for landscape architecture in suburban land 
development is one explanation for the failure of policy and legislation to deliver 
satisfactory product and, conversely, for product to deliver a satisfactory interpretation 
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of the intent of policy. There is always an intrinsic interpretative design process in the 
documentation and realisation of form for a specific location. The legislation of design 
quality is not possible although the obligation to pursue it is. Utopian ambitions 
represent exactly this paradox. 
 
Since its launch in 2002, Melbourne 2030 has been regularly reviewed and amended, 
particularly in regard to its Urban Growth Boundary (UGB). As a tool to limit residential 
land subdivision—‘suburban sprawl’ and its associated infrastructure costs and 
environmental damage—such boundaries have been employed in other cities 
internationally including Portland (Oregon), Boulder (Colorado), Virginia Beach 
(Virginia), Lexington (Kentucky) and San Jose (California) in the United States and 
Vancouver, Toronto and Ottawa in Canada. Since 2000 South Africa’s ‘Municipal 
Systems Act No 32’ for local authorities has required the development of growth 
boundaries, presently represented in earlier regional plans for Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg. Major revisions to Melbourne’s UGB were undertaken in 2005 and 
2006 with the proposal of Delfin Lend Lease for a $4.5 billion development outside the 
UGB, and in 2008 when The Age newspaper announced that Melbourne 2030 was 
‘now a stretch of the imagination’ (The Age, 4 Dec. 2008, editorial). A further 
expansion, announced in December 2009, is to be confirmed in 2010.  
 
The first major UGB extension in 2005 was to accommodate further housing following 
an unpredicted population and building boom. The UGB was accused of unfairly and 
artificially increasing housing prices, severely limiting further industry growth and 
opportunities for consumer choice and affordability (Millar 2008). The same argument 
has applied to later changes and there is general admission that population growth has 
far exceeded that anticipated by the plan. Based originally on 1 million additional 
people by 2030, now ‘another 1.8 million people are predicted to be living in the city 
and its suburbs by 2036’ (The Age, 9 June 2009, editorial), almost double 2002 
projections. Dr Bob Birrell, a staunch critic of the plan, launched a book with colleagues 
in March 2005 that anticipated the erosion of the UGB and flexibility of its principles 
and called for a fundamental review of the policy and its tools (Birrell et al. 2005). Along 
with pointed analysis and criticism of the failure of objectives to be aligned with any 
clear or specific mechanisms to achieve them, ‘Melbourne 2030 has little to say about 
the possibilities of innovation in planning outer suburban communities’ (Birrell et al. 
2005, p.06-8). 
  
Despite issuing an ‘Urban Growth Boundary Strategic Assessment Fact Sheet’ in 
March 2009 to explain the rationale, process and powers of the government in relation 
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to boundary changes, many regard the UGB and the principles it stands for to be 
compromised to the point of rendering Melbourne 2030 pointless. ‘Melbourne 2030 is 
stone dead. The trouble is we don't have a proper policy in its place, we have Rafferty's 
rules led by the development community, and the Government's just rolling over’ 
(Michael Buxton in The Age, 9 June 2009, editorial). This is despite continuing 
statements from State Government that it supports the plan and believes it is being 
implemented. ‘The Government insists that it has not wavered in its resolve to 
implement 2030, which seeks to check Melbourne's costly and unsustainable sprawl by 
setting an urban growth boundary’ (The Age, 28 May 2008, editorial). While the 
weakness of State Government, and specifically its capitulation to the interests of road 
transport, land development and real estate lobbies is often blamed (Davison 2008b, 
Lucas 2009; The Age, 4 Dec. 2008, editorial; The Age, 9 June 2009, editorial; The Age, 
19 June. 2009, editorial), the very nature and work of planning policy as written 
intention—as opposed to design demonstration through built example—is such that 
powerful groups are always able to argue adherence to the binding universal spirit of 
policy (sustainability) while accommodating variously framed truths and realities of the 
moment (affordability and the crises of economic growth).  
 
Planning rhetoric is demonstrably central to the work of urban ‘design’. In January 
2010, Victoria’s Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD) 
launched an Urban Design Charter (DPCD 2010b). Its twelve Principles are 
comparable to the Principles and nine Key Directions of Melbourne 2030 and intended 
to reinforce the objectives and authority of planning policy. They are also similar to the 
Principles of the Landscape Charter of the AILA (AILA 2009). The DCPD Urban design 
Charter is concerned to address: Structure, Accessibility, Legibility, Animation, Fit and 
function, Complementary mixed uses, Sense of place, Consistency and variety, 
Continuity and change, Safety, and Sensory pleasure, and Inclusiveness and 
interaction. Melbourne 2030’s Key Directions seek: A more compact city; Better 
management of metropolitan growth; Networks with the regional cities; A more 
prosperous city; A great place to be; A fairer city; A greener city; Better transport links; 
and Better planning decisions, careful management. Finally AILA Landscape Charter 
requires members to: value our landscape; protect—enhance—regenerate; design with 
respect; Design for the future; and embrace responsive design.  
 
Planning and urban design terms 
The language of urban design as promulgated by Christopher Alexander (1977; 1979), 
Kevin Lynch (1960; 1984), Christian Norberg-Schulz (1968), Jan Gehl (2008) and new 
urbanists Peter Katz (1993), Peter Calthorpe (1997), and Andres Duany (1998), 
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amongst others, abundantly employs such terms as those heading the principles and 
directions above. Even when linked to documented project proposals or built outcomes, 
they prove to be utterly flexible monikers of intention and interpretation. Fredric 
Jameson points out the difficulty of mounting argument against the seeming logic of 
this language and the danger of accepting it. Regarding the writings of Lynch and 
Norberg-Schulz he admits:  
 
It is difficult to argue against these visions, since such an argument would seem to 
stand out for ugliness and squalor, for lack of perception and so forth. But two things 
need to be pointed out: first, that this is bad Utopianism... it asks for resurrection without 
paying the price; change without politics; transformation by simple persuasion and 
common sense... The second point is a class one:... not merely... a class vision, a 
description of the way in which the upper classes... inhabit their spacious dwelling... not 
the will to restore my perceptions, but rather the envy of those full perceptions as they 
are exercised by another class (1997, p.267). 
 
Deceptive reasonableness, like that of urban design, is challenged too by Peter 
Corrigan:  
 
I will never forget hearing as a youth, one of Mies van der Rohe’s mantras at a student 
party ‘St Thomas Aquinas says, reason is the first principle of all human action. If you 
understand this you act accordingly.’ This selfserving truism retains its relevance, but 
more probably the truth lies closer to Goya’s ‘the dream of reason brings forth 
monsters.’ Or more simply, that the law of unintended consequences usually applies 
and asymmetry gives force to its own recognition (2003). 
 
The intentions of urban design to build safe, legible, accessible, permeable, beautiful 
and clean public space, do not translate automatically into form. Gross simplifications 
of the effort required offer easy readings and ready approval for improvement 
schemes. Assumptions of the relationship between intention and form can employ, 
without irony, symbols of deliberate oppression as those of apparent philanthropy. Here 
the class envy Jameson notes is in operation (Plates 28 & 29). Footscray’s former 
Angliss meatworks and abattoir site was developed in the late eighties by the Victorian 
Ministry of Housing and Construction. Leon van Schaik, attending a dinner at 
Government House in 1990 to celebrate its receipt of the Charles Joseph LaTrobe 
Design for Living Award, recorded his opinion of the design and the award process. 
Recalling the arcane pageantry of an evening celebrating participatory design to which 
none of the public users were actually invited, he also noted that:  
 
The publicity handout itself contains written history and historical images that are 
impregnated with sympathy for the feudal estate and overlordship of William Angliss 
himself; this symbolism may have engendered the references in the form of the houses. 
Hardly a proper expression of the soul of participation … Examine the architecture of 
this scheme … How can anyone seriously argue that Federation style houses are 
representations of the popular will? And that some watered down reference to that 
architect-invented style represents for all time what people want and need?... Do these 
elements contribute to the well-being of the inhabitants? Or are they really the signs of 
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the users subordinate and uncreative role as the consumers of the process? (1990, 
p.71). 
 
Is it possible to appeal to inhabitants defined in any other terms than as ‘consumers’? If 
it is true, as Jameson feared and Locke believed, that there is no space outside 
exchange society, can architecture challenge at least the terms by which value is 
assigned and exchanged? The most potent term applied to the value of suburbs, 
agreed to by all political sides, is ‘affordability’. Affordability is clearly intended to enable 
those with less money to purchase a home, or, more accurately, obtain a mortgage. At 
the same time the market needs to ensure continually rising prices to make investment 
worthwhile. A condition of uncertain financial and job markets, the trend for smaller 
houses, and increased government intervention in planning legislation all expose the 
conflicting benefits of affordability to buyers, banks and government.  
 
Victorian Executive Director of the Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA), 
Tony De Domenico, contributed a column to local newspaper real estate supplements 
in late 2008 unintentionally exposing affordability’s confused objectives. The UDIA 
exists to serve the interests of the private property development industry. The title of 
De Domenico’s article ‘Danger in Affordability’ (2008) might seem to hint at there being 
no danger, or less, in non-affordability or higher prices, something likely to appeal to 
the industry. But he does not articulate anything so unpalatable to consumers and ends 
with a question that equally does not supply an answer to the many problematic 
scenarios it raises throughout the text. De Domenico begins by explaining the growing 
demand for housing, pointing out a ‘production problem’ that everyone ‘will have to 
cope with – or not’ (p.58). The first non-coping group identified are architects who, 
through their Institute (the Australian Institute of Architects) lobbied government to ban 
further subdivision in the outer suburbs within the continually expanded UGB, but 
whose arguments are ‘so full of self-interest [they’re] hardly worth bothering with’ 
(p.58). Next he notes that many builders offer much smaller homes (not houses) that 
will fit on much smaller lots. ‘Some would have us believe it’s all in the name of what 
they’re calling sustainability’ as smaller houses are cheaper to run and generally better 
‘in the climate-change scheme of things’ (p.58). The author finds the word ‘a little 
overdone lately’ (p.58) which does not explain why he disagrees with policy logic that 
has served the industry well in promoting its innovative new ‘green’ housing products 
that he has elsewhere championed (see de Domenico 2007). He does think that the 
argument of making houses more affordable (cheaper to build) by making them smaller 
is defeated by rates and service charges that are not more affordable (less expensive 
to run). The final sentences are intended to summarise the dilemma:  
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Also, the danger is that what is affordable today will almost certainly be affordable 
tomorrow and, unless great care is taken, the less likely it is to be anything other than 
affordable (p.58). 
 
What is cheap today will not appreciate in value and will remain cheap and nasty 
altogether. Everything De Domenico suggests is a difficulty in continuing the multi-
layered myth of affordability that has so far enabled the land development industry to 
continue selling property and houses in ways that sustain profit. What he has identified 
is the deceptive logic of affordability which has been forged by the industry to enable its 
continuance from the outset. He concludes demanding to know how his industry can be 
sustained: 
 
But the big question is: how long can need and affordability be sustained, especially 
with a commodity like a home and especially in a market that depends on improvement 
in value for its very existence? (p.58). 
 
The question might more clearly be asked: How long can the dream of detached outer-
suburban housing be stimulated and prices be kept affordable (low) while mortgage 
banking relies on rising prices to maintain affordability (the profitability of the banking 
system and investment value of homeowners)? And a better question might be asked: 
Why continue treating a home, as the industry insists on mythologising it, as a 
commodity at all? It is a utopian effort to transcend such mythologising.  
 
Specificity, authenticity and the concept of the ‘region’ are other key terms in the 
language of planning and urban design. As with American arguments concerning 
strategies for dealing with sprawl (Frug 2001), Marcus Spiller (2005), ex-president of 
the Planning Institute of Australia, argues for the restoration of effective metropolitan 
level governance structures to deal with regional problems unsuited to local, state or 
federal level regulation. The lack of regional thinking is presented as the cause of 
failures and confusion arising from Melbourne 2030. In particular Spiller believes that 
the social and environmental issues of suburban sprawl can only be dealt with at a 
regional level. But ‘regionalism’ is an ill-defined concept, one which has changed over 
time with regard to geophysical areas and one which has no legal standing or distinct 
jurisdictional authority in Australia. Its very vagueness has been suggested as the 
reason for its increasing popularity (Morrison & Lane 2006). Jane Jacobs has been 
blunt regarding the term’s manipulation and essential convenient meaninglessness. ‘A 
region is an area safely larger than the last one to which we found no solution’ (1993, 
p.533).  
 
Regionalism in architecture has enjoyed similar popularity to planning; that is, it has 
served to bring together diverse interests in potentially contradictory ways. The critical 
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regionalism of Kenneth Frampton (1983) that is understood to value architecture drawn 
from its context, was earlier framed by Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre (1981) as 
production which is responsive to but not necessarily consistent with its context. Indeed 
elements that distinguish themselves by their contrast with context are even more 
effective in focusing reflection on it. Jameson has critiqued Frampton’s Critical 
Regionalism (1996). The idea of ‘region’ in America has often served to isolate places 
from each other, observes Douglas Powell (2007). Whether in the nostalgic celebration 
of folk cultures or the urban distaste for ‘hicks,’ certain regions of the country are 
identified as static, insular, and culturally disconnected from everywhere else. Powell 
begins his consideration of ‘critical regionalism’ with Italo Calvino's tale of the city of 
Leandra and the dispute of Penates ('who attach themselves to specific families') and 
Lares ('whose loyalties instead are to a particular house or lot') to claim to represent 
the 'true essence' of the city. Calvino concludes that ‘it is not either definition, but the 
interaction of their definitions, that makes Leandra what it is.’ Powell similarly declares 
he is not interested in answering questions of correct regional attribution, or in taking 
sides, but rather wants ‘to suggest that it is the very asking of questions like these that 
generates the complex and variable experience of place’ (p.33). Quoting Nicholas 
Entrikin on the 'betweeness of place', he adds:  
 
To understand place... requires that we have access to both an objective and subjective 
reality … More important, this very suspension, a tense and dynamic state maintained 
by the exchange of opinions, ideas, and arguments about the nature of the place in 
question, gives that place its distinctive character (p.34). 
 
Authenticity is another slippery term in the rhetoric of Anti. Lebbeus Woods offers a 
critique of the ‘authentic tradition’ proposed by Leon Krier and other New Urbanists (in 
Aslet 1993). Krier criticised the 'pretensions' of modernism that ‘talk about being 
forward-looking and daring’ and also of suburbs ‘literally without quality’. He proposes 
that architects must produce 'real buildings' where the ‘structure not only looks 
traditional but is a traditional form with proper walls and a proper roof’ (pp.15-16). 
Woods responds: 
 
I completely cannot accept this orientation towards a past which might or might not 
have existed: I don’t even want to debate that particular point. What I am interested in is 
the fact that we have undergone changes qualitatively in modern life. You showed a 
slide of a builder's catalogue that advertised kind of pseudo-traditional houses. I find 
them far less horrifying intellectually and spiritually than I do the idea: 'let's be 
authentically traditional, let's give them authentic tradition.' I can accept a kind of hybrid, 
kitschy as it might be, from a builder's catalogue, as being a genuine evolution of 
something happening. But really to try and give them the genuine past, which won’t be 
genuine either, is much more of a pretension – much more horrifying for me to 
contemplate (p.16). 
 
There are those that suggest that kitsch is the genuine expression of our time. Manuel 
Gausa declares that ‘Three commonly accepted clichés spring into the collective mind 
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when the subject of single-family housing comes up’ (Gausa 2002, p.53). The first is ‘a 
diffuse jigsaw of elements,’ a ‘Frankenstein’ of architectural features including ridge 
roof, picture-window balcony and brass latches that make up ‘the house of our dreams’ 
(p.53). The second is the ‘domestic interior’ comprising again a list of elements 
including fitted lace curtains and porcelain objects amongst other items that ‘suggest a 
commercialized and manufactured “multicultural” feeling of HOME’ (p.53). The last 
cliché is the garden gnome and other exterior equivalents of the interior decor, such as 
the kidney-shaped swimming pool and brick barbeque. ‘Transcending contexts and 
cultures, these clichés form, today, the authentic “fetishes” of our fin-de-siecle culture’ 
(p.53). Robin Boyd ultimately had an ambivalent attitude toward what he initially 
dismissed as featurism. While some would declare that there is no kitsch only design 
(Selle 1989), inasmuch as a challenge to the good taste of conservative values is what 
design should also do, others link it to a profit-motivated populism irrelevant, if not 
inimical, to design objectives, and distinct from fashion (Schjeldahl 1994). This view 
argues that it is not a high versus low culture contest but a good versus bad one.  
 
The next speaker in Architecture in Arcadia, Peter Pran, believed Woods, in his 
criticism of Krier was referring also to site specificity as the answer to the problem of 
correct form. He argued that ‘developments in the countryside have to be site specific 
in both concept and execution; they should belong to and enrich the sites. With all the 
alien buildings there that we hate, there has to be a new respect and a new spirit’ (in 
Aslet 1993, p16). The difficulty lies in assumptions as to what is alien or appropriate, 
and how site specificity could ever be unproblematically applied as justification for 
proposals. Within Australian planning legislation, heritage protection and character 
overlays are increasingly linked to environmental protection as inter-dependant 
determinants of a place’s unique value. It has been suggested that neoliberalism has 
linked vernacular heritage and environmental citizenship in order to reinforce political 
rationalisation of collective interests, promoting ‘new forms of trade-able property within 
market systems’ (Lane et al. 2008, p.1135). New regulatory practices are emerging that 
encourage ‘active citizens and engaged communities’ on the one hand, while on the 
other supporting privatisation of a wide range of services previously regulated by 
government agencies. Site specificity becomes an integral, and yet again ill-defined, 
part of arguments for these changes. 
 
Elizabeth Meyer (2005) has examined the considered response of landscape architects 
to the specificity of sites as their distinct contribution to modern design thinking. The 
book to which she contributes her essay examines ways in which the concept of ‘site’ 
has changed over the last century in particular. Meyer is concerned with contemporary 
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landscape architectural interest in site-specificity not simply as site analysis or the 
rational recording and regulated respect for site features which planning regulation is 
concerned with, but as material to be interpreted. Site specificity is not just about 
specifying the site in relation to others as science does, but in relation to observers’ 
experiences. How the site is experienced and how those experiences are related, 
compared and contrasted to the experiences of other sites, gives it distinction. 
Exampling A. J. Downing’s ‘revealing’ of a ‘found’ site, she says that the nineteenth 
century valued landscape architecture as a discipline that could read and interpret sites 
but that later this was not valued. The reason given is that the twentieth century, in 
exploring and offering abstraction, has turned from offering the observer an 
interpretation, to requiring them to make their own. It is also implied that specificity as 
determined by planning similarly fails to make sense of the site through offering a 
necessary interpretation, settling for what is merely collated particulars of a place. She 
discusses the work of nineteenth century sciences and arts as having helped 
landscape architects in their ‘ability to read and alter a site’, giving them ‘additional 
lenses for appreciating and understanding specific sites’, which ‘enriched the site 
readings and practices of both designers and their clients’ (p.99). It does not seem, 
however, that Meyer actually explains what makes a site 'specific' or what requirements 
there may be for use of that specificity such that it constitutes an ‘interpretation’ rather 
than an assumption or presumption. On the one hand, sites are assumed to be specific 
and only need attention drawn to them, while on the other, planning presumes that a 
site is distinct in empirically determinable ways that do not require and should not be 
interpreted as much as respected or maintained. How then does interpretation make a 
site specific? 
 
‘Growing interest in site specificity challenged early nineteenth century idealized 
conceptions of landscape’ says Meyer (2005, pp.100-101). The newer interest ‘valued 
the particular and the unique’, while the older ‘valued the general and repeatable’ 
(p.100). Meyer contrasts F. L. Olmsted’s 1872 description of scenery based on the 
English pastoral ideal comprising grazed meadows and high canopy trees whose 
‘edges were not visible in the deep shadows’, with Cleveland's 1870 preference for a 
found American landscape: a ‘richly layered ecotone of impenetrable perennials, 
shrubs and small trees’ (p.101). Meyer says that Olmsted ‘valued [his] park scenery 
because he believed it aroused certain universal human emotions,’ while what 
Cleveland described was ‘not based on an idealized type or a distant site, but the 
actual forest/meadow edges in the various regions in which he lived and worked’ 
(p.101). Meyer believes that specificity is to be celebrated in Cleveland's ‘advocacy of 
the found site, his commitment to finding beauty in the actual site without abstraction’ 
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(p.101). She goes on to credit and compare Cleveland's sensitivity to site, to ideas of 
Horatio Greenough and Ralph Waldo Emerson whose works endorsed ‘the potential of 
American art forms not derivative of European models, but grounded in specific, not 
idealized nature and in fitting responses to utility and function’ (p.101). 
 
Yet site specificity is already an idealised concept of site understanding abstracted 
from a site. It is, for Meyer, an ideal of site uniqueness dependent on the designer 
drawing it out for the observer to appreciate. Nonetheless, the forms Cleveland 
describes are not art but nature and the degree of praise for their site specificity is 
exactly commensurate with their not having been designed. They have not been 
adapted to utility or function, as English parks were to grazing herds. Cleveland ‘taught 
his readers and clients to see regional sites as worthy sources of landscape beauty 
and design form’ (p.101). But it remains unclear how this was accomplished and why 
they were not sources of delight as they were. In fact they provided ideas for design 
form that would be—necessarily artificially—imposed on a site that did not already look 
like that, just as European forms had been imposed. They would not then be the actual 
site but would represent a particular alteration to site and a particular idea of what was 
to be understood and celebrated as specific to the site. They may have been derived 
from more proximate geographic models, but they would not be exactly of that site, and 
would represent only one of many possible claims to the virtuous naturalness or 
pragmatic utility that supported the democratic American patriotism Meyer describes.  
 
She continues: ‘Landscapes meant something because of not only their appearance, 
but also the associations they aroused’ (p.102) although pleasure in appearance is 
inseparable from the associations it arouses. The English landscape park also aroused 
associations and probably more easily than Cleveland’s designs, albeit Meyer’s point 
may be that America was looking for new and different ones. Reading landscapes, as 
much as designing them to be read, is a complex and uncertain matter of responding to 
appearance and the many resonant contexts as well as any conscious or learned 
understanding of intended associations that each individual may have. Meyer 
endeavours to outline a correct, rather than simply different or even preferable, form of 
response by designers in an American context.    
 
Urban Design Frameworks 
‘Urban design guidelines are … not new’ (Gosling 2002, p.9) and are at least as old as 
a 1262 statute regulating the form of houses fronting the Piazza del Campo in Siena. 
Planned regulation of building works—their physical attributes as well as less tangible 
qualities—are the central tool of planning. For Alun Chapman ‘The Urban Design 
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Framework is one of the most significant advances in the application of urban design 
theory of the past 20 years’ (2006, p.53). Chapman reviews the impact of Melbourne’s 
UDFs generated as part of the State Government of Victoria’s ‘Pride of Place’ initiative 
in 1997. Initially defined as ‘a design tool that provides physical interpretation of local 
visions and strategies’ (Chapman 2006, p.54)—although including as outcomes the 
Framework document, urban design advice and capital works—by 2002, UDFs had 
become ‘strategic planning tools that set out an integrated design vision for the desired 
future development of Municipal Strategic Statements and Planning Schemes to 
practical urban design action at the local level’ (p.54). Articulating a wide range of skills 
requiring multi-disciplinary teams, the clarification nonetheless emphasised analysis, 
stakeholder consultation and pre-design planning over an earlier explicit interest in 
capital works. Although the ‘underlying “driver” was to be good design’ (p.55) this was 
pursued via extensive pre-design work rather than with design proposals themselves. 
The main criticism of the program has been the ‘the lack of tangible outcomes’ (p.55). 
Although Chapman sees this as a lesson for future similar programs, he does not draw 
the most obvious conclusion: that emphasis on the value of planning to alleviate risk 
was made at the expense of the value of design proposition to embrace and transform 
it.  
 
In 2006 Kevin Abbott, then urban designer with the Urban Management Branch 
(Growth Areas) of the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, 
contributed an article to Urban Design Forum. He addressed comments raised in the 
previous issue reviewing the mixed achievements of UDFs. In an apparent effort to 
clean up misunderstandings through a clear-sighted overview, Abbott instead 
demonstrated some of the embedded differences of understanding regarding the role 
of design in processes of developing built outcomes. Beginning with the incorrect 
observation that the previous commentators had ‘confined’ (if not consigned) UDFs to 
the ‘dust bin of failed strategies’, he asks why they had failed in Victoria when 
apparently successful in other states. He begins to speculate on answers before 
explaining what exactly constitutes a ‘failure’ for a UDF or what the common criteria are 
for success. He makes no attempt to make sense of why they are failures or successes 
by first asking how such failure or success is to be ascertained. As it stands, the logical 
answer to ‘why?’ is offered by the observation that unlike other states, Victoria’s UDFs 
are ‘embedded into [sic] the statutory planning system’. Despite linking failure to the 
planning system, the next paragraph immediately relocates blame. It is ‘landscape 
design’ as ‘marketable urban design’ comprising ‘glitzy design ideas’ that is guilty. 
‘Design’ is characterised as unrealistic, irresponsible and perhaps even cynically and 
exploitatively superficial as it looks to the market to sell itself (although to whom?). 
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Confusingly, the attack is not followed by a logic which actually blames design. ‘Most of 
them lack any real urban management strategies’. The ‘them’ are the UDFs, not the 
designs as might be expected, and so the fault lies with the ‘strategies’ not ‘design’ 
however glitzy. In fact, the paragraph may be read as suggesting that glitzy design 
ideas would succeed if they were adequately supported by well-thought-through 
implementation strategies. The implication is that ‘glitzy’ cannot be ‘pragmatic’ although 
it would be easy to demonstrate exactly how efficacious a well-placed bit of bling can 
be. 
 
Abbott then reiterates that professional responsibility requires that the known can only 
be attempted ‘ensuring realistic urban management processes are embedded in their 
products’. Presumably judgement of what is realistic will be made by managers of 
those agencies, more likely planners than designers. It would appear then that the 
measure of success is the degree of acquiescence to process and predictable product, 
of which only reactive management, rather than proactive design, can conceive. Rather 
than simply sharing a common understanding of the need for better management 
processes, the articles from the previous issue characterised two quite different 
positions in regard to the purpose and focus of UDFs. Chapman, giving good 
background, was specific in his identification of difficulties for pursuit of design 
excellence within the cautious constraints of planning. Jenny Donovan’s self-evident 
maxims offered less convincing discussion of applied ideas: only design propositions 
can test or give meaning to such phrases as ‘optimum use’, ‘intrinsic value’, ‘greatest 
contribution’ or ‘quality of life’. But her commentary did emphasise that design 
proposals are generated through process, not determined by policy. Abbott’s 
observations are far more troubling. He urges proposals to be in line with ‘the agencies 
[sic] reality’. This warns of a realm different from anybody else’s experience and 
different too from the understandable and multiple contingent realities of various and 
specific agencies. It would appear from this phrase that any proposition not already 
presupposed by the system cannot succeed; that the only propositions to be made are 
in accordance with what is already determined as achievable. This marks the effective 
end of design—and vaunted ambitions for planning innovation—as explorations 
expanding the scope, understanding and opportunities for improvement. 
 
Few would disagree with Abbott as to the inadequacy of the simple rating system which 
he then describes determining priorities for implementation of project stages, unless 
the criteria for determination were also simple. Prioritisation for UDF implementation 
was to be determined principally on the basis of the ability of successive stages to act 
as catalysts engendering enthusiasm for potentially long-term works projects; a 
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principle driven by a design ideal. This is different to staging determined by budgetary 
constraints, skill availability or other timetabling practicalities. Understandably, these 
considerations in fact come to justify and determine staging so that there are inevitable 
complex compromises with the stated priority. Changing prioritisation to reflect the 
practical means of councils to implement proposals could be argued to defeat the 
stimulating intent of the whole UDF policy inasmuch as practical projects are what 
councils would undertake anyway. 
 
Abbot’s phrase ‘deliver the strategy’ is curious and problematic, symptomatic of a 
chronic inability of planning to relinquish control of ‘process’ and imagine or accept a 
designed and built outcome as anything other than the direct and predictable 
translation to form that results from predetermined content. What you can do is 
strategise the delivery or strategically deliver stages of an outcome. ‘In simple 
language it means that it must be embedded in Council’s budget and organisational 
thinking’. The second ‘it’ seems to be the ‘strategy’, which we note is not strictly the 
thing ultimately being delivered. It is surely the capital works project or at least the 
strategically determined stages to deliver it which require budgeting and organisation 
acceptance, not further planning. It is explained in the next paragraph that 
responsibility is not simply vested in the professional private consultant. Rather, local 
government is responsible, a point which Abbott earlier credits Chapman and Donovan 
with making but refutes as insufficient. Abbott then introduces a new concept of 
‘Champions’ who ‘must have the authority and influence to overcome the reluctance 
and pragmatic ways of certain local government departments’. By this description there 
are already champions aplenty. They are designers, and there is a substantial 
(planning) literature decrying architectural champions by their more common moniker 
‘heroes’. Still, the call of champions to overcome reluctance and pragmatism is 
confusing when ‘reality’ and ‘pragmatism’ have been earlier argued as the core 
requirement of UDF success. 
 
Suddenly, what Abbott has called ‘landscape design’, already posited as a superficial 
offering, is more correctly identified as a ‘streetscape improvement scheme’ exactly 
because any design endeavour has been appropriated by planning and rendered 
merely ‘schematic’. But the damage has been done to design so that now, without 
explanation, even a scheme is attributed to designers as inadequate built outcome. 
‘Beyond built environment outputs’ should be found ‘real solutions’. What could be 
more effectual or affective or tangible or debatable or, fundamentally, more ‘real’ than 
the physical expression of community aspirations, with all the economic, social and 
political contexts that shape such realisation in a built work? Abbott urges that 
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‘community values should be the framework’s design generator’. It would seem more 
direct to wish that ‘community visions’ would become the generator of a framework for 
design than design for a framework. However, we then have ‘practical urban design’, a 
new term announcing the usurpation of design as architecture by design as planning. 
Real outcomes are said to result from ‘fusing practical urban design with municipal 
strategic direction and governance processes’, phrases which anyone must find difficult 
to accept as closer to reality than proposals for built form.  
 
Finally, paternalistically, readers are urged to remember that UDFs are seeking to 
‘achieve better places for people’—why not build them?—although by whose 
judgement seems in contention. As professionals are presumably hired in the first 
place because the community could not realise or perhaps even envisage what these 
‘better places ‘are, it is unlikely they can or will deliver what people don’t know they 
want. ‘What is needed is the ability … to integrate community visions within the built 
environment planning process’. It is difficult to agree, because it is difficult to see how 
this ability is lacking in the process. It is even more difficult to see how this ability is 
related to the built environments which are the subject of critique of UDF efficacy. It is 
surely easy to plan to include community visions but it is another matter and a different 
argument to have them incorporated and evidenced within a design proposal and its 
outcome. It also remains unclear why planning process is privileged over design 
process or delivery process as the mechanism for appreciation and critique of 
individual UDFs. Alternatively, one could recognise that the integrative and 
transformative ability being called for is actually design. 
 
Calls for the ‘fusing [sic] of vision within … process’ may not be misguided but 
meaningless. The logic of any proposal reflects its vision in its product through its 
process. It is a different call to wish planning to be more distinct and transparent. 
Perhaps ‘fusing’ is the wrong metaphor for ‘making it [what?] work’. Then, reminded 
that success happens only after the fusion, you must separately ‘establish 
commitment’. Surely the effective joining is a confirmation of those things, values and 
processes already committed to? Even then, however, something must still be 
designed and built to proffer any test or proof of worth. ‘[E]stablishing commitment’, 
except through coercion of statutory law, is not the role of planning. It is the core 
offering of design. It might otherwise be called inspiration and it requires the 
persuasions of the visionary, the utopian and even the glitzy, where delight and 
determination go hand in hand with full, informed debate and with consensual 
compromise, even eager sacrifice. No wonder ‘it is all too hard’ when explained 
through the prism of planning rhetoric.  
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The planning, design and construction of built environments is indeed hard, but it is not 
too hard. Chapman viewed the Pride of Place program and its funding as an 
expression of optimism, and viewed UDFs as incitements to experimental design of 
great potential, not recognising that this was necessarily a potential that would not and 
could not be guaranteed. It therefore risked failure. They also presented opportunities 
to overcome disciplinary divisions of labour in the difficult task of creating new 
environments, uncovering a frequently obscured danger of cross-disciplinary 
misunderstanding. The development of UDFs presented various built environment 
disciplines with the chance to work—and argue and plan and design—together for new 
possibilities. In the present climate of multiple fears and urgent challenges, such 
optimism stands as an example of what might be achieved with a new commitment to 
design and a better appreciation of how it works to embody change in the world.  
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Conclusion 
 
Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world. 
 
 Percy Bysshe Shelley28 
 
 
If poetry and art legislate while planning and engineering implement, design is the 
reference you call on to check whether either deserves their position. Shelley’s famous 
defense of poetry as the imaginative power necessary to conceive of that which reason 
then pursues is clearly utopian. But utopianism is even more clearly located where 
powers of conception and pursuit of construction are united: in design. Poetic prophecy 
cannot foretell events. That is the pretence of superstition. Design innovation does not 
guarantee what designed form will achieve. That is the necessary pretence of planning. 
It would make good design an attribute of correct planning where projected futures are 
and should be an attribute of designed form. 
 
Planning, engineering and the careful, experienced and skilled application of known 
techniques using familiar tools with predictable outcomes need not have anything to do 
with design. The objective of design is to raise awareness of what is unnoticed or 
unquestioned in even well-planned and beautifully executed propositions. The point of 
design is to enliven; to make people alive to their being alive. This means provoking 
appreciation of our powers to conceive and construct while also arousing questions of 
our rights and responsibilities in exercising those powers. 
 
My grandmother distinguished between cunning, common-sense and cleverness. Nan 
once told me that I was very clever when I topped the primary-school class for 
something-or-other. It was not a compliment. At least if I had rat-cunning, she sighed, I 
would make money, as she predicted (accurately) that my younger brother would. Or if 
only I had common sense, as my clever older sister had, I would be usefully and 
happily engaged with the world. But cleverness alone, she warned, doomed me to the 
life of a second-in-command middle-man, in service to those with more naked ambition 
if less imagination, more confident and grounded propositions if less reflective visions. 
My destiny, she tried to tell me, was to give council, to be a worrier: a critic. My elder 
brother was the black sheep, my sister the white one, my younger brother a frantic 
                                                 
28 Shelley, P. B. 1909-1914 [1821], unpaginated. 
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sheepdog. I was perhaps the paddock. Anyway, something like this, intoned over 
Vegemite toast, is what I remember now. 
 
Designs hit the ground as dense mats of interwoven cunning, common-sense and 
council. Yet cunning and commonsense get all the press. Their lessons are better 
taught and better learnt than those of critical council and they frame life lessons whose 
rewards are clear and bankable. The careful critique of a clever councillor, musing on 
multiple suspended scenarios and sensitive to the slightest tensions between them, 
seems indulgent and over-subtle. Yet, unlike the cunning of the market and the 
commonsense of well-planned, well-engineered building, it is essential to design. The 
problem of service is the problem of design. Neither is defined by the difficulties of 
subservient stewardship. Design service is not deciding how to solve problems but 
determining—investigating and proposing—precisely what the problem is or may be. 
This is the position described by the key figure and narrator of Thomas More’s Utopia. 
It is the dilemma of someone who wants to serve but for whom obedient service 
betrays that very objective. It was also the dilemma of Saint Thomas himself, entering 
the service of Henry VIII only to martyr himself to an ideal of service that wasn’t his 
king’s.  
 
The landscape architectural design of suburbs is a utopian endeavour and a necessary 
service. As a design profession, the service that landscape architecture should render 
is not that which simply gives form to what others have determined should be done, 
whether this is to make the plans of carefully determined engineering or planning policy 
more palatable or saleable, or to submit—somehow—to the actually indeterminable will 
of Nature or Landscape. Much work argues either within these familiar defaults and the 
false dualities they engender—man/nature, public/private, fantasy/reality—or for 
equally misleading and unnecessary synthesis. Landscape architecture needs neither 
to be justified as contributing to natural evolution (performative affirmation of 
potentialities) nor rational logic (the enumerative mania of technologically determined 
solutions). As Sola-Morales said of architecture in contemporary conditions of 
unprecedented urban change, ‘both organicist-evolutionist criteria on the one hand, 
and the causal logic of the rationalist model on the other, can no longer be applied’ 
(Sola-Morales 2005, p.12). 
 
Histories of human settlement have characterised suburban growth, utopian 
proposition and landscape architectural practice within four main views. A first thinks 
they’re great (no problem Pro), a second thinks they’re not (get rid of them Con) and a 
third thinks that they could be great ‘if only’ we did whatever the author suggests. But a 
fourth isn’t actually interested in characterising them at all: it is interested in reinventing 
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them. It is interested in designing them. It is interested in utopianism, in building a good 
place. The dilemma of what then to do is exemplified by the phrase ‘always already’. 
The ‘always already’ signals an ambiguity arising from the conflicting readings of hope 
and despair attached to its critical message. The optimistic warning of ‘always already’ 
enables escape from fraudulent claims of newly found answers, but it can also be 
read—and has been dismissed—as the pessimistic reminder that something more is 
already always missing. Rather than urging a fight for something new, the ‘always 
already’ can tell us we are only returning to something forgotten. However, far from 
complacent and regressive acceptance, intelligent criticism—especially including the 
‘always already’ alerts—is a finely considered commitment to better understanding.  
 
The always-already is already always held within the idea of utopia. The suspensions, 
contradictions, paradoxes, concerns, desires and dangers grappled with in the shifting 
outline of a problem with which designers are engaged: this is the stuff of utopianism, 
the problematic of utopias. Yet even here there is a final slipperiness where committed 
and exploratory utopian openness can fall to non-committal open-endedness as easily 
as it can back to various forms of Pro, Con or Anti closure. The various 
acknowledgements of a failure of design confidence and faith are masked as either 
newly prefigured control or as open-ended licence. 
 
The value of utopian thinking is initially two-fold. Firstly, it produces propositions for the 
relief of an identified condition: the eradication of an evil or the establishment of a good. 
Secondly, dissatisfied with these initial reactionary ideas, it continues to seek and 
refine alternatives. Beyond this, utopian thinking more importantly necessitates 
examination of historical conditions and acknowledgement of historical conditioning, 
regardless of our inability to escape such conditioning. And while utopia cannot provide 
a comprehensive solution to essentially infinite, incomprehensible difficulties, ‘we will 
never come to one without it’ (Jameson 2004, p.36). As Lewis Mumford noted: ‘We can 
never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in Utopia; 
but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all’ 
(2003, p.16). 
 
Utopia, like design, is transformative, radical, essentially subversive and innovative in 
its assertive ambition to concreteness. Even where theoretical possibilities and pre-
design expectations have already been thoroughly anticipated, analysed and 
explicated, design’s material making and doing always finds more in the world than 
could possibly have been accounted for. In this sense it will always actually be a failure 
of comprehension as comprehensiveness. More significantly, while this is the cause of 
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design’s enormous potential for frustration, it is also its greatest potential gift. If good 
utopias encourage us to imaginatively explore the otherwise impossible, and good 
suburbs permit self-discovery and expression, the best utopias make such imaginaries 
seem achievable and the best suburbs necessitate the encouraged self-expression of 
their residents. The best utopian propositions return to the argument of the best design 
propositions: they argue for the making of a distinct place; they argue to realise a good 
place with material conviction, not a no-place, however otherwise convincing. 
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